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SUMMARY
This thesis concerns a controversy as to whether Australia's one operating nuclear
research reactor, H I F A R , should be replaced with a n e w reactor. H I F A R will
almost certainly be permanently shut d o w n in the next 5-10 years, and there is
considerable pressure on the federal government to m a k e a firm decision, in the
near future, for or against the replacement of HIFAR.
Much of the thesis is focused on a sub-debate within the broader HIFAR
replacement controversy - whether a n e w reactor is justified for the production of
radioisotopes used in nuclear medicine. Alternative radioisotope supply scenarios
- involving greater reliance on imported radioisotopes and cyclotron-produced
radioisotopes - are proposed and evaluated.
The medical radioisotope sub-debate, and the HIFAR replacement controversy
more generally, are analysed in the context of civil and military nuclear
development around the world and in Australia. This material serves two
purposes - it provides context for the H I F A R replacement controversy and the
medical radioisotope sub-debate, and it develops a set of arguments concerning
the problems with research reactor programs, in particular their links to covert
nuclear weapons programs.

In terms of situating the thesis in the context of Science and Technology Studies
scholarship, the thesis draws on strands of the "new" sociology of technology
literature but pays greater attention to structural analysis. The principles which
guide most studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge tradition - such as
reflexivity, impartiality, and symmetrical treatment of knowledge claims - are
recast as practical problems within a social problem centred approach.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1. INTRODUCTION
1.2. THE THESIS IN THE CONTEXT OF SCIENCE A N D TECHNOLOGY
STUDIES

1.1 INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEW
AIMS
CHOICE OF TOPIC
OUTLINE
OVERVIEW

This thesis concerns an ongoing controversy as to whether a new nuclear researc
reactor should be built in Australia. The one existing research reactor, the High
Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR), is located at Lucas Heights, just south of Sydney.
H I F A R has been in routine operation since 1960, and is operated by the major
Australian nuclear agency, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organisation (ANSTO). Proposals to replace H I F A R with a n e w reactor have
surfaced periodically since the mid 1970s. Such proposals have generated
considerable opposition from a number of environmental and anti-nuclear
groups, as well as localised opposition in the Lucas Heights region. Successive
federal governments have deferred making a decision on the replacement of
HIFAR.

Several years ago the federal government established the 1992-93 Research React
Review to investigate the issue and advise government as to whether a
replacement reactor should be built. The Review recommended that a decision be
deferred for "about five years", and that recommendation was accepted by the
government. O n the strength of those events, and developments since the
Research Reactor Review, it seems very likely that the government will m a k e a
decision for or against the replacement of H I F A R in 1997 or 1998. A n alternative
option is a major refurbishment and upgrading of HIFAR, but that option has
very little support from A N S T O or anti-reactor groups.
Proponents of a replacement reactor argue that it is necessary for a host of
scientific, medical, commercial, and "national interest" reasons. Other aspects of
the controversy include radioactive waste management, and environmental and
I

public-health issues associated with the operation of a research reactor. The
controversy is also linked to broader debates about Australia's role in nuclear
programs overseas. All of these issues are addressed in the thesis, but the only
issue analysed in detail is whether a n e w reactor is justified for the production of
medical radioisotopes.

The debate over medical radioisotope production and supply is set in the context
of a more general analysis of the H I F A R controversy, which in turn is set in the
context of an analysis of the history of nuclear power, weapons, and research
reactor programs in Australia and around the world. This material is used not
only to contextualise the current debate as to whether a n e w reactor is justified for
medical radioisotope production, but also to develop a set of arguments
concerning the problems with research reactor programs, in particular their use in
support of covert nuclear weapons programs.
There is a theme running through the thesis. While nuclear weapons and nuclear
power have been subjected to great scrutiny, and have been the focus of mass
public opposition, research reactor programs have not been subjected to nearly the
same level of scrutiny or opposition. Critical analyses of the radioisotope industry
and nuclear medicine are particularly scarce. By opening up these topics to critical
analysis, the thesis demonstrates that research reactors, the radioisotope industry,
and nuclear medicine are very m u c h bound up in the socially and
environmentally problematic aspects of nuclear development.

Receiving particular emphasis are the interconnections between research reactors
and covert nuclear weapons programs. I argue that it is unlikely that an
Australian government would seriously entertain the idea of a nuclear weapons
program in the foreseeable future, and that such considerations are marginal vis a
vis the debate over the replacement of H I F A R (see chapter four). Nevertheless the
interconnections between research reactors and nuclear weapons programs
warrant analysis for the following reasons:
•

the relevance of nuclear weapons issues to the H I F A R replacement
controversy is of sufficient importance as to warrant a thorough examination,
whatever the conclusion;

•

I do not entirely discount the possibility that a desire to leave open the
weapons option, as a longer-term contingency, is a possible, partial reason for
the support for a n e w reactor by sections of the Australian state; and

•

it is openly argued, by proponents of a n e w reactor, that a reactor is necessary to
maintain and develop expertise in order to monitor and influence nuclear
programs overseas, not least nuclear weapons programs.
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In view of the above, the thesis tackles the following issues:
•

the current status and underlying trends with respect to nuclear weapons
programs around the world;

•

the historical interest in a nuclear weapons capability in Australia (and the
waning of this interest since the early 1970s); and

•

the use of research reactors in weapons programs.

The thesis also discusses the overlap between reactor radioisotope production and
covert weapons programs. Partly this reflects the concerns outlined above. In
addition, this issue is addressed because the thesis presents a comprehensive
analysis of the radioisotope industry which would be incomplete without
consideration of the weapons connections.

AIMS
The primary aims of the thesis are as follows:
• to analyse the H I F A R replacement controversy, through analysis of the specific
sub-debates (medical radioisotope supply, neutron science, etc.) and by locating
the controversy in the context of i) the history of the nuclear industry in
Australia and ii) the global development of nuclear power, weapons and
research reactor programs; and
•

to analyse, in depth, the cases for and against the construction of a n e w
research reactor in Australia for the production of medical radioisotopes
(taking into account alternative options for future radioisotope production and
supply).

Some further aims can be identified as follows:
•

to m a k e a modest contribution to the literature on the history and current
status of nuclear development in Australia; available literature is mostly
patchy and generally focused on specific topics such as uranium mining;

•

to m a k e a modest contribution to the literature on research reactor programs,
in particular their intersection with nuclear weapons programs; and

•

to develop a more comprehensive analysis of the global radioisotope industry
than is available in publicly-accessible literature.

CHOICE OF TOPIC
My decision research the HIFAR replacement controversy was based on two
primary considerations: the importance and currency of the issue.
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A s for the importance of the issue, the operation of research reactors raises the
same concerns as power reactors, though generally on a smaller scale. These
concerns include the potential for serious accidents, the environmental and public
health effects of routine radioactive emissions, the management of radioactive
waste, the potential for sabotage or terrorism, large financial costs, and the use of
research reactors for covert development of nuclear weapons.
The controversy over the replacement of HIFAR is not only important, but also
topical. A s mentioned, there is considerable pressure on the federal government
to m a k e a decision, in the near future, for or against a n e w reactor.
Once I had decided to study the HIFAR replacement controversy, a short-list of
potential topics w a s arrived at through preliminary research and discussion with a
number of groups involved in the campaign against a n e w reactor. (ANSTO's
views were extensively covered in over 1500 pages of material submitted to the
Research Reactor Review.) A short-list of potential topics emerged, such as
radioactive waste problems, the social and economic impact which would follow
from a serious reactor accident at Lucas Heights, the health effects to the
surrounding population of routine radioactive emissions from H I F A R , and issues
surrounding the production and supply of medical isotopes.
I chose to focus much of my research on the debate over medical radioisotope
production and supply because this is one of the most prominent debates
impinging on the reactor controversy, because there is considerable scope for
useful research into this topic, and because the topic overlaps, to some extent, with
m y previous experience in medical sociology and public health. Other possible
topics were not so amenable to study. For example, there is little data on the
health effects of radioactive H I F A R emissions and thus it would have been
difficult to study that issue though certainly not impossible (indeed the lack of
data could itself be taken as a starting point for useful research). Other topics - for
example the radioactive waste issue - were not pursued because they have already
been the focus of m u c h research.
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OUTLINE
Here I present a brief chapter-by-chapter outline of the thesis.
Chapter one proceeds with a discussion on Science and Technology Studies (STS)
scholarship and the place of the thesis within STS.
Chapter two begins with a sweeping analysis of nuclear power programs around
the world. Then nuclear weapons programs are discussed, with emphasis on the
potential for further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the post Cold W a r period
and also on the intersection between civil and military nuclear programs. Lastly,
the place of research reactors within the broader scope of nuclear development is
introduced, with emphasis on the use of research reactors in covert nuclear
weapons programs.
Chapter three locates the HIFAR replacement controversy in the context of the
history of nuclear development in Australia. This includes discussion on the
British weapons tests in the 1950s and 1960s, the hosting of military bases operated
by the United States (US) military, the uranium mining industry, an abandoned
nuclear power program, an abandoned uranium enrichment research program, a
brief flirtation with "peaceful" nuclear explosives, some high-level interest in the
possibility of a domestic nuclear weapons capability at times, the operation of two
research reactors, and public opposition to all the above to a greater or lesser
degree. Tied in with all these projects is the history of A N S T O and its predecessor
the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC). From its historical role as the
guardian of Australia's entry into the nuclear age, the A A E C / A N S T O has
gradually been downgraded to just another public-sector civil science agency. This
downgrading has been resisted to a considerable extent, but the A A E C / A N S T O
has also trimmed its sails to the political breeze, carving a niche for itself through
involvement in a plethora of scientific, medical, and commercial activities, some
of which are dependent on the operation of HIFAR.

Chapter four discusses the recent history of the HIFAR replacement controversy,
in particular the 1992-93 Research Reactor Review. The politicking surrounding
the Review is discussed. Then I consider the various sub-debates which were
taken u p during the Review. These sub-debates include the "national interest"
debate, a set of nebulous arguments concerning the maintenance of nuclear fuel
cycle expertise, policy advice, national defence/security, and so on. Debates over
medical radioisotope production and supply - which were prominent during the
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Review - are introduced. Other sub-debates within the H I F A R replacement
controversy are summarised, as are developments since the Review.
In chapters 5-8, the focus narrows to the debate about whether a new reactor is
needed in Australia for production of medical radioisotopes. Chapter five briefly
traces the history of the medical radioisotope industry, which developed largely as
an outgrowth of nuclear power and weapons programs in the decades after World
W a r II. The integration of nuclear medicine into medical practice, primarily as
one of a n u m b e r of diagnostic imaging modalities, is considered.
One alternative to a new reactor is greater reliance on imported radioisotopes.
Whether that is a feasible alternative depends on radioisotope production
overseas, in particular research reactor radioisotope production. There is little
current and accurate information on reactor radioisotope production in publiclyaccessible literature, and thus chapter six is dedicated to an empirical survey of
research reactors and radioisotope production around the world.
Chapter seven provides an analysis of the global radioisotope industry, taking up
range of issues: radioisotope demand; production levels; concentration of the
industry; public and private sector involvement; vertical integration; dedicated
production facilities; the links between radioisotope production levels and nuclear
power, weapons, and research programs; technical innovations; and non-reactor
methods of radioisotope production (in particular particle accelerators including
cyclotrons).
On the basis of the information and analysis presented in chapters 5-7, the issue
future supply of medical radioisotopes in Australia is tackled in chapter eight. A n
alternative to domestic reactor radioisotope production is proposed and evaluated.
This alternative supply scenario involves m u c h greater reliance on imported
radioisotopes, and further development of domestic cyclotron radioisotope
production. S o m e organisational and logistical matters relating to this proposed
scenario are addressed. It is also argued that in the longer term it would be
desirable to break the nexus between research reactors and radioisotope
production - one consequence of which would be reduced reliance on imported
radioisotopes - and some lines of medical-scientific research are proposed towards
this end, concerning cyclotron radioisotope production in particular.
Nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry have been the subject of very
little sustained analysis; this thesis is by no means exhaustive in its analysis of
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these topics and thus I conclude chapter eight with some suggestions for future
research.
Chapter nine looks forward to future struggles over the replacement of HIFAR,
and the place of m y research in that context. It then summarises, and further
develops, arguments developed throughout the thesis concerning the problematic
aspects of research reactor programs (including radioisotope production) and
nuclear medicine. I conclude with some comments o n the implications of the
thesis for STS.
Chapter ten is a brief postscript outlining events between September and
N o v e m b e r 1997 (i.e. between the first and second/final submissions of this thesis).
During this period, the federal government announced a decision to replace
H I F A R , subject to an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) assessment under
the Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974. The announcement
met with considerable public and political opposition. A s well as the EIS, the
proposal to replace H I F A R will be the subject of investigation by a Senate
Committee.

1.2 THE THESIS IN THE CONTEXT OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES
TRENDS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES
RESEARCH METHODS
THE FOURTH GENERATION OF SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
THE N E W SOCIOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY
INTEGRATED ANALYSES OF SCIENCE A N D TECHNOLOGY
TRENDS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES
In 1959 C. Wright Mills (1959, p.20) wrote that the sociological imagination
stands opposed to social science as a set of bureaucratic techniques which
inhibit social inquiry by "methodological" pretensions, which congest
such work by obscuring conceptions, or which trivialize it by concern with
minor problems unconnected with publicly relevant issues. These

inhibitions, obscurities, and trivialities have created a crisis in the soc
studies today without suggesting, in the least, a way out of that crisis.
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Not long after Mills' polemic, the academic discipline of Science and Technology
Studies (STS) w a s consolidated as a discrete field of scholarship within the social
sciences. With origins in the academic disciplines of sociology, history, and
philosophy, problems familiar to the social sciences were evident from the start.
H o w e v e r there w a s another current in the first generation of STS, with roots in
progressive movements such as the critical science-and-society movement, the
environmental m o v e m e n t , and the peace movement. Within this current,
important and topical science-in-society issues were tackled. Political conservatism
in the social sciences, which had reached a high-point with the elaborate
functionalism of Talcott Parsons, gave w a y to a range of critiques of dominant
groups and dominant ideologies. The arbitrary and unhelpful boundaries of
academic disciplines were crossed on a number of fronts. Better still, there was
considerable m o v e m e n t of people and ideas between academia, progressive social
movements, and in some cases also scientific institutions, to the benefit of each
domain.

There is still a current of critical scholarship within STS. A considerable volum
of w o r k has amassed on important issues such as environmental issues and the
politics of medicine and health. S o m e STS academics still bridge academic
disciplines freely and imaginatively. There are still some links with progressive
social movements - Marxism has largely gone out of favour, but left-liberal
academics maintain some connections with various social movements (which are
themselves predominantly left-liberal in political orientation).
However the critical current within STS has lost ground in the past 10-20 years.
The academic and political roots of STS varied from country to country, but in the
1980s there w a s a convergence with theoretical and methodological issues taking
centre stage (Bijker, 1993). A s W o o d h o u s e (1991, p.390) argues:
The field of science and technology studies (STS) started with an intention of
helping humanity to understand and partially to overcome the myriad
obstacles to using technical ingenuity for human

betterment. In the 1980s,

however, a good chunk of the field's best energy went toward posing (and, in

some eyes, solving) intellectual puzzles regarding the social construction o
scientific knowledge. While fascinating and possibly of long-term use for
debunking myths about modern science, much of the work moved

away

from engagement with real human problems.
The trend has been towards obscure topics, esoteric theory, and methodological
pretensions. STS scholars have become prone to focusing on issues which, while

8

sometimes fascinating, are of little importance - gravity waves, fluorescent lights,
automated door closers, bicycles, the learning ability of w o r m s , and so on.1
MacKenzie (1986) points to the striking example between the mountain of
literature on science and religion, and the relative paucity of STS analyses of
science, technology, and the military. A related problem is that issues tend to be
treated as little more than vehicles for the resolution of theoretical,
methodological, and epistemological puzzles, or for the development and
elaboration of programmatic STS statements.
At a broad level the sociology of science has been dominated by the "old"
Mertonian, positivist current and the "new" post-Kuhnian sociology of scientific
knowledge (SSK). These two orthodoxies have been tailed by a small and
dwindling thread of critics including Marxists, ecologists, feminists, anarchists and
radical science advocates. (Restivo, 1994.) The new, post-Kuhnian relativism has
proven to be similar to the old Mertonian current in some respects, with
relativist/constructivist conservatism having dethroned positivist celebrations of
science and scientific method. Functionalism and liberal pluralism permeate the
n e w SSK as they did the Mertonian current. The focus remains largely on microlevel action between groups within the scientific community, with little analysis
of broad, structural influences on science and technology such as class struggle.
(Restivo, 1994; Hard, 1993.)
Sometimes the inward, theoretical turn of the 1980s is justified by dubious and
pretentious arguments to the effect that academic squabbles over esoteric theory
are inherently political. For example Jasanoff (1996, p.413) claims that "a deeply
normative project

runs through even the most playful narratives that w e in

science and technology studies construct

" Indeed, but generally it is only the

norms of STS academics and the nuances of esoteric theory that come into the
picture. F e w people outside STS, and still fewer outside academia, have any
knowledge of, interest in, or use for this literature.
An illustration of the problematic inward turn of STS /SSK is an exchange
between (William) Lynch and Fuhrman, and (Michael) Lynch, in Social Studies of
Science. Lynch and Fuhrman (1991) argue for a Marxist sociology of knowledge
(though without a word on h o w Marxist sociology might be linked to Marxist
praxis). W h a t is revealing is Lynch's reply in which he situates himself as a
"radical" relativist (Lynch, 1992, pp.229-232):

1 See Collins (1981) for a survey of the empirical scope of STS.
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(The) emphasis in SSK and laboratory studies (is) on the less obviously

politicised but arguably more pervasive, practical conventions, forms of life,
literary rhetorics, modes of disputation, and sociosemiotic networks which

do not correlate in any clear-cut way with "stable sociological variables" suc
as gender categories, hierarchical structures of authority, and social class
arrangements.
The possibility remains alive that sociological research may demonstrate
occasional, historically contingent, and reformable relations

, but the

general arguments in SSK about the "social" organization of science

do

not necessitate such empirical findings and purposive reforms. And, while
many of the general arguments and case studies in SSK are interesting and
suggestive, to my knowledge they do not supply the sort of firm "metasocial" criteria that L&F's normative proposals demand. If anything, they
suggest that the search for such criteria is pointless.

As many have argued in SSK, a radical analyst cannot hope to trace the
branching pathways of these "social roots" back to a unitary "base," "totality,"
or "ground"; instead, the analyst faces a labyrinth
"social" site through an endless series of others.

from one emergent

(The) demand for a normative SSK seems premature, or worse, regressive,
because it ignores the failure of positive social science to achieve agreement
on the most basic policies of theory and method. Rather than fantasizing yet
another Queen (or perhaps Prime Minister) of the Sciences to stand in
judgment of all the other disciplines, I would urge that the most radical (and
socially beneficial) thing we can do with SSK studies is to puncture the
"epistemological" confidence exuded by proponents of normative proposals
for reconstructing occupational life-worlds.
There is much to argue with here. As with Jasanoff (1996), Lynch grossly overstates the importance of decontextualised, micropolitical SSK. The notion that the
most radical and socially beneficial thing that S T S / S S K scholars can do is to
produce ever-more impenetrable intellectual labyrinths - and to puncture the
normative proposals of anyone w h o suggests otherwise - is utterly at odds with
the vision of the social sciences put forward by C. Wright Mills. Conversely Lynch
fails to understand the links - and the importance of the links - between
micropolitics and broader structural processes. Another problem is the belief that
there could ever be agreement on theory and method. Lynch of all people - with
his eclectic combination of S S K and postmodernism, spiced with hints of
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Frankfurt school critical theory - ought to understand the potential for endless
debating over theory and method. H e might also have learnt from Lynch and
F u h r m a n (1991) that the irreconcilability of class interests under capitalism is a
major obstacle (though not the only one) to reaching any sort of closure let alone
consensual closure o n debates over theory and method. Lynch and F u h r m a n
(1992, p.235) neatly lay to rest Lynch's naive ideas about reaching such a consensus:
Waiting for a mythical, complete set of technical tools before dirtying our
hands, while science is both called upon to solve complex social problems

and itself increasingly becomes a social problem, has much the character of
Nero's fiddling while Rome

burned.

Lynch represents an extreme example of a broader current in STS, which in turn
reflects the broad current of postmodernist obfuscation throughout the social
sciences.2
Woodhouse (1991) argues that it may be possible to use the "theoretical
ammunition" gained through the 1980s to strengthen critical analysis of sciencein-society. H o w e v e r the theoretical ammunition itself is not enough, nor even a
good starting point. A s Martin (1993) argues:
For students looking for a critique that can provide help for social action,

recent theoretical developments can be incredibly frustrating. The frustrat
is inevitable, because creating social change by extending the analysis is
impossible. The flaw in the theoretical search is the assumption that a
grounding for analysis can be founded on ideas alone. Analysis ultimately
depends on practice. The analysis by academics for the most part reflects a
practice of professional advancement and scholarly theorising. An analysis
relevant to social problems must be linked to a relevant practice.
STS needs to be resituated both intellectually and politically.
The movement in STS is not all in the direction of an inward-looking "radical"
relativism. There are signs of a renewal of critical STS scholarship. A n u m b e r of
STS scholars have argued in recent years for a return to the politically-relevant
issues that informed the field m o r e than a decade ago.3 Certainly there are m a n y

2- For similar exchanges in STS, between "radical" relativists and their critics, see W
versus MacKenzie (1981) and Barnes (1981); Woolgar (1991; 1993) and Elam (1994) versus Pinch
(1993B) and Winner (1993; 1994); and Grint and Woolgar (1992) versus Kling (1992). For a critique of
postmodernism see Rorty, 1991.
£ See for example Winner, 1993; Bijker, 1993; Restivo, 1988,1994; Chubin, 1992; Cozzens, 1993; Brante
et al., 1993; Woodhouse, 1991.
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important science-in-society issues which could benefit from critical analysis and
engagement. Moreover theoretical debates can easily be pursued in the context of
analysis of important issues. A n d there are m a n y opportunities for fruitful
collaboration between STS academics and progressive activists and movements.
Rebuilding a milieu of critical academics and progressive activists can potentially
improve understanding of science-in-society issues and also provide
opportunities for social change.

RESEARCH METHODS
Critical STS scholarship must be grounded in important science-in society issues
and problems. Methodology and theory ought to be secondary considerations. A s
discussed the starting point for this thesis w a s the choice of an important, topical
issue. N o w I will discuss methodology, first commenting on some different
approaches to research methodology adopted by STS academics, and then
outlining m y o w n approach.

Academics in the social sciences, carrying out their work in stereotypical academ
fashion - presenting their findings in books, journal articles, conference
presentations and so on - can certainly have an impact in the academic
community but their impact outside that sphere is generally limited. Social
scientists ought to explore a whole range of methods of intervening in social
issues, both as academics and in other roles (citizens, activists), but they rarely do;
this despite their training and skill in social criticism, their pretences to being selfreflective, and their relative freedom to involve themselves in social issues
(Martin, 1984). Most academics accept ideologies of academic neutrality and noninvolvement which are supposed to foster scholarly objectivity. This, combined
with other factors such as a preoccupation with esoteric theory and trivial topics,
ensures that their work has little or no impact outside academia.
In STS, ideologies of neutrality and non-involvement predominate in both the
old (positivist, Mertonian) and n e w (mostly constructivist) sociologies of science
and technology. Even within the critical current running through the history of
STS, the emphasis has been on intellectual radicalism; attempts to join
intellectual radicalism with political engagement have been less frequent.

On occasions, particularly when controversial public issues are studied, processe
of capture or enrolment can occur - academic literature is taken u p by participants
in a public controversy. In effect the social analyst becomes a participant in the
controversy even if he/she tries to maintain a neutral, disengaged stance. A
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variation on this theme is w h e n academics are alert to such processes and
manipulate the situation to have a desired impact. There has been considerable
debate in STS on the capture or enrolment of social analysts and/or their work,
m u c h of it focused on the politics of even-handed symmetrical analyses.4 S o m e
academics involved in these debates are happy for their work to be taken u p by
participants in a controversy, and m a y actively involve themselves in the
controversy to some extent. However the debate has generally gone little further
than considering the fate of (ostensibly) symmetrical scholarship and
manipulating the process to some extent; it amounts to little more than variations
of the dry "trickle-down" theory according to which academic studies will
eventually be taken u p by people outside academia. Other participants in this
debate (e.g. Collins, 1991; 1996) cling to conservative ideas about academic
neutrality and non-involvement.
Some academics undertake participatory studies or fieldwork in which they
involve themselves (as participants, "members", "natives") in the issues they are
studying, but their primary concern is scholarly understanding (and
advancement) rather than social change. STS studies which attempt to open the
"black box" of science and technology to sociological analysis, such as lab studies,
sometimes fit this category. A variation of participant comprehension is w h e n
academics involve themselves in the issue but with just as m u c h or more interest
in social change as in scholarly understanding. Beder's (1989; 1991) intellectual and
political engagement with a political controversy over sewage outfalls is a good
example. Another example is Martin's (1996) involvement in a dispute as to
whether polio vaccination might be implicated in the origin of H I V / A I D S in
h u m a n s - a notable example in that Martin helped to generate the dispute rather
than intervening in an already-established dispute. Another model which can be
adopted to fuse improvements in understanding with social change is to engage
in participatory action research in which small groups engage in a problemcentred dialectic of theory and action (Action Research Issues Association, 1991).
One form of academic work which clearly involves engagement in social issues is
w h e n academics are contracted to conduct research, often by government or
industry. Such work is commonplace and can be prestigious and financially
rewarding, but it can be quite the reverse for academics supporting community or
social-action groups or political parties. Moreover there is limited scope for
serious critique of science or society in the context of government or industry
contracts - co-option or mute compliance are the norm.

£ See for example Scott, Richards and Martin, 1990; Collins, 1991,1996; Martin, Richards, and Scott,
1991; B a m m e r and Martin, 1992; Ashmore, 1996; Richards, 1996; Pels, 1996.
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S o m e camps in the n e w sociology of science argue for greater self-reflection
(reflexivity) on the part of STS academics. It is commonplace for STS scholars to
argue that science and technology are shaped by a range of social and personal
interests and ideologies rather than being a straightforward application of a
neutral scientific method. This has given rise to the argument that STS scholars
should be aware of, and perhaps attempt to analyse and explain, the interests and
ideologies shaping their o w n work. So far so good, but the debate has become
sterile and inward looking, disconnected from questions about relevance and
political engagement. It has collapsed into relativist obfuscation - an "endlessly
enchanting hall of mirrors" as Winner (1993, p.376) puts it.5
As with reflexivity, the debate in the STS literature about the normative
dimensions of STS /SSK has largely degenerated into a theoretical puzzle rather
than a (re)turn to political engagement. Radder (1992) for example is concerned
with "normative reflexions" in relation to constructivist STS but his concern is
narrowly intellectual. It remains to be seen whether the broader "politics of SSK"
debate, which has resurfaced in recent years, will go d o w n the same path.6
Chubin and Restivo (1983), proponents of the "weak program" in STS, begin with
a critique of the detached conservatism c o m m o n to most constructivist and
relativist schools in STS. Their solution is to assert that the roles of researcher and
citizen are inseparable. H o w e v e r they are cryptic w h e n it comes to articulating
concrete strategies for their "meta-analysis". They say (p.62) their agenda emanates
primarily from a political program and only secondarily from a research program.
H o w e v e r the political program is not spelt out and to the extent that it can be
teased out of their writings, it is narrowly confined within a liberal pluralist
framework which goes no further than influencing "policy-makers". Associated
with their liberal pluralism is a naive, idealist conviction in the power of ideas
(Chubin and Restivo, 1983, p.74, emphasis in original):
Value-criticism is the message and the science policy-maker is presumed to
be listening. The future of meta-analysis is staked on this presumption

-and

the confidence that listening makes a difference.

5 For various perspectives on reflexivity see Chubin and Restivo, 1983; Woolgar, 1991,1993; Potter,
1987; Doran, 1989; MacKenzie, 1981; Fuhrman and Oehler, 1986; Rowse, 1986; Pinch, 1993B; Winner,
1993.
£ See for example the special edition of Social Studies of Science (May, 1996) devoted to the politics
of SSK.
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Proponents of the weak program can be considered part of the broader "academic
left". Comprising (left) liberals, academic Marxists, and supporters of one or more
of the social movements (feminism, gay and lesbian rights, environmentalism
and so on), most members of the academic left are critical of contemporary science
and society but short on strategies for change and unlikely to be involved in social
action.

In defence of the nebulous prescriptions of Chubin and Restivo, it can be argued
that it is difficult to be more prescriptive than they are about h o w the analyst/
citizen should engage himself/herself politically because of the need to deal with
the idiosyncrasies of any given issue. There are any number of contingencies, such
as the relative need for research or activism. In general, a positive impact is more
likely w h e n the analyst/citizen is actively, politically engaged in the issue, rather
than adopting ideologies of neutrality or relying on the trickle-down theory. The
increasingly sterile academic outgrowths of the social movements - e.g. women's
studies, peace studies, or the generic sociology-of-social-movements literature are testament to the importance of maintaining links beyond academia.
In terms of adopting a participatory/reflexive approach to my research, some
comments need to be m a d e on the nature of the long-standing debate as to
whether a n e w reactor is to be built in Australia. The controversy livens up
whenever there is an imminent likelihood of the federal government making a
decision one w a y or the other, such as during the 1992-93 Research Reactor
Review. At other times the controversy goes into hibernation, with little media
attention and only a few activists maintaining ongoing involvement by w a y or
research or lobbying.
My research has been conducted during a low period of the controversy. This has
been advantageous in that it has given m e the time to research issues in depth
without being constrained by deadlines associated with an impending review. It
has however limited the scope for participatory research and active involvement
in the campaign during the period of research. In short this means that m y
research methods have differed only minimally from the usual academic
approach of information collection and synthesis. Nevertheless, the thesis has a
practical, political agenda. Moreover the numerous contacts I have m a d e
throughout the research period - with anti-nuclear groups, nuclear agencies,
radioisotope retailing companies and others - m a y prove to be of some value
w h e n the controversy next flares up.
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A s for the actual research methodologies deployed, these can be considered in two
parts. Chapters 1-4 encompass an analysis of STS; analyses of nuclear power,
weapons and research reactor programs around the world and in Australia; and
analysis of the 1992-93 Research Reactor Review. This material is drawn from a
range of primary and secondary sources: books, journals, organisational reports,
written and verbal submissions to the Research Reactor Review, etc.
Chapters 5-8 encompass an empirical survey of radioisotope production around
the world, an analysis of the global radioisotope production and processing
industries, with the empirical and analytical material then being used to analyse
the alleged need for a research reactor in Australia for future supply of medical
radioisotopes. A wider range of research strategies were deployed in compiling
this material, including written and verbal correspondence with a range of people
involved in nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry. These strategies are
further discussed in chapter 6.1.

The originality of the thesis lies primarily in chapters 5-8. This material is or
in the compilation and synthesis of empirical material from a wide range of
sources. The analysis of the global radioisotope industry is also original. For some
aspects of the analysis - e.g. the links between public and private enterprise, and
the links between radioisotope production and nuclear programs - the analysis is
entirely original. For other aspects of the analysis, some superficial analyses exist
but nothing as comprehensive as that presented in this thesis (e.g. the vertical
integration of the radioisotope industry, and the trend towards dedicated
production facilities).

THE FOURTH GENERATION OF SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Some methodological, epistemological, and political issues can be addressed by
locating this thesis in the fourth generation of SSK according to the schema
outlined by Pinch (1993). According to Pinch, the first generation of S S K w a s the
establishment of symmetrical analysis. The tenets of this line of research were
most clearly laid d o w n by the pioneers of the so-called strong program (Barnes,
1974, 1977; Bloor, 1976). These tenets are the epistemological position that scientific
knowledge is considered to derive from social processes rather than residing in
nature; impartiality at various levels; symmetrical treatment of all knowledge
claims (as opposed to a positivist sociology of error in which the only task for
sociology is to explain fallacious knowledge claims); and the notion that
explanatory patterns apply reflexively to the social analyst as well as the scientist.
The second generation of S S K w a s the elaboration of the first through
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contemporary and historical studies. The third generation w a s the extension of
the symmetrical thesis to other areas such as applied science, science policy, gender
issues, and public understandings of science.
There are any number of variations and permutations in the first three
generations of SSK. A useful categorisation is that of Mercer (1993), w h o considers
four camps. These are the strong program (Edinburgh School) and the closely
related empirical program of relativism (Bath School); textual and discourse
analysis and experimentation with n e w literary forms; actor network analyses;
and fourthly, lab studies and ethnographic approaches. All that needs to be said
here about these various SSK camps is that, despite the enormous variety of
approaches, the work of all four camps hinges around the four SSK shibboleths of
reflexivity, impartiality, symmetry, and epistemological/causal positions which
emphasise the social over the natural.
Pinch (1993) argues that exploration and development of non-neutrality ought to
inform a fourth generation of SSK. S o m e tentative steps in this direction can be
seen in attempts to analyse and manipulate the partisan impact of ostensibly
symmetrical analyses. A second approach is to abandon symmetry altogether.
Pinch suggests as m u c h himself - after all, symmetrical analysis is generally
underpinned by a naive belief in methodological neutrality and a conservative
commitment to political non-commitment. 7 Far better to acknowledge that the
adoption and application of methodologies and theories inevitably carries with it
ideological and political baggage. Abandoning symmetrical analysis can lead in
m a n y directions. In general it will m e a n resituating the analysis - a simple
example would be to focus sociological analysis on one side of a debate. Pinch uses
the example of Richards' (1988, 1991) symmetrical analyses of the vitamin C and
cancer controversy, which could usefully be reworked as straightforward critiques
of clinical trials - still drawing on SSK though the narrative and audience would
differ.
Symmetry is not the only SSK shibboleth that needs to be resituated in a fourth
generation of SSK. A s mentioned all the camps and generations of SSK hinge
around the four issues of epistemology, reflexivity, impartiality, and symmetry. I
will take these u p in turn, recasting them as practical problems within a social
problem centred methodology rather than as narrowly intellectual issues.

2 This phrase is a play on Collins' (1996) argument that "commitment to commitment" is an
incoherent position. If so, then his commitment to non-commitment has nothing more to recommend
itself.
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Epistemological issues will need to be considered in the fourth generation of
STS/SSK 8 , though they ought not become de facto subjects of analysis at the
expense of science-in-society issues. A s Russell (1986) argues, relativism can be
useful as a limited heuristic device: suspending judgement o n the validity of
technical arguments (in other words bracketing them) can help to clarify the social
aspects of science-in-society issues. However as Russell goes o n to argue it is easy
for methodological relativism to slide into a substantive, political relativism.9
Jasanoff's (1996) argument that STS/SSK does not abandon a commitment to be
explanatory and normative by adopting a "relativizing pose" belies the empirical
record which shows that such a commitment has indeed been largely abandoned,
with the "radical" relativists leading the march into an inward-looking
obscurantism.

Relativism if it is to be used at all must be treated cautiously. Likewise positi
has its intellectual and political pitfalls. Intellectually, STS/SSK has done m u c h to
undermine the epistemological claims of positivist science by demonstrating the
pervasive social/political factors which shape science; claims relating to the
objectivity of scientific method, or the inevitability of technological development,
can usefully be seen as rhetorical devices deployed by scientists and their
benefactors. Politically, positivism has a long history of being deployed in support
of dominant ideologies and dominant interests. This is anything but clear-cut m u c h political mileage can be and has been m a d e through positivist critiques of
science - but it holds in general.
As Giere (1993) notes, there are a number of intermediary positions between
positivism and relativism, and these intermediary positions can overcome the
limitations of both positivism and relativism and the corollary problems with
crude technological or social determinisms.10 Such an approach is adopted in this
thesis - it is constructivist in that it is alert to the socially-constructed nature of
science and technology, but it does not apply relativism as a methodological
principle.
One advantage of adopting an intermediary approach, as an alternative to an allembracing positivism or relativism, is that it is potentially more flexible. Thus on
occasions, particularly w h e n dealing with the radioisotope industry and future
radioisotope supply scenarios for Australia, m y approach is skewed towards a
8 Pinch (1993) focuses on SSK but the arguments can be applied to STS more generally.
2 This is essentially the same as the distinction made by Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (1983, p.5)
between epistemic relativism (all knowledge is rooted in time and culture) and judgmental
relativism (which further claims that all forms of knowledge are valid), or the distinction made by
Pinch and Bijker (1986, pp.355-356) between cognitive and moral relativism.
1£ See also Pinch and Bijker, 1986; Restivo, 1988.
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positivist treatment, with the socially-constructed nature of the debates receiving
less attention. O n other occasions - such as w h e n dealing with the safety/danger
to patients of nuclear medicine procedures, or the public health consequences of
routine radioactive emissions from research reactors - I largely bracket the
technical issues and focus primarily on the social manoeuvring, thus adopting
more of a relativist position. This is done for no other reason than that these
issues are highly complex, and in some cases hotly contested, and it is beyond the
scope of the thesis to explore them deeply and to attempt to resolve the technical
debates.

Epistemological authority is only one plank of the authority of science as Mercer
(1993) notes: science is as m u c h underpinned by instrumental, strategic, economic,
and other such social/political claims. Epistemological authority is still less central
to debates over technological artifacts and systems. Thus for example the H I F A R
replacement controversy revolves around a series of sub-debates in which
political, social, and economic claims are paramount; the epistemological
authority of science, and the concomitant authority of scientists, is no more than
one component of some of the sub-debates.
As for reflexivity, the second of the four SSK shibboleths to be considered, my
project is one in which the aim of reflexivity is taken seriously rather than being
hived off as yet another esoteric debate. I support Chubin and Restivo's (1983)
advocacy of a reflexive combination of the roles of analyst and citizen but aim to
go beyond their idealist fetishisation of intellectual critique and the liberal
pluralist framework which underpins it. A s discussed previously, the H I F A R
replacement controversy will re-emerge in the public sphere in the near future,
and m y intention is to contribute to the public debate. Tied in with the question of
reflexivity - which I have essentially recast as political engagement - is the choice
of topic. Fourth-generation STS/SSK will remain a sterile extension of the
previous generations unless important science-in-society issues are tackled.

Now to consider the question of impartiality/partisanship, which ties in with the
more general issues of reflexivity and political engagement. Intellectual
understanding and political engagement in science-in-society issues can be
symbiotic. H o w e v e r intellectual understanding certainly can be compromised by
engagement, and this is all the more likely w h e n that engagement is openly
partisan. Partisanship can lead to analyses in which certain arguments and
positions are distorted or ignored, complexities and ambiguities oversimplified,
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and so on.11 Clarity on these issues is all the more important for fourth-generation
STS/SSK given the currency of conservative, scientistic critics of STS.12
How is the balancing act between partisanship and scholarly rigour managed in
this thesis? The research w a s shaped from the outset by a critical attitude to m a n y
aspects of nuclear development, and a degree of scepticism towards the claim that
a n e w reactor is needed in Australia. However this has not involved an uncritical
acceptance of arguments put forward against a n e w reactor. Indeed even if that
w a s the intention it would be difficult to carry out because the anti-reactor
campaign embraces a range of people and groups, with different perspectives on
the H I F A R replacement issue, with different political philosophies, and with
m a n y other differences besides.
Despite my partisanship I do attempt to concentrate on providing information
and constructing arguments that can withstand scrutiny from both pro- and antinuclear partisans as well as disinterested observers. Thus for example in chapters
5-8, having set myself the task of analysing the cases for and against a n e w reactor
for medical radioisotope production, I pursue the analysis as even-handedly and
thoroughly as possible despite m y preference (and that of most nuclear critics) for
the non-replacement of H I F A R for various reasons. To do otherwise would
compromise scholarly rigour. O n e consequence of this partial disengagement
(impartiality) is that the thesis provides some information and arguments which
might be used to support the case for a n e w reactor (though it has more to offer
anti-reactor campaigners). The selective use and misuse of any study in support of
various conflicting positions is commonplace and inevitable and can be controlled
by the analyst only to a certain extent.
A more subtle aspect of partisanship is de facto partisanship - the notion that
choices of topics (and sub-topics), methodologies, and theories inevitably entail
political and partisan implications (Bammer and Martin, 1992). Certainly
academics frequently choose topics, methodologies, and theories which m a k e it
likely that their work will not become part of public political discourse, but that
amounts to nothing more than an acceptance of the political status quo which is
itself a type of partisanship. A n acceptance of the political status quo can also be
ascribed to the "radical" relativists for all their pretensions. Other academics are
oblivious to the political implications of their choices of topic, methodology, and
theory, but that amounts to nothing more than naivete.

H Of relevance here are Yearley's (1989,1991) studies of the ambiguous relationship between sc
and the environmental movement.
12 See for example the m u c h publicised critique of STS by Gross and Levitt (1994) and Martin's
(1996B) critique of Gross and Levitt's book.
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The issue of de facto partisanship is complex and its relevance for this thesis will
be discussed only briefly. A s mentioned the thesis w a s pre-figured by an antinuclear partisanship. The choices of sub-topics are partisan at times but at other
times these choices are guided by the aim of analysing issues as rigorously and
thoroughly as possible. (The partisan choices of sub-topics could be reframed in a
more neutral, sanitised manner by saying that I add balance and depth to public
debates by addressing a number of issues which have not been subjected to
rigorous analysis in relation to the H I F A R controversy (e.g. the use of research
reactors in support of nuclear weapons programs) or the medical radioisotope subdebate (e.g. iatrogenesis). The lack of consideration of these issues reflects the
shaping of the controversy by powerful state and nuclear interests.) A s for
methodology and de facto partisanship, this is not m u c h of an issue in relation to
m y research since the controversy has been in hibernation throughout the
research period. A s for theory and de facto partisanship, the impartiality or
partisanship of the analytical model proposed in the following section depends on
its deployment; it is not inherently partisan to any significant degree.
The fourth and last SSK shibboleth to be considered is symmetry. I use
symmetrical analysis to some extent, but focus more attention on teasing out the
social interests underlying nuclear development and the arguments deployed by
pro-nuclear advocates. Less effort is m a d e to critically analyse arguments deployed
by nuclear critics, though this by no means amounts to an uncritical acceptance of
those arguments. M y approach is indeed symmetrical at another level: pronuclear advocates have had decades of advantage through funding and
institutional power to push their preferences (e.g. their preference for research
reactors over cyclotrons for radioisotope production), to set issue agendas, and to
establish bodies of knowledge. Opponents of the replacement of the H I F A R
reactor, and nuclear critics more generally, have had far less resources. There is no
neutral position from which to analyse such an inherently unequal dispute.
Rigorous research, prefigured by anti-nuclear partisanship, can potentially add
balance (and depth) to a debate which has been dominated by pro-nuclear
partisans.
A final point on (a)symmetry is that I am less concerned to deconstruct the views
of others than to construct m y o w n arguments in relation to the H I F A R
replacement controversy and the medical radioisotope sub-debate. In particular
the treatment of nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry, in chapters 5-8,
goes well beyond an exegesis of existing literature on these topics.
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THE NEW SOCIOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY
The most relevant body of STS theory for this thesis is the "new" sociology of
technology literature. A s Bijker (1993) notes, contemporary technology studies
have diverse origins such as economic studies of technical change, and
sociological-historical studies drawing from history of technology and SSK.
Moreover technology studies has by no means been the sole preserve of STS historians and economists in particular have had m u c h to say. M y overview is
necessarily schematic and focuses on the STS/SSK literature.
There are several recurring themes in the new sociology of technology.13 Many
these themes borrow from constructivist schools in SSK. Technologies are seen as
representing sets of different meanings associated with different social
connections. For some, such as the Edinburgh "interests school", both social
interests and meanings are at work. Technologies are constituted or constructed
through the interplay of these different meanings and social interests.
Technological development is seen to be a complex, contingent, and open-ended
process with a spectrum of possible alternatives and branching points, rather than

being seen as the unilinear application of scientific knowledge. The S S K concept of
interpretive flexibility can be applied as can the related notions of technological
flexibility and contingency. Technologies can undergo stabilisation (closure) w h e n
there is a sufficient coalition of consensual interests and meanings and/or w h e n
some interests and meanings are marginalised. Generally technological flexibility
correlates with success (growth, spread), but not always, and closure or
stabilisation can certainly be more difficult with a flexible technology (Saetnan,
1991).

Some variations of the new sociology of technology can be considered - perhap
uncomfortably given their diversity - under the banner of actor network analysis
( A N A ) (e.g. Latour 1983,1987; Callon and Latour, 1981; Callon et al., 1988). In one
approach the scientist occupies centre stage. Social analysts follow actors to
discover h o w technologies are constituted and to reveal negotiations between
actors. S o m e writers consider actors other than scientists. For example in the work
of L a w (1988) and L a w and Callon (1988), "heterogenous engineers" constitute a
resolvable problem or project and enrol the support of technical and h u m a n
actors, thus creating an actor network. Success or failure depends on the ability to
enrol and combine all the necessary elements which can include artifacts, social
groups, beliefs, finances and so on. This approach is in some respects similar to
resource mobilisation theory, which has some currency across a number of social
1^ See for example Pinch and Bijker, 1984; 1986; Bijker et al., 1987; MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985.
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science disciplines. In other branches of A N A there is emphasis on science as the
organisation of persuasion through literary inscription, science as the struggle for
the transformation of conjectural statements into statements of "fact", the
crystallisation of knowledge claims into instruments and systems of
measurement, and other such notions (e.g. Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Translated
to technology studies, the notion of struggles over the transformation of
knowledge claims into "facts" has a parallel in the notion of stabilised
technological artifacts becoming tools with which to pursue further interests.
The various branches of ANA have done much to reveal the social dimensions of
science and technology. However they share some c o m m o n limitations.14 The
focus on actors comes at the expense of an adequate conception of social structure
and structured relations. S o m e exponents of A N A claim to break d o w n the
division between technology and society, which they do to some extent, but they
generally present a reified, abstracted view of actors and artifacts. M o r e precisely,
actors and artifacts are seen in a social context, specifically a network, but the
network tends to be reified. Technological artifacts have the status of actors
("actants") in Latour's work, and the science/society dichotomy is further broken
d o w n with notions of scientists constructing both science and society, but these
concepts do not substitute for an adequate conception of the social structuring of
technological development and lead to a form of technological determinism
(Rowse, 1986). A related set of problems stems from the empiricism of A N A : there
is little scope for analysis of the place of non-actors or would-be actors in
technological development, groups that have n o voice or are deliberately
excluded. Pre-existing networks are inadequately conceptualised, and the focus on
consensus building neglects power relations. Lastly, there can be a tautological
element to A N A notions of success or failure resulting from the subjective
capacity of actors to mobilise alliances or to combine the elements of a network.
Pinch and Bijker (1986, 1987) offer an approach - the social construction of
technology (SCOT) model - which borrows heavily from the strong program and
the empirical program of relativism. They discuss "relevant social groups", with
different groups having different interests and attaching different meanings to
technologies. This is far more useful than the focus on a single scientist or
engineer or entrepreneur; it can more adequately deal with overlapping networks,
pre-existing networks, and competing interests. Their approach generally involves
demonstrating interpretive and technological flexibility, then showing h o w an
artifact is stabilised and finally relating the form of the artifact to the wider social

14 Some of these problems are discussed by Saetnan, 1991; Martin and Scott, 1992; Russell, 1986.
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context. In short, technological development is seen as a contingent process
involving the clash of competing interests.
The SCOT model goes some way beyond ANA. However it falls into some of the
same problems. It is agency-oriented and lacks discussion of power, stratification,
and hierarchy. Pinch and Bijker (1987) argue that "aspects such as power or
economic strength (may) enter the description, w h e n relevant", but an ad hoc
approach to structural analysis is inadequate.15 The different meanings and
interests that social groups attach to technologies are discussed, but social groups
need to be located not only in relation to technologies but also in relation to other
sections of society and to broad economic, political, historical, and ideological
forces. A s Blume (1992, pp.53-54) argues, the relevant social groups in the work of
Pinch and Bijker emerge "from thin air": the problematisations of the relevant
social groups are related to their experiences and preferences, but there is little
analysis of the structuring of those experiences and preferences. The S C O T model
tends to result in a liberal pluralist conception which implies that the various
social groups are equal in power (Winner, 1993, p.369; Russell, 1986; Hard, 1993).
The S C O T model is also empiricist, not easily able to consider the relevance of
non-actors or would-be actors. A m o n g other problems there is also a tendency to
over-aggregate groups, masking internal divisions (Russell, 1986).

Because of their failure to securely tie technological development to the backb
of social and economic history, Pinch and Bijker are prone to lapses such as
dropping their conflict perspective w h e n it comes to closure/stabilisation, which
they see in consensus terms. Conflict a m o n g competing groups is addressed but
broad, structural antagonisms and contradictions are not. Conflict is seen as
extrinsic; thus for example the S C O T model is not easily able to address processes
such as the incentive for technological development and innovation stemming
from class conflict in the workplace or the broader dialectics between class conflict
and technological development. (Hard, 1993; MacKenzie, 1984; Winner, 1980).
The various problems with ANA, SCOT, and sundry other branches of
constructivist technology studies, are neatly summarised by Winner (1993, p.373):
(The) methodological posture of social constructivism is characteristically
unwilling to engage in argument about the aspects of technology that now

weigh heavily in key debates about the place of technology in human affairs

Such concerns are now deleted from historical accounts of how technologi

arise, as well as from contemporary descriptions of technological and soc
15 Pinch (1993) has acknowledged this problem more recently, if only partially.
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change. There is, similarly, no willingness to examine the underlying

patterns that characterise the quality of life in modern technological soci
There is also no desire to weigh arguments about right and wrong involved
in particular social choices involved in energy, transportation, weaponry,

manufacturing, agriculture, computing, and the like. Even less is there any

effort to evaluate patterns of life in technological societies taken as a w
All the emphasis is focused upon specific cases and how they illuminate a

standard, often repeated hypothesis, namely, that technologies are socially
constructed.

Despite their limitations, many of the concepts (e.g. flexibility, contingency)
in A N A and S C O T analyses are useful. There is no need to throw the baby out
with the bath water as Yearley (1994) argues. Constructivist technology studies
have added insight and conceptual rigour to the field. Detailed studies of specific
technologies (and technological systems) have m a d e it far easier to counter
appeals to technological determinism by revealing social interests, contingency
and so on - the main problem being the tendency to raise the constructivist toolkit to the level of methodological principle. Detailed empirical studies are a
necessary antidote - and addition - to deductive, structuralist approaches starting
from theoretical schemas, such as the economic studies which largely leave
unopened the black box of technology. A n d of course constructivism is an
improvement upon W h i g hagiography and technological determinism.
One step beyond the work of Pinch and Bijker, and of considerable relevance to
this thesis, is the analysis of the medical imaging industry by Stuart Blume in his
1992 book Insight and Industry. This book is by far the most sophisticated and
useful overall analysis of the medical imaging industry, with case studies
addressing ultrasound, thermography, computerised tomography, magnetic
resonance imaging, and x-radiology. I will return to Blume's study in later
chapters; for n o w I will just summarise the ways in which Blume advances the
S C O T model.

Blume (1992, p.55) is keenly aware that the study of technology-in-society requ
an interdisciplinary framework, his o w n analysis drawing from the "very
disparate areas" of medical sociology and the economics of innovation. H e argues
(pp.54-55) that the lack of any conception of structure is a "fatal flaw" in m u c h
recent sociology of technology, and he turns primarily to literature on the
economics of innovation to conceptualise the structural dimensions of the
medical imaging industry.
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Blume develops the notion of an interorganisational structure of medical
imaging. A n interorganisational structure characterises the c o m m o n interests and
specific structural relations - m o d e s of integration and interdependence between producers (companies), purchasers (mainly hospitals), and users
(radiologists) of medical imaging equipment. The interactions between the actors
are structured by market forces and, conversely, the medical imaging market is
constituted through these interactions. Within this milieu of structured collusion
and collision, the technological artifacts (various imaging modalities) are
dependent for their existence and form on the structured relations between
producers, purchasers, and users.
As Misa (1992) argues, constructivists (such as most sociologists of technology)
tend to overstate the fluidity of sociotechnical relations whereas structuralists
(such as most economists) tend to understate (or ignore) sociotechnical fluidity.16
In m a n y respects Blume's conceptualisation of an interorganisational structure
demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of the dialectical relationship between
agency and structure. The emphasis in debates on agency and structure has shifted
a w a y from reified conceptions towards a focus on the process of structuring
(Barley, 1986). This suggests the need for longitudinal studies of technological
change. Here again Blume's analysis is useful because his study begins with the
development of x-radiology in the late nineteenth century. Thus he analyses the
initial development of the interorganisational structure of medical imaging and
its evolution over the best part of a century including successful and failed
attempts to incorporate n e w imaging modalities into the structure, the effects of
changes in the external environment (such as government regulation, economic
cycles), and so on.
The interorganisational structure of medical imaging has undergone continual
modification - mostly incremental, sometimes more extensive as with the
introduction of a number of modalities from the 1960s. Modifications create a n e w
environment which shapes further technological development. Moreover the
external environment in which the co-development of technologies and markets
takes place is by no means set in stone. Blume (p.72) makes the pertinent point
that
The "contexts" into which successive innovations are introduced are not
strictly speaking the same. At the same time the broader social, industrial,
and demographic structure of society also changes, so that the historian is

16 For useful discussions on the structure/agency issue in relation to technology, see also Bijker 1993;
Barley, 1986.
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properly enjoined to embed the history of technology in a more general
social and economic context.
Blume (1992) has much to say about the interaction between the
interorganisational structure of medical imaging and the external environment,
taking u p issues such as the redeployment of military technology and the impact
of nuclear research and development in the post World W a r II period; the
development and commercialisation of computers and microelectronics from the
1970s; and challenges in the past generation to both industrial oligopoly and
professional monopoly by radiologists, stemming from a w e b of interconnected
developments such as increasing development costs and attempts to impose
stricter regimes in relation to technology evaluation.

In his analysis of the economic structuring of medical imaging technologies and
markets, Blume has m u c h to say on mergers, concentration ratios, entry barriers,
the relationship between industry concentration and innovation, and so on.
However recognising the importance of industrial interests, and recognising that
the development of imaging modalities is constrained by the structured relations
of a market, does not allow a one-sided analysis in which medical professionals
are seen to be drip-fed whichever imaging technologies promise a handsome
profit. Rather, there is a co-development of markets and technologies, and further
innovation occurs only w h e n there is a convergence of industrial and
professional interests. (Blume, 1992, pp.66-67.)

Arguing that economists fail to consider social dynamics which do not fit neatl
with economic concepts, Blume (p.55) draws not only from the economics of
innovation literature but also from medical sociology. A n adequate analysis of
medical imaging modalities - including nuclear medicine - would be flawed
without a grasp of medical sociology because medical markets are peculiar in
m a n y respects. The health-care system is both a purchaser of technology and a
provider of services based on those technologies. Buyers (such as hospitals and
doctors) and sellers (such as manufacturing companies) have c o m m o n interests in particular extending the size of the market - which are often not constrained by
marketplace price mechanisms. The ultimate consumers - patients - have very
little input into decisions which shape the development of the industry, generally
deferring to ideologies of professional expertise. In contrast to m a n y other
industries, health-care systems have tended to become increasingly capital and
labour intensive; once again the lack of marketplace cost constraints is relevant. In
these and m a n y other respects, health-care systems fail to fit ideal-type economic
conceptualisation.
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Blume's schema is a considerable improvement on A N A and S C O T models.
While he does not directly discuss nuclear medicine, his analysis of other imaging
modalities, and the interorganisational structure of medical imaging in general, is
suggestive of h o w an analysis of nuclear medicine might proceed. H o w e v e r his
analysis of the broad social structuring of the medical imaging industry could be
further developed. While Blume is well able to analyse the impact on the imaging
industry of structures that are superficially identifiable - such as government,
companies, and the military - he is unwilling to go any further. Thus his analysis
remains constrained by empiricism and an implicit liberal pluralism, even if less
so than m u c h other writing in the sociology of technology.

Blume is well aware of the significance of the symbiotic integration of profession
and industrial interests in medicine, and he cites Brown's (1979) Rockefeller
Medicine Men in which that symbiosis is linked to c o m m o n class interests and
ideologies. H o w e v e r Blume (pp.259-260) simply asserts that his analysis is "distant
cousin" to Brown's and he has nothing more to say on the class structuring of the
medical imaging industry. There is an abundance of detailed, sociologicallysophisticated literature on the class structuring of all aspects of medicine. W h e n
medical specialists, the elite of the medical profession, meet capitalists in a
lucrative market situation, as has generally been the case with medical imaging
modalities, class interests and ideologies are all too obvious.

As Hard (1993, p.413) argues, tied in with the liberal pluralism and empiricism of
STS conceptualisations of sociotechnical systems is a strong thread of
functionalism17:
The world of a sociotechnical system looks and feels like an iron cage. There
is no place for critique and no way out. Established sociotechnical systems
conservative. By adhering to a functionalist methodology, we can never
succeed in being critical in a substantial manner. By presenting a view of
technology in terms of functionally arranged sociotechnical systems, we will
support those who benefit from harmony

and cooperation and discourage

those who might benefit from conflict and opposition. We might be able to
reveal both unexpected and unwanted aspects of a technology, but we will
remain unable to suggest an alternative.

1Z Hard points specifically to the business organisations approach and to Hughes' (1987)
conceptualisation of technological systems, but the same could be said in relation to actor networks,
Bijker's (1993) "technological frames" and "sociotechnical ensembles", and also to Blume's
interorganisational structures. See also Hull (1994) for a brief but useful critique of sociotechnical
systems thinking in STS.
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Blume sits with the functionalists: a sophisticated analysis of the interpenetration
of science and society but a critique of neither.

That the various conceptions of sociotechnical systems being developed in STS are
beset with problems does not m e a n they need to be done away with. They m a y
necessitate a w k w a r d distinctions between internal and external forces, but
attempts to go further into the realms of the "seamless web" tend to be so
amorphous as to be no improvement at all.18 Moreover there has been an uneven
progression in STS from the analysis of specifics - specific artifacts, debates,
individuals, institutions - towards a more general analysis of sociotechnical
systems. To give up on the latter would be a backwards step.
Conceptions of sociotechnical systems must be further developed. As to how this
should be done, the limitations of the various conceptions currently in use would
strongly suggest that there is little to be gained through further abstractions and
generalisations derived from constructivist studies of technological development.
A s Winner argues (1993, p.376), the focus needs to shift from an academic interest
in h o w technologies are constructed to an intellectual and political commitment
to reconstructing our technology-centred world in ways inspired by democratic
and ecological principles. Studying h o w this can be done is a great challenge for
cross-disciplinary study as Winner goes on to say. O n e path - though not a
panacea - is to build on and learn from the practical attempts of the (embryonic
and vacillating) alternative technology m o v e m e n t which aims to construct
alternative technologies or reconstruct existing technologies (MacKenzie, 1984).

Analysis of alternative technologies certainly forms a part of this thesis; for t
m o m e n t however the concern is to introduce an analytical framework.

INTEGRATED ANALYSES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The framework to be deployed in this thesis takes inspiration from a number of
integrated, multi-level approaches which have been proposed and/or deployed by
STS scholars in recent years. Giere (1993) argues that analysis of technological
systems requires an understanding of technological artifacts in their scientifictechnological context; an understanding of relevant psychological or cognitive
features of various actors (e.g. inventors, entrepreneurs, managers, consumers);
an understanding of relevant microsocial interactions; and an understanding of

IS O n seamless webs, which aim to break d o w n analytical distinctions such as that between science
and society, see Bijker, 1993; Giere, 1993; Hughes, 1986.
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various macrosocial interactions, including cultural and economic factors.
Another example is Mercer's (1993) study of the ongoing controversy about the
health effects of non-ionising electromagnetic radiation. Mercer adopts an
"eclectic" approach to controversy analysis, drawing elements from controversyas-politics, technocratic politics, fact-value approaches, historico-narrative
approaches, controversy closure studies, and SSK. A third example is the
integrated approach to controversy analysis proposed by Martin and Richards
(1995), bringing together structural, group politics, SSK/constructivist, and
technical analysis.
From what has been said it is clear that the major limitation of much
contemporary sociology of technology is the lack of consideration of the broad
social structuring of science and technology. Integrated approaches can retain what
is of value in constructivist and (functionalist) systems approaches while going
beyond those approaches through closer attention to structural analysis. Another
c o m m o n limitation is the tendency to prefigure analyses through attachment to
theoretical or methodological schemas. Once again integrated approaches are
advantageous in that they offer some scope for flexibility - different levels of
analysis can be used as appropriate, and different topics can be addressed at
different levels. This flexibility is important for this thesis since the empirical
scope is wide-ranging.

There is no need here to map out the various levels of analysis to be used in t
thesis - to do so might risk schematically prefiguring the analysis, and in any case
the scope of the thesis is too broad and the approaches used are too varied to be
neatly m a p p e d out. Suffice it to say that m a n y of the approaches suggested by Giere
(1993), Mercer (1993), and Martin and Richards (1995) will be used and to m a k e
some preliminary comments on h o w the analysis will proceed.

Generally, the analyses in the following chapters are cognisant of i) the speci
features of the system/technology/debate under discussion, ii) the aims of the
discussion and its place within the thesis as a whole, iii) the variety of approaches
and levels of analysis that could be deployed, and iv) the approaches to generic
STS/SSK issues (reflexivity, symmetry, partisanship/impartiality, and
epistemology) most suitable for a fourth generation of (politically-relevant)
STS/SSK.
The thesis is concerned with two overlapping sociotechnical systems - nuclear
programs and health-care systems - with m u c h of the thesis focused on the
intersection of these two broad systems in the radioisotope industry and nuclear
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medicine. These sociotechnical systems are located in the overarching structural
milieu of capitalism since World W a r II. The dialectics between science,
technology, and capitalism will not be systematically explored, but some attention
to these connections is necessary to overcome the limitations of constructivist
STS/SSK. In particular the analysis of nuclear programs in chapters 2-3 needs to be
related to the broad contours of post World W a r II capitalism and international
political and economic history more generally.
The analysis of the radioisotope industry and nuclear medicine in chapters 5-8
mostly operates at lower levels. The analysis in these chapters is driven by the
practical question of future radioisotope production and supply for nuclear
medicine in Australia, and this requires some detailed consideration of m u n d a n e
issues such as the scale of radioisotope production and export operations overseas.
The analysis is alert to the themes of constructivist technology studies but
development of those themes is not given emphasis. A s for the broad social
structuring of nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry, the main concern
is to tease out the interconnections between nuclear medicine, the radioisotope
industry, and nuclear development more generally.
Finally, some comments on how the different levels of analysis relate to one
another. Essentially, I argue that the more detailed, lower-level analyses of the
H I F A R replacement controversy and the radioisotope industry are m u c h better
understood in the context of the broad, historical analyses of nuclear power,
weapons and research reactor programs around the world and in Australia.

As discussed in chapter 4.1, my integrated approach to the analysis of the HIFAR
replacement controversy encompasses technical/positivist analysis, and it
embraces a number of themes from constructivist STS/SSK. It is argued that
further important insights can be gained through greater attention to the
structural and historical location of the controversy. Of particular interest in this
regard are the multifaceted and somewhat nebulous "national interest"
arguments put forward for the construction of a n e w reactor. According to the
Research Reactor Review (1993, p.2), the national interest issues connected to the
operation of a research reactor in Australia concern "how necessary it is to
maintain s o m e degree of nuclear capability to assist non-proliferation initiatives,
to find out what others are doing, or to protect its o w n national interest if occasion
demanded."

In general terms, the national interest debates are much better understood in th
context of the historical tension between the A A E C / A N S T O as an institution of
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key strategic importance (vis a vis nuclear weapons and power) versus the
A A E C / A N S T O as one public-sector civil science agency a m o n g many. That
tension is fully explored in chapter three. In addition, the national interest debates
relate to Australian involvement in nuclear industries overseas, and thus the
overview of nuclear programs around the world, provided in chapter two,
provides important contextual material.
The historical analysis of nuclear programs in chapters 2-3 also facilitates
detailed analysis of nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry in chapters
5-8. In particular, the radioisotope industry is seen as an outgrowth of the nuclear
weapons and power programs of the post World W a r II period. The ongoing links
between the radioisotope industry, and nuclear programs more generally, are also
analysed in detail. Thus for example the problems faced by the nuclear power
industry over the past two decades are shown to have impacted, in various ways,
on the research reactor infrastructure around the world and thus on reactor
radioisotope production. Similarly the history and trajectory of nuclear weapons
programs impacts on reactor radioisotope production in m a n y ways.
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT:
NUCLEAR POWER, WEAPONS, AND
RESEARCH REACTORS.
2.1. INTRODUCTION
2.2. NUCLEAR POWER
2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
2.4. RESEARCH REACTORS

2.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents summaries of nuclear weapons, power, and research reactor
programs around the world. This provides useful context for the closer analysis,
in chapters 3-4, of Australia's nuclear history and the H I F A R replacement
controversy.
The other main task of this chapter is to discuss the interconnections between
civil and military nuclear development, in particular the links between research
reactors and covert weapons programs. Again, this provides useful context for the
analysis of the intersection of civil and military nuclear development in
Australia.

This chapter also provides a backdrop for the analysis of the radioisotope indust
in chapters 5-8. The radioisotope industry developed as an outgrowth of the
nuclear power and weapons programs of the post World W a r II period, and there
are still strong connections between nuclear programs and the radioisotope
industry.
Even a sweeping analysis of nuclear programs deserves some consideration of
anti-nuclear opposition. H o w e v e r to avoid duplication, anti-nuclear opposition is
only briefly addressed in this chapter, and is considered in more detail in chapter
three.
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2.2. NUCLEAR POWER
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER
THE DECLINE OF NUCLEAR POWER
THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER
There is no need in this thesis for anything more than a sweeping overview of
nuclear power, and I will focus this discussion on the development of nuclear
power in the capitalist countries.
During World War II and in the immediate post-war period, civil nuclear
applications were generally accorded a m u c h lower priority than nuclear weapons
and were developed largely along lines dictated by military requirements. For
example the first "commercial" nuclear power plant, the Calder Hall complex in
the United K i n g d o m (UK), w a s designed primarily to produce plutonium for
weapons.
The viability and success of any technology depends on the ease with which it
be subsumed within existing social structures or, failing that, the degree to which
social structures and technologies can be reshaped to accommodate each other.
Nuclear power w a s broadly commensurate with the structure and trajectory of
post-war capitalism, and w a s seen to be an important element in the
reconstruction of the international capitalist order. It w a s to be an important
industry in itself, and a means to further expansion in other industries through
the generation of cheap electricity. It promised some advantages over other
energy/electricity industries, which were more labour intensive and sometimes
prone to labour militancy. Nuclear power was also seen as a w a y of "cashing in"
on technologies developed for nuclear weapons. (Falk, 1982; Roberts, 1976;
Camilleri, 1984.)
Notwithstanding the broad compatibility of nuclear power with post-war
capitalism, a great deal of social and technological engineering w a s required to
establish nuclear power industries. Existing scientific institutions generally lacked
the necessary organisational and financial resources to accommodate and develop
nuclear power. The military had a large degree of control over nuclear
development during the w a r in some countries, but military control over (civil)
nuclear power w a s ideologically unacceptable and logistically impractical.
Industrial interests had been established to some degree - for example
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Westinghouse had gained experience in reactor manufacture during the war - but
it soon became clear that nuclear power w a s a complex, multifaceted system, the
commercial risks were high, and the developmental phase would last for some
years. (Spence, 1984.)

The net effect of the various strategies employed by early advocates and sponso
of nuclear power w a s to create the institutional and ideological framework for the
establishment and acceptance (however limited) of nuclear power. In countries
pursuing nuclear programs a "nucleocracy" was established, institutionalised, and
further developed, comprising a coalition of state, industrial, and professional
interests involved in the civil and military development of nuclear technologies.
There would be deep divisions between sections of the nucleocracy at times, but a
fundamental, shared commitment to nuclear development. Atomic energy
agencies (a.k.a. institutes, laboratories, commissions) were established in m a n y
countries, well supported by public funds and closely connected with private
industry and numerous branches of the state apparatus; these agencies were
central to nuclear development. In some countries (e.g. France, the Soviet Union),
little effort w a s m a d e to separate civil and military nuclear programs; in others
(e.g. the US), efforts were m a d e to disentangle them if only to a certain extent; and
in other countries, nuclear power was developed but there was no serious pursuit
of nuclear weapons (e.g. Canada) or a weapons program was pursued for a time
but then abandoned and the emphasis was on civil applications (e.g. Sweden).
The nuclear fuel cycle is highly integrated and requires a great degree of coordination, regulation, and financing. The reactor industry cannot be considered
in isolation because it depends on "front-end" technologies (uranium mining and
processing, uranium enrichment for some types of reactors, fuel fabrication), and
"back-end" technologies (reprocessing of spent fuel, and management and
disposal of radioactive wastes). Each facet of the cycle must operate adequately or
the viability of the entire nuclear power industry can be threatened. All the
necessary components of the nuclear fuel cycle were in the early stages of
development in the post-war period. In some cases technologies developed for
weapons production, such as enrichment, had direct spin-offs for nuclear power;
but other aspects of nuclear power, such as reactor technology, required a great
deal more development.

The role of the capitalist state was crucial for the development of nuclear pow
and the nuclear fuel cycle more generally. M a n y of the political, judicial, financial,
administrative, and coercive arms of the state have been involved. The state has
always been central to capital accumulation, and accumulation has increasingly
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been marked by industrial and financial concentration, technological innovation,
and centralised production and distribution. Nuclear power w a s a prime example
of these trends, but an unusually high degree of state support w a s necessary
because of the cost and complexity of nuclear power. Another reason for the
central role of the capitalist state w a s the reluctance of the private sector to become
involved - particularly in the formative years of the industry - because of the
high capital costs and high risks. The military potential of nuclear energy
provided a further reason for substantial state regulation over all facets of the
nuclear fuel cycle. (Spence, 1984; Camilleri, 1984, pp.274-278.)
In many countries, energy demand rose substantially and steadily in the post-war
generation. State subsidisation of electricity production - in particular nuclear
power generation - stimulated electricity demand. Electricity utilities, public or
private, could be directed, or at least encouraged, to meet at least some d e m a n d
with nuclear power as opposed to coal, oil, gas, or hydroelectricity. Forward
estimations of electricity d e m a n d rested on variables that were difficult to predict;
thus there w a s scope for creative accounting to bolster nuclear power. (Camilleri,
1984, ch.2.) M o r e directly, state institutions funded and/or conducted a great deal
of research and development (R&D). In addition, private companies were offered
a range of financial incentives and concessions to encourage their involvement in
the industry, such as indemnity legislation limiting private-sector liability in the
event of accident, opportunities to commercialise state-funded R & D , and sundry
other incentives such as generous support in relation to fuel use and fuel
fabrication charges and waste management. (Falk, 1982.)
Another major area for the state has been regulation, including the implementation of security systems to prevent sabotage, theft, or terrorism; control of
information; licensing and regulation of radiation hazards; and the development
of international safeguards systems to prevent weapons proliferation. Regulatory
processes were (and are) complex and contested. Traditional models of scientific
research, including open-ended ("pure") research and the free flow of information
across national borders, were restrained in the context of bureaucratised and
militarised nuclear science. Vetting of employees, security provisions attached to
employment, and limited disclosure of information, resulted in the state and the
nucleocracy having a near monopoly of nuclear expertise, with independent
critical inquiry subordinated to institutionalised interests. Regulatory agencies
have generally not been sufficiently strong or independent to call into question
major aspects of nuclear development. Politicians and bureaucrats have often
been the prisoners of blinkered "expert" advice from the nucleocracy. (Camilleri,
1984; Moyal, 1975.)
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Commercial nuclear power plants came into operation in the 1950s, but growth
was slow. Then from the mid 1960s, there was an upsurge of orders - 105 power
reactors were ordered around the world from 1966 to 1971. In the early to mid
1970s, uncertainty over oil maintained the m o m e n t u m of nuclear power.
(Camilleri, 1984, pp.167-178.) Most of the powerful capitalist countries developed
substantial nuclear power programs - in particular the U S , the U K , France, West
Germany, Japan, Canada, and Sweden. A major nuclear power program was also
pursued in the Soviet Union. Small or moderate nuclear power programs were
established in various other capitalist and Eastern European countries and in a
small number of developing (third-world) countries.

Some national industries - such as those in the US, the UK, France, and India
strove for independence across the nuclear fuel cycle. Independence was sought to
avoid the financial burden of dependence on foreign suppliers, because independence in nuclear power fitted well with nationalist ideologies, and in some cases
because expansion into areas such as reprocessing and enrichment facilitated the
development of nuclear weapons. However for most countries, complete
independence was impractical for a system as complex and costly as nuclear
power. There was a demand-side pull for nuclear equipment and services, and
also a supply-side push with m a n y national industries seeking export markets to
recover the huge investments m a d e in the nuclear power industry. Thus there
has been a great deal of international cooperation and competition, carried out in
the context of an international division of labour characterised by stratification,
competition and uneven development. A s with the management of domestic
nuclear industries, the state has been heavily involved in all aspects of international nuclear relations - attempting to protect and strengthen the national
nuclear industry vis a vis foreign competitors, supporting the export initiatives of
the national industry, and managing international issues such as control of
weapons proliferation. (Camilleri, 1984; Falk, 1982.)

The US had enormous political and economic power in the first two decades aft
the war, and that strength was used to shape the international development of
nuclear power. Light-water reactors19, developed in the US, had advantages over
reactor types being developed elsewhere, and the American industry enjoyed
other advantages such as a virtual world monopoly, outside the Eastern Bloc, of
uranium enrichment facilities. The U S government launched the A t o m s for
Peace policy in 1953. This involved supply of enriched fuel and agreements to take

12 Light-water reactors use ordinary ("light") water as the moderator of the uranium fissio
reaction, and are fuelled with low-enriched uranium. Heavy-water reactors use heavy water
(deuterium oxide) as the moderator, and some can be fuelled with natural uranium.
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back spent fuel; access to training facilities and research results; and loans for
privately-owned utilities. These funds were m a d e available only if they were used
to buy equipment, materials, and technical services from the U S nuclear industry.
Behind the Atoms for Peace policy was a strategy to stimulate the global nuclear
power market, to control and profit from it as m u c h as possible, and to control
weapons proliferation. (Clausen, 1985.)

American light-water reactors led the field when there was a surge of orders f
power reactors from the mid 1960s. A number of countries with significant
nuclear power industries also based their programs on U S light-water reactor
technology, including West Germany, France, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland. In
some cases (e.g. France), indigenous reactor designs were developed but dropped
in favour of light-water reactor types. The U K and Canada developed and
persisted with their o w n reactor types, some of which use natural uranium as fuel
and thus avoid the problems associated with reliance on overseas enrichment
services or the cost and complexity of construction of domestic enrichment
facilities. (Thomas, 1985; Spence, 1984; Wohlstetter et al., 1979.)

The strong position of the US nuclear industry was under threat even before th
end of the 1960s. The erosion of U S dominance in nuclear power was part of a
broader trend of declining U S hegemony in the face of the growing strength of
European and Japanese capital; America's military superiority was secure but its
economic dominance was not. Even w h e n based on U S light-water technology,
competitors began to threaten U S dominance in the nuclear power export market.
By the late 1960s, a controlled market, dominated by the U S , gave w a y to more
classical market mechanisms. (Rees, 1990; Spence, 1984.) There was a gradual
spread of enrichment technology, fierce competition for reactor sales, a race for
technological leadership in the development of fast breeders20, and diverging
approaches to international safeguards which tended towards the lowest c o m m o n
denominator. (Camilleri, 1984, pp.286-288.)
In addition to the growing strength of individual nation states vis a vis the
alliances were undermining American control over nuclear power. O n e of the
informal alliances w a s between French technology and G e r m a n industrial muscle
in areas such as reprocessing and fast breeders. A number of European countries
collaborated to develop enrichment facilities, thus gradually reducing their

2Q "Breeder" reactors are fuelled with natural uranium and plutonium-239. They produce more
plutonium-239 than they consume, through conversion of uranium-238 which constitutes 99.3% of
natural uranium. The development of breeder technology has been extremely expensive, unsuccessful,
and also contentious for various reasons including the weapons proliferation implications of the
plutonium economy. See Collingridge, 1983, ch.9.
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dependence on the U S . Alliances involving major capitalist countries and semiperipheral countries were also emerging - for example between West Germany
and Brazil, West Germany and Argentina, and France and South Africa - and
other nuclear alliances, for civil and/or military nuclear development, were
forming independently of any of the powerful capitalist or Eastern Bloc countries.
(Camilleri, 1984.)

THE DECLINE OF NUCLEAR POWER
Some countries have managed to maintain growth in nuclear power over the past
20 years, such as France, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and to a lesser extent
Canada, India, and China (where nuclear power was not seriously pursued until
the 1980s). In most cases these countries have been able to proceed with nuclear
power expansion because of an exceptionally high degree of state involvement in
and control over nuclear power, often a function of a more general political
centralisation. (Thomas, 1985; Camilleri; 1984.) However growth was the exception
rather than the rule from the mid 1970s. Nuclear power programs in m a n y other
countries went into decline.
A number of factors were responsible for the decline of nuclear power. Major
accidents, most notably those at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, had a
substantial impact. More generally, concerns about the social and environmental
impact of the nuclear fuel cycle generated significant public opposition and mass
anti-nuclear movements. Accidents and heightened public opposition led to more
stringent environmental and safety regulations. Increased regulation, in turn,
resulted in delays and major cost blow-outs. Lead times blew out to 12-15 years or
more, requiring planning which greatly exceeded the industry's forecasting
capabilities, and lengthening lead times resulted in spiralling capital costs due to
additional interest payments and increased inflationary effects. (Thomas, 1985;
Camilleri, 1984; Falk, 1982.)

Delays and cost blow-outs occurred at a time when countries all around the worl
were hit by economic stagnation and recession, with a consequent decline in
energy and electricity demand. Electricity utilities were faced with over-supply
which ambitious construction programs could only exacerbate. Financing nuclear
power projects became far more difficult against a background of economic
stagnation, high inflation, and high interest rates. The economics of nuclear
power vis a vis alternative electricity sources had always been dubious, and such
comparisons were still less flattering as the nuclear power industry went into
decline. Technical problems also plagued the industry and had further
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consequences for costs, delays, increased regulation, and public opposition.
(Collingridge, 1983; Thomas, 1985; Camilleri, 1984; Falk, 1982.)
When orders for power reactors slowed down or dried up altogether, reactor
manufacturers could cut their losses, thus abandoning any share in a future
revival. Alternatively they could maintain their manufacturing capability, but
only by seriously jeopardising profitability in the short term. S o m e stop-gap
measures were available: fixing problems resulting from deficiencies in various
reactor designs; expanding into other facets of the nuclear fuel cycle; and
transferring personnel into R & D projects. (Falk, 1982; Camilleri, 1984, pp.133-134.)

The decline in demand for nuclear power had obvious implications for the reactor
industry. This in turn impacted on other aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle,
significantly affecting the economics of uranium mining, enrichment, and
reprocessing. The nexus between nuclear power and nuclear weapons further
debilitated the nuclear power industry (even if a degree of symbiosis persisted),
through public opposition and stricter export policies. Reprocessing and fast
breeder programs, which promised at least some hope of improving the viability
of the nuclear power industry, were scaled d o w n in some countries because of
their implications for weapons proliferation. (Camilleri, 1984, pp.284-285.)
Attempts were made to reorganise national industries with a view to achieving
economies of scale, reducing capital costs, and ensuring long-term viability. This
included efforts to merge or amalgamate companies in order to protect the
domestic industry from the encroachment of foreign competitors. State
intervention w a s aimed at improving the overall situation of the national
industry though sections of it were disadvantaged or even sacrificed at times.
Efforts to streamline regulatory and licensing processes were pursued, but were
often frustrated by factors such as patchy technical performance and public
pressure. Moreover in a number of countries the state apparatus w a s incapable of
significantly reducing the regulatory burden. For example in the U S , the complex
division of powers between national, state, and regional political institutions
could not be refashioned to any significant extent, nor could it be bypassed, and in
West G e r m a n y the judiciary w a s heavily involved in nuclear regulation and w a s
a major obstacle to streamlining. Growing public opposition and activism
presented the state with an acute dilemma: decisive action by the state to salvage
the nuclear power industry tended to sharpen political conflict and to undermine
the state's legitimacy, whereas procrastination or concessions to anti-nuclear
movements could only deepen the predicament of the industry. (Camilleri, 1984.)
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In the context of declining domestic prospects for nuclear power, there w a s
intensified rivalry for export markets. There w a s growing interest in stimulating
and supplying markets for nuclear power in developing countries. Nuclear power
promised to be still more problematic in developing countries than in the
advanced industrial countries: the expertise and industrial infrastructure was
generally lacking; electricity d e m a n d and grids were not suited for the large plants
being favoured in the advanced capitalist countries; and financing w a s a big
obstacle. Nevertheless, suppliers m a d e use of political, military, and economic
leverage to stimulate nuclear power markets in developing countries. Inducements were important - these could include bribery, or low-interest loans and
generous trade packages designed to give exporters a toe-hold in a market. A s with
so m a n y other aspects of nuclear power, state support w a s crucial in the attainment of export contracts; the loans offered by the U S Export-Import Bank being an
important example. Suppliers often found a receptive audience a m o n g political
and military elites, and Western-trained scientists, in recipient countries.
However these efforts had only modest success, although they did give some
companies some important breathing space. (Ne'eman, 1981; Sharma, 1985; Hayes
and Bello, 1979; Hayes and Shorrock, 1982.)
With declining US hegemony, international nuclear commerce has largely
followed the classical model of imperialist rivalry in which large national capitals,
each backed by its domestic state, vie for markets and raw materials. In the difficult
environment of the past 20 years, national rivalries have become increasingly
sharp, and insecurity and shrinking markets have also added m o m e n t u m to the
contradictory tendency for suppliers to pool resources in collaborative ventures.
(Spence, 1984.)

THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER

Thirty-two countries operated a total of 437 power reactors as at late 1996, wi
power reactors under construction, planned, or on order in a further five
countries. Thirty-two power reactors were under construction, nine were on order
and 70 were planned. ( A N S T O , 1996F.) O n the strength of the past 20 years it can
safely be said that a fair percentage of the 70 planned power reactors will not be
built.
One of the major impediments to a resurgence in the nuclear power industry is
ongoing global economic stagnation, and there are no signs of a significant, lasting
abatement of that stagnation. Notwithstanding the profound changes in
international relations over the past decade, the nuclear power industry is still
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embedded in a system of international multipolarity with intense competition for
export markets between rival corporations and nation-states. The collapse of the
bureaucratic collectivist (Stalinist) regimes has opened u p some commercial
opportunities for Western nuclear export, but the broad outlook for nuclear power
remains poor.
Lower-level determinants of the future of nuclear power include containment of
public opposition, further efforts to streamline regulatory procedures, and
resolution of radioactive waste problems. N o significant progress has been m a d e
in these areas, although anti-nuclear movements are generally smaller and
weaker than in the 1970s and 1980s. Technical innovation is another variable.
Innovation proceeds across the nuclear fuel cycle in the hope of sparking a revival
- or at least a neutralisation of some of the major deficits. There is m u c h ongoing
work in the field of reactor design, but m u c h of this involves modifications of
existing designs - a major technical breakthrough such as a viable breeder
industry is unlikely (Kabanov et al., 1992).

Despite the significant decline in power reactor sales and construction in the p
20 years, this has not resulted in a steady decline in nuclear power output. For
example there has been a slight, uneven increase in nuclear power output in the
mid 1990s. This growth has had little to do with the commissioning of n e w
reactors, instead reflecting temporary fixes such as refurbishments of existing
reactors to increase production capacity, extensions of plant life, and improving
load factors (efficiency). Growth could not be sustained through these technical
fixes for any length of time. (Anon., 1996H.)

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
INTRODUCTION
SURVEY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
NUCLEAR WEAPONS A N D "THE N E W WORLD ORDER"
INTRODUCTION
This section begins with a survey of nuclear weapons programs, followed by some
commentary on the potential for further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the
post Cold W a r period. The cross-fertilisation of civil and military nuclear
development is discussed in this section and again in the following section (2.4)
on research reactor programs.
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S o m e preliminary comments should be m a d e in relation to the manufacture of
nuclear weapons. Weapons-grade fissile material is the crucial ingredient in
nuclear weapons. Production of plutonium-239 (Pu-239) by neutron bombardment
of uranium-238 in a reactor, and enrichment of uranium to produce highlyenriched uranium (HEU), are the two most c o m m o n methods of producing fissile
material for bombs. (A third method is reactor irradiation of thorium to produce
fissile uranium-233.) Production of plutonium requires a reactor - either a
purpose-built reactor, a power reactor, or a research reactor - plus reprocessing
facilities for extracting the plutonium from spent fuel. Uranium enrichment
facilities are generally complex and expensive, but as methods of enrichment have
been developed and improved the potential for production of H E U b o m b s has
increased. In nearly all countries pursuing nuclear weapons programs, efforts
have been m a d e to domestically produce plutonium and/or to enrich uranium,
but it is also possible to acquire weapons-grade fissile material by gift, theft, or
purchase (including diversion of material acquired for civil purposes). In addition
to fissile material, components such as high explosives, firing triggers, and
handling devices are also required. Developing these components requires
considerable technical skill, although producing or acquiring weapons-grade fissile
material is the biggest obstacle. Another requirement is a sizeable team of highlytrained specialists. S o m e delivery systems, such as aircraft modified for delivery of
nuclear weapons, pose no great obstacle, but advanced missile systems are far
more complex and expensive.

SURVEY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
In the decades following World War II, the US and the Soviet Union built over
40 000 increasingly powerful and sophisticated nuclear weapons between them, as
well as associated technologies such as advanced missile-delivery systems. While
neither of the superpowers used nuclear weapons in military conflict since 1945,
threats and posturing were c o m m o n enough (Booker, 1993). The Cold W a r
confrontation and arms race had profound implications through the shaping of
international political alignments, the enormous resources committed to nuclear
militarism, the social and environmental impact of weapons tests, and the
hundreds of accidents involving nuclear military facilities, bombs, planes, silos,
submarines, and so on. (Vallentine, 1992.)

There is no need here to recount the history of Cold War nuclear politicking. A
s u m m a r y of recent developments is in order however, since the situation is fluid.
The collapse of the Stalinist regimes throughout the Eastern Bloc, giving w a y to
capitalist restoration, has had significant implications for nuclear weapons
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development and politicking. The most important of these implications is that
the potential for nuclear war between the U S and former Soviet countries is
considerably less likely than was the case during the Cold War. Russia and the U S
have deactivated hundreds of strategic nuclear weapons and thousands of tactical
nuclear weapons and have dismantled thousands of warheads. There has also
been some progress in other areas - for example the blending d o w n of some
weapons-grade fissile material for use in power reactors, and recent initiatives to
stop weapons testing. (Spector et al., 1995.)
Despite these encouraging developments, the post Cold War world promises a
continuation of inter-state economic and military conflict, and the potential for
nuclear attacks cannot be disregarded, whether between the U S and former Soviet
countries (in particular Russia), or between other countries. The nuclear weapons
stockpiles in the U S and former Soviet countries are still very large. A s at 1995 the
estimated U S stockpile was 8 500 strategic nuclear weapons, and 7 000 tactical
weapons, with the estimates for Russia being 7 200 strategic weapons and 6 000 13 000 tactical weapons. (Spector et al., 1995.)
Historically, the various nuclear disarmament treaties between the US and the
USSR/Russia have had limited success in terms of disarmament, more success as
publicity stunts (Rees, 1990). The most recent initiative involves preliminary
negotiations concerning a third Strategic A r m s Reduction Treaty, S T A R T III,
which aims to gradually reduce arsenals of strategic warheads in the U S and
Russia to 2 000-2 500 - still an enormous inventory and it needs to be kept in
mind that S T A R T II has yet to pass the Russian D u m a (Schweid, 1997).
While some of the energies of the US nuclear-industrial complex have been
redirected into reduction of nuclear stockpiles, there is still enormous expenditure
on nuclear weapons programs. For example, from 1994-96 the U S Department of
Energy (DOE) approved a $ U S 2.3 billion National Ignition Facility (a superlaser to
aid in the simulation of weapons tests); the D O E announced a $ U S 93 million deal
with I B M to build the world's fastest supercomputer (again for use in simulated
weapons tests); the B-2 Stealth Bomber program was extended; construction of a
third Seawolf nuclear attack submarine was approved; and an anti-missile defence
system, closely related to the Strategic Defence Initiative (Star Wars) program, was
approved. (Anon., 1996G; Beers, 1995.)

The partial break-up of the Soviet Union has meant that Russia, Ukraine, Belaru
and Kazakhstan all have nuclear weapons on their territories. All four states have
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
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Ukraine have joined the N P T as non-weapons states, with International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of nuclear facilities but not of the nuclear
weapons still on their territory. N o n e is able to use its remaining nuclear weapons
independently of central c o m m a n d in Russia.21 (Spector et al., 1995.)

There is no likelihood of complete nuclear disarmament in Russia. The intentio
to maintain a significant arsenal is underpinned in part by the strong thread of
national chauvinism in post-Soviet Russia, shared by all the major power blocs
including the ruling power bloc and the remnants of the Communist Party.
(Kagarlitsky, 1995). This national chauvinism can spill over into military conflict
easily enough, as in Chechnya. In addition, the economic situation in Russia (as
throughout Eastern Europe) is dismal and worsening (Clarke, 1996). For a state
with a powerful military and a declining economy, there must always be the
temptation to use the former to prop up the latter. The economic problems
associated with capitalist restoration also underscore a considerable level of
political instability within Russia.
With respect to Russian involvement in horizontal nuclear weapons
proliferation, two immediate concerns are state-sanctioned sales of nuclear
materials to countries with nuclear weapons ambitions such as Iran (discussed
later), and smuggling of nuclear materials. There has been evidence in recent
years of smuggling and sales of nuclear materials, including weapons-grade H E U
and plutonium, from the former Soviet countries. In some cases, the volumes of
H E U have been sufficient for manufacture of crude nuclear weapons. Historically
every country that has seriously pursued a nuclear weapons program has
developed an indigenous capacity to produce H E U or plutonium (even if other
strategies, such as diversion of imported H E U fuel, have also been pursued). The
black market in weapons-grade fissile materials m a y change this situation. In
addition, illicit trafficking increases opportunities for sabotage, terrorism, and
black-mail without actual weapons manufacture. (Dolley and Leventhal, 1994;
Blix, 1995; Spector et al., 1995; Montague, 1995.)
The UK, France, and China all have advanced nuclear weapons systems including thermonuclear fusion weapons, which are usually fuelled by isotopes of
hydrogen and also require a nuclear fission detonator - as well as relatively
advanced delivery systems. The logic behind the nuclear weapons programs in
both the U K and France w a s questionable given that they would always remain
peripheral to the arms race between the U S and the USSR. In both cases national
prestige/chauvinism w a s an issue, as was the strategic place of Western Europe in
21 The NPT/IAEA non-proliferation safeguards regime is discussed later in this section
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the context of the Cold War. In the case of the U K another issue w a s resentment at
the broken commitment by the U S to collaborate for civil and military nuclear
development. (Booker, 1993.) A s at 1995 the U K had an estimated 100 strategic
nuclear weapons and 100 tactical weapons; for France the figure w a s 482 strategic
weapons but n o tactical weapons. (Spector et al., 1995.) China began its nuclear
weapons program in 1957. China's arsenal was estimated in 1995 to consist of 284
strategic nuclear weapons and 150 tactical weapons. (Spector et al., 1995; Booker,
1993; Gordon, 1992.)
Israel, which is not a party to the NPT, has covertly developed a reasonably
sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal.22 It probably has between 50-100 nuclear
weapons, and it has nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The Israeli nuclear weapons
program w a s launched in 1956, in the wake of the Suez crisis. The IRR-2 (Dimona)
research reactor, supplied by France, has been central to the program. It is fuelled
with natural uranium, thus optimising plutonium production.23 France also
supplied information on the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons, and
assisted in the construction of other facilities at the Dimona site including a
reprocessing plant. Israel has also m a d e some progress in the development of laser
enrichment technology - thus while plutonium extraction from spent research
reactor fuel has been the major source of fissile material for Israel's bombs,
uranium-235 b o m b s m a y be constructed with the help of the enrichment facilities.
In 1977, 200 pounds of H E U went missing from the Nuclear Materials and
Equipment Corporation ( N U M E C ) in Pennsylvania - it is suspected to have
ended u p in Israel although there is no unequivocal evidence.

Israel is one of a number of countries where an ostensibly civil research react
program has facilitated a covert weapons program. There are no power reactors in
Israel, although the pretence of a nuclear power program m a y have facilitated the
transfer of materials and expertise from France and other countries.
Israel's nuclear weapons capability is entangled in the complex web of Middle
Eastern politics. Iran is thought to be 5-10 years away from being able to build a
nuclear weapon, but this could be accelerated if nuclear materials leak from
former Soviet countries. There have been reports of the Iranian regime
attempting to purchase fully-fabricated nuclear weapons. Iran has been supplied
with nuclear materials from a number of countries over the years. Dual-use

22 For literature on Israel's nuclear weapons program, see Reiss, 1988, ch.5; Holdren, 1983; Quester,
1985; Booker, 1993; Spector et al., 1995; de la Court et al., 1982; Carnesale, 1981; Bar-Or, 1972.
22 Natural uranium contains about 99.3% uranium-238 and 0.7% uranium-235. Fissile Pu-239 is
produced by neutron bombardment of uranium-238 and thus Pu-239 production decreases as the level of
uranium-235 enrichment increases.
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technologies - ostensibly for civil purposes but with potential uses for weapons
development - have been purchased. These include two power reactors which
were damaged by Iraqi air strikes in 1987-88 and are no longer operating. A 5 M W 2 4
research reactor has been in operation since 1967, and three very low power
research reactors (two of them sub-critical facilities) began operation between 199294 (IAEA, 1994). The U S has attempted to put in place an embargo on the sale or
supply of nuclear materials to Iran. The embargo has been supported by Western
governments, but not by Russia or China, both of which have signed agreements
to sell nuclear power plants to Iran. T w o nuclear-capable ballistic missiles were
sold to Iran by North Korea, and efforts m a y be in train to increase the arsenal of
ballistic missiles through negotiations with China and North Korea. (Spector et
al., 1995; Arnett, 1995; Gordon, 1992.)

As in Israel, a civil research reactor program has facilitated a covert weapon
development program in Iraq.25 The Iraqi regime has been trying to develop
nuclear weapons at least since the 1960s. At various stages it has been supplied
with nuclear materials by West Germany, Portugal, Niger, Brazil, Italy, France,
Britain, and the Soviet Union. S o m e of these transfers were fairly benign, such as
the 2 M W research reactor supplied by the Soviet Union. Other transfers were
obviously risky in terms of facilitating weapons production, such as the Frenchsupplied 40-70 M W Osirak research reactor, and hot cells (radiochemical
processing laboratories) supplied by Italy. Iraqi oil has been an important
bargaining chip for a number of nuclear transfers, although oil exports were
severely disrupted by the Iran-Iraq war.
In 1979, in France, the cores of two research reactors destined for Iraq were
damaged by an explosion - a French ecology group claimed responsibility, but it is
also possible that Israeli agents were responsible. In 1980, a scientist involved in
the Iraqi nuclear program was murdered while in France - again it is possible that
Israel was involved. In September 1980, two Iranian warplanes b o m b e d the Iraqi
Al Tuwaitha nuclear reactor facility. A French-supplied 0.8 M W research reactor,
one of the three reactors at the site, was operating at the time, but the bombing
caused little damage. In 1981, an Israeli strike on the Al Tuwaitha site damaged the
40-70 M W French-supplied Osirak reactor (which was shortly to begin operation),
but not the two low-power research reactors. After the Israeli strike, Saddam
Hussein called on "peace-loving" countries to help the Arabs build a nuclear

24 M W , or MW(t), is megawatts (millions of watts) of thermal power; k W or kW(t) is thousands of
watts of thermal power.
25 For literature on Iraq's covert nuclear weapons program, see Snyder, 1985; de la Court et al., 1982;
Froggatt, 1991; Spector et al., 1995; Nuclear Control Institute, 1995C; Uranium Information Centre,
1995; Richter, 1981; Fainberg, 1981; Gruemm, 1981; Carnesale, 1981; Ne'eman, 1981; A N S T O , 1995B.
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b o m b , and Libya's Colonel Qaddafi declared it time for the Arabs to destroy the
D i m o n a nuclear complex in Israel.
A covert weapons development program continued through the 1980s in Iraq.
Several methods of weapons development were in train - domestic enrichment,
domestic reprocessing (plutonium extraction), and, on occasions, diversion of
H E U fuel supplied for the research reactors. Iraq repeatedly violated its N P T
obligations, by pursuing a number of techniques for uranium enrichment, efforts
to design an implosion-type nuclear device and to test its non-nuclear
components, planning to produce lithium-6 (which converts to tritium w h e n
irradiated with a neutron beam) for "boosted" atomic b o m b s and hydrogen bombs,
and pursuit of a missile delivery system. In addition, a small amount of
plutonium w a s separated using unsafeguarded hot cells supplied by Italy; the fuel
w a s irradiated in IAEA-safeguarded research reactors. Estimates of the annual
plutonium production (separation) capacity of the hot cells ranged from 0.3-10 kg;
if the actual capacity w a s closer to the high estimate, the hot cells would certainly
have been of value for weapons development.
The extent of the Iraqi program was revealed after the 1991 Gulf War. IAEA
officials estimated that Iraq m a y have been able to manufacture its first nuclear
b o m b as early as 1993. Most of Iraq's nuclear facilities were destroyed by U S
bombing during the Gulf War, including the two remaining research reactors at
the Al Tuwaitha site. After the war, other nuclear facilities were destroyed by
order of the Iraqi regime, possibly in an effort to deceive I A E A inspectors as to the
nature of the nuclear program. Later, some other nuclear facilities were destroyed
by I A E A inspectors.
The close scrutiny and control over what remains of Iraq's nuclear program, by
the I A E A under direction from the United Nations, precludes the possibility of
nuclear weapons manufacture in Iraq in the short term. Moreover the nuclear
program has been set back m a n y years by the destruction of so m a n y facilities.
Nevertheless Iraq is still under the rule of a military dictatorship, deeply
embroiled in a volatile regional situation, and it still has hundreds of nuclear
scientists and engineers as well as a range of nuclear facilities, some of which are
still intact if not operational.
Libya allegedly attempted to purchase a nuclear bomb from China in the 1980s
although the deal fell through.26 Over the years there have also been reports of

2^ For literature on Libyan efforts towards a nuclear weapons capability, see Booker, 1993; Holdren,
1983; Ne'eman, 1981; Spector et al., 1995; Quester, 1985, pp.46-47; de la Court et al., 1982.
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negotiations with France, India, and Pakistan in relation to nuclear transfers. Libya
ratified the N P T long ago, but its obvious pursuit of nuclear weapons indicates
h o w hollow such a commitment can be. A 10 M W research reactor, fuelled with
H E U , is in operation. The reactor was supplied by the Soviet Union, which m a d e
N P T ratification a condition of supply. There is no evidence of diversion of H E U
fuel but it remains a possibility. Extraction of plutonium from spent fuel for
weapons production is also a possibility.27 Another possibility is that nuclear
materials being smuggled out of the former Soviet Union could facilitate a covert
weapons program in Libya.

In 1987, Algeria purchased a 1 MW research reactor from Argentina. In early 19
U S intelligence agencies discovered that a second research reactor, k n o w n as Es
Salam, w a s under construction. This raised suspicions since it w a s being built in
secret, it w a s unusually powerful (10-15 M W ) in relation to Algeria's rudimentary
nuclear research program, and it was not subject to I A E A safeguards. The reactor
was supplied by China. A n agreement was reached to place the Es Salam reactor
under I A E A safeguards, and in 1995 Algeria formally acceded to the N P T . Algeria
also has hot cells for processing of radioisotopes; they were not under I A E A
safeguards as at 1995 but would come under I A E A inspection w h e n processing
spent fuel from either of Algeria's two research reactors. (Spector et al., 1995;
Booker, 1993.)
Some other countries in the Middle East and North Africa warrant passing
mention. Egypt m a y have undertaken some preliminary work in pursuit of
nuclear weapons. Syria m a y have m a d e some effort to acquire nuclear weapons,
but there are no power or research reactors in Syria and it would be m a n y years
before nuclear weapons could be produced. (Booker, 1993.) There have been
reports that Saudi Arabia collaborated with Iraq in a joint nuclear weapons
development program during the 1980s, at which time Saudi Arabia also acquired
nuclear-capable missiles from China. The collaboration between Saudi Arabia and
Iraq, such as it was, ceased at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, by which time Saudi
Arabia had joined the N P T . (Spector et al., 1995.)

22 HEU-fuelled research reactors are generally not suitable for production of Pu-239, but it depends on
m a n y variables such as reactor power, level of fuel enrichment, irradiation time, and sophistication
of plutonium extraction facilities. One option - which was almost certainly pursued in Iraq - is to
surround the reactor core with a "blanket" of natural uranium. In this way an HEU-fuelled reactor
can potentially produce large amounts of Pu-239.
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India has a significant nuclear weapons capability, developed largely as a result of
protracted tension and conflict with China and Pakistan.28 India has the
technological infrastructure and materials to produce nuclear weapons
independently of other countries, including a domestic uranium mining industry,
reprocessing facilities sufficient to process several hundred tonnes of spent fuel
each year, a large nuclear power program, and sufficient fissile material for tens or
even hundreds of nuclear weapons. India probably has 60+ tactical nuclear
weapons.
A "peaceful" nuclear test explosion was conducted in India in 1974. This used
plutonium extracted from fuel irradiated in a research reactor k n o w n as Cirus,
which w a s supplied by Canada. The U S administration denied having provided
materials which were used to produce the Indian b o m b , but later admitted
supplying heavy-water reactor moderator without restrictions on its use. Other
research reactors - in particular the Purnima reactor - were used to conduct
research crucial to the development of a weapons capability. The Dhruva research
reactor, and a number of power reactors, are also believed to have been used for
plutonium production over the years. The reprocessing facilities used to extract
plutonium have been justified by a long-term plan to develop breeder reactors.

India has historically gone to great lengths to avoid participating in safeguard
agreements or treaties, yet it found little trouble finding nuclear suppliers in the
early period of its nuclear program. There is n o w little scope for nuclear suppliers
to threaten or implement supply cut-offs to retard India's weapons program,
because of India's independent nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. Indeed India has
itself become a modest nuclear supplier, and in recent years there have been
reports of potential weapons proliferants such as Iran and Syria negotiating with
India for supply of nuclear equipment including research reactors.
Pakistan launched a covert nuclear weapons program in the aftermath of the
Indo-Pakistani war in the early 1970s.29 In 1974 an agreement w a s struck between
Libya and Pakistan, before the Indian test explosion, for Libya to help fund
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in return for nuclear materials and
information. This w a s tied in with plans a m o n g a number of countries to build an
"Islamic" b o m b , which were stepped up once India exploded a "Hindu" test bomb.
The weapons program in Pakistan has been assisted by China, and some

28 For literature on India's nuclear weapons program, see Arnett, 1995; Cronin, 1985; Booker, 1993;
Reiss, 1988, ch.7; Gordon, 1992; Spector et al., 1995; Bellany, 1972; de la Court et al., 1982; Findlay,
1990, ch.12.
22 For literature on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, see Cronin, 1985; Booker, 1993; Spector et
al., 1995; Arnett, 1995; Ne'eman, 1981; de la Court et al., 1982.
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equipment and materials have been procured through clandestine deals with
private Western companies.
Pakistan's weapons program was initially geared around plutonium separation
from reactor fuel irradiated in a 137 M W ( e ) power reactor.30 However in 1978
France pulled out of an agreement to build a reprocessing plant because of the
weapons implications. Efforts to complete the plant without further French
assistance struck insurmountable obstacles. During the 1970s Pakistan also began
secret construction of a small reprocessing plant at Rawalpindi. In addition, a hot
cell facility was completed, with French and Belgian assistance, and this facility
could be used to produce small amounts of plutonium. While there have been
ongoing efforts to develop plutonium separation capabilities, the emphasis of the
covert weapons program shifted to uranium enrichment. In 1978 France broke off
an agreement to supply an enrichment plant, but later that year news began to
leak out that an enrichment plant was being built, with some Libyan funding and
some equipment bought by " d u m m y " companies from European and North
American suppliers.
Currently Pakistan has a small nuclear power program, uranium enrichment
plants, reprocessing facilities, uranium reserves and facilities for processing
uranium and for fuel fabrication, a variety of aircraft which could be used to
deliver nuclear bombs, and it probably has sufficient weapons-grade material for
15-25 nuclear warheads. Pakistan has refused to become a party to the N P T . A s at
1995, a 50 M W research reactor was under construction at Khusab, with the
potential to provide Pakistan with its first supply of unsafeguarded spent fuel. The
reactor is being built with Chinese assistance. T w o operating research reactors are
under I A E A safeguards. O n e of these reactors, PARR-I, m a y have been used
clandestinely to produce tritium for advanced nuclear weapons.
North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions have been deeply entangled in the
politicking between North and South Korea, China, the USSR, and the US. 31
North Korea became a party to the N P T in 1985, but did not allow I A E A
inspections until 1992. In 1992, I A E A inspectors discovered discrepancies
indicating that a reprocessing plant, and possibly some laboratory-scale hot cells,
had been used more often than had been declared and that weapons-grade
plutonium could have been produced and separated. The covert plutonium
separation, if it took place, probably involved irradiated fuel from a 5 M W ( e )
"Experimental Power Reactor" at the Yongbyon site. In early 1993 the I A E A asked
2Q MW(e) is megawatts of electrical power output.
21 For literature on the North Korean nuclear weapons program, see Gordon, 1992; Spector et al., 1995;
Uranium Information Centre, 1995.
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for permission to inspect two undeclared waste sites, which might have revealed
more about the covert weapons program. The request was refused, and North
Korea announced an intention to withdraw from the N P T . In mid 1993 North
Korea announced it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the N P T .
In short, the North Korean weapons development program proceeded under
cover of a rudimentary nuclear power program plus reprocessing facilities. The
situation is still fluid, but it has eased somewhat since the 1994 signing of an
"Agreed Framework" between North Korea and the US. This involves the
building of two light-water nuclear power plants in North Korea; these reactors
are said to be less suitable for plutonium production than the 5 M W ( e )
Experimental Power Reactor and a partially-completed 50 M W ( e ) power reactor.32
The Agreement also provides for a verified freeze of the activities at the North
Korean facilities believed to have supported the weapons program - including
the 5 M W ( e ) and 50 M W ( e ) reactors and the reprocessing facilities - and the
eventual dismantling of those facilities.
North Korea also has an expanding ballistic missile program, which has been
supplied and/or supported by Egypt and Iran, and there have evidently been
efforts by the North Korean regime to sell long-range missiles to Iran and Libya.
North Korea has a 4 M W research reactor (called IRT) as well as a critical assembly
and a sub-critical assembly, all supplied by the Soviet Union and all under I A E A
safeguards. These research reactors do not seem to have been directly involved in
the weapons program.
Other countries in the Asian region warrant brief mention. South Korea has for
m a n y years hinted at the possibility of developing nuclear weapons, in part to
encourage the U S to maintain its military presence in the peninsula. (Reiss, 1988;
Kennedy, 1980.) There has been occasional interest in the development of nuclear
weapons in Taiwan, but this has been held in check by pressure from the U S and
the possibility of retaliation, such as a pre-emptive strike, from China. Both South
Korea and Taiwan have substantial nuclear power programs which would greatly
facilitate weapons development. (Booker, 1993; Arnett, 1995; de la Court et al.,
1982.) The technical and economic barriers to nuclear weapons development in
Japan are very low, although domestic and foreign political circumstances are far
less conducive (Reiss, 1988).

22 If the light-water reactors are built, they will presumably use L E U "caramel" fuel. Plutonium
production m a y be high but separating it from the spent fuel m a y be beyond North Korea's technical
capacity, and inspection provisions would further limit the potential to use the light-water reactors
in pursuit of a weapons capability. A s at early 1997 the light-water reactor project was proceeding,
though slowly ( A N S T O , 1997).
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From the 1970s until the late 1980s, South Africa pursued a nuclear weapons
program, initially under the guise of a peaceful nuclear explosives program and
then under the cover of a nuclear power program. Power reactors were not used to
produce plutonium for use in bombs, but the power program provided important,
and perhaps crucial, justification for nuclear supplies from France and other
countries. The major strategy for weapons production was the development of
enrichment facilities. This culminated in the production of six H E U bombs. In
1990, under instructions from President de Klerk, the enrichment plant was
decommissioned, the b o m b s were dismantled, the H E U was sent to the South
African Atomic Energy Commission for storage and possibly for use as fuel in the
Safari I research reactor. In 1991, South Africa acceded to the N P T and concluded a
full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. (Blix, 1995; Spector et al., 1995;
Reiss, 1988; Jaster, 1985; de la Court et al., 1982.)
Argentina pursued a covert nuclear weapons program for many years, refused to
adhere to the N P T , and did not sign the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty). A gaseous diffusion
enrichment plant w a s built. Construction of reprocessing facilities w a s pursued for
some years but was suspended in 1990. A number of sites and facilities were
developed for uranium mining, milling, and conversion, and for fuel fabrication.
A missile development program was pursued for some years. Argentina's nuclear
program was supported by a number of countries: power reactors were supplied by
Canada and West Germany, a heavy water plant was supplied by Switzerland, and
the Soviet Union was another supplier of nuclear equipment. Hot cells operated
from 1969-1972, with no international safeguards; figures on the amount of spent
fuel treated in the hot cells vary greatly. (Spector et al., 1995; Holdren, 1983; Spence,
1984; Poneman, 1985; de la Court et al., 1982.)
Brazil pursued a covert nuclear weapons program in response to Argentina's
program. It developed a modest nuclear power program, enrichment facilities
(including a large ultracentrifuge enrichment plant and several laboratory-scale
facilities), a limited reprocessing capability, a missile program, a uranium mining
and processing industry, and fuel fabrication facilities. Brazil was supplied with
nuclear materials and equipment by West Germany (which supplied reactors,
enrichment and reprocessing facilities), France, and the US. (Myers, 1985; Spector
et al., 1995; Spence, 1984.)
The regional nuclear arms race between Brazil and Argentina has eased. Both
countries have entered into a bilateral safeguards agreement; both have signed
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and ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty; both have agreed to I A E A inspections in
addition to those provided for under the bilateral agreement; and Argentina
acceded to the N P T in 1995. (Spector et al., 1995.) Both Brazil and Argentina
operate research reactors, but these reactors do not seem to have been directly
involved in the weapons programs.
Romania ratified the NPT in 1970, but a covert nuclear weapons development
program w a s pursued under the Ceausescu regime. Little information is publicly
available on the weapons program, but it is k n o w n that hot cells were used for
experimental plutonium extraction from irradiated research reactor fuel. After
Ceausescu's overthrow in 1989, the weapons program was terminated. Supply of
H E U for a 14 M W Triga research reactor was terminated by the U S in the late 1980s
because of the possibility of diversion of H E U for weapons production; the reactor
was shut d o w n from 1989-91 and it was converted to enable use of low-enriched
uranium (LEU) fuel. A nuclear power program has been in the planning stages for
some years in Romania, with five power reactors under construction as at 1995.
(Spector et al., 1995.)
Some effort has been expended towards a nuclear weapons capability in a few
countries other than those already discussed. For example nuclear weapons
research w a s carried out in Sweden until the late 1960s, in tandem with and under
cover of a nuclear power program (Johannson, 1986; Reiss, 1988). Another
example is Yugoslavia: according to recent revelations, laboratory-scale separation
of plutonium once took place, although the amount was very small. In addition,
large volumes of H E U were supplied by the USSR/Russia to fuel the 6.5 M W
research reactor (RA) at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences in Belgrade.
( A N S T O , 1997.)

Many other countries have the potential to develop nuclear weapons, with mor
or less effort and time, as judged by overall technical capacity and industrial
infrastructure, and/or operation of reactors, and/or stocks of weapons-useable
materials. These countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain. (Spector et al., 1995.) This is not to
suggest that these countries are on the brink of becoming nuclear weapons states
of course.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS A N D "THE NEW W O R L D ORDER"
This commentary focuses on the potential for further proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Firstly I will summarise the current state of nuclear weapons programs
around the world. The easing of tensions between the U S and the (former) Soviet
Union, along with partial reductions in their nuclear weapons arsenals, clearly
reduces the threat of nuclear war. Nuclear weapons programs have been
abandoned in a number of other countries in recent years, including South Africa,
Brazil, Argentina, Romania, and Algeria. So too the nuclear weapons programs of
Iraq and North Korea have been retarded, if only by force or coercion. O n the other
hand the five declared nuclear weapons states have no intention of completely
dismantling their nuclear arsenals. The India-Pakistan-China situation is a
nuclear hot-spot; and the precarious peace in the North Asia region is further
complicated by other rivalries such as those between North and South Korea, and
China and Taiwan. The Middle East is another nuclear hot-spot.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the broad contours of post Cold
political development in any detail whatsoever, but the briefest s u m m a r y is
necessary since the future of nuclear weapons is intimately bound u p with broader
political developments.33
Any hopes that the collapse of Stalinism would usher in an era of peace and
prosperity - a " N e w World Order" - have long since faded. The two Cold W a r
superpowers have themselves been involved in military excursions in the 1990s,
for example the U S involvement in the 1991 Gulf War, and Russia's war on
Chechnya. The collapse of Stalinism has "lifted the lid" on a number of longsuppressed regional tensions (e.g. the Balkans) and reshaped m a n y other regional
alliances and tensions (e.g. India-Pakistan-China).
The end of the Cold War has in some respects exacerbated the trend towards
polycentrism, but simultaneously broad regional alliances are forming and
reforming. The U S remains the largest economic and military power, in both cases
by far, and it has some advantages over other regional power blocs in that it is a
single integrated state, not so liable to centrifugal forces. Nevertheless the capacity
of the U S to unilaterally shape the world continues to wane, as shown for
example by declining U S influence within N A T O . Overall the U S decline is
serious but relative. Russia remains a powerful military and economic force,
notwithstanding considerable decline on both fronts, and still has some influence
in Eastern Europe if less than during the Cold War. Europe is emerging as an
22 Some aspects of the summary draw from Rees, 1990.
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economic and military power bloc with greater independence from the U S . A n d of
course there are powerful countries shaping the Asian region, not least Japan and
China.

In some respects the post Cold War world is similar to periods before and after
World W a r I, w h e n Germany, France, Russia, the U K , and the U S vied for
supremacy, with the instability of that competition heightened by unequal
military and economic strength between the various powers. This parallel has its
limits of course. It is complicated by factors such as the increasing importance of
middle powers (e.g. a number of Middle Eastern and Asian countries) and the
reshaping of relations between the imperialist powers and their former colonies.
Another important difference is that there is n o w a m u c h higher level of
militarisation all around the world. The Iran-Iraq war illustrated these trends:
both middle powers with nationalist regimes which replaced colonial control or
subservient client regimes of major powers; both putting m u c h effort into
militarisation (including as yet unsuccessful covert nuclear weapons programs);
both striving for regional control; and both manoeuvring in an environment in
which no single nation state, within or beyond the region, has such hegemony as
to be able to impose its will on the regional tensions.

Within the fluid situation of post Cold War politics it is not possible to pred
with confidence the alliances and antagonisms that will emerge, nor which
antagonisms will spill over into war. It can be said that, notwithstanding the
effects of the collapse of Stalinism, the post Cold W a r world is and will remain
marked by inter-state rivalry and competition, with the potential for political and
economic conflict to spill over into military conflict. S o m e underlying
fundamentals are still in place despite end of the Cold W a r , including the division
of the world into sovereign states, the need for economic expansion as a basic
condition of capital accumulation, competition for foreign markets and the
tensions and conflicts arising from that, and ongoing economic stagnation.

In addition to international antagonisms, there are many countries, particularl
those on the periphery of the capitalist system, where there is m u c h potential for
major domestic political upheaval, as the recent examples of R w a n d a , Zaire, and
Albania demonstrate. A number of countries with a significant nuclear
infrastructure are also prone to domestic political turmoil with unpredictable
consequences - examples here include South Korea and various Eastern European
countries including Russia.
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Given the fluidity of world politics, it is difficult to predict the impact of broader
political trends on nuclear weapons proliferation and vice versa. S o m e general
comments can be m a d e however. Several political factors encourage efforts to
acquire or produce nuclear weapons: nation states m a y want nuclear weapons to
counter threats to national security, to increase their capacity to achieve by force
political objectives outside their boundaries, or to increase regional or global
influence through the political and economic leverage that can be gained by
possession or pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Apart from the political considerations, there are technical and economic facto
and obstacles. These obstacles are insurmountable only for the poorest, least
developed countries. With time, money, and determination, m a n y developing
countries could develop nuclear weapons, as shown for example by the substantial
progress m a d e in India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, and Iraq towards a nuclear
weapons capability.

On the other hand the technical and economic obstacles are substantial, and ver
few countries have an independent capacity to produce nuclear weapons.
Consequently international nuclear commerce has been an important factor in the
spread and retardation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear trade has been complicated by
the interconnections between civil and military nuclear expertise and equipment.
Declining growth in the nuclear power industry in the 1970s, tied to economic
stagnation, had important implications for nuclear weapons proliferation. A s
domestic markets dwindled, the establishment of export markets became all the
more important for the viability of nuclear power industries. However export
markets for nuclear power were also declining. Thus competition for markets w a s
intense, all the more so given the increasing number of supplier countries. These
developments exacerbated the conflict between non-proliferation goals and the
pursuit of commercial profit in the nuclear power industry. Nuclear supplier
countries such France, Canada, and West Germany strengthened their hand
against the U S by showing a greater willingness to sell sensitive nuclear materials
and equipment. In this they were not alone - all or almost all nuclear exporting
countries, not least the U S , have been guilty to a greater or lesser degree. Of the
countries being targeted by suppliers for commercial deals, the most receptive
were precisely those most likely to harbour military ambitions. (Clausen, 1985;
Camilleri, 1984; Potter, 1985.)

Many supplier states have sold nuclear materials or equipment to countries with
nuclear weapons ambitions. France has supplied Brazil, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan,
South Africa and Pakistan. West Germany has supplied Brazil, Argentina, South

57

Africa, and Iran. Canada has supplied Argentina and India a m o n g other countries.
China has supplied Pakistan and Algeria a m o n g other countries. The Soviet
Union supplied Argentina, Iraq, and India, and subsequently Russia has supplied
Iran, Iraq, and India. This list is by no means exhaustive, nor does it give a sense of
h o w this trade fed into weapons programs; suffice it to say that all of these deals
m a y have assisted covert nuclear weapons programs and some of them certainly
did.34

While the US opposed more than a few of the transfers just listed, it has itself
been involved in similar deals - for example with Brazil, Pakistan, India, Israel,
Iran, Iraq, and South Africa. Nor w a s the U S averse to selling nuclear materials to
countries which had not ratified the N P T until the late 1970s - as at 1975, no less
than thirteen of the U S agreements for nuclear co-operation were with non-NPT
countries. (Camilleri, 1984, pp.245-249; Clausen, 1985.)
By the mid 1970s, the inadequacies of the NPT/IAEA non-proliferation regime
(discussed below) were openly acknowledged by politicians and by the nuclear
establishment. The implications of civil nuclear commerce for weapons
proliferation were equally stark, not least with the 1974 test explosion in India.
This led to the formulation of n e w proposals to prevent horizontal weapons
proliferation, particularly in the U S . During the Carter presidency, an elaborate
mixture of unilateral and multilateral initiatives w a s proposed to prevent
horizontal weapons proliferation. In 1978 some of the proposals formed the basis
of a Non-Proliferation Bill. This set criteria for cooperation agreements and export
licenses, such as attachment of full-scope safeguards agreements to all civil
nuclear commerce, prohibition of reprocessing without U S approval (where U S supplied materials or equipment w a s involved), and prohibition of third-party
transfer without U S approval. (Clausen, 1985; Camilleri, 1984, pp.255-257.)
However the US initiatives had only a modest impact on nuclear weapons
proliferation - and that impact w a s as m u c h positive as negative. The policy
exacerbated the trend for other countries to further develop their o w n nuclear fuel
cycle capabilities. Countries expanding their nuclear infrastructure included
Canada, several Western European countries, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea,
India, Pakistan, and South Africa. S o m e of these countries became exporters in
their o w n right. Various alliances were formed, sometimes independently of the
major capitalist powers, whether for civil or military nuclear programs. The result
w a s a progressively more heterogeneous and competitive international situation,

24 For literature on nuclear commerce and nuclear weapons, see Spector et al., 1995; Reiss, 1988; and
the contributions to Snyder and Wells, 1985.
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which n o single state could hope to control. (Clausen, 1985; Camilleri, 1984,
pp.269-273.)
In many cases, sales of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment have been
motivated simply by commercial profit and a desire to increase the viability and
competitiveness of national nuclear power industries. In other cases nuclear
commerce has also been embedded in larger strategic designs. International
nuclear trade has been inextricably intertwined with geopolitical alliances and
rivalries, with various colonial, neo-colonial, and imperialist relations drawn
u p o n and reshaped through nuclear commerce. Examples include U S efforts to
promote its regional objectives in the Middle East by offering to sell nuclear
reactors to both Egypt and Israel, and (wavering) efforts by the U S , France, and
West G e r m a n y to cement their relationship with Iran through nuclear power
projects. In some cases - such as the deal between West G e r m a n y and Brazil major capitalist countries sought to secure uranium supply in return for
assistance in nuclear (weapons) development. (Spence, 1984.)

The collapse of Stalinism has had no significant impact on the overall status o
nuclear power industries; nor has any other recent development. Fierce
competition for foreign markets will remain the n o r m for the foreseeable future,
and this will continue to complicate and contradict non-proliferation initiatives.

From what has been said it is clear that the conditions are in place for furthe
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. That said, there are numerous
obstacles and disincentives to nuclear weapons development - and further
disincentives to use existing nuclear weapons in conflict. A s discussed the

technical and economic obstacles are substantial if only rarely insurmountable. In
addition there are political barriers to weapons development: the possibility of
being subjected to military attack (ranging from pre-emptive strikes on nuclear
facilities35 to nuclear attacks); the possibility of external sanctions or
countermeasures (such as a regional arms race); the global non-proliferation
regime which restricts somewhat the availability of necessary materials and
equipment; and the possibility of internal opposition or revolt over the
acquisition of nuclear weapons. (Holdren, 1983; Reiss, 1988.)

25 A m o n g the candidates for future pre-emptive conventional strikes on nuclear facilities are some
Arab states (e.g. Iran, Syria, Libya) by Israel, North or South Korea by one another, and Taiwan by
China. (Arnett, 1995; Snyder, 1985.) Conventional strikes on nuclear facilities in Pakistan by India,
or vice versa, are also conceivable although they might not count as pre-emptive. There were report
in 1984 that the Indian government was considering a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan's enrichment
and reprocessing facilities. (Cronin, 1985.)
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Here I will focus on various non-proliferation initiatives and regulatory regimes,
the most important of which is the N P T / I A E A system. The N P T w a s born out of
international nuclear diplomacy in 1968. It divides the world into five weapons
states - the U S , the U K , France, China, and Russia - and non-weapons states. The
weapons states are bound not to supply other countries with nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, they are bound not to facilitate the efforts of any
non-weapons state to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, and they are
bound to m o v e towards nuclear disarmament themselves. Non-weapons states
are bound not to accept the transfer of nuclear weapons nor to manufacture them
or to seek assistance in doing so. They also undertake to accept the safeguards and
verification system of the IAEA, which is in effect closely linked to the N P T . O n e
purpose of the I A E A is to monitor safeguarded materials and facilities to detect
any diversion into military programs. A s at 1995, the I A E A had 122 m e m b e r states,
and 188 countries had some form of safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
(Booker, 1993; Spector et al, 1995.)
There are polarised opinions in relation to the NPT/IAEA non-proliferation
system. M a n y commentators are highly critical, arguing that the N P T / I A E A
system suffers from numerous limitations, contradictions, and loopholes.36
A m o n g the most strident of the critics is Falk (1983, p.190), w h o argues that the
defects in the world's non-proliferation regime m a k e it "half-blind, toothless and
mute".

Critics note that the safeguards provisions of the NPT and other such treaties
no relevance for countries that do not become signatories, with some notable nonN P T states being India, Pakistan, and Israel. It is advantageous for countries
wishing to develop civil nuclear programs to accede to the N P T / I A E A system
because it allows for freer non-military nuclear transfers. However the
international marketplace for nuclear materials and services is so highly
competitive that countries which have not signed the N P T have, on occasions,
been able to find suppliers, even for sensitive materials with potential for
diversion to weapons programs.

For countries which do accede to the NPT/IAEA system, this does not preclude a
covert weapons program. In such cases, with Iraq being the obvious example, N P T
status can absolve supplier states of moral responsibility for dubious sales.
Recipient states, if members of the N P T , can also pressure supplier states because

26 See Gilinsky, 1985; Findlay, 1990; Camilleri, 1984, pp.242-244; Booker, 1993; Snyder, 1985; Falk,
1983, ch.9; Moglewer, 1981; Froggatt, 1991; Richter, 1981; Wheeler, 1995.
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of the possibility that withdrawal from the N P T would encourage other states to
do likewise.
Other limitations of the NPT/IAEA system can be listed as follows:
•

the N P T allows participating countries to design, develop, and assemble the
non-nuclear parts of nuclear weapons;

•

signatories can withdraw from the N P T with just 90 days notice;

•

countries are generally warned in advance of I A E A inspections, and such
inspections do not preclude a covert weapons program. Diversions of small
quantities of fissile material m a y not be detected by I A E A inspectors;

•

I A E A inspectors do not usually have the authority to seek out undeclared or
clandestine facilities or materials;

•

there is the possibility of countries taking advantage of a safeguarded facility to
build an unsafeguarded duplicate, as in Pakistan for example;

•

there are some provisions for N P T parties to exempt some nuclear materials
and facilities from safeguards - for example areas can be declared out-of-bounds
to I A E A inspectors because of alleged radioactive contamination;

•

I A E A safeguards are impotent against theft or sabotage of nuclear material, nor
do they cover international transport of nuclear materials;

•

the I A E A inspection program is under-resourced and sometimes incapable of
adequately carrying out inspections; and

•

the I A E A statute contains secrecy provisions which are interpreted broadly weak excuses m a y be accepted as an explanation for discrepancies, depending
on the circumstances, and those discrepancies are not necessarily revealed
publicly.

However the NPT/IAEA system has its supporters (e.g. Blix, 1995). Even critics
generally argue for a strengthening of the system, rather than its abandonment.
While the above-mentioned criticisms of the N P T / I A E A are justifiable, it is
equally true that the N P T / I A E A system has helped to stop or retard some covert
weapons programs. The underlying philosophy is to accelerate and facilitate civil
nuclear development and transfers, and to prevent weapons proliferation by
imposing conditions on (non-weapons) N P T / I A E A m e m b e r states such as a
commitment not to pursue weapons programs and a willingness to open facilities
to monitoring. It can be safely assumed that if the first part of this strategy
(encouraging the spread of civil nuclear technologies) w a s pursued without the
non-proliferation commitments and the monitoring, a greater number of
countries would have developed nuclear weapons.
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O n e premise of the N P T / I A E A inspection regime is that undeclared nuclear
activities would be detected by intelligence activities, and thus the I A E A has
historically played little or no role in the detection of undeclared facilities. After
the 1990 N P T Review Conference, the potential to use the Special Inspections
provisions of N P T / I A E A safeguards agreements has been taken more seriously all the more so after the 1991 Gulf W a r and the discovery of the extent of the Iraqi
nuclear weapons program. (Uranium Information Centre, 1995.) In addition, the
N P T / I A E A safeguards regime has been strengthened in the 1990s with technical
improvements to safeguarding procedures, tightened supplier-state export
controls, increased United Nations Security Council involvement in enforcing
non-proliferation measures, and the accession to the N P T / I A E A regime of a
number of countries including Algeria, Argentina, China, France, South Africa,
and a number of Eastern European countries. (Spector et al., 1995.) In 1995 the 178
N P T m e m b e r states indefinitely extended the Treaty. The N P T commitment to
nuclear disarmament by the declared weapons states was confirmed though
without a timetable for disarmament.
In addition to the NPT/IAEA safeguards regime, there are a number of other
international non-proliferation initiatives which warrant brief mention. S o m e
supplier-state export control agreements are in operation. The N P T Export
Committee (the Zangger Committee) w a s formed in 1974. Soon after, an
overlapping group of suppliers, this one including France, w a s formed to control
supply of sensitive nuclear materials - this was k n o w n as the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) or the London Suppliers Group. S o m e of the proclamations
stemming from these export control groups were ill-defined to say the least, such
as the N S G guideline to exercise self-restraint in the transfer of sensitive materials
and technologies such as enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water. The N S G s
guidelines did not require suppliers to require N P T adherence or I A E A
inspections as a precondition for supply. (Camilleri, 1984, p.250-254.) A s with the
N P T / I A E A regime, some efforts have been m a d e to tighten N S G guidelines in the
1990s. After the 1991 Gulf War, N S G export controls were broadened to cover a
large number of dual-use items, and also included a requirement that future
exports be conditional on the recipient countries accepting I A E A inspection of all
their peaceful nuclear activities. This last provision effectively precludes nuclear
commerce between N S G m e m b e r countries and India, Israel, and Pakistan.
(Spector et al., 1995.)
Various bilateral or regional treaties have been instituted over the years to
prevent nuclear weapons development or to reduce stockpiles - these include
treaties between the U S and Russia, Brazil and Argentina, the 1986 Treaty of
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Raratonga which includes a number of Asia Pacific countries, the South American
Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the 1996 African Pelindaba Treaty.
In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), with 158 votes in favour, three against (India, Bhutan, Libya),
and a number of countries abstaining or absent (including Syria and North Korea).
It must be signed by 44 n a m e d nations before it comes into force, including India,
Israel, and Pakistan. India has refused to sign the C T B T , citing the failure of the
Treaty to establish a firm timetable for the elimination of existing weapons.
Pakistan voted in favour of the Treaty but said it would not sign unless India did.
Britain and Russia said they would not sign if entry-into-force provisions were
changed, i.e. if the rules were changed. It seems likely that the C T B T will not
achieve legal status because of the dissenters, but it is nonetheless likely to have a
positive impact in preventing further weapons testing. (Hallam, 1996; 1996B;
A N S T O , 1996.)
The CTBT is likely to further entrench the nuclear dominance of those countries
which already have nuclear weapons, in particular countries with advanced
weapons programs; they can m o v e to simulated tests and sub-critical tests. N o n weapons states will find it hard to develop weapons without testing. Proliferants
are likely to place greater emphasis on development of weapons types which can
be developed with greatest reliability without testing (in particular H E U , gun-type
designs) as opposed to complicated designs which would have low reliability
without testing (e.g. multi-stage thermonuclear bombs). (Spector et al., 1995.)
Similarly, efforts to limit or stop further production of weapons-grade fissile
material will further entrench the position of those countries with existing
stockpiles of H E U and /or plutonium.

2.4. RESEARCH REACTORS
THE HISTORY OF RESEARCH REACTORS
RESEARCH REACTORS A N D NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In this section, the first task is to discuss in general terms the place of resea
reactors within the broader scope of nuclear development. Then I discuss the use
of research reactors in covert nuclear weapons programs.
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THE HISTORY OF RESEARCH REACTORS
Research reactor programs serve one or more of three broad functions. Firstly,
research reactors are often used in support of nuclear power programs - to
develop expertise, test reactor materials or fuels, and so on. Secondly, research
reactors can be used directly or indirectly in the development of nuclear weapons.
Thirdly, research reactor programs have increasingly taken on a life of their o w n ,
being used for a plethora of civil scientific, medical, and commercial functions.
The history and trajectory of research reactors are taken u p in detail in a later
chapter (6.3) on radioisotope production; for the m o m e n t some general comments
will suffice.

Definitions vary, but research reactors are generally considered to include all
reactors except commercial (and sometimes prototype) power reactors and
dedicated weapons (plutonium) production reactors.

In the post World War II period, a great deal of research was conducted in supp
of nuclear power and weapons. This entailed the construction of a large number
of research reactors including prototype, test, and experimental reactors as well as
multipurpose research reactors. This developmental phase did not give w a y to
later phases, such as commercialisation of nuclear power, in any neat manner. For
some years a variety of nuclear power reactor types were under development, all
of which required major research projects involving research reactors. Even once
U S light-water reactor technology began to dominate nuclear power industries in the U S and elsewhere - considerable effort w a s still invested in nuclear power
research and m u c h of this involved research reactors.
Any country embarking on a nuclear power program, regardless of the extent to
which the facilities will be domestically produced or imported, must first develop
an appropriate nuclear science and technology base and an administrative and
regulatory infrastructure. Often this development will involve the purchase of
one or more research reactors which can range from zero-power facilities to large
test reactors. If the later development of nuclear power is planned, m e d i u m or
high-power multipurpose research reactors are the most appropriate - they enable
the training of a range of personnel, they can be used for research relevant to the
proposed power program, they require the development of a significant regulatory
infrastructure, and they can be used for sundry other scientific, medical, and
commercial purposes. (Mooradian et al., 1972.)
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The growth and spread of research reactors w a s impressive, with the number
peaking at 373 operating reactors in 1975. Most research reactors were built in
advanced industrial countries, but over 60 countries have built or purchased
research reactors. Nuclear supplier states sought to stimulate and then supply n e w
markets for nuclear power, and sales of research reactors were an important aspect
of that strategy. M a n y developing countries acquired small research reactors, often
on generous terms provided by supplier states intent on stimulating markets for
nuclear power - in some cases research reactors were donated by supplier
countries. Over 100 U S research reactors were sold abroad, in m a n y cases
facilitated by generous financial loan arrangements from the U S Export-Import
Bank. (Spence, 1984, pp.82-83.) Other suppliers - such as Germany, the U K , France,
and Canada - followed in the path of the U S . The promotional wing of the I A E A
has also played an important role in the development of nuclear facilities in
developing countries including the transfer and operation of research reactors.
S o m e developing countries went on to develop modest nuclear power programs,
but most did not and only operate research reactors if any reactors at all.
Radioisotope production and nuclear medicine were bound up in these
developments - such applications were prominent in the sales pitches for more
than a few research reactor sales to developing countries (de la Court et al., 1982).
A s Pearson (1994, p.30) from Greenpeace puts it:
The application of nuclear technology in areas such as medicine and
agriculture provides the nuclear industry with a foot in the door to
developing countries. By pushing smaller scale, "benign" nuclear

technologies, and the infrastructure and expertise needed to use them, th

countries can be lured down the road to the big ticket items, such as nuclea
power plants.

RESEARCH REACTORS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Research reactor programs can be used, overtly or covertly, to assist in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons in several ways. The most direct link is the use
of research reactors for plutonium production. Another link is that H E U research
reactor fuel can be diverted for weapons production. Another possibility is that
H E U can be extracted from spent research reactor fuel. The operation of research
reactors can also provide some justification for the development of enrichment
and/or reprocessing facilities, which can facilitate weapons programs. M o r e
generally, research reactor programs involve the development of a nuclear
infrastructure which lowers the barriers to weapons development.
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It would be completely impossible to produce plutonium-239 weapons from some
research reactors, such as zero-power test facilities. It would be extremely difficult
to use m a n y other research reactors to produce plutonium weapons because of
insufficient production volumes or insufficient plutonium purity - for example
m a n y of the low-power reactors in developing countries would not be suitable.
Nor are research reactors fuelled with H E U suitable for plutonium production.37
Similarly, the potential to use research reactor programs in support of HEU
weapons development should not be overstressed. The fuel stockpiles and
throughput of m a n y HEU-fuelled research reactors are too small to be of m u c h
concern. A n d it would be difficult or impossible to use research reactors fuelled
with L E U or natural uranium in support of an H E U weapons program (though
these reactors are more suitable than HEU-fuelled reactors for plutonium
production).38
Despite the above qualifications, research reactors can be and have been used
support of nuclear weapons programs. Even low-power reactors can be of concern.
For example the Iraqi IRT-2000 research reactor, which originally operated at 2
M W but w a s later upgraded to 5 M W , could have produced sufficient plutonium
for one weapon over a period of several years. This risk, albeit small, w a s
amplified by the fact that I A E A inspections of the reactor were infrequent because
of the low-risk status of the reactor. (Snyder, 1985.)

In general terms, the most useful research reactors for covert weapons program
are m e d i u m to high-power reactors fuelled with natural uranium or very lightly
enriched uranium (thus producing significant quantities of plutonium-239), or
m e d i u m to high-power reactors which use significant quantities of H E U fuel
(which can be diverted before irradiation, or H E U can be extracted from spent
fuel).39 M a n y other research reactors can be used for weapons-related research, or
more generally to develop nuclear expertise. It is notable that research reactors
operate in roughly twice the number of countries as power reactors: in 1996, 59
countries operated research reactors and 32 operated power reactors ( A N S T O ,
1996F; 1997).

2Z However, as discussed in section 2.3, it is possible to "blanket" an H E U reactor core with natural
uranium and thus generate significant volumes of Pu-239.
2S Definitions vary, but L E U is generally considered to be < 2 0 % uranium-235 by weight, with H E U
containing 2 0 + % uranium-235. Some categorisations also include medium-enriched uranium (MEU),
with 20-50% uranium-235. A weapon could be produced with M E U , but it would be a cumbersome
process and a crude device; H E U is far more suitable.
22 For general discussions on research reactors and nuclear weapons, see Wohlstetter et al., 1979,
pp.167-169; Fainberg, 1983; Holdren, 1983; 1983B.
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Sales of research reactors are an important part of the broader picture of dubious
nuclear trade. The major capitalist powers have sold research reactors to a number
of countries with weapons ambitions: recipient countries include India (sales and
support from Canada, the U S , the U K , etc.), Pakistan (US, France), Algeria
(France), South Africa (US), Iran (US), Iraq (France), Israel (France), Argentina (US,
West Germany), South Korea (US), Taiwan (Canada, US), and Brazil (US). (There
is no evidence of serious pursuit of a nuclear weapons program in Chile, but
research reactor sales and support to Chile by the U S , the U K , and Spain could also
be questioned.) The Soviet Union has also been involved in some questionable
research reactor sales, including sales to Libya, Egypt, and North Korea. China has
a long history of dubious nuclear sales; with respect to research reactors, China has
sold two small research reactors to Iran, it supplied Algeria with the 10-15 M W Es
Salam research reactor, and it is assisting Pakistan with the 50-70 M W research
reactor at Khusab. Several other countries have developed reactor industries such as Argentina and India - with further potential for domestic use of research
reactors in support of weapons programs or exports of research reactors to
countries with weapons ambitions. Thus India has used research reactors in
support of domestic nuclear weapons development and has reportedly been
negotiating the sale of a research reactor to Iran. Most research reactors in
Argentina have been indigenously designed and built, and for some years there
were plans to build a 70 M W research reactor in Argentina which would not be
subject to any international safeguards and would have enabled plutonium
weapons production without violation of I A E A safeguards agreements. While
Argentina has struggled to establish a nuclear export industry, some sales have
been m a d e including the sale of a small research reactor to Algeria. (Poneman,
1985; Watford, 1993; Spector et al., 1995; Carnesale, 1981; de la Court et al., 1982.)
The most direct use of research reactors for nuclear weapons development is
extraction of plutonium-239 from irradiated research reactor fuel. The two most
important examples of this are India and Israel. In both cases, research reactors
have been used in conjunction with reprocessing facilities to produce substantial
volumes of plutonium for nuclear weapons. In Iraq, IAEA-safeguarded reactors
have been used to produce small quantities of plutonium, and larger volumes
would probably have been produced and separated if not for the bombing of Iraq's
research reactors on four occasions from 1979 to 1991. In Romania, experimental
plutonium extraction, using spent research reactor fuel, m a y have taken place in
support of the covert weapons program prior to Ceausescu's overthrow in 1989.
Similarly, there m a y have been covert plutonium separation in North Korea,
probably involving irradiated fuel from the 5 M W ( e ) "Experimental Power
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Reactor" at the Yongbyon site. (It is a moot point whether this Experimental
Power Reactor counts as a research reactor, a power reactor, or a dedicated
plutonium-producing weapons reactor - suffice it here to note that the term
research reactor can be a misnomer.) In Pakistan, one of the two operating
research reactors, PARR-I, m a y have been used to produce tritium for advanced
nuclear weapons despite being subject to I A E A safeguards, and the 50-70 M W
research reactor under construction at Khusab m a y provide Pakistan with its first
supply of unsafeguarded spent fuel. In Algeria, there m a y have been plans to
produce plutonium for weapons in the 15 M W Es Salam research reactor,
although that it less likely n o w that the reactor is under I A E A safeguards and
Algeria has acceded to the N P T . In Taiwan, it w a s suspected that the Canadiansupplied T R R research reactor w a s being used in conjunction with a small
reprocessing plant for weapons development; under pressure from the U S , the
reprocessing plant w a s dismantled in 1977 and the T R R reactor w a s shut d o w n in
1987 although there are n o w plans to restart the reactor.40

Tied in with plutonium production is the question of reprocessing facilities fo
plutonium extraction. The longstanding view that reprocessing is a legitimate part
of the nuclear fuel cycle - and perhaps a necessary step in the longer term - has
legitimated the establishment of reprocessing facilities in a number of countries
and has assisted in a number of covert weapons programs. The five declared
weapons states all have substantial facilities for separation of weapons-grade
plutonium. A number of other countries - including India, Israel, Iraq, and
Pakistan - have sought help from advanced supplier states to develop
reprocessing facilities. North Korea apparently succeeded in constructing a
reprocessing facility without foreign assistance. In Argentina and Brazil,
construction of reprocessing facilities w a s suspended. A number of other countries
have expended some effort towards the establishment of reprocessing facilities,
and in some cases, such as Taiwan and South Korea, this m a y have been
associated with weapons ambitions (notwithstanding the substantial nuclear
power programs in those countries). (Camilleri, 1984; Spector et al., 1995.)
In most of the cases listed above, nuclear power programs have provided the
major rationale for developing reprocessing facilities, with research reactors being
of less importance. That said, reprocessing facilities have certainly been used in
several countries in support of covert weapons programs.

4Q The main source for this information on plutonium production is Spector et al., 1995. See also the
references listed in the survey of weapons programs in section 2.3. of mis thesis. The comments on
Taiwan are drawn from Independent Committee of Inquiry, 1984; Wohlstetter et al., 1979, pp.168.
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The use of hot cells - lead-shielded radiochemical laboratories with remote
handling equipment for examining and processing radioactive materials - is
more closely related to research reactors. Hot cells can, if adequately equipped, be
used to extract plutonium from spent fuel. The simpler and cheaper the facilities,
the lower the volume and the lower the purity (and thus the weapons-useability)
of the plutonium. Hot cells are "dual-use" facilities: they can be used for
radioisotope processing, and numerous other non-military purposes, as well as for
plutonium separation. Thus for example there has been a dispute as to whether
one of the facilities at the North Korean Yongbyon site is a "radiochemical
laboratory" or a plutonium separation facility. Unsafeguarded hot cells, supplied
by Italy, have been used in Iraq for plutonium separation. In Argentina, hot cells
operated from 1969-1972 and m a y have been used to extract spent fuel. A small
volume of plutonium w a s separated from hot cells in Romania. In Brazil,
laboratory-scale reprocessing facilities were completed but are not k n o w n to have
operated. A hot cell facility w a s built in Pakistan, with French and Belgian
assistance, and might have been used for plutonium separation even though
larger-scale facilities were also built. H a d Algeria's covert weapons program
proceeded, the existing hot cells could have been used for plutonium separation as
well as for radioisotope processing. (Spector et al., 1995; Cronin, 1985; Snyder, 1985;
de la Court et al., 1982.)
Civil nuclear programs - involving power and/or research reactors - are also
implicated in the development of H E U bombs. There are three methods of using
the cover of a civil nuclear program for H E U weapons production. O n e is
diversion of imported H E U . A second possibility is extraction of H E U from spent
reactor fuel. A third, less direct connection is that civil nuclear programs provide
justification for the development of enrichment facilities. Generally a nuclear
power program is a far more plausible rationale for the pursuit of a domestic
enrichment capability than a research reactor program, because of the cost and
complexity of enrichment facilities. In other cases enrichment is seen as a means
of adding value to uranium exports. Justifications for the development of
enrichment facilities cannot neatly be separated from each other. In Australia, for
example, enrichment research w a s pursued for numerous reasons - adding value
to uranium exports, doubts about the ongoing availability of H E U fuel for HIFAR,
the possibility of enriched-uranium power reactors being introduced, and the
research m a y also have been pursued to keep open the nuclear weapons option
(see chapter 3.4).

Historically there has been more interest in, and concern about, the production
plutonium for covert weapons programs; plutonium w a s easier and cheaper to
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produce than H E U . However improvements in enrichment technology have
altered this balance somewhat. Another consideration is that weapons can be
m a d e from a simpler design using H E U .
Most of the countries which have pursued covert weapons programs have built or
purchased uranium enrichment facilities or have pursued research into uranium
enrichment. (Indeed most of these countries have also put some effort into
plutonium production and separation, thus doubling their options.) In some
cases, such as South Africa and Pakistan, a nuclear power program has provided
legitimacy for the development of enrichment plants which have been used to
produce H E U bombs. In other cases, such as Argentina and Brazil, a nuclear power
program has provided legitimacy for the development of enrichment technology
but the work has not progressed beyond the research stage, or enrichment facilities
exist but have not been used to produce H E U . In a number of other countries,
research reactor programs have been implicated in covert H E U weapons
programs. O n e of the strategies pursued in Iraq was diversion of imported H E U
fuel supplied for research reactors. In 1980, Iraq announced that I A E A inspections
would be temporarily suspended because of the circumstances of the Iran-Iraq war,
and 26 pounds of H E U were removed from the core of the low-power T a m m u z II
reactor and stored in an underground canal. Something similar happened during
the 1991 Gulf War. So too domestic enrichment work was in progress before the
bombing and/or dismantling of m u c h of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure in the early
1990s. A centrifuge enrichment program m a y have been pursued in Iran - to the
extent that there was any attempt to justify this covert research in relation to the
civil nuclear program, it could have been justified for production of fuel for
research reactors or for the planned nuclear power program. Israel has
concentrated on plutonium weapons production but has m a d e some progress in
the development of enrichment technology. To the extent that there is any
pretence that the Israeli nuclear program is a non-military program, it would be
possible that enrichment work could be justified for the production of H E U for the
IRR-1 HEU-fuelled reactor; alternatively the pretence of a nuclear power program
in the longer term m a y be relevant. (Spector et al, 1995; Spence, 1984; Bellany,
1972; Holdren, 1983; Falk, 1983, ch.9.)
There are other cases where imported HEU research reactor fuel has raised
concerns even if there has not been any diversion for weapons production so far
as is publicly known. The supply of H E U to Libya by the Soviet Union (and n o w
Russia) has been contentious. If there was a more serious pursuit of nuclear
weapons in Sweden, diversion of H E U fuel, supplied by the U S for the R 2 research
reactor, might have been a feasible option, safeguards notwithstanding. Just before
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pulling out of Vietnam, the U S removed 12-13 kg of 2 0 % enriched uranium from
the Dalat research reactor, which it had supplied. Supply of H E U research reactor
fuel from the U S has been suspended a number of times over the years because of
concerns about the potential for diversion: there is no evidence of diversion of
H E U in South Africa, but the U S supplied 104 kgs of H E U research reactor fuel
before supply was cut off in the mid 1970s; supply to Mexico was cut off for some
months in 1978; supply to Israel was suspended in 1981; and supply to Romania
was cut off from 1989. There are a number of other examples of supply of H E U
research reactor fuel, or H E U targets for radioisotope production, being suspended
or refused by the US. These instances reflect ongoing concern, dating from the
1970s, about the international trade in H E U and the weapons implications of the
trade. (Jaster, 1988; Harby, 1988; Spector et al, 1995; de la Court et al., 1982.)

Leaving aside specific examples, it is widely acknowledged that research reac
are important in the H E U economy. The level of uranium enrichment for power
reactors rarely exceeds 3-5% uranium-235, and this fuel is far short of the level of
enrichment necessary for weapons production. M a n y research reactors, by
contrast, are fuelled with H E U . In the 1950s and 1960s, low-power research reactors
were built around the world using L E U fuel. L E U fuel was chosen in part because
it is not suitable for weapons manufacture. However L E U fuels gave w a y to H E U ,
which can be used for longer in the reactor core, and can generate a higher
neutron flux which is preferable for purposes such as fundamental research and
materials testing. In addition, the use of H E U fuel facilitates the generation of high
neutron fluxes and this facilitates radioisotope production; this was another
reason for the use of H E U fuels. H E U became readily available and was used not
only for high-power research reactors but also for low-power reactors for which
L E U would have been sufficient if not ideal. (Muranaka, 1983.) The U S has been
the main supplier of H E U , since it had a near monopoly of enrichment facilities
for m a n y years, and has exported over 25 000 kg of H E U - most of this (85%) was
sold to the 12 Euratom countries, but a total of 51 countries have received H E U for
use in research reactors from the US. (Takats et al., 1993.)

The use of HEU fuel in research reactors has provided impetus for the producti
of and trade in H E U with implications for weapons proliferation. The weapons
implications gave rise to the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactor
(RERTR) Program, a U S initiative which arose out of the 1978 Nuclear NonProliferation Act. The primary aim of the R E R T R program is the conversion of
HEU-fuelled reactors to enable use of L E U fuels. The implications of the H E U ->
L E U reactor conversion program for radioisotope production will be taken up in
chapter seven; for the m o m e n t m y concern is with weapons proliferation. A
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considerable proportion of HEU-fuelled research reactors in the U S , or U S supplied research reactors in other countries, have been converted to L E U . S o m e
in-principle agreement to support the program has also been given by Russia and
China. These signs are promising, but it is likely that the connection between
HEU-fuelled research reactors and weapons proliferation will be an issue for the
foreseeable future. A significant number of reactors still use H E U fuel. S o m e
reactor operators are refusing to convert reactors to L E U fuel - the technical
logistics of reactor conversion are neither simple nor fully developed and the
effect of conversion on reactor performance is a contested issue. There is little or
no likelihood that weapons ambitions are influencing decisions in those countries
where some reactor operators are refusing conversion (e.g. Belgium, the
Netherlands, South Africa, the US). Nevertheless reactor conversion raises a
familiar dilemma facing all attempts to deal with proliferation concerns with
technical fixes - countries wishing to acquire a nuclear weapons capability using
materials gained for or from research reactors are precisely those countries the
least likely to be interested in the acquisition of or conversion to proliferationresistant technologies. Another limitation of the reactor conversion program is
that conversion to L E U will increase plutonium production.
As well as the potential for research reactors to be used for nuclear weapons
production via the plutonium or H E U routes, research reactors can be used for
weapons-related research - perhaps the most striking example is the 19 M W
Purnima research reactor in India, which w a s essential for theoretical calculations
relating to nuclear explosions and thus played an important role in the Indian
nuclear weapons program including the 1974 test explosion (Reiss, 1988, ch.7).
There would be m a n y other examples of research being used for weapons-related
research. This issue is greatly confused by the overlap between civil and military
nuclear technologies - for example materials testing research is often ambiguous
in its potential applications.
More generally, research reactor programs, as with nuclear power programs,
require the establishment of a nuclear infrastructure, involving various nuclear
fuel cycle technologies, technical expertise, the establishment of nuclear trade
links, and so on. Development of this infrastructure can facilitate the later pursuit
of nuclear weapons even if the original intention w a s only to pursue non-military
nuclear development. Sometimes this has occurred through the intermediary of
nuclear power: research reactor programs have been developed as a forerunner
and/or an adjunct to nuclear power, and the power program is then entangled in
a covert weapons program. Thus in a number of countries - e.g. South Africa,
Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil - power programs have been used as cover for covert
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weapons development, with little or no direct involvement of research reactors in
the weapons program, yet in all these countries research reactors played an
important role in the development of the nuclear infrastructure.41
The indirect links between research reactors and covert weapons programs are
complex and little is to be gained by commenting and speculating on all the cases
where research reactors have, or m a y have been, indirectly involved in covert
weapons programs. A number of points can be illustrated using the example of
South Africa. There is no evidence that research reactors were used to produce
plutonium for weapons in South Africa, nor that H E U research reactor fuel was
diverted. Yet the two research reactors, Safari I and II, were probably of indirect
value to the weapons program. They might have been used for weapons-related
research - for example neutron generation and control research, or materials
testing (Jaster, 1985). The operation of research reactors w a s certainly important in
the development of a nuclear infrastructure in South Africa, and that
development w a s certainly important for the weapons program. The termination
of U S supply of H E U research reactor fuel gave some impetus to, and justification
for, the pursuit of a domestic enrichment capability, which w a s crucial to the
weapons program. Lastly, as in Argentina, the supply of a research reactor (Safari I)
to South Africa facilitated the later indigenous design and construction of a
research reactor (Safari II) which w a s not under international safeguards (Jaster,
1985).

Since much of this thesis is concerned with the medical radioisotope industry, i
worth noting the connections between radioisotope production and covert
weapons programs. O n e of the direct links between radioisotope production and
weapons proliferation is plutonium extraction using hot cells. Another close link
is that the use of H E U reactor fuel facilitates production of high specific activity
radioisotopes42 - this was one of the reasons for the historical trend towards using
H E U fuel, and it m a y be a reason some reactor operators have refused conversion
to L E U fuel more recently (see chapter 7.7).
Another set of links between radioisotope production and covert weapons
programs involves enrichment facilities. In Iraq, it w a s discovered in 1991 that
large calutrons - electromagnetic isotope separation devices, also k n o w n as highcurrent mass spectrometers - were being used for uranium enrichment.

^ 1 A related issue is whether it makes more sense to pursue a covert weapons program under cover of a
nuclear power program or a research reactor program. This debate is taken u p in The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists by Fainberg (1983) and Holdren (1983; 1983B).
^2 Specific activity refers to the ratio of the desired radioisotope to contaminants (which can include
isotopes of the desired product).
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Calutrons are also used to enrich stable isotopes, which are used, a m o n g other
purposes, as feedstock for the production of some medical radioisotopes. There
have been concerns that a small, Chinese-supplied calutron might have been (and
might yet be) used for uranium enrichment in Iran. (Spector et al., 1995.) A s with
electromagnetic enrichment facilities such as calutrons, other enrichment
technologies, including lasers and gas centrifuges, can be used both for uranium
enrichment and for the separation of isotopes for radioisotope production (Hardy,
1996).
Beyond the more-or-less direct connections between radioisotope production and
covert weapons programs, there are more general connections. Medical
radioisotope production is routinely promoted as one of the most beneficial uses
of research reactors. This gives impetus and legitimacy to research reactor
programs, despite the potential for covert weapons development. O n e notable
example is Iraq, where the nuclear program was kick-started with a small research
reactor and a radioisotope laboratory, both supplied by the Soviet Union.

As discussed in the following chapter, Australia is yet another country where a
small-scale civil nuclear program, based on a research reactor, became entangled
in a covert weapons program for a time. Moreover Australia is one of m a n y
countries where propagandising about the wonders of nuclear medicine, and thus
the importance of reactor radioisotope production, has been used repeatedly as an
ideological prop for a research reactor program.
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CHAPTER THREE:
NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA
3.1. INTRODUCTION
3.2. THE EARLY YEARS
3.3. THE AUSTRALIAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
3.4. NUCLEAR POWER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A N D "PEACEFUL"
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
3.5. THE AUSTRALIAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION IN
SEARCH OF A MISSION: 1970-1987
3.6. THE AUSTRALIAN NUCLEAR SCIENCE A N D
TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION
3.7. ANTI-NUCLEAR OPPOSITION IN AUSTRALIA
3.8. CONCLUSION

3.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses the history and current status of nuclear projects in
Australia. The primary aim is to provide context for the analysis, in chapter four,
of the H I F A R replacement controversy and in particular the 1992-93 Research
Reactor Review. This chapter can also be read as a case study of issues discussed in
the previous chapter, in particular the rise and fall of nuclear power and the
intersection of civil and military nuclear programs.

There are two recurring themes in Australia's nuclear history - military concern
and the troubled history of A N S T O and its predecessor the Australian Atomic
Energy Commission (AAEC). The military concerns include active support of the
nuclear weapons programs of the U S and the U K , in particular through the
hosting of British weapons tests and U S military bases. In addition, there has been
wavering interest in a domestic nuclear weapons capability, and a willingness to
pursue civil nuclear projects in such a w a y as to lower the barriers to weapons
development. A second focus in this chapter is the A A E C / A N S T O : from its
historical role as the guardian of Australia's entry into the nuclear age, the
A A E C / A N S T O has gradually been downgraded to just another public-sector civil
science agency, though not completely and not without resistance. These two
themes - the weapons connections, and the rise and fall of the A A E C / A N S T O are summarised in the concluding section (3.8) of this chapter and are related to
the H I F A R replacement controversy in chapter four.
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3.2. THE EARLY YEARS
Until recently, the major sources of information on the history of nuclear
development in Australia were Moyal's (1975) study of the A A E C , the selective
sketches found in literature produced by nuclear or scientific agencies, and m a n y
studies, mostly by academics or activists, of particular issues such as the uranium
mining industry or the British weapons tests. In 1992, Alice Cawte's Atomic
Australia w a s published; it is a comprehensive history of m a n y aspects of nuclear
development in Australia and I draw from it substantially in this chapter.
A rudimentary, uncoordinated nuclear program took hold in Australia after
World W a r II. The federal government played a leading role, as did a few highprofile scientists. Early initiatives included the establishment of nuclear advisory
bodies, the establishment of a school of nuclear physics at the Australian National
University, and some limited research by universities and science agencies into
topics such as uranium geology. (Moyal, 1975; Cockburn and Ellyard, 1981; Cawte,
1992.)
There was little interest in the domestic construction of nuclear weapons in the
post-war period. Certainly there were concerns and insecurities about defence indeed there w a s a good deal of paranoia about perceived threats from the north.
However there were also cost considerations and the perceived security afforded
by alliances with the U S and the U K . A s Cawte (1992, ch.2) argues, nuclear policies
were guided by a vision of national economic development. Energy sources,
industry, and export markets were the major concerns. Australia w a s largely
dependent on imported oil. Power production from coal w a s inefficient. Industrial
relations problems in the coal mining industry seemed intractable and recalcitrant
gas and electricity unions also figured in the equations. The potential of hydroelectricity had yet to be established. This uncertainty over power sources w a s a
dampener o n industrial development and there w a s great hope that nuclear
power would save the day.
The lack of interest in a domestic nuclear weapons capability was not unanimous
nor did it last. Moreover the interconnections between civil and military nuclear
technologies complicate the issue: in the 1960s, w h e n there w a s greater interest in
a domestic nuclear weapons capability, this w a s primarily expressed through the
pursuit of ostensibly civil nuclear projects to lower the barriers to weapons
development.
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With a limited industrial base and a small scientific establishment, the Australian
state and emerging nucleocracy inevitably pursued nuclear development as a
diplomatic exercise in acquiring overseas technology. Early efforts to procure
nuclear technology from the U K , the U S , or through the United Nations, were
largely unsuccessful. It became clear that Australia would need some bargaining
chips. Thus Australia supported the weapons programs of the U K and U S through
the hosting of British nuclear weapons tests, the hosting of U S military bases, and
the supply of uranium. (Cawte, 1992, ch.2; Moyal, 1975.)
Establishing a uranium mining industry was a priority during and after World
W a r II. The aims were to provide for Australia's future needs, to exchange
Australian uranium for foreign currency and foreign nuclear technology, and to
support the weapons programs of the U S and the U K and to strengthen those
alliances more generally. The federal government increased its uranium
prospecting through the 1940s and 1950s, and offered generous incentives to
encourage private prospecting. The various incentives were sufficient to spark a
prospecting boom, reminiscent of the nineteenth-century gold rushes. M a n y
hundreds of deposits were found, but only a few of these were sizeable. Moreover
by the late 1950s, significant uranium deposits had been discovered overseas. The
U S had stopped stockpiling uranium for military purposes, and the U K had
sufficient supplies. Only one Australian uranium mine was operating by 1964, and
that only through government subsidy. (Cawte, 1992; Alder, 1996.)
In the early 1950s, Prime Minister Menzies unilaterally agreed to a British
proposal to conduct weapons tests in Australia, partly in the hope that Australia
would gain some nuclear expertise in return, and partly because of Cold W a r
paranoia. From 1952, 12 weapons tests took place, firstly on Monte Bello Island, off
the coast of Western Australia, then at E m u Field and Maralinga in South
Australia. Bomb-related tests continued at Maralinga until 1963. The weapons
tests resulted in considerable environmental impact and h u m a n injury to
Aborigines and armed service personnel. Successive governments used legislated
secrecy provisions to withhold information about the weapons tests, and then to
frustrate compensation claims. The issue resurfaced in the late 1970s and led to a
Royal Commission in the mid 1980s. Still it w a s another decade before the
Australian and British governments agreed to pay some compensation to victims
and to pay for a clean-up of the Maralinga area.43

42 For literature on the weapons tests, see Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia,
1985; Milliken, 1986; Mayne, 1994; Independent Committee of Inquiry, 1984, pp.98-100; Gardner, 1988;
Carter and Carter, 1983; Martin, 1980; Booker, 1993.
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The hosting of U S military facilities grew slowly but steadily in the post-war
generation. The main reason for hosting the facilities w a s to strengthen the
alliance with the U S , but at times there w a s also some hope and expectation of
assistance in the development of nuclear expertise and facilities in Australia. By
the 1970s, the establishment of a number of U S nuclear bases in Australia had tied
Australians to the nuclear arms race. The most important bases are those at North
West Cape, Pine Gap, and Nurrungar, all of which became operational in the late
1960s and early 1970s. These bases have had a plethora of functions over the years,
a m o n g the most important of which are tracking missiles, communicating with
U S nuclear-armed submarines, monitoring arms control agreements, and broader
espionage operations. The history of U S bases in Australia is one of secrecy and
deception. For example, proposals for upgrading equipment at the bases have
routinely been developed without consultation with the Australian government
or government departments. S o m e of these unilateral developments - such as a
n e w satellite ground station at North West Cape - have been significant in terms
of the functions and strategic importance of the facilities. It is also clear that some
U S Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations at Pine G a p have never been
revealed to the Australian government, and there is considerable evidence that
the facilities have been used to gather intelligence on Australian
communications. 44
The strategy of supporting the weapons programs of the US and the UK to
facilitate civil nuclear development in Australia had only modest success in the
1940s - assistance amounted to little more than tokens such as the placement of
seven Australian research fellows at the British Harwell institute. Nuclear
technologies, such as power reactors, were far from mature even in the most
advanced nuclear countries, and those countries were guarding nuclear expertise
because of the military implications and to a lesser extent to gain commercial
advantage in the nuclear power industry. In the late 1940s and early 1950s,
considerable effort was put into the acquisition of an experimental power reactor
from the U K . W h e n Menzies w a s in London to discuss the first round of weapons
tests, scheduled for 1952, he asked about the possibility of a joint program to build
a large power reactor in Australia. The weapons tests went ahead, but assistance in
developing a nuclear power industry in Australia w a s slower coming - the British
government pointed to the agreement it had with the U S and Canada not to
divulge nuclear k n o w - h o w without agreement from all parties. (Cawte, 1992.)

44 For literature on the U S military bases, and the alliance more generally, see Ball, 1980; 1988; Ball
and Mathams, 1983; Hayes et al., 1986, pp.409-421; Smith, 1982; Falk, 1983, ch.8; Spigelman, 1972,
pp.46-50; Colmer, 1989; Kennedy, 1982.
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3.3. THE AUSTRALIAN ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION

Despite some early set-backs, efforts continued to secure British assistance in
development of a nuclear power industry in Australia. In the early 1950s, an
agreement w a s struck involving the sale of Australian uranium, from the Mary
Kathleen mine in Queensland, in return for m o n e y and technical cooperation.
This included a commitment from the British to assist in the design of a nuclear
reactor and provision of materials for its operation. Weapons tests also figured in
the negotiations; tests at Monte Bello Island had been conducted and agreement
was reached on tests to be conducted at E m u Field and Maralinga. By mid 1952, a
reorganisation of scientific and nuclear institutions and advisory bodies w a s
underway in anticipation of nuclear cooperation with the U K . It was in this
context that the Australian Atomic Energy Commission ( A A E C ) w a s established.
(George and Walker, 1982; Cawte, 1992, ch.4.)
The 1953 Atomic Energy Act was administered by the federal Minister of
Resources and Energy and empowered the A A E C (ASTEC, 1985, p.43):
• to undertake exploration for, and mining and treatment of uranium;
• to construct and operate plant and equipment for the liberation of atomic
energy and its conversion into other forms of energy;
• to sell materials or energy produced as a result of the operations of the
Commission;
• to carry out research and investigations in connection with matters associated
with uranium or atomic energy, or in connection with other such matters as
the Minister determines; and
• to arrange for the training of scientific research workers.
A three member Commission was established as a statutory authority under the
Act. Its membership increased to five in 1958. With funding from the federal
government, the A A E C began construction of a Research Establishment at Lucas
Heights in the mid 1950s. Fifty scientists were recruited to the A A E C . The small
group of scientists which had been attached to Harwell since 1947 joined the
A A E C and formed the nucleus of its scientific staff. The Commission w a s able to
maintain its o w n research team at Harwell from 1954. (Alder, 1996; Moyal, 1975;
Baxter, 1963.)
The Act contained extremely strict security provisions which gave the
government almost unlimited powers to act on the slightest suspicion of
unauthorised release of nuclear information. The security provisions applied
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right across the nuclear fuel cycle: thus for example a union ban on the supply of
spare parts for mining equipment could theoretically lead to a seven-year jail
sentence. This legislation w a s intimidatory to employees and in later years to antinuclear campaigners. It w a s not repealed until 1987. In practice the major effect of
the security provisions w a s to stifle A A E C employees and ex-employees w h o
might otherwise have had more opportunities for constructive contribution to
public debates on nuclear matters. (Independent Committee of Inquiry, 1984, p. 162;
Evans, 1986.)
Phillip Baxter soon emerged as the most prominent figure within the AAEC.
Baxter had played a role in the Allied nuclear weapons program during World
W a r II, producing Britain's first uranium hexafluoride in 1941. H e later worked
on the chemical separation of plutonium at the Windscale plant in England. H e
was part-time Chairman of the A A E C from 1953 to 1957, and full-time Chairman
from 1957 until he resigned from the A A E C in 1972. H e was also worked for m a n y
years at the N e w South Wales University of Technology. Baxter was an extremely
enthusiastic advocate of nuclear power, nuclear weapons, peaceful nuclear
weapons, uranium mining, in short of all things nuclear. H e w a s very m u c h a
technocrat, arguing for example that (purported) trends towards participatory
democracy in Western countries were a "dangerous heresy" that might bring
about the military dominance of the "planned-economy countries" (Baxter, 1975).
Like others of his time and his class, he was paranoid about national security this paranoia initially focused on Japan, then Indonesia, then China, and still later
the Soviet Union. A s Venturini (1993) puts it, "This was Menzies' Australia: a
bastion of white British Imperialist Protestant Christianity - and racist to boot, the
'frightened country'." That racism was also evident in the lack of concern by
Baxter and others about the impact of weapons tests and uranium mining on
Aborigines. (Moyal, 1975; Martin, 1980; Baxter, 1975; Spigelman, 1972.)

By 1956, to draw from Cawte's (1992, pp.62-63) summary of the situation, Australi
had access to considerable foreign nuclear expertise, the A A E C had been
established, a uranium industry was established, nuclear tests had been conducted
in Australia thus improving (if only modestly) the bargaining position with
Britain, and the potential for domestic nuclear power generation w a s at a highpoint. Yet there w a s a darker side: improvements in the prospects for
conventional fuels in Australia m a d e nuclear power less important; the uranium
mining industry w a s about to come unstuck; weapons testing and uranium
mining had damaged or destroyed the lives of more than a few Aborigines,
servicemen, and miners; and there was significant environmental destruction
and contamination at test sites and uranium mines.
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The A A E C wanted a commercial nuclear power plant and it wanted it
immediately. However no nuclear power station in the world fed a national
electricity grid, and the economics of nuclear power were dubious. A research
reactor seemed both appropriate and feasible: it would be a pilot plant in order to
gain experience, to test design principles, and to provide research facilities. A n
agreement w a s struck in 1954 for a U K company to build such a reactor. The
federal government approved and provided funding - £5.5 million over five
years. The reactor was a 10 M W , heavy-water moderated, high-flux materials
testing reactor. The U K Atomic Energy Agency agreed to supply enriched fuel
rods, which it would redeem for reprocessing. ( A N S T O , 1993D.)

Baxter wanted the reactor as close to him as possible - in fact he wanted it te
minutes from his University of Technology office in the densely-populated
eastern suburbs of Sydney. However it was decided to locate the reactor at Lucas
Heights, 20 k m s south of Sydney. Partly this was because of safety concerns, not
that they were paramount, and partly it was because isolation was seen as desirable
for security reasons. The High Flux Australian Reactor, HIFAR, first went critical
(i.e. achieved a sustained uranium fission reaction) on Australia Day, 26 January
1958. The reactor was in routine operation by 1960. (Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)
A second reactor, MO AT A, achieved criticality in 1961. It was a low-power
(originally 10 k W , later upgraded to 100 k W ) , graphite and water moderated
reactor procured from the US. A s with HIFAR, M O A T A ' s design reflected plans to
introduce nuclear power into Australia. It was permanently shut d o w n in 1995,
because of limited utilisation and high operating costs. (Anon, 1995C; A N S T O ,
1993N; 1995-96.) M O A T A w a s never as contentious as H I F A R - because it was so
m u c h less powerful - and need not be discussed further.
The AAEC research laboratories were completed in the early 1960s and included
facilities for metallurgy, engineering, chemistry, radiochemistry, chemical
engineering, and health physics. By June 1961 A A E C staff totalled 840. Various
reciprocal research and training arrangements were in place with a number of
countries including the U K , the U S A , Canada, and some south-east Asian
countries. (Moyal, 1975; Cawte, 1992, ch.6; Baxter, 1963.)

The principal justification for HIFAR was to develop the means for nuclear powe
generation through reactor design research, in particular the testing of reactor
materials under extreme radiation and temperature conditions. The intention w a s
to introduce natural-uranium power reactors and to fuel them with domestic
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uranium, and thus the A A E C decided to embark upon a research program into
the potential use of beryllium (or beryllium compounds) as a moderator in gascooled, natural-uranium reactors. Plans to use H I F A R for testing of beryllium
moderators w a s well underway by the time H I F A R was in operation. Another
reactor design w a s researched, based on liquid metal cooling, but it received less
attention and w a s abandoned in 1958. (Moyal, 1975; Baxter, 1963.)

As the research plans proceeded, so too did plans to produce isotopes for medicin
industry, and agriculture. In 1956 the A A E C began active promotion of
radioisotopes by establishing a Radioisotope Advisory Service. Yet radioisotope
production w a s regarded as little more than a by-product of the research program.
For example the production of cobalt-60 began because there was surplus reactor
space until irradiation rigs for the research program were ready. All isotope and
radiation research w a s lumped under the miscellaneous category of "Support and
Associated Research". N o more than 5-10% of the total workforce at Lucas Heights
would be devoted to radioisotope research and production - nothing was to
interfere with the beryllium research. Radioisotope production provided good
opportunities for propaganda even if it w a s a marginal activity: in 1956 the head of
the Commission's isotopes program published a book called the World of
Radioisotopes (Gregory, 1956), and in 1957 an "Isotopes for Industry" exhibition
was held in Sydney, attracting 20 000 visitors. (Alder, 1996, pp.8-9; Anon., 1968.)
Britain was less interested in supporting Australia's nuclear ambitions as the
1950s came to a close. The uranium glut had struck. The major weapons tests had
taken place. A s a result of these changed circumstances, Australia w a s left to
continue the beryllium experiments on its o w n , whereas previously it had been a
joint project. With the British feeding electricity from the Calder Hill plant into a
power grid, there was some questioning of the need for reactor research in
Australia. Thus the beryllium project w a s in some trouble before H I F A R w a s even
operational, but the A A E C had already invested four years into the planning of
the project, and there w a s a "can-do" attitude and a good deal of optimism and
m o m e n t u m within the A A E C . (Moyal, 1975; Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)
Coal production rose significantly from the mid 1940s, and continued to do so
through the 1950s and 1960s. Domestic oil production began in the 1950s and
steadily grew through the 1960s and 1970s. This was a considerable disincentive to
pursue nuclear power, which was barely tested let alone proven through the
1950s. A further problem w a s the impact of the decline in the uranium industry.
The A A E C w a s also generating ill-will with the government and the federal
bureaucracy because of its questionable assessments on matters such as cost
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estimates and the strength of overseas markets for uranium. S o m e changes were
m a d e in the organisation of the A A E C , to lessen its independence from the
government and the bureaucracy. (Moyal, 1975.)
Although on the surface the beryllium research was going smoothly, the research
was making little progress. By 1963, if not before, A A E C scientists were privately
admitting that Australian reactor technology simply could not compete with
developments overseas. Teams in both France and the U S had investigated and
abandoned beryllium moderator research. The development of nuclear power
overseas w a s proving to be m u c h slower, more expensive, and more difficult than
most had anticipated. Thus the prospect of nuclear power reactors in Australia in
the short-term w a s unlikely. Moreover American and British suppliers usually
offered turn-key contracts and few countries were developing indigenous reactor
technology. The rationale for the beryllium research, particularly given the poor
results, w a s fading but no alternative project was evident. Eventually the
beryllium research w a s w o u n d d o w n from the mid 1960s. (Alder, 1996; Moyal,
1975.)

3.4. NUCLEAR POWER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
OVERVIEW
THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
NUCLEAR POWER
OVERVIEW
A case might have been made for scaling back or abandoning a range of nuclear
projects in Australia by the mid 1960s. The prospects for uranium mining looked
glum, the failure of the beryllium research m a d e it still less likely that domestic
ingenuity could lay the foundations for a nuclear power industry, there was in any
case little need for nuclear power given the discovery and exploitation of fossil
fuel reserves, and support of U S and British nuclear militarism had brought with
it a host of problems. However there were established interests by the mid 1960s,
in particular the A A E C . Lacking a raison d'etre, the A A E C management wanted a
power reactor regardless of the obstacles and regardless of the doubtful value of
nuclear power to Australia, it wanted to use peaceful nuclear explosions for civil
engineering projects, and there was also a push to develop a nuclear weapons
capability. That m u c h w a s no surprise: what was remarkable in the late 1960s w a s
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the level of political support for these projects. This flurry of activity in the late
1960s clearly illustrates h o w a seemingly innocuous, small-scale nuclear program
can, in a short space of time and under the impact of changing conditions, become
something more sinister.

There was high-level interest in nuclear weapons before the late 1960s. It is wor
tracing over this history since it is relevant to the arguments being developed, and
since m u c h of it has only recently come to light - largely thanks to Cawte's (1992)
research and more recently with the declassification of government documents
dating from the early to mid 1960s.
In the 1950s Baxter was openly arguing that one of the advantages of nuclear
power w a s that it would open up the possibility of producing nuclear weapons. H e
was arguing for a reactor which could be converted fairly easily and cheaply for
m a x i m u m plutonium production if necessary. H e courted politicians and the
military establishment. H e might have expected a sympathetic ear given the Cold
W a r paranoia of the time; indeed the defence and foreign policy establishment
had shown some interest in acquiring nuclear weapons from the U S . (US
legislation had been passed enabling the stationing of nuclear arms in allied
countries, and the A N Z U S treaty further bolstered the possibility of U S weapons
being stationed in Australia.) S o m e politicians, including government Ministers,
were also advocates of domestic nuclear weapons. However the general weight of
opinion, a m o n g politicians and other arms of the state, was that there w a s no
urgency and that the alliances with the U S and U K would suffice. (Cawte, 1992,
ch.6.)
Whatever the confidence in the US and the UK, sections of the Australian
military establishment wanted nuclear bombs. The government's Defence
Committee, comprised of the chiefs of the armed forces, approached the US. Very
little came of the approach, just some vague promises to consider Australia if the
U S chose to station nuclear weapons in the region. The Defence Committee
considered approaching the U K for the supply of tactical nuclear weapons,
thinking that Australian support of the British weapons program would boost its
chances. In 1958 an informal approach was m a d e to buy bombers and tactical
nuclear weapons from the U K , but to no avail. (Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)
Menzies and other leading figures in the government consistently denied that
overtures were being m a d e about the purchase of nuclear weapons overseas.
However some within the government were openly advocating the acquisition of
nuclear weapons - including John Gorton, w h o later became Prime Minister.
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While interested in purchasing nuclear weapons, or having nuclear weapons
stationed in Australia, defence planners were less interested in producing them in part because of the cost, and also because of the implications for relations with
allies, in particular the US. Thus Baxter's idea in the 1950s for a power reactor at
Mount Isa, which could also produce plutonium to be stockpiled for weapons,
came to nothing. (Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)

Similar attitudes prevailed through the early to mid 1960s, during which time the
government w a s paranoid about Indonesia's role in the region (Sheridan, 1994).
In 1962 a Defence Committee submission to Cabinet argued that a nuclear
weapons capability would vastly increase Australia's defensive and offensive
strength. However the Committee said that there was no immediate need for an
independent nuclear weapons capability, and that in the short term it was more
important to strengthen conventional forces. In the same year, Cabinet discussed
the possibility of a feasibility study into the building of a power reactor at Lucas
Heights. The Minister for National Development, William Spooner, said that the
expertise gained through a power reactor project would be invaluable if a decision
were m a d e to build nuclear weapons. A submission to Cabinet by the A A E C also
noted that a power reactor could provide plutonium for nuclear weapons.
(Stewart, 1993.)
The willingness to entertain the nuclear weapons option was evident in the 1963
decision to buy F-lll bombers from the U S ; one reason for this decision was the
potential to modify F-llls to carry nuclear bombs if required. Moreover their
range of 2000 nautical miles m a d e them suitable for strikes on Indonesia. (Stewart,
1994.)
In 1965 and 1966, the Minister for National Development, David Fairbairn, made
submissions to Cabinet proposing a design and cost study into nuclear power. The
1966 submission canvassed the weapons connection, in particular the potential to
use the expertise gained in a nuclear power program for the development of
weapons. (Henderson, 1997.)
In 1965, the AAEC and the Department of Supply were commissioned to examine
all aspects of Australia's policy towards nuclear weapons and the cost of
establishing a nuclear weapons program in Australia. The A A E C , floundering at
the time, would have to be maintained if the weapons option w a s to be pursued
or even left open. Harold Holt, w h o replaced Menzies as Prime Minister in 1966,
gave Baxter some indication that the government might approve construction of
a power reactor. The beryllium project gave w a y to research into heavy-water,
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natural-uranium reactors; still there w a s an expectation that power reactors would
be fuelled with natural uranium from domestic deposits. (Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)
The AAEC also began a centrifuge uranium enrichment program in 1965. One
reason for this program w a s doubts about ongoing supply of research reactor fuel.
Another reason w a s the potential profit to be m a d e through export of enriched
uranium or even completed fuel elements. Tied in with this were nationalist
ideologies, and ideologies of technological progress and sophistication as opposed
to being a "quarry for Big Brother", to use the words of a former Chief Executive of
the Commission (Alder, 1996, pp.30-31). A third reason for the enrichment
research w a s to keep open the option of introducing LEU-fuelled power reactors
and producing that fuel in Australia. (Hardy, 1996.)
The enrichment research was carried out in secret until the Commission made
the project publicly k n o w n in 1967. The initial secrecy was for fear that public
knowledge of the project would raise allegations of intentions to develop nuclear
bombs. (Alder, 1996, pp.30-31.) Whether the enrichment research w a s initiated or
pursued partly because of the weapons connection is open for speculation. Clearly
there w a s some interest in and support for a nuclear weapons capability at the
time, and a willingness to pursue civil nuclear projects in such a w a y as to leave
the weapons option open. Baxter m a d e the link between uranium enrichment
and weapons production a number of times over the years (Cawte, 1992, ch.6). It is
also worth making the (obvious) point that regardless of intentions, an
enrichment plant certainly would have facilitated the production of H E U
weapons if they were ever sought.
From the mid 1950s, the US entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with a
number of countries. O n e such agreement was signed with Australia in 1956
although it had little consequence for technology transfer. (Cawte, 1992, pp.60-62.)
In 1966, the U S government wanted to transfer safeguards provisions associated
with the agreement to the IAEA. The Australian government agreed, but only
after being reassured by defence officials that I A E A safeguards would not preclude
a nuclear weapons program. (Greenless, 1997.) The previous year, there were
Cabinet discussions on the potential for nuclear transfers from France which
would not be subject to safeguards (Henderson, 1996).
Despite the glut in the uranium market, the Minister for National Development
announced in 1967 that uranium companies would henceforth have to keep half
of their k n o w n reserves for Australian use, and he acknowledged that this
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decision w a s taken because of a desire to have a domestic uranium source in case
it was needed for weapons production. (Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)

There was a clear pattern through the 1950s and 1960s. There was sustained, high
level, and growing interest in a domestic nuclear weapons capability, but it was
not seen as an urgent matter nor was their consensus on the issue. The
government w a s not intent on developing nuclear weapons in the short term - it
merely wanted to keep its options open.
The momentum continued to build in the late 1960s. Baxter was still an
influential advocate of nuclear weapons, as were some other influential nuclear
scientists and administrators such as Ernest Titterton. The now-defunct
Democratic Labor Party (DLP), strongly R o m a n Catholic and fiercely anticommunist, alone a m o n g political parties of any substance past and present,
advocated nuclear weapons development in official defence policy statements.
The D L P polled between 5-10% at federal elections. The Returned Services League
advocated a weapons program, though equivocally at times, and there was some
support within the defence forces. (Martin, 1980; Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)
The growing momentum was fuelled by political developments overseas. The
Menzies government was far more comfortable with the Suharto military
dictatorship than it had been prior to the 1965 massacre and take-over by the
Indonesian military. Nevertheless, the British had withdrawn from Malaya and
there was concern about Soviet or Chinese c o m m u n i s m spreading south. In 1964
China exploded its first nuclear weapon. The collapse of the 1954 Geneva
agreement over Vietnam seemed imminent. There were doubts about the
willingness of the U S or Britain to provide military aid in the case of threats to
Australia. There was particular concern to strengthen the alliance with the U S ,
which partly explained Australia's involvement in the Vietnam W a r and the
hosting of a growing number of U S military facilities. (Bellany, 1972, chs.5, 7;
Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)

THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
In late 1967 Holt disappeared while swimming, and Gorton became Prime
Minister. Gorton had openly advocated production or acquisition of nuclear
weapons in the late 1950s. Within weeks of Gorton becoming Prime Minister, the
U S put forward a second draft of the N P T . Gorton was determined not to sign.
That got a mixed reception: some such as Baxter were on-side but there were also
opponents w h o held the view that the N P T should be signed to placate the US.
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Gorton established an interdepartmental committee in which the A A E C was
strongly represented. (Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)
When the United Nations General Assembly met in April 1968, the Australian
position w a s one of obfuscation and general rejection of the N P T . The argument
was put that Australia would not sign without greater conviction that the N P T
would be effective. However that w a s a circular argument: by signing the Treaty
Australia would be doing what little it could to strengthen non-proliferation
initiatives. The government argued that signing the N P T would disadvantage
Australia economically by retarding civil nuclear development - mention was
m a d e of the potential use of peaceful nuclear explosives for civil engineering
projects, of the potential for the N P T to interfere with Australia's uranium trade
(such as it was), and the impact of the N P T on indigenous nuclear research. Baxter
argued that the intention of the N P T was to restrict all nuclear research and
development, to the advantage of the US. There was some logic to the argument the U S had indeed played the non-proliferation card in order to strengthen its
o w n economic hand in civil nuclear development after the war. Nonetheless
these were arguments of "not inconsiderable gall" as Bellany (1972, p.106) argued,
given the rudimentary state of Australia's nuclear program. There was no basis to
the anti-communist fear-mongering in the argument that the N P T would enable
communist espionage - the N P T m a d e allowances for m e m b e r countries to veto
inspectors from particular countries. (Encel and McKnight, 1970; Anon., 1969.)
If the unwillingness to sign the NPT was partly because of an unwillingness to
close off or complicate the nuclear weapons option, as it almost certainly was, then
it was not a convincing argument even in those terms. Signing the Treaty would
make it easier to gain assistance in the development of nuclear fuel cycle
technologies such as enrichment, reactors, and perhaps reprocessing.
Development of some of those technologies was essential if a weapons program
was to be pursued, and that development would require foreign assistance.
(Bellany, 1970; Anon, 1969.) It was not difficult for non-NPT states to find nuclear
suppliers in the 1960s and into the 1970s, but a strategy of pursuing civil and
perhaps military nuclear ambitions as a non-NPT state risked jeopardising the
alliances with the U S and the U K ; as always, those alliances were seen to be vital.
Australian opposition to the NPT could only worsen regional relations, such as
those with Indonesia, Japan, and China. By 1970, international rivalries had
subsided somewhat. The U S , Italy, and West Germany had adhered to the N P T ,
arms reduction talks between the U S and the U S S R showed some promise, and
Sino-American talks had begun. Under those circumstances the refusal to sign
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and ratify the N P T w a s even more "noteworthy and obscurantist" as Encel and
McKnight (1970, p.17) argued.
During the two-year period that the government refused to sign the NPT, the
Minister for National Development had admitted that a sticking point with
respect to the N P T was indeed a desire not to close off the weapons option. In 1969,
two further projects were announced, both with implications for weapons
development - the Cape Keraudren peaceful nuclear explosion project, and two
weeks later an announcement by Gorton that a nuclear power reactor would be
purchased. (Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
In early 1962, the US Atomic Energy Commission had, at the invitation of the
A A E C , sent an expert to Australia to discuss the potential uses of so-called
peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs) in Australia. The following year, the federal
Cabinet approved a proposal from the Minister for National Development that a
team be sent to the U S to find out more about PNEs. There was caution however,
given that problems concerning the British weapons tests were surfacing for
public debate at the time. (Pemberton, 1994.)
In the late 1960s the interest in PNEs was renewed and the AAEC set up a
Plowshare Committee. Both the U S and the Soviet Union established
experimental P N E programs from the 1950s. It was argued that nuclear explosives
could be suited for major engineering projects, such as widening the Panama
Canal. However the economic and environmental aspects of P N E s were major
concerns, as were the weapons proliferation implications. Apart from Australia,
very few non-weapons states were interested in PNEs. Those that were - such as
India, Brazil, and South Africa - were almost certainly interested in the military
implications of a P N E program. (Findlay, 1990; Bellany, 1972, chs.5, 7; Warner,
1971.)
The most advanced plan in Australia was for a major nuclear excavation forming
a harbour off the northern coast of Western Australia, at Cape Keraudren. The
harbour was to facilitate a nearby mining venture. This project was conceived in
the late 1960s. Most of the interest in using PNE's in Australia came from
elsewhere - specifically, from the U S Atomic Energy Commission. The A A E C was
also an enthusiastic advocate of the use of P N E s in Australia - Australia would
not have flirted with P N E s if not for the existence of the A A E C and the
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consequent availability of nuclear expertise and the efforts of propagandists such
as Baxter. (Findlay, 1990; Bellany, 1972, pp.40-41.)
The role of the Australian government in the Cape Keraudren project was,
according to Findlay (1990), "incredibly naive". The project would clearly violate
the Partial Test Ban Treaty to which Australia was a signatory. It was also
hypocritical given Australia's condemnation of France for nuclear testing in the
Pacific. The time-scale for the project was highly ambitious - because of a
perceived urgency to trial P N E s to push ahead with the Panama Canal project. The
project amounted to Australia being used as a guinea pig to determine the
feasibility of massive civil nuclear explosions. The proposal w a s for five 200
kiloton explosions - by comparison the Hiroshima b o m b w a s 12-15 kilotons.
(Findlay, 1990; Bellany, 1972, p.41.)
The unwillingness of the government to sign the NPT, and the Cape Keraudren
adventurism, were indicative of a broader problem: the A A E C , and Baxter in
particular, had too strong a position in terms of providing advice to government,
and the A A E C could not be relied upon to be "wholly impartial" as Bellany (1972,
pp.106-107) argued. There was insufficient technical expertise within the
government to counter specious technical arguments if such should be used by
the A A E C . Moreover informed outside comment was restricted by the Crimes Act
and the Atomic Anergy Act; thus m a n y scientists w h o had worked at the A A E C
were unable to provide independent commentary. (Anon., 1969.)
The Cape Keraudren project was abandoned in 1969, only three months after it
was first announced. The reasons included some or all of the following:
constraints imposed by treaties such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the N P T ; an
unwillingness to finance the project from the various interested parties;
questionable profit-making opportunities from the mining venture near Cape
Keraudren; an unwillingness from Japanese customers to purchase contaminated
ore from the mining operations; concern in the U S because of the Australian
government's refusal to sign the N P T ; and concern in some quarters about
ecological damage and radiation hazards. The A A E C maintained a smaller
Plowshare Committee after the Cape Keraudren project fell through. Various
other possibilities were explored for the use of P N E s in Australia, but none of
these plans reached fruition and the Plowshare Committee was disbanded. Some
bizarre proposals, such as one from the Queensland Premier, Joh Bjelke-Peterson,
to use P N E s to halt the progress of C r o w n of Thorns starfish in the Great Barrier
Reef, only brought P N E s into further disrepute. (Findlay, 1990; Anon., 1969;
Hutton, 1979.)
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NUCLEAR POWER
Numerous proposals had been advanced through the 1950s and 1960s concerning
the introduction of nuclear power. In 1969, the government announced that
Australia's first nuclear power plant w a s to be built. In effect it would be a lead
station, paving the w a y for the individual states to commission nuclear power
plants in the future. (Alder, 1996, ch.9.)
Given the interest in developing a nuclear weapons capability at the time, it is
hard to imagine that there w a s no interest in the pursuit of nuclear power to
lower the technical barriers to nuclear weapons. Submissions to Cabinet had m a d e
the connection on several occasions over the years. Baxter and Gorton, the key
proponents of the nuclear power plan, had supported weapons development at
various stages. The N P T and P N E fiascos further indicated an interest in weapons
development. A n d while it is true that there w a s a spate of orders for nuclear
power plants around the world at the time, it w a s anything but clear that nuclear
power w a s a necessary or desirable energy option for Australia given the
substantial fossil fuel reserves.
A stipulation was imposed upon tenderers that the power reactor had to be
capable of being fuelled with Australian uranium, with fuel elements m a d e in
Australia (Alder, 1996, ch.9). This stipulation w a s justified with appeals to
nationalistic ideologies of technological self-sufficiency, but it can easily be read as
suggesting an interest in weapons. In effect the stipulation meant that the reactor
would be fuelled with natural uranium (e.g. the Canadian C A N D U reactor type),
or tenderers would be required to facilitate the establishment of an enrichment
plant in Australia. Either way, Australia would be a step closer to a weapons
capability and could pursue that option without the threat of overseas fuel supply
being terminated. If a natural-uranium reactor w a s built, it would be preferable for
plutonium production, and of course there would be no reliance on overseas
enrichment services. If an enriched-uranium reactor w a s built, then the transfer
of enrichment technology to Australia would facilitate, to a greater or lesser
degree, the production of H E U for bombs, and the possibility of producing
plutonium for b o m b s would also remain open.
Publicly, there was silence and evasion about the prospects for nuclear weapons.
Even Baxter would not be drawn on the topic once the nuclear power project w a s
underway, and Baxter (1975) and others from the A A E C (e.g. Alder, 1996) have
insisted over the years that the power project w a s not pursued even in part
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because of the weapons connection. Yet even in 1969 Baxter (quoted in Anon.,
1969B) m a d e one of his characteristic statements:
The growth of this (nuclear power) industry and the expertise and the
facilities which it will create will provide a basis from which an Australian
government, at any future date feeling that nuclear weapons were essential
to provide this nation's security, could move with minimum
provide such means of defence.

delay to

In addition to the nuclear power proposal, the AAECs enrichment research grew
steadily through the 1960s and beyond, and the Commission had begun
preliminary research into plutonium separation.45 A s with the nuclear power
project, it is conceivable that the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing research
had nothing to do with weapons ambitions, but it seems more plausible to argue
that there w a s a dove-tailing of civil and military nuclear ambitions.
Some problems faced the nuclear power project, such as finance, where the reactor
would be built, and what would be done with the electricity. The states and
territories were unenthusiastic. Power reactors were unsuitable for the smaller
grids of the western and central states and territories, and there w a s little interest
in the eastern states because of abundant supplies of conventional fuels. Jervis
Bay, on the south coast of N e w South Wales, w a s selected as the site for the reactor
- it w a s convenient in that it w a s commonwealth land. The federal government
agreed to sell the electricity produced to N e w South Wales at below cost. (Moyal,
1975; Alder, 1996.)
In late 1969 a federal election was held. The Liberal/Country government held on
but with a reduced majority. Within the Liberal Party the balance had swung back
to those more economically minded and less concerned about declining U S power
in the Pacific and the implications of that for Australia. Given the election result it
was only a matter of time before the question of the N P T surfaced again. Gorton
decided to sign the N P T , protesting that it w a s not to be taken as a decision to ratify
the Treaty and pointing out that the Treaty w a s not binding until ratified. Nor
would the government ratify the N P T until its list of objections had been
resolved. (Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)

45

Cawte, 1992, p.127. Cawte does not provide any information on the plutonium separation research.
There was certainly some interest in reprocessing - for example in February 1971 the A A E C directed
an employee to visit a European reprocessing plant on an information-gathering exercise. See Hardy,
1996, p.60.
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The Australian Labor Party (ALP) opposition w a s generally supportive of the
government's plans to establish a nuclear power reactor. However by 1970 the
A L P objected to some aspects of government and A A E C policy and procedure in
relation to nuclear power. Contentious issues included the methodology by which
site studies began only after tenders had been issued; the fact that the A A E C was
the sole buyer, builder, borrower, and operator; and the obsessive secrecy
surrounding the project. (Moyal, 1975.)
Preliminary site work began at Jervis Bay - $1.25 million was spent on roads,
power, water, and houses for future employees.46 A display caravan was set up to
inform and placate the residents of Jervis Bay; it was not informative nor did it
placate opponents. There had been only scanty studies of issues such as site
selection, environmental impact, safety issues and accident plans, waste disposal,
the eventual decommissioning of the plant, and the comparative cost of nuclear
and coal-generated power. Studies into these issues were rudimentary or nonexistent and findings were not released. (Spigelman, 1972, pp.69-74; Cawte, 1992,
ch.6.)
For various reasons including the largely bipartisan support of nuclear power,
there was no mass public opposition to nuclear power at this time. However there
was at least some public opposition, particularly around the proposed site at Jervis
Bay. The South Coast Trades and Labour Council announced that it would refuse
to assist in the building of the plant. (Falk, 1983, ch.ll.)
Fourteen tenders were received from seven organisations from four countries the U S , the U K , West Germany, and Canada. The A A E C was strongly represented
on the assessment committee which was established to evaluate tenders, as was
the Electricity Commission of N e w South Wales. A n American company, Bechtel,
acted as consultants. A short list of four proposals was arrived at, and eventually
the assessment committee recommended an LEU-fuelled steam-generating heavywater reactor from a U K / G e r m a n consortium. According to Alder (1996, ch.9),
w h o was involved in assessing the tenders, there was little to separate the tenders
on economic grounds, and the U K / G e r m a n proposal w a s favourable in relation to
the transfer of enrichment technology.

Gorton's position as leader of the Liberal Party was under intense pressure and h
resigned in March 1971. William M c M a h o n succeeded him. M c M a h o n was less
enthusiastic about nuclear power than his predecessor. Reasons for this included
concern over the financial costs; awareness of difficulties being experienced with
4& All figures are in Australian dollars unless otherwise indicated.
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reactor technology in Britain and Canada; recognition of strongly divided opinion
within the A A E C ; suspicions that the government w a s not being kept fully
informed by the A A E C ; and, according to Moyal (1975, p.376), "a personal
reluctance on his part to identify with a nuclear policy that required types of
uranium suitable for military purposes."
McMahon seemed prepared to proceed with the nuclear power project but he was
more inclined towards an American tender - in part because of his desire to
maintain friendly dealings with the U S . The short-list of tenders w a s passed to
Treasury which prepared a highly critical response. The comparison with respect
to coal-generated electricity was extremely unfavourable, even making allowance
for a premium price to bring Australia into the age of nuclear power. There was
also less impetus for keeping the option of nuclear weapons production open
given the change in the balance of forces within the Liberal Party. The project was
deferred for twelve months in June 1971, and deferred indefinitely in June 1972.
The Whitlam government did nothing to revive the nuclear power project from
1972-75. (Moyal, 1975; Cawte, 1992, ch.6.)
It took a decade or more for the AAEC to adjust to the abandonment of the Jervis
Bay project; it did not consider the project to have lapsed in 1975, and in 1979 the
A A E C reception centre still boasted a glossy display of the project with no
suggestion that it had been abandoned. (Hutton, 1979).
Plans to develop nuclear power or nuclear weapons have never had as much
high-level support as they did in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but the interest has
never subsided completely. True to form, Baxter was advocating the establishment
of a domestic enrichment plant through the 1970s for several uses including
weapons production. (Martin, 1980, pp.48-49.) The financial costs associated with
nuclear weapons were never likely to be insurmountable. Developing the
technical and manufacturing expertise and facilities would have taken
considerable time and effort, a significant but not prohibitive obstacle. The major
barriers to nuclear weapons manufacture in Australia have been political. There
were (and are) considerable doubts as to whether the advantages of acquiring
nuclear weapons would outweigh negatives such as the possibility of sparking a
regional nuclear arms race, or the possibility of threatening the alliance with the
US. (Bellany, 1970; 1972.)
There were occasional signs of a renewed interest in nuclear power through the
1970s and into the 1980s, though this interest has faded. Almost all state and
territory governments expressed interest in nuclear power at some stage, and
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there w a s interest from some state electricity utilities. S o m e familiar elements of
nuclear politicking were on display, such as wildly exaggerated predictions of
future electricity demand; boastful comments by the Premier of Western Australia
that a nuclear power plant would be enormously prestigious, adding to W A ' s
"State of Excitement" image; and recognition that the capital-intensive nature of
nuclear power w a s attractive w h e n compared to the occasional industrial
militancy in the coal industry. However there w a s strong public and union
opposition to nuclear power, which fed into the mass anti-nuclear, anti-uranium
movements of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The replacement of Liberal
governments by the A L P in a number of states also put a dampener on proposals
for nuclear power. (Falk, 1982, ch.ll; Martin, 1984B; Hutton, 1979; Brotherton,
1979.)

3.5. THE AUSTRALIAN ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION IN SEARCH OF A MISSION:
1970-1987
By the time the ALP won the 1972 federal election, the AAEC was floundering, as
it had been before the flurry of activity in the late 1960s. The A A E C had cost some
$170 million (1972 value) over the previous two decades but had little to show for
itself. (Cawte, 1992, ch.6.) The accession of the A L P to government initially had
little consequence for the A A E C . There w a s little direction from the responsible
Minister, nor even m u c h communication between the Minister and the A A E C .
Baxter retired from the A A E C in 1972, which further removed the Commission
from political and public visibility. A major investigation and then a
reorganisation of the A A E C took place from 1972 to 1974; but none of this w a s
informed by, nor did it lead to, any explicit, major shift in objective. The review
criticised the excessive secrecy of the A A E C and the over-classification of
documents, but no steps were taken to enable greater public scrutiny and debate
though the A L P had argued for such changes w h e n in opposition. (Moyal, 1975.)
In 1975, Ann Moyal (1975, pp.382-383) summed up the AAEC thus:
Basically the history of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission is an
object lesson in the problems and dangers of closed government. At root it is
a case study of the framing of a national nuclear policy through the influence
of one powerful administrator surrounded largely by silent men. Moreover
in the Australian environment, Sir Phillip Baxter's exercise of a monopoly of
scientific advice on nuclear matters was compounded

by the weakness in our

parliamentary system in failing to make adequate information available to
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the Opposition. Throughout, there was insufficient opportunity for public
debate and little for assessment and meaningful comment among the
scientific and public communities. Overall there was a disdain for public
accountability on the part of a major scientific establishment.
Despite the sense of drift, the AAEC was entrenched as the focal point for all
matters nuclear. In 1976, staff numbers reached a peak of 1354, of w h o m 1190
worked at Lucas Heights. The Commission had responsibilities in relation to the
uranium mining industry; it w a s involved in setting standards for ionising
radiation; it w a s one of the available authorities on the licensing and regulation of
nuclear facilities; it w a s the negotiating headquarters for Australia's international
nuclear relations; and since the 1973 ratification of the N P T , it w a s the authority
for control and supervision of N P T safeguards. (Moyal, 1975.)
Notwithstanding the centrality of the AAEC, the range of institutions involved in
nuclear projects had expanded considerably. The Australian Institute of Nuclear
Science and Engineering w a s founded in 1956, and has played an important role in
linking the research efforts of the A A E C / A N S T O with Australian universities.
The Australian School of Nuclear Technology w a s founded in 1964 as a joint
venture between the A A E C and the University of N e w South Wales; it has
provided training for m a n y Australian and overseas scientists in a range of
nuclear fields. A number of other universities have pursued nuclear R & D . The
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) is
Australia's major scientific research and development organisation; m a n y of its 40
divisions were involved in nuclear-related research by the mid 1970s. The
Australian Radiation Laboratory, part of the C o m m o n w e a l t h Department of
Health, played a significant role in the regulation of nuclear materials. The federal
government's Bureau of Mineral Resources played a significant role in the
uranium industry. Several private companies also formed part of the nuclear
infrastructure by this stage; apart from private-sector investment in the uranium
industry, a number of companies were involved in nuclear projects such as
applied research or radioisotope support services. ( A A E C , 1974.)
Through the 1970s the major area of work for the AAEC was at the front-end of
the nuclear fuel cycle - uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment. The
uranium mining industry underwent a revival from the late 1960s. By the end of
1970 more than 60 companies were exploring for uranium - more than twice the
number of the previous year. S o m e promising deposits were uncovered in the
Northern Territory, South Australia, and Queensland. (Falk, 1982, ch.ll; Cawte,
1992, ch.7.)
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The A A E C had been involved in every facet of uranium mining since its
inception - exploration, mining, milling, conversion, safety and environmental
regulation, securing export deals, and negotiating and overseeing safeguards
agreements. Yet the Commission's involvement in the uranium industry varied
according to government policy, no more so than during the 1970s. In October
1974, the federal A L P government announced that, through the vehicle of the
A A E C , it would be the sole uranium marketing authority with a 5 0 % interest in
any venture resulting from discoveries by private companies. The A A E C would
be the only organisation exploring for n e w deposits in the Northern Territory thus the A A E C set up exploration operations from scratch, since m a n y years had
passed since it had been involved in exploration. The Commission became a
partner in the Mary Kathleen mine in Queensland, the large Ranger mine in the
Northern Territory, and it was also involved in a joint venture in the Ngalia
Basin region of the Northern Territory. (Alder, 1996, ch.14; George and Walker,
1982; Brennan, 1985; Falk, 1982, ch.ll.)
During 1975 the ALP was increasingly under siege. Nuclear power was once again
in trouble around the world, which dampened prospects for uranium exports.
Weapons proliferation concerns, highlighted by the Indian test explosion in 1974,
gave further impetus to non-proliferation initiatives. A n anti-uranium
movement was gathering strength. There were opponents of uranium mining
within the A L P ; they were in the minority but sufficiently numerous and vocal to
provide stiff opposition. Under pressure, the government established the Ranger
Uranium Environmental Inquiry in mid 1975, which slowed uranium mining
ventures even though the government was keen for sales to go ahead after some
years of procrastination. The Ranger Inquiry was still in progress through the
constitutional crisis of late 1975 which saw the dismissal of the Whitlam
government and a landslide victory to the Liberal Party in the ensuing election.
(Alder, 1992, ch.14; Falk, 1982, ch.ll; Cawte, 1992, ch.7.)
From 1976 the Liberal government substantially reduced the role of the AAEC in
the uranium industry. The Commission's exploration program was phased out,
and its financial interest in a number of uranium mines was sold to private
interests. The Commission's Uranium Branch was abolished in 1979, and then in
1982 the Uranium Resources Evaluation Unit of the A A E C was transferred to the
federal government's Bureau of Mineral Resources. ( A A E C , 1981-82; 1983-84;
Alder, 1996, ch.16.)
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The last major project for the A A E C w a s enrichment R & D . This work had
expanded rapidly from its commencement in 1965. The Commission was
restructured in the early 1970s to put greater emphasis on enrichment research. By
1977 - and perhaps earlier - the Centrifuge Enrichment Project Division (CEPD)
was responsible for the Commission's largest research program. The C E P D
acquired considerable expertise in enrichment technology, but it always remained
some distance behind the larger R & D programs in several other countries. Thus
there were repeated efforts to collaborate with overseas enrichment programs
towards the establishment of a plant in Australia. These overtures were generally
well received. Apart from whatever technological sophistication the C E P D could
offer, Australia w a s attractive because of the availability of suitable sites for an
enrichment plant, large uranium reserves, a high level of political stability, and
relatively cheap and abundant reserves of fossil-fuel energy (an important factor
since enrichment plants generally consume large amounts of electricity). (Hardy,
1996; Alder, 1996.)
Over the years, negotiations, and sometimes joint studies, were carried out
between the A A E C and various overseas enrichment organisations and consortia
- the U S Atomic Energy Commission (and its successors), teams from Japan and
France, the German-UK-Netherlands U R E N C O consortium, and the short-lived
Association for Centrifuge Enrichment which involved seven European countries
plus Canada, Japan, and Australia. The prospects for a collaborative venture were
strong, but were never realised for various reasons such as changes in
government and/or government policy, and fluctuating interest from potential
overseas partners, some of w h o m developed facilities elsewhere. (Hardy, 1996;
Alder, 1996.)
Several Australian companies were also interested in establishing facilities for
uranium conversion (to uranium hexafluoride) and enrichment. In the early
1980s a "pre-feasibility study" was carried out into centrifuge enrichment
technology by the Uranium Enrichment Group of Australia ( U E G A ) , a joint
venture formed by four Australian companies with the assistance of the A A E C .
Plans for a full feasibility study were approved by government. There was
considerable interest from overseas enrichment groups, and U E G A chose to
collaborate with U R E N C O . However in 1983 the newly-elected A L P federal
government put a stop to the venture. (Alder, 1996, ch.18; Hardy, 1996.)
By this time, enrichment work absorbed a quarter of the AAECs research effort.
Most of the effort concerned centrifuge enrichment, but there w a s also a small
laser enrichment research project. The enrichment work was scaled d o w n , under
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direction from government, and it had terminated by 1985. For a year or two, the
expertise and facilities developed through the enrichment work were redirected to
enrichment safeguards projects. Proposals were developed within the C E P D to use
the centrifuge enrichment facilities for separation of molybdenum isotopes, which
would then be used as targets to produce radioactive molybdenum-99 for nuclear
medicine. However nothing came of those proposals - by that time considerable
resources had been invested in a molybdenum-99 production regime involving
irradiation and processing of H E U targets. (Alder, 1996, ch.18; Hardy, 1996;
Brennan, 1985; A A E C , 1981-82, p.14; 1983-84, p.ll.)
A recent review of the AAEC/ANSTO divides its history into three phases (Bain
International et al., 1994, p.4.). The first was the development of nuclear power,
which lasted until the early 1970s. The second phase focused on uranium studies
and centrifuge enrichment, which was terminated in the mid 1980s. In the third
phase, the main purpose of the A A E C has been, as the review euphemistically
notes, "less clear".

A series of reviews and reorganisations of the AAEC took place through the 1970s,
including a major reorganisation of the Commission in 1974 and a reorganisation
of senior management in 1978. In 1979 a committee of the National Energy
Research Development and Demonstration Council ( N E R D D C ) reviewed the
research activities of the A A E C . The N E R D D C review recommended a
diversification of energy research to include non-nuclear energy. The A A E C had
been conducting some limited non-nuclear research, including solar energy
research, from the mid 1970s, but this work was limited by constraints imposed by
the Atomic Energy Act. The terms of reference for the N E R D D C review also
mentioned commercial activities and spin-offs: from this point on commercial
activities and collaborations would become increasingly important rather than
tacked-on extras to the research program. (Hardy, 1996; A A E C , 1981-82, pp .52-53;
George and Walker, 1982; Brennan, 1985.)
In 1980 the federal government announced that an interdepartmental committee
would undertake a review of the 1953 Atomic Energy Act and related matters. The
Uranium Advisory Council also undertook reviews of the Act in 1980-81.
(ANSTO, 1993D, p. 1.4.) In June 1981 the government announced that, as a result of
the various reviews, it had decided that far-reaching changes to Commonwealth
legislation in nuclear matters were required, as the Atomic Energy Act did not
provide an appropriate basis for the development, regulation, and control of
nuclear activities. (National Energy Advisory Committee, 1981, p.6.)
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The legislative changes were a long time coming however. In the meantime, the
government announced that direct government involvement in non-nuclear
energy research and development should remain the province of the CSIRO.
Consequently about one third of the A A E C s research staff was transferred to the
CSIRO, including the entire Chemical Technology Division. A C S I R O facility was
established adjacent to the A A E C s Lucas Heights facilities. (ASTEC, 1985, p.45;
Alder, 1996; ch.16.)
The decision to restrict the AAEC to nuclear work was significant. As a past
Chairman noted, "The m o m e n t for the creation of an Australian Energy
Commission had come, and passed." (George, 1984.) H o w a revamped Australian
Energy Commission would have dealt with energy issues, and within that the
question of nuclear energy, is anyone's guess. It might have remained a white
elephant, as the A A E C had arguably become, but a broader agenda for the A A E C
might also have weakened and diluted its advocacy of dubious nuclear projects
such as power reactors, PNEs, and weapons. The latter scenario was certainly a
strong possibility if the A A E C was merged with the CSIRO, which was one option
under discussion at the time.
With its reduced resources, the AAEC once again reviewed its programs and
underwent a reorganisation. In 1982 the senior management structure at the
A A E C was reorganised again, and research management was reorganised yet again
in 1983. S o m e programs in chemistry, and isotope and radiation applications, were
terminated or transferred to the CSIRO along with the solar energy research.
Synroc, an experimental waste disposal technique, became a major focus. Synroc
research began in 1979, and by 1985 it accounted for 1 5 % of the research effort of
the Commission. S o m e speculative work on nuclear fusion as a long-term energy
source began in the early 1980s. The Commission's involvement in international
safeguards and technical assistance was increased. More effort was put into
bilateral and multilateral nuclear projects, especially with regional countries such
as Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Nuclear science programs
continued in areas such as nuclear physics, materials, radioisotope applications,
and environmental science. (George, 1984; Brennan, 1985.)
Radioisotope production assumed more importance in the scope of the AAECs
activities. Indeed radioisotope production had slowly assumed greater
prominence within the scope of the A A E C s activities from the late 1960s. A
national service for the production and distribution of reactor-based
radiopharmaceuticals had been established in the 1970s. This growth was slow but
not imperceptible: radioisotope production, for medicine in particular, had been
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continually milked as a public relations winner, beginning even before H I F A R
was operational. The commercial use of H I F A R was extended in 1985 with silicon
irradiation on behalf of Japanese companies. A A E C expenditure for 1984-85 was
$48 million, revenue from commercial operations was $2.5 million, and the
Commission had a total staff of 1060. (George and Walker, 1982; Brennan, 1985;
A A E C , 1983-84, p.4; A S T E C , 1985, pp.45-46.)

The various changes in the early to mid 1980s led to a degree of industrial unres
This was in contrast to the early years of the Commission w h e n industrial
disputes were virtually unknown. A shortage of staff in some areas led to an
increase in the incidence of demarcation disputes and also had an adverse effect
on morale. Industrial unrest was exacerbated by the lack of a sense of direction in
the A A E C , and the absence of an appropriate industrial relations strategy by the
A A E C management. ( A A E C , 1981-82, p.91.)
The AAEC noted in its 1983-84 Annual Report that several years of financial
restraint had resulted in a marked decrease in the funds available for capital
programs, to the point that the staff were not appropriately housed or equipped.
The same complaint was m a d e in the following years. ( A A E C , 1983-84, pp.17-18;
1984-85, p.17; 1986-87, p.7.)
By the time that the Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC, 1984)
was asked to review Australia's role in the nuclear fuel cycle in 1984, it was no
wonder that a commentator asked what more a review could possibly say by that
stage (George, 1984). Then followed the A S T E C (1985) review of nuclear science
and technology in Australia.
The AAEC management was under siege through the 1980s, from tight-fisted and
meddling governments, from unions, and from anti-nuclear activists. A number
of specific incidents only m a d e things worse. In 1983 significant quantities of
gelignite and a m m o n i u m nitrate were found inside the A A E C s boundary fence
along with three detonators. Several incidents occurred in 1984: the accidental
release of 1.5-2.5 kg of uranium hexafluoride; improperly sealed isotopes were
driven through Sydney for five hours, and the driver w a s exposed to the
m a x i m u m radiation dose considered acceptable in a year; a ruptured pipe released
100 litres of radioactive sludge into stormwater drains with two workers
contaminated, and no notification of the general public. (King, 1985.) Also in 1984,
a threat w a s m a d e to fly an aircraft packed with explosives into H I F A R a week
later. The threat caused considerable media attention and concern in the local
community. A person w a s charged and found guilty on two counts of causing
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public mischief. ( A A E C , 1984-85, p.77.) In 1985 it was reported that low levels of
radioactive tritium had been leaking from the Lucas Heights facilities into two
stormwater drains over the previous decade. Also in 1985, after vandalism of a
pipe, radioactive liquid drained into Woronora river, and this incident was not
reported for 10 days. In 1986 an act of vandalism resulted in damage to the
sampling pit on the A A E C s effluent pipeline. This sparked widespread media
coverage. ( A A E C , 1985-86, p.15.) In 1987 a serious fire occurred in the charcoal
filters of a hot cell, burning for nearly two hours with two workers contaminated.
(Lucas Heights Study Group, 1986; 1993.) All through this period the problem of
radioactive waste disposal was becoming increasingly embarrassing.
These were not happy days for the AAEC. It was time for a change of name, an
eye-catching logo, and another review.

3.6. THE AUSTRALIAN NUCLEAR SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION
In November 1985 the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation
(ANSTO) Bill was introduced into the Senate, and subsequently the A N S T O Act
came into force in April, 1987. Thus A N S T O was born. In m a n y respects the n e w
legislation did not represent any fundamental break from the past; rather it
reinforced and provided a legislative basis for a number of trends already evident.
In 1986, the Collins Committee was established by the Minister for Resources and
Energy to review the A A E C . The review was timed to coincide with the formation
of A N S T O and to provide the first A N S T O Board with some working ideas. The
A N S T O Board adopted the majority of the recommendations - which was no
surprise since three members of the Collins Committee were appointed to the
Board. The Collins Committee argued that the A A E C had no clear objectives, too
large an administrative effort, too m a n y committees, that more effort was needed
in commercial activities, and, inevitably, that another review w a s needed (Collins
et al., 1986; Anon., 1987; A A E C , 1986-87, p.6.)
Some changes in activities occurred but still ANSTO's work was eclectic.
ANSTO's functions were to include research, the provision of expert technical
advice (primarily to government), the operation of national nuclear facilities, and
the commercial marketing of products and services. The radioisotope operations
were remoulded: Australian Radioisotopes w a s established as a commercial
subsidiary attached to A N S T O . (AAEC, 1986-87, p.7.)
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Some research into basic aspects of laser enrichment of uranium were restarted,
although nothing on the scale of the previous enrichment R & D . A private
company, Silex Systems (formerly Australian Nuclear Enterprises), has also
pursued research into laser isotope separation processes in the past decade, and
some of this work has been carried out in collaboration with A N S T O . 4 7 (Hardy,
1996, ch.9.)
In addition to its nuclear work, ANSTO was empowered to undertake nonnuclear work at the discretion of the Minister for Resources and Energy, where
that would be an effective use of its resources and would not unnecessarily
duplicate activities being conducted elsewhere. That allowance seems not to have
had any significant impact on A N S T O ' s work but it did ensure ongoing friction
between A N S T O and the CSIRO.
The Collins Committee proposed a basic strategy for ANSTO which was "outwardlooking, strongly interactive with other bodies, and directed towards the practical
utilisation of nuclear science and technology for the benefit of Australia." This
was typical of the discourse within which nuclear science and technology had
become embedded. It has a number of elements. O n e was the multiplicity of
nuclear applications, from termite removal to industrial gauges to decontamination of bee-hives. Tied in with the eclecticism was a perceived need to broaden
the constituency for nuclear science: "The degree of involvement of outside
organisations is particularly important for the future viability of A N S T O " , the
Collins Committee noted. (Collins et al., 1986.) Another feature of the n e w
discourse was the compulsion to establish endless reviews, whether initiated by
government or by the A A E C / A N S T O : this reflected the currency of managerialist
ideologies and also the ideology of economic rationalism; it was indicative of the
underlying lack of direction; and it was politically convenient for governments to
establish reviews since that shifted the burden of decision-making to some extent
and delayed the need to m a k e contentious decisions, not least decisions concerning the future operation of research reactors.
Over the decades the AAEC/ANSTO had gradually lost its status as guardian of
the coming revolution that w a s nuclear energy, and it was refashioned as one
public-sector civil science agency a m o n g many. A N S T O competed for scarce
resources with a host of other science and technology institutions. It adapted to
this n e w environment to some extent, learning for example to be more
competitive w h e n applying for grants from outside funding bodies. However

^- In 1997 Silex signed an agreement with a U S enrichment organisation (USEC), whereby U S E C will
examine the commercial potential of the Silex laser technology. (ANSTO, 1996F.)
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A N S T O has also attempted to assert its special place within the public-sector
science and technology infrastructure, in particular by playing u p its role in
foreign policy areas such as non-proliferation. This has been tied to objectives
such as the acquisition of a n e w research reactor, and an ongoing struggle to avoid
being amalgamated with the CSIRO.
Like all public-sector science agencies, and many others besides, government
funding w a s insecure. Funding did not fall but nor was it increased. Funding for
capital works w a s scarce, and expensive n e w toys such as a n e w research reactor
were unlikely to gain approval in this climate. The other side of this coin was that
there was considerable pressure on A N S T O to increase its revenue from sources
other than government.

In order to cut costs, there was pressure to cut staff numbers and to increase the
ratio of research and operational staff compared to support staff. Staff numbers fell
through the 1980s. By mid 1976 A A E C staff numbers had peaked at 1354; by 1987
there were 1026 staff. ( A A E C , 1986-87, p.6.) In the first years of ANSTO's existence
the staff cuts continued; the government's requirement w a s that staff levels be
reduced by 240 over the three years to 1990. The A N S T O Board agreed to the staff
cuts in the expectation that significant increases would occur in the funds
available to upgrade ANSTO's buildings and equipment. ( A N S T O , 1987-88, p.7.)
By mid 1994 there were 785 full-time staff and 46 part-time staff. Several major
projects were completed during ANSTO's first few years, including the National
Medical Cyclotron, a Business and Technology Park at Lucas Heights, a
supercomputer, and a tandem accelerator. ( A N S T O , 1993D, pp.1.3-1.4; 1993-94,
p.54.)
The second component of the austerity drive concerned revenue raising. This was
part of a broader drive to integrate public-sector science and technology with
industry (Johnston, 1993). From 1988 A N S T O was able to retain revenue from
commercial activities, an initiative designed to stimulate links between A N S T O
and industry. In 1987 a target was set for A N S T O to earn, within five years,
external revenue equal to 3 0 % of its government appropriation. Similar targets
were set for other organisations including the CSIRO. ANSTO's target had been
reached in 1990-91, including revenue from Australian Radioisotopes. (ASTEC,
1994, p.3; A N S T O , 19931, p.1.54.) The 3 0 % revenue target was reached with a little
help from the n e w "Prophecy" accounting system in which sales were recognised
immediately upon issuing an invoice rather than actual collection of payments.
( A N S T O , 1990-91, pp.59-60.)
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A n A S T E C (1994) review of the external earnings targets scheme said that the
scheme had encouraged the development of links between A N S T O and industry
and other research users - 373 private companies "interacted" with A N S T O
(excluding ARI) between 1990-91 and 1992-93. These "interactions" seem to have
grown exponentially such that nuclear gadgetry can be found in any nook, cranny,
termite nest or bee-hive. A 1994 review of A N S T O argued, as had m a n y reviews
of the A A E C / A N S T O before it, that "ANSTO's mission has become increasingly
complex, and activities have proliferated with no clear sense of focus or priority."
(Bain International et al., 1994, p.4.)
ASTEC (1994) recommended against higher revenue targets because too much
appropriation capital would be diverted to achieve the target, placing at risk
intellectual capital, longer-term research, and "research programs of national
importance and public good". A S T E C noted that there was a contradiction
between public good and commercial research, and argued for increased
accountability and minimising the less desirable effects of the external earnings
targets. Undoubtedly the public good is a secondary consideration, if a
consideration at all, as A N S T O refashions itself to m a k e it attractive to paying
customers. That said, from the point of view of nuclear critics a loss of intellectual
capital at A N S T O might not be a bad thing; it could raise the technical and
economic barriers to developing nuclear weapons, nuclear power, PNEs, or other
such dubious projects. A similar point can be m a d e about "research programs of
national importance and public good": silicon doping and other such revenueraising concerns are considerably more benign than m u c h else that the A A E C /
A N S T O has been involved in. O n the other hand it is not a simple either/or
situation: ANSTO's eclectic operations m a y be relatively benign but the nuclear
expertise and facilities could be redirected into more contentious areas in future.
Another aspect of the drive to integrate ANSTO with industry was to change the
governing Executive of A N S T O to include a majority of members appointed from
outside A N S T O . Advisory Committees were established in each of the research
programs, including representatives from industry, other science and technology
institutions, and academia. Those changes were advertised as moves towards
greater responsiveness and accountability to the "community". However only
narrow sections of the community, in particular industry and science, have been
included.
Married to the economic rationalism which has come to affect ANSTO is a
managerialist, bureaucratic ethos. These various ideologies have come to
permeate the public sector (Pusey, 1991). At A N S T O the managerialist ethos

105

manifests itself in m a n y ways. O n e is the sort of bean counting that has A N S T O
tallying its "interactions" with private enterprise. Other manifestations of the
managerialist ethos include the focus on strategic and corporate plans,
performance indicators, operational efficiency, external revenue targets and the
like. The Collins Committee w a s well versed in this jargon: "The Committee
believes that A N S T O should adopt a formal mechanism for setting its objectives,
and institute appropriate corporate planning procedures for allocation of resources
to programs to achieve these objectives, and to monitor its performance against
the identified goals." (Collins et al., 1986.) Again the endless series of reviews is
relevant, though they seem to generate more turmoil than "operational
efficiency".
Collins, then Chairman of the ANSTO Board, noted in 1988 that: "In a climate
where nuclear issues attract bad publicity, and where public attitudes towards
nuclear matters are so negative, the challenge of ensuring A N S T O ' s survival in
an appropriate, viable and effective form is no small one." ( A N S T O , 1987-88, p.7.)
The following year Collins w a s considerably more chirpy, mentioning the
greenhouse effect and ozone depletion and arguing that "If nuclear energy is to
play a more important role in the future energy generation of the world, Australia
has the opportunity and the responsibility to contribute to that endeavour." This
could be achieved by increasing uranium sales, he argued. H e went on to accuse
nuclear critics of being irrational, emotional, ill-informed, and politicallymotivated. ( A N S T O , 1988-89, pp.7-8.) This n e w zeal indicated that after a decade or
so of being under siege from m a n y directions, A N S T O was n o w on a more secure
footing.
Associated with the 1987 ANSTO Act was the Atomic Energy Amendment Act,
which repealed m u c h of the 1953 Atomic Energy Act including the draconian
security provisions. A S T E C (1985, p.74) saw that modification as facilitating greater
efforts to propagandise about the "many important and peaceful applications of
nuclear technology." Propagandising w a s nothing n e w to the A A E C / A N S T O , but
in the past decade more effort has been put into open days, community forums
(with a minimal exchange of significant information), glossy brochures and the
like; this substitutes for genuine public accountability. O n e expression of this trend
was the establishment of a Public Affairs Unit in 1990.
With some renewed zeal in the Organisation, and a boosted propaganda unit,
A N S T O w a s better placed to renew its efforts to secure a replacement research
reactor and this campaign duly gained m o m e n t u m in the late 1980s and beyond.
However the issue of radioactive waste disposal had become increasingly
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contentious and w a s a major issue in the lead up to the 1992-93 Research Reactor
Review. A N S T O confidently announced in 1987-88 that plans were in train to
send 450 spent fuel rods to the U S for reprocessing, and that a transport container,
costing over a third of a million dollars, had been constructed for that purpose.
(ANSTO, 1987-88, p.43.) In 1990-91 all that A N S T O could record in its Annual
Report (p.66) w a s that developments were being monitored, an initial loading of
H I F A R fuel rods had been prepared, and additional interim storage had been
installed for H I F A R fuel rods. In addition a contract was negotiated with A E A
Technology, Dounreay, Scotland, for reprocessing of 150 H I F A R fuel rods.
Another waste issue concerned ANSTO's role in handling radioactive waste
generated elsewhere in Australia. A n attempt to m o v e waste from the munitions
factory of the Australian Defence Industries at St. Marys, Victoria, to the A N S T O
facilities at Lucas Heights was successfully opposed in the N S W Land and
Environment Court by the Sutherland Shire Council. The Court held that
A N S T O did not have the power to deal with radioactive waste from n o n - A N S T O
origins. A s a result, the legislation governing A N S T O was amended. The A N S T O
A m e n d m e n t Act 1992 allowed A N S T O to store, manage, and process radioactive
waste as a commercial activity with immunity from state/territory and local
government laws. The n e w provisions were open-ended and highly contentious.
Efforts to establish a national waste repository were stepped up at this time.
(Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, 1994.)

3.7. ANTI-NUCLEAR OPPOSITION
IN AUSTRALIA
INTRODUCTION
THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PARTY
RETREAT A N D CO-OPTION
GREEN PARTIES
ECO-PAX IN THE 1990s A N D BEYOND
OPPOSITION TO THE AAEC/ANSTO
INTRODUCTION
In this section I summarise anti-nuclear opposition in Australia from the mid
1970s to the present. The 1992-93 Research Reactor Review, and the H I F A R
replacement controversy more generally, cannot adequately be understood
without consideration of the trajectory of anti-nuclear opposition over this period.
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Anti-nuclear opposition in Australia has to a considerable extent mirrored events
overseas, but there have also been some distinctive features. Uranium mining
and export has been the biggest concern, with the links between uranium export
and weapons proliferation a major focus. Another notable and distinctive feature
of anti-nuclear politicking in Australia was the important role played by the
labour movement in the 1970s and 1980s; however that support has fallen away
over the years.
A forceful anti-uranium movement developed through the mid 1970s. In
nationally-coordinated demonstrations, the movement was attracting up to 50 000
marchers in the major cities. In Victoria alone, over 100 local groups opposed to
uranium mining had been set up by the end of 1977. A number of groups had
formed - Friends of the Earth (some of which were off-shoots from Greenpeace),
the Movement Against Uranium Mining, Campaign Against Nuclear Energy,
Uranium Moratorium (later superseded by Coalition for a Nuclear-Free
Australia), and Campaign Against Nuclear Power. Some more established groups
were involved, such as the Australian Conservation Foundation and the
Wilderness Society. The c o m m o n themes of anti-uranium campaigns were (and
are) environmental hazards, the link between uranium export and weapons
proliferation, and the impact of uranium mining on Aborigines and workers in
the industry. There were two threads to the movement: mass opposition in the
major cities, and opposition in the regions of the mines which has usually
involved Aborigines. Along with the formation of a number of anti-nuclear, antiuranium organisations, there was significant opposition to uranium mining and
export by trade unions from the mid 1970s. (Martin, 1982; Falk, 1982.)
By 1977 the ALP had a formal policy opposed to uranium mining and export.
Sections of the anti-uranium movement helped the A L P in marginal seats in the
lead up to the federal election of December 1977. However this campaigning in
marginal seats seemed to have little effect, and the Liberal government was reelected. The anti-uranium movement faded for a time after this defeat; m a n y
activists left the movement while a number of groups effectively ceased to exist.
Mass demonstrations in the late 1970s were large but in decline from the 1977
peak. Union opposition to uranium mining and export began to wane. (Falk, 1982,
ch.ll; Cawte, 1992, ch.7.)
In the early 1980s, the various strands of the peace movement picked up once
again. Apart from uranium mining, issues taken up by the mass movement
included weapons proliferation overseas, the U S bases, the A N Z U S alliance,
French weapons testing in the Pacific, and the secret history of the British weapons
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tests which w a s slowly coming to light. In 1984 peace marches were twice as big as
the previous year, sometimes with marches a quarter of a million strong in the
largest cities. These were backed up by industrial action and blockades and
demonstrations at some of the uranium mines and U S bases. Violence w a s rarely
seen on the scale that w a s sometimes evident in Europe and North America, but
state power w a s never far away, as demonstrated for example by mass arrests at
demonstrations against the U S bases. O n top of the long-established groups, and
the numerous groups that formed in the 1970s, there w a s further organisational
development and coalescence in the peace movement. For example People for
Nuclear Disarmament (PND) was formed in 1981 as a coalition of peace and antinuclear groups; the number of P N D groups around the country had mushroomed
to 65 within a year. (Goertzen, 1988; Hewett, 1982; S u m m y , 1987; Falk, 1983, ch.10;
Friends of the Earth, 1986; Hallam, 1988; Ralfs and Miller, 1988.)

THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT PARTY
As in other countries, peace and anti-nuclear movements in Australia have lost
ground because of illusions in mass social-democratic parties, in Australia's case
the ALP. A m o n g the more notable disasters was the 1966 federal election, in
which m a n y opponents of the Vietnam W a r actively supported the A L P ; the
result was that the movement was demobilised and demoralised and the A L P
secured fewer votes than at any election since 1906 (Saunders and S u m m y , 1982).
Then the anti-uranium movement lost energy after the federal elections in 1977
and 1980; m u c h hope was put in an A L P victory which did not eventuate (Martin,
1989).
The "victory" of the ALP winning government in 1983 was even more demoralising since the n e w government reversed most of its progressive policies such as
its opposition to uranium mining. (The government put in place a compromise
policy which allowed only for the development of three, n a m e d mines; this policy
remained in place from 1983 to 1996.) Anti-nuclear movements have had some
limited success in winning over the A L P to certain positions on certain issues at
certain times, but as Saunders and S u m m y (1982, p.26) note:
the cost of wooing the ALP has usually resulted in the need to adopt a
lowest-common-denominator approach; analysis has been simplified and
policy and tactics have been moderated in order to maintain and increase the
support the movement has won from the party. Moreover, not only has the
movement's ability to engage in radical critique and militant action been
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compromised, but concomitantly the prospects for sustained future growth
have been diminished.
The early performance of the ALP government led to a great deal of bitterness. At
the 1984 A L P National Conference, the three-mines policy w a s established, and
the conference gave support to the A N Z U S Treaty, the U S bases, and visits of
nuclear warships to Australian ports. The major response of nuclear critics was to
compete with the A L P in the electoral arena. Thus was born the Nuclear
Disarmament Party (NDP). In less than six months the N D P had 8 000 members, it
had polled 650 000 primary votes (6.8%) in the federal election of late 1984, and an
N D P candidate, Jo Vallentine, was elected to the Senate. (Christoff, 1985; Prior,
1987; Pakulski, 1991.)
In another six months the NDP had all but collapsed. From the start the NDP's
purpose was to contest the next federal election; it was in Christoff's (1985, p. 15)
words "guerilla electoralism". The N D P drew considerable support from
disgruntled members and former supporters of the A L P , it was very popular
among young people, and a range of people and groups from the environmental
and peace movements threw their weight behind the N D P election campaign. The
Party had three planks to its platform (and no more): the closure of all foreign
military bases in Australia; banning the stationing in Australia or the passage
through Australian waters or airspace of any nuclear weapons; and the banning of
uranium mining and export.
NDP election campaigning was frantic, and there was a good deal of exhaustion
after the 1984 election (which returned the A L P to government). Since the N D P
had been established to contest the election, its future direction was unclear. Some
hoped it would evolve into something along the line of the G e r m a n Greens.
Other people had different ideas. The general and vague Party program w a s a
blank page onto which m a n y groups wrote their o w n ideologies and programs,
and these proved too diverse and contradictory. The N D P had grown so quickly
that issues of structure, accountability, policy, and the involvement of members of
other parties had not been properly addressed. At a conference in April 1985, the
Party was badly split over these issues. The charismatic rock star Peter Garrett led a
walk-out of some of the leaders which signified the beginning of the end of the
N D P . Jo Vallentine renounced her allegiance to the N D P . Membership declined
rapidly and the N D P faded into obscurity.
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RETREAT A N D CO-OPTION
The A L P w a s certainly affected by the initial success of the N D P , but it did not
adopt more progressive policies. Indeed it was soon after the 1984 election that the
M X missile controversy flared up. Early in 1985 Prime Minister H a w k e m a d e a
secret commitment to the U S government to provide back-up facilities for the test
landings in the Tasman Sea of two unarmed M X missiles. This information came
to public notice, and provoked such a furore that H a w k e was forced to reverse his
decision in the next few days. (Sharp, 1985.) The M X missile controversy helped to
put the U S bases and the A N Z U S alliance firmly on the political agenda of nuclear
critics and the major political parties alike; the decision of the N e w Zealand
government to ban visits by nuclear warships was seen by m a n y as a model for
Australia.48

A section of the ALP left faction resigned from the Party in the mid 1980s. Since
then the left faction has been nothing more than a r u m p with bland policies and
very little influence within the A L P . Perhaps the most significant change in the
A L P was that its leadership became considerably more adept at co-opting social
movements including eco-pax49 movements. This co-option took various forms.
In general the main method of co-option was (and is) to offer leaders of the
movements places in the bureaucratic sun, for example through state funding of
conservative peak bodies (such as the Australian Conservation Foundation) and
the involvement of movement leaders in formal processes such as the
Environmentally Sustainable Development process. (Shannon, 1996.)
In the case of anti-nuclear movements, the ALP government appointed an
Ambassador for Disarmament, w h o sometimes appeared to be primarily a
spokesman for the government's policies on the U S alliance and uranium
mining (Diesendorf, 1987). A Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was signed in 1986 by the
government, which also amounted to little more than a co-option of the
movements. Such initiatives gave politicians the opportunity to appear to be
making a contribution to non-proliferation, but issues such as the U S bases and
uranium mining and export were not negotiable. These projects also gave the
leaders of the anti-nuclear groups something to do in a period w h e n the
movements were in decline - though the movements declined all the faster

4S A s Wills (1985) notes, the stance of the N e w Zealand government was little more than electoral
populism: the government still supported U S interests in the region, not least by continuing to host U S
intelligence bases. In retaliation to the banning of nuclear warships, the U S cut a number of military
and intelligence links with N e w Zealand, but m u c h remained.
42 There was a good deal of coalescence between the various strands of the environmental and
peace/anti-nuclear movements, hence the term eco-pax. See Pakulski, 1991.
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because resources were diverted from important, topical campaigns such as
uranium mining at Roxby D o w n s (Fricker, 1988; Martin, 1985).
The ALP's task of co-opting anti-nuclear movements was made easier by three
interconnected developments: the movements became increasingly disconnected
from the working class and the unions; they were in decline from the mid 1980s
onwards; and the broad political strategy of building and broadening the mass
movement increasingly gave w a y to various dead-end liberal strategies.
The movements were increasingly disconnected from the working class and the
unions. A s economic stagnation and the associated capitalist austerity drive took
hold from the mid 1970s, concern gradually shifted from environmental, nuclear,
and foreign policy issues to jobs and the economy. With the A L P in government
from 1983, the union movement w a s increasingly being drawn into the consensus
conservatism of the business-union-government Accord process. Struggles
around workplace issues were on the wane, as were struggles around broader
social issues such as uranium mining. M a n y union leaders were only too happy to
do the bidding of the A L P government because of the close historical links
between union leaders and A L P politicians and their c o m m o n class location in
the labour aristocracy. Socialists were excluded or went into self-imposed exile
from the eco-pax movements; other socialists had failed to see the anti-capitalist
dynamic of the movements and had ignored them from the start. (McDonald,
1996; Shannon, 1996; Beresford, 1977.)
Working-class involvement in the movements declined, and the power that
could be wielded through union activities such as strikes was all but lost to the
social movements. In turn the movements distanced themselves from the
working class and unions; less effort w a s m a d e to involve unions and workers in
campaigns. The movements became more bureaucratic and reformist and far
easier to co-opt whether by the state or by capitalists (e.g. green consumerism).
Building and broadening mass campaigns gave w a y to reformism and
individualism - professional lobbying, letter-writing campaigns, petition drives
and so on, all of which can be useful tactics in the context of the building of a mass
campaign but have precious little impact by themselves. S o m e activists retreated
entirely into the dead-end politics of lifestyle change.
These various trends are neatly summarised by Shannon (1996):
With the labour movement hunkered down in defensive bunkers, resisting
with more or less (mostly less) success the assaults of a desperate capitalist
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class during the 1980s recession, green strategies took on a wistful and
ineffective hue. Green self-improvement versions of the Biblical injunction
to 'change thyself (half a brick in the toilet cistern, recycling, and so on),
elitist Greenpeace heroics, green consumerism, and the perennial ballot box
came to dominate the outlook of most of those with environmental
concerns.
Universities were of course shaped by the capitalist austerity drive and the decline
of the social movements. Milieux of m o v e m e n t activists and academics went into
decline, as seen for example in the inward turn of STS. Theoretically, m o v e m e n t
leaders and theorists, and s o m e academics, constructed a intellectual edifice
justifying the retreatist politics of the movements. The idea took hold that the
working class w a s no longer the agent of social change, that it had c o m e to form
part of the "productivist core" (or similar notions) along with the ruling class and
the state. Often this w a s (and is) linked to overambitious theorising about the
possibility that the social movements might fill the void left by the "corporatised"
working class (e.g. Touraine, 1981, 1988). Sometimes the "new" social movements
as a whole are glorified - "neither left nor right but out in front" - and contrasted
to the "old" labour movement. In other cases one or other of the n e w social
movements is held to be the guardian of the n e w age. Thus the central argument
of Babin's (1985) book on the Canadian nuclear industry is that "it is within the
antinuclear m o v e m e n t that w e find the starting point for the most important
struggle in post-industrial society."50

GREEN PARTIES
From the mid to late 1980s, in Australia as in many other (predominantly
capitalist) countries, leaders of the eco-pax movements formed green electoral
parties. To some extent the green parties were an advance on the environmentalism of the 1970s, in that they went beyond simplistic lifestyle solutions, and they
bridged local issues to international issues and environmental issues to social
issues. The green parties were attracting significant numbers of people from the
social-democratic parties and the mass movements. They sometimes threatened
to disrupt the two-party systems typical in most capitalist countries, and more
generally they had the potential to spur the growth of progressive movements
both inside and outside the electoral arena. (McDonald, 1996.)

52 For more sober and convincing assessments of the social movements, old and new, see Burgmann,
1993; McDonald, 1996.

113

M a n y local green parties formed in Australia - there were 13 in N e w South
Wales alone by 1991. However their early promise has not been realised. The
political circumstances in which they were developing w a s not helpful, with the
movements in decline and increasingly disconnected from workers and unions,
the economy in stagnation and periodic recession, most of the small socialist
parties in self-imposed exile, and the A L P becoming more adept at co-opting social
movements. More than a few of the green-party leaders were (and are) opportunists and careerists - social m o v e m e n t superstars - and this w a s never likely to
help. Early electoral successes immediately raised the question of the balance to be
struck between electoral and campaigning work. Most of the leaders argued for a
greater focus on electoral work, and by pursuing this approach the green parties
have become disconnected from their extra-parliamentary campaigning base. This
was exacerbated by the enactment, after a struggle, of a proscription clause which
resulted in the expulsion of campaign-oriented activists such as those from the
Democratic Socialist Party. (McDonald, 1996.)
The Australian Greens were launched in 1992, uniting all those green parties
which wanted to be part of a national organisation and would agree to adopt
proscription. This unification was of little significance however. Before and after
the formation of the Australian Greens, the trajectory w a s towards a narrow
electoralism. The various parties affiliated to the Australian Greens have
generally had only limited involvement in campaigns around French nuclear
testing, uranium mining, or woodchipping of native forests. Indicative of the
trajectory w a s the decision of the Australian Capital Territory Greens (affiliated to
the Australian Greens) to form a coalition government with the conservative
Liberal Party in the mid 1990s. Thus the A C T Greens are dutifully implementing
the ruling-class austerity drive and justifying this with appeals to the shibboleth of
"stable government". (McDonald, 1996.)

ECO-PAX IN THE 1990s AND BEYOND
Of course the green parties have not been the only organised expressions of ecopax politics in the past decade. A number of groups from the first w a v e of eco-pax
politics in the 1960s and 1970s have survived, though in almost all cases they have
minimal personnel and resources. Friends of the Earth (FOE) groups still exist though numerous F O E groups folded in the early 1990s. Other groups such as
M o v e m e n t Against Uranium Mining, and People for Nuclear Disarmament, are
in m u c h the same situation as F O E - alive but struggling. The Wilderness Society
has a paper membership of m a n y thousands, but it has very few activists, it has
become closely tied to the electoralist green parties in most states, and it has at best
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a modest involvement in campaigns such as those against uranium mining or
French nuclear testing. The Australian Conservation Foundation is in m u c h the
same situation - m a n y thousands of paper members but very few activists and a
thoroughly reformist perspective. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), and the
youth group Resistance, are the major socialist forces still involved in eco-pax
politics; they have considerable influence given their small size, but as w a s shown
by the proscription of the D S P from most of the green parties around Australia,
liberals currently have the upper hand in Australian eco-pax politics.
Another group which needs mention, as it is perhaps the most visible of all ecopax groups, is Greenpeace. Greenpeace is well able to generate enormous publicity
for itself and for the issues it takes up. In some campaigns, such as that against
French nuclear testing in the Pacific, Greenpeace plays a major, multifaceted, and
positive role.
However Greenpeace tends to operate in a bureaucratic and exclusive manner its members, and the public at large, are encouraged to support the organisation
with m o n e y but there is little room for active involvement. Thus for all its
appearance of being at the cutting edge of radical eco-pax politics, Greenpeace is
m u c h the same as the Wilderness Society and the Australian Conservation
Foundation - a very high paper membership but a very small number of activists
and a liberal reformist perspective.

Some eco-pax groups established in the 1970s or 1980s have folded altogether. For
example Campaign Against Nuclear Energy, which arose in the mid 1970s and
used to have a membership of over 1000, ceased operating in 1987 because of debts
and lack of personnel. (Ralfs and Miller, 1988; Fricker, 1988; Orzanski, 1989.) The
Communist Party of Australia, which used to have considerable involvement in
eco-pax campaigns and other social movements, collapsed in the early 1990s.
In the absence of mass movements, most of the eco-pax groups have necessarily
functioned as pressure groups rather than as a movement core. While there is
little eco-pax politicking beyond these groups, the waves of the eco-pax
movements have left a reservoir of public anti-nuclear sentiment. This sentiment
can flare up on occasions, For example, demonstrations against French weapons
tests attracted tens of thousands of people in 1995. Another example w a s the
National Peace Protest and Desert Festival at the U S base at Nurrungar in 1993,
which attracted nearly 1000 protesters despite the remote location. These
radicalisations tend to be short-lived and shallow but are significant nonetheless.
Both the social m o v e m e n t organisations, such as they are, and the reservoir of
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anti-nuclear sentiment in the public, are of considerable significance to the debate
over the replacement of HIFAR.
Pakulski (1990, p.58) offers the following diagram in which political openness
refers to the ability of disaffected groups to channel grievances through state
institutions, and political strength refers to the capacity of state institutions to
respond to such pressure:
POLITICAL OPENNESS
Flexible Rigid
Weak Assimilation Revolution
(e.g. U S A )
POLITICAL
STRENGTH
Strong
Persistence
(e.g. Sweden)

(e.g. West Germany 51 )

Suppression
(e.g. France)

I would locate the Australian eco-pax movements vis a vis the state somewhere
between the assimilation and persistence categories in Pakulski's schema, though
the assimilation has been more a co-option with little substantive shift in the
policies and practices, let alone the structure, of state institutions including the
major political parties.
While that pattern of persistence and co-option of eco-pax movements in
Australia is likely to remain for the foreseeable future, there have been some
significant changes in the political landscape. The capitalist austerity drive has
stepped up another notch with the election of the Liberal/National Coalition to
government in March 1996. This has provoked some reaction by some of the
social movements and also by sections of the union movement. However the
reaction has been sporadic, and the trajectory of the austerity drive vis a vis the
defensive reaction cannot be predicted with confidence. The n e w government's
nuclear policies, and the (tame) opposition to them, are discussed in chapter 4.5.

OPPOSITION TO THE AAEC/ANSTO
From its inception until the 1970s, there was little opposition to the AAEC
Reasons for this included the secrecy of the A A E C and the largely bipartisan
support for nuclear technology from the major political parties. (Moyal, 1975.)
51

Eco-pax movements in (West) Germany have fallen some distance short of creating a revolutionary
situation, but the combination of rigidity/blockage and weak state responses led to massive and
sometimes violent protests in the 1970s and 1980s.
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Since then, the various operations at Lucas Heights, including the research
reactors, have failed to mobilise opposition to the same extent as issues such as
uranium mining and the U S bases. However the A A E C / A N S T O ' s involvement
in most of Australia's nuclear projects has never been lost on nuclear critics.
Moreover there has always been considerable mutual support between different
eco-pax campaigns and groups. For example groups such as the Movement
Against Uranium Mining, Friends of the Earth, and Greenpeace, have all taken up
a range of issues including uranium mining, the U S bases, disputes over
radioactive waste, and last but not least the issue of the future of research reactors
in Australia. Similarly, organisations such as uranium mining companies have
supported the replacement of H I F A R even where they have little or no direct
interest in the construction of a n e w reactor.
As well as the broader opposition to the AAEC/ANSTO from the eco-pax
movements, there has been more concentrated opposition from sections of the
local population. The Sutherland Shire Environment Centre has consistently
been involved in campaigns relating to the A A E C / A N S T O . The Lucas Heights
Study Group, a residents action group, was established in the mid 1970s and has
been involved in m a n y campaigns over the years. A m o n g the various issues
taken up by the Study Group have been demands that residential development
near the A A E C not be allowed; that there be greater accountability and less secrecy
in the A A E C / A N S T O ' s operations; that H I F A R and M O A T A be shutdown (for
various reasons such as safety and environmental impact); that a waste repository
be established and waste removed from Lucas Heights; that the discharge of liquid
radioactive waste into the ocean cease; that the A A E C / A N S T O should undertake
non-nuclear research and development; that a national cyclotron for medical
radioisotope production be established; and that a health study should be
conducted in areas adjacent to Lucas Heights. (King, 1985.) Apart from the longstanding issues associated with the A A E C / A N S T O ' s operations, such as waste
storage and disposal, there has been considerable adverse publicity from time to
time relating to specific incidents such as the escape of uranium hexafluoride in
1984, and the 1996 shipment of 114 spent fuel rods to Scotland.

3.8. CONCLUSION
One issue which emerges from Australia's nuclear history is the recurring theme
of nuclear militarism. Initially this involved support of the weapons programs of
the U S and the U K through the hosting of British weapons tests, American
military facilities (including nuclear bases from the late 1960s), and uranium
supply. Then from the 1950s there was some interest in the purchase of nuclear
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weapons from the U S or the U K or the stationing of nuclear weapons in
Australia. A n d through the 1960s, there w a s a greater willingness to entertain the
idea of domestic development of nuclear weapons, most concretely expressed in
the series of projects from 1969-71. The high-level interest in nuclear weapons
faded quickly, along with most of the relevant projects, but national defence/
security concerns continue to shape nuclear development in Australia including
the H I F A R replacement controversy.
Australia's nuclear history is also the history of the AAEC/ANSTO and its
transition from an institution of great political, economic, and even military
importance, to its more modest role as a public-sector civil science agency.
The themes which have predominated in this chapter - the weapons connection,
and the rise and fall of the A A E C - have been taken up in some recent literature
on Australia's nuclear history. They receive emphasis in Alice Cawte's (1992) book
Atomic Australia. Cawte is not the first writer to discuss the nuclear weapons
issue, but her account is the most systematic and sustained analysis of the interest
in a domestic weapons capability and the intersection of that with projects such as
the Jervis Bay nuclear power project.
Cawte's analysis is based on detailed archival research - she analysed a considerable volume of unpublished literature such as Cabinet submissions from the
government's Defence Committee, various government Ministers, and Phillip
Baxter. Cabinet documents from 1962-66, released in the five years since Cawte's
book, all confirm the general thrust of her arguments - that there w a s high-level
political interest in the possibility of developing a nuclear weapons capability
(though no decision to systematically pursue a weapons program), and a willingness to pursue ostensibly civil nuclear projects such as nuclear power to lower the
barriers to nuclear weapons. 52 In other respects Cawte's arguments are necessarily
speculative. For example there is a great deal of circumstantial evidence to support
the argument that the Jervis Bay nuclear power project w a s pursued, in part, to
lower the barriers to nuclear weapons, even though there w a s no public
admission along those lines.53 Overall, Cawte's analysis of the interest in a
domestic weapons capability is convincing. It is also insightful in its linking of the
weapons issue with the history of the A A E C . In particular, Cawte shows h o w the
A A E C w a s floundering in the late 1960s and thus all the more willing to involve

52 See Stewart, 1993,1994; Sheridan, 1994; Pemberton, 1994; Henderson, 1997; Greenless, 1997.
52 Indeed the sudden silence was revealing. More information on the 1969-71 period will come to
light around the turn of the century, with the release of classified documents under the 30-year rule
on disclosure of sensitive government documents.
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itself in the development of nuclear explosives, whether for peaceful or military
uses - this insight is of some relevance to the H I F A R replacement controversy.
Cawte's book, and other literature on the weapons issue, has provoked some
defensive responses from the nucleocracy. O n e such response is a book by Alder
(1996), w h o was centrally involved in m u c h of the A A E C s work from the
Commission's creation until 1982.54 O n the weapons issue, Alder (1996, pp.7-8)
says that:
there was never any planning or work done by the AAEC towards the
development of nuclear weapons in Australia
(All), repeat all, of the
Commission's own work was directed at all times to the peaceful uses of
Atomic Energy, and those who say otherwise are remoulding history to suit
their own false views and political purposes.
Whether there was ever any research at the AAEC directly related to weapons is
an open question that is not addressed in the existing literature (so far as I a m
aware) nor in this thesis. In some respects the question can be questioned:
regardless of intentions, and regardless of whatever might have taken place at the
A A E C in relation to weapons development, a fair percentage of the A A E C s
ostensibly civil research, not least the power reactor research and the enrichment
program, had obvious implications for weapons development even if that was
not the aim.
Whether consideration was ever given to the potential to use HIFAR in a more
direct manner towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons is also a matter of
speculation. Consideration m a y have been given to extraction of plutonium from
spent H I F A R fuel, although the reactor produces insignificant amounts of
plutonium, and yields might still be insignificant even if plutonium production
was maximised. Most probably the A A E C s plutonium extraction research, to the
extent that it w a s concerned with weapons development, was pursued with a
view to reprocessing fuel from the planned power reactor. In any case the
Commission's preliminary plutonium extraction research seems not to have gone
far. Consideration m a y also have been given to diversion of H E U fuel, or
extraction of H E U from spent H I F A R fuel. Pursuit of any of these options m a y
have jeopardised further supplies of H E U from abroad, which might have been
one reason enrichment research was pursued.

54 See also Hardy, 1996. Like Alder, Hardy was employed by the A A E C / A N S T O for m a n y years.
Hardy's book is far more tightly argued than Alder's, but it only addresses the weapons issue in
passing. Both books are focused on the A A E C s enrichment program.
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M o r e generally, Alder's (1996) polemic misses the point. H e ignores Baxter's
arguments, repeated over the years, that projects such as nuclear power and
enrichment should be pursued in part to lower the barriers to weapons
production. H e ignores (or is unaware of) the overtures m a d e by the federal
government's Defence Committee to the U S and U K in relation to acquisition of
nuclear weapons. H e says nothing about the A A E C s Plowshare Committee and
the Cape Keraudren P N E project. H e says nothing about the refusal of the
government to sign the N P T in the late 1960s, and Baxter's role in that episode. H e
ignores the public advocacy of Gorton and several other politicians for a nuclear
weapons "deterrent". H e ignores other comments on the public record, such as the
admission by the Minister for National Development in 1967 that it w a s
government policy to maintain a domestic uranium source for weapons
production. H e says nothing about the intersection of civil and military nuclear
programs overseas. To the extent that these issues are addressed by Alder, it is
simply to assert that neither Baxter nor anyone at the A A E C supported weapons
development or supported civil nuclear development in part to lower the barriers
to weapons development. H e repeatedly claims that those w h o claim otherwise
are politically-motivated, anti-nuclear dogmatists whose arguments rely on
dubious sources.

As for the rise and fall of the AAEC, Alder (1996, p.9) says the Commission did
"lose its way" at all:
what actually happened was that our political masters kept changing the

rules. Not just once or twice, but over and over again. In retrospect, I bel
the AAEC

and its staff showed great resilience in the face of constant

politically motivated changes, many of which were caused by ignorancebased dogma.

In short, Alder's (1996, p.79) thesis is that "Dogma won, over national interes
His vision (p.83) is for Australia to provide the world with "total nuclear fuel cycle
services including reprocessing and waste disposal", and if the ignorant,
politically-motivated dogmatists have their way, Australia risks invasion from
Asian countries in need of uranium.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THE 1992-93 RESEARCH REACTOR REVIEW
4.1. INTRODUCTION
4.2. HISTORY OF REVIEWS
4.3. THE RESEARCH REACTOR REVIEW PROCESS
4.4. DEBATES A N D FINDINGS
4.5. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter covers the recent history of debates over the replacement of HIF
focusing on the 1992-93 Research Reactor Review (RRR). I begin by summarising
the 20-25 year history of the A A E C / A N S T O ' s efforts to convince the government
to approve and fund a n e w reactor. Then the politicking surrounding the R R R is
discussed. Then I summarise the overall findings of the Review, and discuss a
number of the debates taken u p during the Review, although it is beyond the
scope of the thesis to analyse all of the debates in any detail. I conclude this chapter
with some discussion on developments since the Review.
Before proceeding, some comments on the place of this chapter in the context
the thesis and on different approaches that might be used to analyse the R R R and
the H I F A R controversy more generally. M y analysis draws from the contextual
material of the previous two chapters; in other words the H I F A R controversy is
treated as a microcosm of the ongoing history of nuclear development in
Australia and abroad. This approach can be contrasted with two different
approaches. O n e approach would be a positivist/technical analysis of the H I F A R
controversy - this would probably go no further than an analysis of each of the
sub-debates within the broader H I F A R controversy.

Another approach would be to rely heavily on constructivist STS/SSK concepts,
still focusing on the various sub-debates but with m u c h more attention given to
the social dimensions. For example the S S K concept of interpretive flexibility
could be used to show h o w , during the R R R , pro- and anti-nuclear partisans
attempted to ascribe to their o w n knowledge claims the status of fact, and to
ascribe to their opponents' "facts" the status of conjecture. O n e might also expect
some consideration of the symbolic dimensions of nuclear energy - the fears some
people hold about nuclear holocaust, efforts by pro-reactor partisans to counter
that anti-nuclear symbolism, and so on. In s u m one would expect that a typical
STS/SSK account of the R R R would be insightful, but that it might give weight to
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Winner's (1993, p.373) gripe that "All the emphasis (in social constructivism) is
focused u p o n specific cases and h o w they illuminate a standard, often repeated
hypothesis, namely, that technologies are socially constructed."
Both a technical/positivist approach and an STS/SSK approach to the RRR could
be justified. Public-policy debates surrounding the H I F A R controversy could profit
from further technical/positivist analyses of some of the sub-debates. A n STS/SSK
approach might also add to public-policy debates; for example some of the complex
sub-debates might profit from a symmetrical SSK analysis, or to give another
example an STS/SSK analysis might expose and critique technocratic (and antidemocratic) ideologies and their role in the H I F A R controversy.
My approach borrows from the two approaches just described: there is some
technical analysis, although not m a n y issues are explored in depth; and the
analysis is also alert to STS/SSK insights. In addition, the following analysis draws
from the broader, historical picture of nuclear development presented in chapters
2-3. That material provides some important insights. Generally, the H I F A R
controversy is more than the s u m of its component sub-debates, yet a
technical/positivist analysis or a narrow STS/SSK analysis of the R R R might
easily reduce the controversy to its sub-debates. More specifically, the H I F A R
controversy is m u c h better understood in light of the historical tension between
the A A E C / A N S T O as an institution of key strategic importance versus the
A A E C / A N S T O as one public-sector civil science agency a m o n g many. That
tension, and its significance, could only be partially teased out of the material
presented to and by the R R R panel; it is m u c h better understood with some
historical background. Similarly, a technical/positivist or STS/SSK analysis could
scarcely even begin to consider the intersection of the H I F A R controversy with
nuclear weapons issues, since there was hardly any explicit discussion on nuclear
weapons during the Review (except for nuclear weapons programs overseas). Yet
on the strength of the discussion on the use of research reactors in nuclear
weapons programs in chapter two, and also drawing from the analysis in chapter
three of the interest of sections of the Australian state and nucleocracy in a
domestic nuclear weapons capability and their willingness to pursue civil nuclear
projects to lower the barriers to nuclear weapons, the intersection of the H I F A R
controversy and nuclear weapons issues can be analysed.

The contextual material of the preceding chapters is most useful when addressing
the "national interest" sub-debate of the H I F A R controversy, one component of
which is national defence/security. If the only purpose of the preceding two
chapters w a s to throw light on the national interest sub-debate, it would be a case
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of using a sledge-hammer to crack a walnut. However the contextual material of
chapters 2-3 also sheds light on other issues; in particular, the analysis of nuclear
medicine and the medical radioisotope industry, in chapters 5-8, profits from a
broad, historical understanding of nuclear development.

4.2. HISTORY OF REVIEWS
With the AAEC/ANSTO floundering for lack of purpose through the 1970s and
1980s, H I F A R became more important to its activities. Partly this importance was
practical - for example as economic rationalism took hold, H I F A R was
increasingly used for silicon doping, radioisotope production, and other functions
to increase revenue. Partly the importance of H I F A R w a s symbolic - A N S T O
(1991) admits as m u c h itself in saying that the operation of a research reactor
brings "international prestige and influence".
The AAEC began pushing for government approval and funding for a new
reactor, or a major upgrading of HIFAR, in the mid 1970s. O n several occasions,
federal governments have referred the issue to review committees and deferred
making a decision on the issue. In broad terms, the repeated deferrals of a decision
on the issue can be seen as reflecting financial considerations and the dubious
rationale for a n e w reactor. Public opposition has also been a factor: while
governments in Australia have not been forced to radically alter nuclear policies
in response to public opposition, they have at least been forced to adopt a more
guarded approach.

In 1975 the AAEC initiated a preliminary study into the possibility of replac
HIFAR. The study was completed in 1978, at which time the government
approved a submission to proceed with detailed design studies, site selection, and
financial estimations. A French designed replacement reactor, costing $30-40
million, w a s under discussion. However the 1979 National Energy Research
Development and Demonstration Council ( N E R D D C ) review recommended that
H I F A R should not be replaced in the short term, although it did say that there w a s
a need for a research reactor and that H I F A R should be refurbished. ( A N S T O ,
1991.) This w a s just ten years after all the interest in nuclear power and nuclear
explosions, yet more m u n d a n e issues - such as the relative merits of reactors and
cyclotrons for medical radioisotope production - dominated the debate (Malone,
1979).
The NERDDC recommendation terminated the study for a new reactor. A
program to refurbish H I F A R began at an estimated cost of $4.7 million over five
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years. M u c h of the impetus for the refurbishment was that H I F A R did not comply
with safety and reliability standards which had been adopted during the two
decades of the reactor's operation. The refurbishment involved work on the
containment building, emergency core cooling system, reactor instrumentation,
and electrical power supply. Short of a n e w reactor, the A A E C wanted an
upgrading of H I F A R including an increase in neutron flux, but most of the
modifications the government was prepared to fund were not to upgrade
performance but to improve safety. The refurbishment program continued
through the 1980s. ( A A E C , 1981-82, pp.52-53; A N S T O , 1989-90, p.58.)

The future of HIFAR - and the possibility of a replacement reactor - was back
the agenda in 1985. A n A S T E C (1985, p.61) review argued that it was essential for
Australia to be involved in nuclear science and technology, and to operate a
research reactor, for the following reasons: economic advantages through transfer
of nuclear technology to Australian industry; scientific advantages; social
advantages in medicine and environmental science; and foreign policy
advantages, which A S T E C related to "Australia's influence in the International
Atomic Energy Agency and other influential forums concerned with aspects of the
nuclear fuel cycle."

ASTEC considered three options: replacement of HIFAR with a reactor of at lea
equal neutron flux; replacement of H I F A R with a smaller 5 M W reactor combined
with assurances of access to overseas high-flux research facilities; or further
refurbishment of HIFAR. A S T E C argued for retention of H I F A R with a regular
budget for upgrading and maintenance; it said that with refurbishment H I F A R
could operate safely and efficiently into the 1990s. Modifications would include
improvements to neutron beam instrumentation. Replacement of H I F A R with a
reactor of at least equivalent flux was "not feasible in the present Australian
economic climate", the A S T E C report said, and a 5 M W reactor would m e a n
discontinuation of most of the "international standard" research programs carried
out using HIFAR. (ASTEC, 1985, p.4, pp.69-70.)
The HIFAR refurbishment program continued through the 1980s and beyond. In
1989-90 an ongoing H I F A R "modernisation program" commenced, initially
focused on the completion of seismic hardening work and a program of
replacement of electrical instrumentation and protective signals. Again the
emphasis was on safety rather than upgrading performance. ( A N S T O , 1989-90,
p.58.)
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By 1990 the transition from the A A E C to A N S T O had been completed. In some
respects A N S T O w a s on a more secure footing - government funding had
become a little more secure and generous, enabling some capital works projects to
proceed, and anti-nuclear opposition w a s in decline. O n the other hand there was
some industrial unrest at this time, and the safety of H I F A R w a s a topical issue.
The issue of replacing H I F A R resurfaced. Collins, then Chairman of the A N S T O
Board, declared that there w a s public discussion, "mostly of an uninformed
nature", on the issue. A N S T O had commenced planning for a n e w reactor by this
stage, and argued that a firm decision from government was essential within the
next few years. ( A N S T O , 1990-91, pp.5-8.)

One aspect of the science and technology policy debate in Australia by this ti
revolved around "big science". It was in this context that A S T E C undertook a
review into major national research facilities. (The definition of these facilities
rested on various criteria, one of which was capital cost of at least $5 million. Of
the six major national research facilities operating at the time, one was HIFAR,
and another w a s the National Medical Cyclotron.) In A S T E C , A N S T O had a strong
ally. ASTEC's uncritical support of the A A E C and other facets of nuclear
development in Australia had been m a d e clear on a number of occasions through
the 1980s, no more so than in the 1984 A S T E C report which was a whitewash of
the uranium mining industry. A S T E C (1992) argued that a reactor to replace
H I F A R should be one of seven priorities in terms of major national research
facilities, narrowed from an initial list of 96 proposals. A S T E C estimated that a
replacement reactor would cost $150 million. This was by far the most expensive
of the proposals for major national research facilities; in fact it accounted for over
half of the $275 million estimated total costs for the seven proposals.
The ASTEC review accepted ANSTO's rationale for a new reactor. However the
issue w a s soon to be subjected to more searching scrutiny.

4.3. THE RESEARCH REACTOR REVIEW
PROCESS
On 30 September 1992, the then Federal Minister for Science, Ross Free,
announced the establishment of the Research Reactor Review (RRR) which w a s
to cost $1.2 million. The Terms of Reference for the Review were as follows:
1. Whether, on review of the benefits and costs for scientific, commercial,
industrial and national interest reasons, Australia has a need for a new
nuclear research reactor.
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2. A review of the present reactor, HIFAR,

to include an assessment of the

national and commercial benefits and costs of HIFAR

operations, its likel

remaining useful life and its eventual closure and decommissioning.
3. If the finding on 1. above is that Australia has a need for a new nuclear
research reactor, the Review will consider possible locations for a new
reactor, its environmental impact at alternative locations, recommend

a

preferred location, and evaluate matters associated with regulation of the
facility and organisational arrangements for reactor-based research.
In assessing the environmental impacts of the facility, the Review will take
account of the objectives of the Environment Protection (Impact of
Proposals) Act 1974, as amended. In this regard the Review will schedule
public hearings and call for submissions from any interested parties by
advertisements in major newspapers.
The Review panel consisted of three academics. The Chairperson was Professor
K e n McKinnon, then Vice Chancellor of the University of Wollongong and a
m e m b e r of the Prime Minister's Science and Engineering Council. The other
panel m e m b e r s were Professor A n n e Henderson-Sellers, Director of the Climatic
Impacts Centre and Professor of Physical Geography at Macquarie University, and
Dr. Tor Hundloe, a Commissioner of the Industry Commission and a former
Director of the Institute of Applied Environmental Research at Griffith
University.
Ross Free (quoted in Sutherland Shire Environment Centre, 1993) said that
membership on the Review panel of persons with k n o w n views "would totally
distort the open-minded basis from which the Review is beginning." Thus it w a s a
bone of contention that Henderson-Sellers w a s on the Review panel. A m e m b e r
of A S T E C , she w a s a signatory to the 1992 A S T E C report which recommended the
construction of a n e w reactor.
Although the terms of reference mentioned the 1974 Environmental Protection
Act, the Review w a s not established under the Act. This aspect of the Review w a s
criticised by opponents of a n e w reactor because it lessened the scrutiny which the
proposal for a n e w reactor would receive. In particular it allowed for the Review
to proceed without identification of a specific proponent for the n e w reactor
although A N S T O w a s clearly the major proponent. Without being identified as
the proponent, A N S T O w a s not required to reveal detailed and specific
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information relating to the project, which obviously put opponents at a
disadvantage. (Wallace, 1993.) The Sutherland Shire Council (1993B) asked the
Review to direct A N S T O to place its case for a n e w reactor before the Review
before asking for submissions from other parties. The Review refused: proponents
and opponents alike were required to forward submissions by the same date. The
Council suggested that the Review gather government documents relevant to the
H I F A R issue, and m a k e them available to the public; again the Review refused,
suggesting that use be m a d e of the Freedom of Information Act.
Another bone of contention was the time allowed for the presentation of
submissions. The closing date for submissions w a s given as 18 December 1992,
allowing just two and a half months to prepare submissions. This w a s clearly
disadvantageous to opponents of a n e w reactor. A N S T O , with far more resources,
w a s in a m u c h better position to submit a substantial submission in a short space
of time.
Genevieve Rankin, a Sutherland Shire Councillor (and later the Mayor), voiced a
number of other objections about the Review not long after its inception. She
complained that M c K i n n o n w a s naive about funding and that other aspects of
science would necessarily suffer if a reactor w a s built. She took issue with
McKinnon's blaming of the Council for the existence of housing in the Reactor
Buffer Zone surrounding H I F A R . She objected to the refusal of the Minister for
Science to provide s o m e funding to the Council to help with its input into the
Review. Rankin (1993) s u m m e d u p her objections thus:
It is distressing to find the supposedly objective Chairperson with very fixed
views that cannot be changed by the weight of evidence, and to find him preempting the outcome of issues before hearing evidence

Your

(McKinnon s) determination to continue the Review with no requirement
for ANSTO

to present detailed costings or specifications, and no resources

be made available to opponents of the proposal, and with a panel member
(Henderson-Sellers) who has an already stated public position in favour of
another reactor, has made meaningful participation by the mass of the

Australian community who are directly affected by this proposal impossible

believe these matters combine to a deliberate attempt to force another reacto
on to our community as a fait accompli. Sutherland Shire Council's formal

submission is an attempt to participate in good faith within the limits of loc
resources in your review on the assumption that there may at some future
date be some indication that this process is more than a bureaucratic
whitewash.
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M a n y thought it inevitable that the Review would give unqualified endorsement
to a n e w reactor. The Council had considered boycotting the Review, but went
ahead and prepared a submission. Prepared in haste, the submission w a s flimsy.
Other opponents of a n e w reactor contributed first-round submissions which
clearly showed the effects of a lack of time and resources. By contrast, ANSTO's
numerous submissions totalled 1500+ pages. In addition, A N S T O hired a publicrelations firm (Edelmans) to assist in the soliciting of submissions in favour of a
n e w reactor.

Clearly the Review was not an even playing field. The federal government set t
agenda, limited the time for submissions, and appointed personnel from the
upper echelons of academic and science institutions to conduct the Review. That
there w a s high-level support within the government for a n e w reactor was
further indicated by pro-reactor submissions from almost every government
department. The Review panel, in turn, seemed unwilling to alter the balance of
forces.

The capitalist state does not speak with one voice: a number of local councils
the southern Sydney region were opposed to a n e w reactor (as were a number of
local branches of both the Labor and Liberal Parties). Of particular importance was
the active opposition of the Sutherland Shire Council. The Council and local
community had been burnt before in accepting "expert" assurances: to give just
one example, a meeting of the Council in 1955 was assured that there would be no
release of radioactive material of any kind from a research reactor at Lucas
Heights, and thus the Council had voted to accept the proposal without raising
any objections. Moreover the Council's political teeth had been sharpened in
other disputes: the Shire hosts a toxic waste d u m p and Australia's largest capacity
waste tip along with A N S T O . (Wallace, 1993.)

As well as being centrally involved in the Review itself, the Council was a fo
point for a broader campaign against a n e w reactor. The Council w a s a source of
financial resources, administrative support, publicity, and technical expertise. The
Council adopted a joint Council/community approach to the fight against a n e w
reactor, which entailed a joint Council/community working group including
groups such as the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre and the Lucas Heights
Study Group. (Wallace, 1993.) M u c h more alliance building went on in a less
formal manner.
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While the various strands of the peace movement subsided through the 1980s, a
number of social m o v e m e n t organisations remained. Groups such as Greenpeace
and Friends of the Earth (FOE) presented the Review with substantial (secondround) submissions and involved themselves in other aspects of the campaign
such as media work. Dozens of other organisations and individuals contributed to
the campaign. The arguments put to the Review by the Council, F O E , Greenpeace,
and m a n y others, were notable in that they did not adopt a N I M B Y (not-in-myback-yard) approach: they argued that there was no case for a reactor anywhere in
Australia. (Wallace, 1993.) A s well as the social movement organisations, the mass
movements of the 1970s and 1980s had also left a residue of anti-nuclear
sentiment in the public, and that sentiment w a s tapped during the Review.

It had seemed that a decision in favour of a reactor was a fait accompli, but t
situation began to change. The initial deadline for submissions w a s pushed back to
February 1993, and supplementary submissions were accepted for several months
after that. Over 400 submissions were received, about 4 0 % opposed to a n e w
reactor. The Council's second submission to the Review was far more substantial
than its initial submission, and included solicited papers from a range of
consultants including academics, accountants, lawyers, and scientists, on topics
such as safety issues, radioactive waste, and alternatives to a domestic reactor for
medical radioisotope production and supply. Other groups forwarded secondround submissions that are also likely to have influenced the outcome of the
Review. The Review (1993, p.3) said:
Some of these submissions contained a great deal of helpful material,
especially those from ANSTO

and the Sutherland Shire Council, both of

which included consultant opinions. The Review also profited a great deal
from the close attention given to ANSTO

and Lucas Heights matters over a

long period by concerned citizen groups, including the Lucas Heights Study
Group, Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. This input gave the Review a
feel for community concerns and suggested many of the questions which
were subsequently followed up through consultancies commissioned by the
Review.

The Review travelled to all capital cities in Australia except Hobart and Darwi
hearing evidence from 150 people over 13 days of hearings.
The additional time also enabled opponents of a new reactor to mount a public
campaign. The issue w a s taken up by sections of the environmental movement,
featuring prominently for example in World Environment D a y marches and
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rallies in m i d 1993. This campaigning m a y have had some impact on the Review
panel. Certainly McKinnon, w h o had seemed inflexible on a number of issues,
became more inquisitive as the Review proceeded. Henderson-Sellers' critical
questioning of A N S T O belied her status as a m e m b e r of A S T E C ; in fact her
performance as part of the Review panel w a s "not only entertaining, but highly
confronting toward A N S T O " according to John Hallam of Friends of the Earth
(1993C). The public campaign m a y also have had some impact on the federal
government: it w a s clear that there was considerable support within the government for a n e w reactor, but ultimately it accepted the Review's recommendation
to defer the decision for another five years or so.

4.4. DEBATES AND FINDINGS
OVERALL FINDINGS
THE NATIONAL INTEREST
MEDICAL RADIOISOTOPES
RADIOACTIVE WASTE
RADIOACTIVE EMISSIONS
ACCIDENTS A N D EMERGENCY PLANS
REGULATION OF ANSTO
COST OF A N E W REACTOR A N D COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
PUBLIC OPINIONS
OVERALL FINDINGS
The Terms of Reference for the Review asked it to consider the scientific,
industrial, commercial, and national interest arguments for and against a n e w
reactor. The Review w a s m u c h concerned to adopt an objective position, sorting
facts from arguments and contention and basing its findings solely on the former.
It further hoped to base its findings on an economic evaluation, which it
conceived as encompassing financial evaluation and also attaching dollar figures
to non-financial aspects such as the scientific benefits and the national interest.
However in that sense the Review w a s over before it had begun: it proved
impossible to attach dollar figures to national interest considerations or to the
scientific benefits, and so the Review's overall conclusions were equivocal.

The Review (p.xx) said that "an economic analysis of the balance of benefits ove
costs is not positive, unless high values are arbitrarily assigned to the science and
national interest components for either H I F A R or a n e w reactor." It further
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argued (p.xiii) that "The Government

has taken a strong position on the

importance of the national interest. Consequently it might want to m a k e a
positive decision about a n e w reactor for the same reasons and in the same w a y as
it does for defence and other national interest issues, bearing in mind that a n e w
reactor might cost n o more than a n e w frigate or submarine." Thus the Review which only had an advisory role in any case - gave the government s o m e
leverage to proceed with a reactor primarily on the basis of the national interest.
While giving the government the option of proceeding with a reactor on national
interest grounds, the Review argued that a decision on a n e w reactor should be
deferred for "about five years". A deferral of a decision on the issue seemed
appropriate to the Review for several reasons. Firstly, the issue of radioactive
waste disposal w a s crucial (p.xiv): "It would be utterly wrong to decide on a n e w
reactor before progress is m a d e on identification of a high level waste repository
site." Secondly, the Review (p.xiv) argued that there w a s sufficient doubt as to the
merits of reactors vis a vis alternative technologies for scientific research and
radioisotope production to m a k e it "prudent" to have some delay in making a
final decision on a n e w reactor. Thirdly, the Review (p.xiii) argued that "There are
no safety, health, community risk or other reasons to close H I F A R . A technical
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is desirable, to assess its remaining life
potential, but its remaining life is not likely to be less than a decade."
There was some expectation that the Review would proceed to a second stage
dealing with issues such as siting of a n e w reactor. H o w e v e r this did not happen
because of the recommendation that a decision on a n e w reactor should be
deferred.
In sum the recommendations of the Review (p.xiv) were that the government
should:
• keep HIFAR going;
•

commission a Probabilistic Risk Assessment to ascertain HIFAR's
remaining life and refurbishment possibilities;

•

provide an additional $2 million per year for scientists to gain access to
international advanced neutron scattering facilities;

•

commence

work immediately to identify and establish a high level waste

repository;
•

accept the financial implications of the fact that neither the current nor an
new reactor can be completely commercial;
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•

accept in consequence that any decision on a new reactor or other neutron
source must rest primarily on the assessed benefits to science and

•

Australia's national interests; and
make a decision on a new neutron source in about five years' time when
the relative arguments relating to spallation sources, cyclotrons and reactors
might be clearer, and when Australia's scientific neutron scattering
performance is more evident.

To the list of recommendations was attached various conditions (p.xv):
If, at the end of a further period of about five years,
• a high level waste repository site has been firmly identified and work
•

started on proving its suitability
there is no evidence that spallation technology can economically offer as

•

much or more than a new reactor
there has been no practical initiation of a cyclotron anywhere worldwide to

•

produce
technetium-99m
there is good evidence of strong and diverse applications of neutron
scattering capability in Australian science, including many

•

young scientists,

and a complex of industrial uses
the national interest remains a high priority

it would be appropriate to make a positive decision on a new reactor. The most
suitable site would need to be identified.
If any one of these onerous requirements is not met, either a negative decision, or
a decision to delay further, would be indicated.
The Review (p.xvi) made no clear recommendation on the possibility of
maintaining or upgrading H I F A R ; it said that a P R A w o u l d be required before
those possibilities could be assessed. There w a s very little support from either proor anti-reactor campaigners for the options of maintaining or upgrading H I F A R .
Opponents generally argued against having any sort of reactor anywhere. A N S T O
w a s m o r e equivocal but argued that to maintain H I F A R until 2025 w o u l d require
something of the order of $152 million to ensure its safety and a performance
upgrading w o u l d cost considerably more; a n e w reactor w o u l d be a better
instrument and w o u l d cost about as m u c h .
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N o w to consider the most important sub-debates taken u p during the R R R . A
number of these issues will be explored in greater depth in chapters 5-8, insofar as
they relate to radioisotope production.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The issues debated during the Review did not leap out of thin air nor were they
set in stone by the nature of research reactor technology. Rather the issues taken
up - and those that received little or no attention - were functions of a w e b of
social, historical, and technological factors, no more so than with the national
interest debate.
Key players in the nucleocracy had explicitly made the links between civil and
military nuclear technologies from the 1950s to the 1970s. People such as Baxter
and Gorton m a d e the links between nuclear power and weapons, and saw those
links as an argument in favour of the development of nuclear power. Once
weapons proliferation had become an important argument against nuclear fuel
cycle developments, the debates shifted - pro-nuclear partisans such as Baxter
began to downplay the connections between civil and military nuclear
technologies. (Martin, 1980.) A related aspect of the shifting nuclear discourse in
Australia w a s the transformation of the A A E C / A N S T O into a multifaceted civil
science agency. This transformation has never been complete however, and the
national interest debate is the current formulation of the debate about whether
A N S T O is the guardian of Australia's entry into the nuclear age (or at least an
institution of great strategic, political significance), or just one science agency
a m o n g many.

The RRR (p.l) said that since Australia has no power reactors, it seemed "fairly
natural" that the Review would be a focus for anti-nuclear groups:
While accepting this interest as natural, the Review had a constant battle to
keep a clear distinction between the 'big' nuclear matters, power and
weaponry, and the local issues of whether the High Flux Australian Reactor
(HIFAR) at Lucas Heights has purposes and earns its keep sufficiently to
justify a new one.
That view indicates some naivete with respect to the interconnections between
the "big" nuclear issues and small-scale nuclear programs and research reactors. In
any case the Review w a s obliged to deal with a number of "big" issues. These
were, perhaps surprisingly, put on the agenda not so m u c h by opponents of a n e w
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reactor, but by proponents of the project w h o advanced a host of arguments under
the rubric of the national interest.
ANSTO is considered by some to be a strategically important and unique
institution by virtue of its nuclear fuel cycle expertise, and this expertise is said to
be largely dependent on the operation of a research reactor. This expertise is said to
improve Australia's capacity to strengthen the international non-proliferation
regime, and to provide the government and other arms of the state with
intelligence and advice. These themes came through in the Review's (p.2)
comments that national interest issues connected to the operation of a research
reactor concerned "how necessary it is to maintain some degree of nuclear
capability to assist non-proliferation initiatives, to find out what others are doing,
or to protect its o w n national interest if occasion demanded." Elsewhere the
Review (p.97) identified four areas of national interest: national security; the
provision of expert advice; the ability to influence international and regional
nuclear affairs; and commercial opportunities arising from nuclear facilities in the
region.
I will now take up various threads of the national interest debate. A number of
these threads are cryptic and nebulous, none more so than an issue which
received hardly any direct attention - the weapons connection.
THE WEAPONS CONNECTION
Literature on the possibility of an Australian nuclear weapons capability tends
focus on the post-war generation, and in particular on the flurry of activity from
1969-71. However the issue would still appear to be a sub-text in debates over
nuclear development in Australia, submerged within the national defence/
security component of the national interest debate.

The interest in and support for a weapons capability fell away through the 1970s
along with the nuclear power and P N E projects. Since that time, there has been
little or no high-level support for the systematic pursuit of a domestic nuclear
weapons capability. However there m a y be some support, within political,
military, and nuclear institutions, for the view that nuclear weapons should not
be ruled out and that Australia should be able to build nuclear weapons as quickly
as any neighbour that looks like doing so. This current of thought w a s evident in
a leaked 1984 defence document called The strategic basis of Australian defence
policy. The document implied that the government could simply disregard the
N P T if it decided to develop nuclear weapons - which as Martin (1984B) notes
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does not sit well with the government's heavy reliance on the N P T as the
guarantee against military use of Australian uranium exports.
There was very little open discussion during the RRR about the potential to use
H I F A R or a replacement reactor directly or indirectly in support of nuclear
weapons. There were some cryptic references by the Review panel itself; for
example it is not clear that reference to "national security" refers only to such
issues as maintaining a role in the IAEA, nor is it clear what is meant by asking
"how necessary it is to maintain some degree of nuclear capability

to protect its

o w n national interest if occasion demanded", and the Review's comparison of a
research reactor with a frigate or a submarine must have raised some eyebrows.
The weapons connection was not taken up by anti-reactor campaigners to any
substantial degree. Perhaps the only exception was a c o m m e n t in the submission
of the Lucas Heights Study Group (1993):
We contend that indeed there is a possibility that a new reactor could be used
for weapons research and production, depending on the policy of future
Governments and the course of world events in the next 50 years. Certainly
weapons research was carried out at the AAEC

in the 60's. Such research

would effectively make the establishment a target in time of war, hence the
extreme security on site during the Gulf War.
In submissions from ANSTO and from government departments, there was no
mention of the weapons connection (so far as I a m aware), nor even any cryptic
references such as those offered by the Review. It is however possible that there
remains some support within political, military, and nuclear institutions for the
view that weapons development should not be ruled out. The leaked 1984 defence
document is suggestive, and it is worth noting that it would be seen as counterproductive as a political/diplomatic manoeuvre for such views to be publicly
expressed if indeed they are held.
A private submission to the Review (Watford, 1993) was perhaps indicative of
what could be a broader sentiment in political, military, and nuclear circles. This
submission argued the following case. Australia should not develop nuclear
weapons in the foreseeable future, one reason being that it could lead to a regional
nuclear arms race. However the time m a y come w h e n it would be necessary or
desirable to develop nuclear weapons and to this end a civil nuclear program
must be maintained. While it would not be practical or desirable to attempt to
achieve civil or military nuclear parity with India or China, a civil nuclear
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program at least the equivalent of other countries in the Asian region should be
maintained. Moreover nuclear development in Australia should be boosted by
resumption of work on uranium enrichment; this would add value to uranium
exports and also facilitate weapons development. A s a m i n i m u m step towards
halting the decline of nuclear fuel cycle expertise, H I F A R must be replaced
(Watford, 1993):
The statements made by ANSTO and others concerning national security
are not overstatements or exaggerations. The replacement of HIFAR as
proposed is the absolute minimum that can be done through the civil

nuclear industry to protect Australia's national security in the total sense
well as the more limited sense of defence.
While there may be on ongoing degree of interest in a nuclear weapons program,
this should not be overstressed. It is extremely unlikely that any Australian
government would pursue a weapons program in the foreseeable future barring a
dramatic shift in international circumstances. There are m a n y reasons for this,
such as the possibility of sparking a regional nuclear arms race, the
inappropriateness of nuclear attack as a response to any conceivable threat to
Australian sovereignty, the possibility that a weapons programs would threaten
the U S alliance, cost considerations, and so on. Thus if there is any interest in a
weapons program, this interest would go no further than leaving open the
weapons option as a longer term contingency.

So much for speculating about possible high-level support for the maintenance of
nuclear fuel cycle expertise to lower the barriers to nuclear weapons. N o w to
comment on h o w a H I F A R or a replacement reactor could facilitate weapons
development in Australia.
Each of the fuel rods irradiated in HIFAR contains only about 0.5 grams of
plutonium (Coleby, 1986). Even with 1600 spent fuel rods accumulated over the
best part of 40 years, the total volume of plutonium stored at Lucas Heights is
about 1600 x 0.5g = 800 grams. This is just one tenth of the 8kg figure which is
often put forward as the m i n i m u m required for a b o m b - 8kg of plutonium is one
"significant quantity" in nukespeak. Cruder devices could be m a d e with a smaller
volume, and high levels of technical sophistication can off-set limitations
imposed by low volumes of fissile material. For example Spector et al. (1995) argue
that a country with a high technical capability could build a 20 kiloton b o m b with
as little as 3kg of plutonium-239 or 5kg of H E U , and a 1 kiloton device might
require half these amounts. Even so, it would be a cumbersome exercise to extract
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800g of plutonium from 1600 fuel rods, all the more so since there are no
reprocessing facilities in Australia. A n y effort to use spent fuel rods supplied by
the U S and the U K in support of a weapons program would almost certainly meet
with extreme opposition from those countries.
Plutonium production could be maximised by reducing the fuel irradiation time
in H I F A R or a replacement reactor. If L E U is used for a n e w reactor, as is proposed,
then this could be a net positive in terms of reducing the potential for weapons
production given that H E U is of considerable concern with respect to weapons
proliferation. However L E U reactors are more efficient plutonium producers and
thus increase the feasibility of production of plutonium weapons.
HEU weapons construction may be a more feasible route, either by diversion of
fresh fuel or extraction of H E U from spent fuel. For uranium-235, 25kg is one
significant quantity (SQ) and the inventory of spent fuel at Lucas Heights contains
over 5 S Q of uranium-235 (Australian Safeguards Office, 1993). Fresh fuel stocks
are maintained at less than ISQ (Australian Safeguards Office, 1993). Diversion of
fresh fuel would almost certainly result in termination of fuel supply from
abroad, unless the diversion went undetected. Alternatively, the A A E C / A N S T O ' s
enrichment research could be restarted. The Liberal/National Coalition
government has evidently ruled out a resumption of enrichment research
(Uranium Information Centre, 1996).
Extraction of HEU (or plutonium) would require reprocessing facilities. The
government w a s considering the possibility of establishing a domestic
reprocessing plant as at early 1997, with a view to reprocessing spent fuel from
HIFAR, and perhaps also from a future reactor. It would be highly speculative,
and perhaps even a little paranoid, to suggest that the weapons connection is a
significant factor in the government's deliberations on a reprocessing plant. Apart
from providing some sort of solution to the problem of ridding A N S T O of
stockpiles of spent fuel rods, a reprocessing plant would enable a commercial-scale
demonstration of Synroc, the glass encapsulation technology which has been
under development in Australia since the late 1970s. That said, with a new, highpower research reactor and a reprocessing plant, it is likely that significant
quantities of plutonium could be produced and separated, or that fissile uranium233 could be produced (by irradiation of thorium) and separated. In addition, large
quantities of H E U could be separated from spent H I F A R fuel.
If a nuclear weapons program was pursued, many other factors would need to be
considered other than the relative feasibility of H E U or plutonium bombs. These
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factors would include supply of reactor fuel, suspension or maintenance of
N P T / I A E A membership, delivery systems, the m a n y technical and engineering
aspects of weapons development other than production of fissile material, and so
on.
Apart from the possibility of HIFAR or a replacement reactor being used directly
for weapons development, there are the indirect links. A n e w reactor could be
used for weapons-related research. More generally, nuclear fuel cycle expertise
developed through the operation of a research reactor lowers the technical and
economic barriers to weapons development. A related issue is the strident pronuclear stance that is c o m m o n a m o n g people and institutions directly involved
in nuclear development - Phillip Baxter is the classic example of this - and their
potential role as a political constituency for nuclear weapons.
From a stand-point of unqualified opposition to nuclear weapons, the weapons
connection is a legitimate argument against the operation of research reactors though of course other arguments need to be considered also. It should be noted
that proponents and even qualified opponents of nuclear weapons could easily
agree with the premise but not the conclusion; in other words the fact that the
operation of a domestic research reactor lowers the barriers to nuclear weapons
can be seen as an argument in favour of a n e w reactor, "just in case".
INTELLIGENCE. INFLUENCE AND ADVICE
The major overt component of the national interest debate during the RRR was
whether a reactor is required to maintain nuclear expertise, and whether such
expertise facilitated Australia's capacity to influence international nonproliferation initiatives and to procure and process information relating to
overseas nuclear developments. More generally, the Review (1993, p.2) asked
"whether Australia could exert better influence in such issues as non-proliferation
by remaining an active m e m b e r of the international nuclear community or by
working from outside".

One of the arguments was whether operation of a research reactor was essential to
maintain Australia's designated seat on the Board of the I A E A - an argument
with some history, dating at least from 1985 (ASTEC, 1985). While arguing for a
continuing role in international nuclear forums such as the IAEA, the Review
(p. 102) w a s more sceptical about the need for a domestic reactor to secure
Australia's designated position on the IAEA's Board of Governors. It referred to
comments by the I A E A which suggested that other issues were more important,
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such as Australia's role as a major uranium exporter and Australia's significant
contribution to I A E A technical assistance programs. The Review also mentioned
the example of N e w Zealand, which does not operate any reactors but still has
periodic representation on the Board for a m i n i m u m of two years out of six, on a
rotating basis.
The Review also touched upon some other issues relating to the IAEA, if only to
note comments m a d e by opponents of a n e w reactor. These issues include the
extent to which Australia has influence on the I A E A Board given that the Board
has no less than 35 members; whether Australian representatives on the Board
actively promote non-proliferation or whether their interest is more in technical
assistance programs which might expand potential markets for Australian
uranium; and whether Australia might lose its designated place on the Board
regardless of the operation of a research reactor, given the advancement of nuclear
programs in regional countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The
Review said there was no real data on h o w Australia would suffer in influence or
any other w a y if it were not a designated Board member. There might even be
advantages, the Review said, in not being so closely identified with some of the
IAEA's stances. (RRR, 1993, pp.100-103.)

The most substantial submission in relation to intelligence, influence, and advi
was that of the Commonwealth Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).
The D F A T considered national security to be the key plank of the national
interest. It said that it was government policy to keep the world and in particular
the region free of nuclear weapons, and pursuit of this policy required access to
"objective" information. The D F A T argued that operation of a research reactor
was essential to maintain expertise for purposes such as monitoring nuclear
materials exported from Australia (e.g. uranium) and keeping informed about the
"clandestine practices of certain countries". The D F A T also argued that the
expertise gained through operation of a research reactor m a d e it easier to "assess
quickly and independently any nuclear terrorist threat in Australia or to
Australia's interests abroad." The D F A T also said that the operation of a research
reactor assisted in the provision to government of commercial advice.
The claim from the DFAT that it is dependent on ANSTO for "objective" advice
was at best naive given the A A E C / A N S T O ' s history of advocacy of and/or
involvement in everything from nuclear weapons to "nuking" termite nests. A s
Greenpeace (1993) argued, A N S T O is "part of an industry deeply committed, both
emotionally and career-wise, to the expansion of the global nuclear industry ".
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It is difficult to see the logic in the DFAT's argument that operating a research
reactor helps in assessing nuclear terrorist threats or the "clandestine practices of
certain countries". There might be examples w h e n A N S T O is able to provide
useful information, concerning for example the technical aspects of safeguards or
covert weapons programs. However those instances are likely to be infrequent. N o
concrete examples were given to back u p the claims m a d e in relation to
intelligence, influence, and advice. Security and intelligence networks are of far
greater importance than any information A N S T O could provide, and it is unclear
that any information provided by A N S T O would be crucially dependent on the
skills associated with operation of a domestic reactor. Moreover a research reactor
could itself be targeted by terrorists - A N S T O has indeed been subject to terrorist
or sabotage threats in the past.

The DFAT's argument that operation of a research reactor is essential to maintain
expertise for purposes such as monitoring nuclear materials exported from
Australia is difficult to assess. Such monitoring is largely dependent on the I A E A
regime and the monitoring provisions associated with bilateral safeguards
agreements. Certainly some A A E C / A N S T O staff have been involved in these
activities. Whether their proficiency is markedly increased through experience
with the operation of H I F A R is another matter. It is difficult to imagine that this
experience would be of m u c h use in the monitoring of uranium, which is the
only export requiring safeguards monitoring (and then only after conversion to
uranium hexafluoride). Experience with H I F A R would be of use w h e n inspecting
reactor facilities, as some A A E C / A N S T O staff have done through the IAEA; but
again, this experience m a y not be crucial nor has it been established that the I A E A
safeguards regime would be m u c h the poorer without the handful of Australian
inspectors w h o have been involved in overseas reactor inspections over the years.
As for commercial advice, another point raised by the DFAT and other
government departments, these issues were not spelt out clearly but uranium
would be the principal concern. Presumably the argument is that HIFAR-related
expertise enables engagement in activities such as regional nuclear cooperation
projects; in the process knowledge is gathered, friendly and cooperative relations
established, and this can facilitate uranium sales. It is not in A N S T O ' s charter to
act as a sales agent for uranium mining companies, and in any case it could
continue in the absence of a domestic reactor.
The Review largely accepted the view that operation of a reactor was important
for purposes such as gathering intelligence and providing advice to government.
For example it said (pp.97-98) that the
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DFAT

has a key role in assessing the impact of nuclear activities, which could

pose risks directly for Australian territory or for Australians generally,
whether accruing in our region or worldwide. Its concerns that a replacement
for HIFAR

was needed in the national interest to keep abreast of nuclear

science and technology had to be given very considerable weight.
In short the Review accepted the cryptic and unsubstantiated arguments put
forward b y institutions such as the D F A T in relation to intelligence, influence,
and advice; this despite claiming (p.2) that it w a s appropriate to be "particularly
sceptical" about claims m a d e for the national interest, "because claims of national
standing or influence are so often overstated all around the world."
Along with the DFAT, numerous other federal government departments and
agencies supported a n e w reactor and claimed to be dependent o n A N S T O to some
extent for policy advice.55 These submissions dealt with issues such as nuclear
safeguards, nuclear regulation, radioactive wastes, visiting nuclear warships, offshore nuclear accidents, occupational and public health, and radiation protection.
Most of these submissions argued that the continued operation of a research
reactor of a significant power level w a s important for the provision of expert
advice. (RRR, 1993, pp.99-100.) The C S I R O (1993) said that A N S T O ' s expert
knowledge in nuclear and related sciences allowed Australia to take a
technologically-advanced position in the provision of advice to the Pacific Rim, to
maintain a sophisticated position in negotiating defence agreements, and it
facilitated technical sophistication in the handling of radioactive materials which
is important given Australia's uranium mining and export industry.
The CSIRO (1993) also said that a new research reactor would allow Australia to be
strategically placed should Australia ever need to develop nuclear power. This
was one of only a very small number of submissions to refer to the potential for
future development of nuclear power.
As with the DFAT submission, it was not convincingly demonstrated in the
submissions of government departments and agencies that A N S T O ' s nuclear
expertise is indispensable for the various purposes mentioned, nor that the
operation of a research reactor w a s essential for the maintenance of that expertise.

55 The Departments of Industry, Technology and Regional Affairs; Primary Industries and Energy;
Environment, Sport and Territories; Health, Housing and Community Services; and Defence. The
agencies included the CSIRO, Australian Safeguards Office, Australian Radiation Laboratories, the
Commonwealth Environment Protection Agency, the Office of the Supervising Scientists, the Office
of the Chief Scientist, and the Office of National Assessments.
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A related aspect of the national interest debate concerns technical assistance
projects. The A A E C / A N S T O has played an active role in nuclear technical
assistance projects, mostly involving regional countries. This involvement
operates through the I A E A , the O E C D Nuclear Energy Agency, the United Nations
Development Program, and a n u m b e r of bilateral nuclear cooperation projects.
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1995, pp.181-182.) Another channel for this
benevolence is the International Conference for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia;
A N S T O (1991) says this forum covers some projects which could not proceed
through the I A E A because of weapons proliferation implications. Technical
assistance projects are wide-ranging - nuclear medicine, nuclear safety, waste
management, radiation protection, safeguards, occupational health and safety,
environmental protection, transport of radioactive material, hydrology, food
irradiation, tracer technology, radiation sterilisation, use of research reactors, H E U
-> L E U reactor conversion, reactor physics, fusion, and databases. (Henderson,
1987.)
The reasons given by ANSTO (1991) for its involvement in technical assistance
projects are the familiar national interest arguments: influencing bodies such as
the I A E A to discourage weapons proliferation; obtaining nuclear information
from other countries which would otherwise be m o r e limited; and opportunities
for commercial profit. Predictably, it w a s argued in a number of submissions to the
R R R that ongoing involvement in technical assistance projects required the
operation of a domestic research reactor. I will return to this issue in chapter 9.2.

MEDICAL RADIOISOTOPES
The debates about radioisotope production and supply during the RRR were very
similar to those that had surfaced on several occasions from the late 1970s. To give
just one example, A S T E C (1985, p.4) put forward a set of arguments in 1985 that
were just the same as arguments put to the R R R by advocates of a n e w reactor:
A range of radioisotopes currently produced at HIFAR is used in medicine,
industry and applied research in many fields. ASTEC

believes that the

domestic production of radioisotopes should continue so that Australian

patients can benefit fully from the diagnostic techniques of nuclear medicine.
If domestic production were to cease, patients would be vulnerable to the
interruption of the supply of radioisotopes from overseas and also would be
deprived of diagnostic techniques which utilise short-lived radioisotopes
which cannot be imported. A nuclear reactor cannot be replaced by a
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cyclotron for radioisotope production because some of the radioisotopes
which are made by a nuclear reactor cannot be made by a cyclotron, and
others can be made by a cyclotron only with great difficulty.

While on the surface these debates have changed little over the years, at a broade
level there has been a significant shift. Radioisotope production has become more
important in the scope of the A A E C / A N S T O ' s activities and more central as a
justification for the existence of a nuclear agency and the operation of a research
reactor. In other words, the debates about radioisotope production have not
changed m u c h but they have become more important components of the overall
controversy as to whether a domestic reactor is necessary.
The Review (ch.8) took up the issue of radioisotope production and supply in
considerable detail. The focus w a s on medical radioisotopes since the vast
majority of radioisotopes produced using H I F A R are for nuclear medicine as
opposed to industrial or research uses. Radioisotope production and supply w a s
clearly an important debate: for example one of the three main reasons the
Review argued that the decision on the replacement of H I F A R be deferred w a s the
possibility that cyclotron technology might develop rapidly in the following years,
in which case there m a y not be a case for a reactor for radioisotope production, in
which case the overall balance might swing towards the non-replacement of
HIFAR. Of course m a n y other issues were also important: for example the issue of
waste disposal w a s crucial, and debates over scientific research were very
important given that research would be the major use of a n e w reactor. Suffice it
to assert that the radioisotope issue w a s given m u c h attention by the Review, and
it also featured prominently in written and verbal submissions to the Review.
The Review considered various options for future procurement of medical
radioisotopes. O n e w a s a greater reliance on imports. It discussed issues such as
reliability of supply and the relative costs of imported versus domestic
radioisotopes. The Review's conclusions (p.95) on this issue were vague and
somewhat contradictory. It noted that m a n y countries have either overcome the
problems associated with reliance on imported medical radioisotopes, or found
them not to be a problem, but then the Review goes on to say that "The Review is
persuaded that the presence of a domestic source of supply is an important feature
of the current high standard of services in nuclear medicine."
The emphasis in most submissions to the Review, for or against a new reactor,
was on cyclotron versus reactor radioisotope production; the possibility of greater
reliance on imported radioisotopes received considerably less attention. This
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emphasis o n cyclotrons versus reactors w a s reflected in the Review's findings.
The Review (p.xvii) w a s non-committal about the prospects for cyclotron
production of radioisotopes as an alternative to reactor production. It focused o n
the possibility of cyclotron production of technetium-99m, which is used in
80-90% of nuclear medicine procedures:
Cyclotron technology is evolving quickly, but the debate about whether
technetium can be produced successfully in cyclotrons

is not resolvable at

this time. There are no current cyclotrons producing technetium and no
plans anywhere to construct a large enough cyclotron for this purpose.
The Review (p.88), comparing reactors and cyclotrons for medical radioisotope
production, said:
The Review neither could, nor would want to, pronounce one source better
than the other. It does, however, need to reiterate the conclusion it must
draw on the evidence to this point, that a reactor-based source will continue
to be essential as far ahead as can be foreseen, if Australia's need for medical
isotopes is to be met domestically.
Henderson-Sellers (1993, p.810), during verbal submissions, said:
7 think the thing that has impressed me most as we have read through all of
the submissions and have travelled around the country is not only the
fluency and the highly articulate nature of the submissions from the medical
fraternity but also I think their almost complete internal consistency -and
that is very right and proper; they are all telling the same story I believe and
have no reason to believe it is not the truth.
However Henderson-Sellers (p.811) then went on to ask whether the medicos
were perhaps well-briefed enthusiasts. Certainly A N S T O solicited submissions
from medical institutions, as did the public relations firm it hired. Indeed two
submissions from independent medical institutions in different countries were
identical; whether they briefed each other, or whether both institutions (and
perhaps others besides) were given a helping hand b y A N S T O , or the public
relations firm hired b y A N S T O , is open to speculation.56

56 The two institutions are the Isotope Department, Nuclear Energy Unit, Malaysia; and Eastern
Technical Services, Hong Kong.
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Nuclear medicine practitioners were keen to support a n e w reactor because their
careers are dependent on security of supply of radioisotopes. So too they have a
financial stake in the matter: they are concerned that in the absence of a domestic
reactor, radioisotope prices might increase but Medicare Schedule fees would not
reflect the increased costs. Though supply might be equally secure and inexpensive in the absence of a domestic reactor, there seems to be a genuine belief a m o n g
nuclear medicine practitioners that it is very m u c h in their interests for there to be
a domestic reactor source. A N S T O has played a major role in cultivating that
belief.

RADIOACTIVE WASTE

In Australia, as in so many other countries, the political fall-out from radioact
waste problems is proving to be one of the major impediments to further nuclear
development. There are no long-term repositories for any form of radioactive
waste. S o m e modest progress had been m a d e towards the establishment of a
national repository for low-level waste ( L L W ) and intermediate-level waste
(ILW). A short-list of eight potential sites has been arrived at; however there are
many obstacles and progress has been very slow. Lucas Heights is by far the largest
radioactive waste storage site. L L W and I L W is also held at about 50 interim
storage sites around Australia; in m a n y cases it is held in buildings that were not
designed or located for radioactive waste storage (Anon., 1995). In 1994 A N S T O
transferred 10 000 drums of L L W to W o o m e r a in South Australia. The W o o m e r a
storage site is supposed to be temporary.
Still less progress has been made with respect to a high-level waste (HLW)
repository. Roughly 1600 of the 1800-1900 spent fuel rods from H I F A R are stored at
Lucas Heights, with the remainder having been shipped overseas for reprocessing.
As at early 1997 the government was deliberating on three options. O n e is the
construction of a domestic reprocessing plant. Another option - for some or all of
the 700 or so rods of U S origin - m a y be shipment to the U S for reprocessing. It
m a y also be possible to ship some or all of the 900 or so UK-supplied rods to the
U K for reprocessing.57
The Review (pp.xiv, xxii-xxiii) gave ANSTO little reason for comfort in relation
its waste problems:
A crucial issue is final disposal of high-level wastes, which depends upon

identification of a site and investigation of its characteristics. A solutio
For an update on waste issues, see chapter 10.
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this problem is essential and necessary well prior to any future decision about
a new reactor

It would be utterly wrong to decide on a new reactor before

progress is made on identification of a high level waste repository site.
The Review (p.xx) noted that the costs of HLW disposal will be very high, and will
include identification of a suitable site, construction of a repository, and transport
of H L W . The Review (p.xxiii) also laid to rest A N S T O ' s notion that 1600 or so
spent fuel rods stored at Lucas Heights are a financial asset:
The spent fuel rods at Lucas Heights can only sensibly be treated as high level
waste. World opinion is moving in the direction of favouring the
conditioning and direct disposal of spent fuel rods in preference to
reprocessing. In any case, maintenance of the view that reprocessing is the
best option inevitably involves return to Australia of by-product high level
liquid wastes, making a national high level waste repository an inescapable
concomitant of having any kind of nuclear reactor. The pretence that spent
fuel rods constitute an asset must stop.
Apart from the environmental and financial aspects of waste storage, there are
also weapons implications. A s discussed previously the spent fuel at Lucas
Heights contains over five Significant Quantities of uranium-235. H E U extracted
from the spent fuel rods could conceivably find its w a y into nuclear weapons. A
related issue is safeguarding - there are ongoing debates around the world over
the safeguarding of radioactive wastes, concerning for example w h e n wastes pose
a sufficiently small proliferation risk that it is appropriate to terminate
safeguarding procedures. That debate has financial implications, and it also has
public health and safety consequences relating to the logistics of safeguarding
procedures. (Linsley and Fattah, 1994.)
Of particular relevance to this thesis is the extent to which radioactive waste
generation at Lucas Heights is associated with radioisotope production and
processing. A N S T O w a s keen to advertise to the R R R the connection between
medical radioisotope production and processing and waste: the first sentence in its
submission o n radioactive waste announced that the principal source of radioactive waste at Lucas Heights is from the production of radiopharmaceuticals.
( A N S T O , 1993J, p.5.1.) A N S T O (1993P, p.9.1) w a s also at pains to point out that
increased rates of waste generation from a n e w reactor would result solely from
increased radioisotope production and processing.
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Presumably A N S T O imagines that making the connection between waste
generation and nuclear medicine will quell concern - waste generation serves a
good purpose, it is a necessary evil. This tactic seems not to have had any effect on
the Review panel. It is notable that, in early 1997, the same tactic was deployed by
the Minister for Science and Technology, Peter McGauran. H I F A R is fuelled with
30-40 fuel rods each year, and McGauran said that "During this year more than
260 000 Australians will have a nuclear medicine procedure

A s a result of

these procedures, some 35 spent fuel rods are generated by the Lucas Heights
research reactor every year."58 The main point here is McGauran's linking of
waste and medicine; in addition he would have us believe that all of the spent
fuel rods are the result of radioisotope production despite the m a n y other uses of
HIFAR.
With respect to HLW, about 5-10% of the 1600 or so spent fuel rods can be
attributed to medical radioisotope production.59 In addition, some H L W is
generated during the production and processing of uranium fission-product
radioisotopes such as molybdenum-99 (Mo-99). According to Egan et al. (1993;
1994), H L W is produced in radioactivity quantities 20 times greater than the Mo-99
yield, and the total volume of H L W at Lucas Heights from Mo-99 production is
estimated to exceed 370 000 G B q (about 10 000 Ci).60

As for LLW and ILW stored at Lucas Heights, the majority of these wastes result
from radioisotope production and processing: all the liquid ILW, 7 0 % of the solid
ILW, 9 0 % of the liquid L L W and 8 0 % of the solid L L W ( A N S T O , 1993J).
ANSTO claims that improved reactor technology would minimise the generation
of waste by a n e w reactor. However the fact remains that a suitable long-term
repository for any form of radioactive waste has yet to be established and
producing more waste will only add to the problem. In relation to the improved
technology of the proposed n e w reactor, A N S T O (1993P, p.9.1) said "The clear
conclusion from this is that waste management is a favourable factor as regards
any potential public impact from a n e w reactor." Such an argument is a nonsense
and an obfuscation. O n e wonders what ANSTO's response might be to a serious
HIFAR accident - that m u c h experience was gained in disaster management and
the accident was clearly a favourable factor as regards a n e w reactor?

^Questions Without Notice, House of Representatives, 6 March.
52 Approximately 1 0 % of HIFAR's neutrons are used for medical radioisotope production, less in
earlier years and decades, hence this rough figure of 5-10%.
G B q (gigabecquerels) and Ci (curies) are measurements of radioactivity. 1 G B q = 0.027 Ci.
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RADIOACTIVE EMISSIONS
There are several issues relating to radioactive emissions from routine operations
at Lucas Heights. These include debates about the actual levels and nature of
emissions, the public and occupational health implications, the environmental
impact (which feeds back into public health issues), the adequacy of standards in
relation to permissible emissions, and the methods by which standards are
determined and emissions are monitored. These issues are complex and hotly
contested. S o m e of the issues are clouded by a paucity of data; the lack of
information is itself a bone of contention, with repeated calls over the years for
studies into issues such as the public health impact of H I F A R emissions having
mostly gone unheeded.
The Review (p.xx, 177) concluded that radioactive emissions from Lucas Heights
are minimal and within international standards. The Review said that if there is a
problem, it is simply one of a lack of trust and information.
As for occupational health, the Review's (pp.191-192) benign picture was at odds
with claims m a d e by opponents of a n e w reactor. Opponents pointed to an article
appearing in The Australian in 1990 concerning Dr. Arthur Tucker, w h o worked
at the A A E C from 1964 to 1985. Tucker claimed that on numerous occasions his
studies into staff health were obstructed or his findings kept secret. H e said that he
had been directed to stop his studies into possible links between the use of metals
such as beryllium and the lung disease sarcoidosis, and that his research results
were not published. Tucker also claimed that his later attempts to reinforce his
studies with similar work were thwarted as funds, staff, and facilities were
withdrawn. H e also claimed that important reference materials were burnt by the
A A E C . (Kennedy, 1990.)
The Review's (p.205) conclusion on the public health impact was that "it is very
unlikely that any relationship exists between the current reactor H I F A R and
community health in the Sutherland Shire." The Review (pp.146-148) claimed
that the risks of radiation-induced cancer are relatively low and are well studied
and well documented and form the basis of all radiation protection standards and
systems. Elsewhere (p.184) the Review acknowledged that the epidemiological
research, and the radiation protection standards and systems, are hotly contested
within and beyond scientific and regulatory institutions. In their submissions to
the Review, the Sutherland Shire Council (1993B) and the Sutherland Shire
Environment Centre (1993) pointed to overseas studies showing greater than
expected numbers of cases of leukaemia around U K nuclear facilities at Dounreay,
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Sellafield, Harwell, Aldermaston, and Burghfield. The Review (p.184) noted that
other studies had found no increased leukaemia incidence around nuclear
facilities, and then extracted itself from the debate by saying that "Clearly this
debate a m o n g epidemiologists will continue." Given that equivocation, it was
surprising that the Review w a s so confident as to say that it is "very unlikely" that
H I F A R emissions have any impact on public health.
Leaving aside debates over the impact of routine emissions, a number of accidents
have resulted in releases of radioactive materials to the environment, some of
which also had consequences for public or occupational health and safety (see
chapter 3.5).
A considerable proportion of the radioactive emissions associated with ANSTO's
operations result from radioisotope production and processing. Liquid and
gaseous emissions result from reactor operation - one purpose of which is
radioisotope production - and there are also substantial emissions from
radiopharmaceutical processing. (RRR, 1993, p. 17.) Of the total number of A N S T O
staff on the dosimetry service in 1991-92, the 1 9 % of total staff working in close
proximity to H I F A R or working for Australian Radioisotopes (ARI) accounted for
about 7 2 % of the aggregate whole body dose of A N S T O employees. A R I staff
accounted for 3 5 % of the total radiation exposure to all A N S T O employees
although A R I has only 8 % of the total staff. For A R I staff the m e a n whole body
dose was 4.84 m S v , and the aggregate whole body dose was 0.300 person-sieverfs.
(RRR, 1993, p.187.)
Just as ANSTO likes to link radioactive waste and nuclear medicine, so too
Walker, then an A A E C employee, linked radioactive emissions to nuclear
medicine (Walker, 1985, italics in original):
Using the most pessimistic assumptions, it would take over a hundred years
of routine emissions of radioactivity from Lucas Heights to produce one
'extra' cancer in the whole population of Sydney. Yet, each year more than
70,000 Australians receive medical treatment using radiopharmaceuticals
produced at Lucas Heights. Even a small success ratio for these diagnostic and
therapeutic treatments puts the balance overwhelmingly in favour of Lucas
Heights.
Walker's comments contain numerous debatable assertions; suffice it here to note
that linking radioactive emissions and nuclear medicine is seen to be a useful
public-relations manoeuvre.
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ACCIDENTS A N D EMERGENCY PLANS
Inevitably there were conflicting opinions as to the safety record of research
reactors during the R R R . Pro-nuclear campaigners such as A N S T O argued that the
safety record w a s excellent. The Review (p.13) largely accepted that view:
"Research reactors are operated under the general nuclear code of seeking
m a x i m u m safety. Their record of safety is excellent. There have been very few
accidents and even fewer involving loss of life." The Review (p.13) referred to a
1980 report by the U S O a k Ridge National Laboratory ( O R N L ) which listed nine
accidents involving prototype power reactors or experimental reactors, and a
further three involving multipurpose research reactors (Bertini et al., 1980). The
multipurpose research reactor accidents were two accidents involving Canadian
research reactors (see chapter 6.2 of this thesis), and a fuel element melting at the
O R R reactor at the O R N L in 1963. N o n e of these three accidents at resulted in any
immediate deaths but the longer-term effects are disputed. The Review (p.13)
went on to say that there has been only one further report of a research reactor
accident since 1963, which occurred during refuelling of a critical assembly reactor
in Argentina in 1983 and caused one death.
Some of the accidents not mentioned by the Review, or by ANSTO (1993L),
presumably because they involved experimental research reactors rather than
multipurpose reactors, are as follows. In 1955, the Idaho Falls EBR-1 research
reactor suffered a partial core meltdown which destroyed it. In 1958, the research
reactor at the Boris Kidric Institute in Yugoslavia overheated; six scientists were
irradiated and transported to France for treatment, with one death. A power surge
accident occurred at the 3 M W research reactor (SL1) at Idaho on 3 January 1961.
The reactor blew u p and three operators were killed. (Vallentine, 1992.)
The argument was put to the Review that accidents are more common in
multipurpose research reactors than in power reactors because there are more
frequent start-ups, shut-downs, fuel and rig movements, and more opportunities
for h u m a n error. These arguments were drawn from industry literature and so
could not easily be refuted. O n the other hand there w a s no dispute that, in
general, accidents involving power reactors pose a far greater risk to the general
public because of the far greater volumes of fissile material used to fuel power
reactors. (RRR, 1993, p.228.)
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O n the safety of H I F A R , the Review (p.xxi, p.159) said:
Despite the many submissions questioning the safety and health aspects of
the operation of HIFAR,

the evidence strongly supports the view that HIFAR

operates safely by an adequate margin, well within international safety
standards

The risks to the people living in the Sutherland Shire are very

much less than the risks of traffic accidents, lightning strikes, bushfires,
several other forms of natural hazards
accepts that the likelihood of

On the evidence, the Review

a serious event is remote and that, in the

unlikely event of such an accident to HIFAR,
would be small.

the radiological consequences

The data and issues relating to the safety of HIFAR are ambiguous and contested
and cast at least enough doubt on the matter to query the benign view presented
by the Review and by A N S T O . In fact despite the above comments the Review
argued that a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) should be carried out to
ascertain HIFAR's remaining lifespan and to provide additional safety
assessments.
ANSTO's critics, in particular the Sutherland Shire Council and Friends of the
Earth (FOE), entered into a technical debate with A N S T O and the Nuclear Safety
Bureau regarding the safety of HIFAR. F O E (1993B) claimed that HIFAR's control
systems, in particular the cooling system, are problematic - that H I F A R has
leaking thermal shield cooling coils, heat-exchanger leaks, and reactor
instrumentation connected to an "uninterruptible" power supply that has never
worked. F O E claimed that HIFAR's emergency backup shutdown system is
inadequate, consisting of two "safety rods" well outside the core and able to absorb
only 0.5% of the radioactivity. F O E said that there are doubts about the reliability
of the unusual signal-arm safety absorbers, a significant problem since a loss-ofcontrol-arm accident could result in a power surge leading to melt-down of the
reactor core. Finally, F O E noted that HIFAR's core is surrounded by graphite, the
material which burnt fiercely out of control at Chernobyl.
Some revealing history surfaced during the Review concerning disputes over
H I F A R safety issues. In the late 1980s, senior engineers employed by A N S T O
wrote to the Federal Minister for Science and Energy, asking for a full external
safety audit. This request w a s m a d e with the support of the Association of
Professional Engineers of Australia (APEA), but the Minister did not agree to the
audit. The engineers were acting in response to a series of operator-error incidents
over a protracted period of time, some of which were serious incidents with direct
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safety significance. A s well as approaches to the government, the engineers had
tried to initiate action through A N S T O , regulatory authorities, and the courts, but
without success. (Darroch, 1990; Friends of the Earth, 1993B.)
Finally, in 1989, ANSTO commissioned a safety review by Atomic Energy of
Canada Ltd. (AECL) which presented its report in 1990. A E C L reported that the
safety culture at A N S T O was inadequate. The report dealt with numerous
problem areas: inadequate training for key reactor operating personnel; inadequate
operating manuals; inadequate reviews, testing and inspection; poor health and
safety practices; improper waste management; inadequate emergency
arrangements; and a vital emergency core cooling system which was
compromised resulting in unnecessary danger for two years. The A E C L Review
also said that during the past one to two years, there had been virtually no work
done on improving the reactor, upgrading the training programs for reactor
operators, improving the reactor maintenance program, or developing quality
assurance systems. The A E C L report said that in the light of past performance,
there was reason for concern as to h o w future changes would be managed. That
concern seems to have been well founded: ANSTO's response to the A E C L report
was an "Action Plan" which, according to some employees, failed to even address
many of the problems let alone propose workable solutions. Subsequently the
A P E A gave the Nuclear Safety Bureau a report of alleged deficiencies and argued
that H I F A R should be shut d o w n pending a further independent inquiry; the
Bureau reviewed this document but recommended to the Minister that no action
be taken. (Darroch, 1990; Friends of the Earth, 1993B.)
Another safety-related debate is emergency planning, which is all the more
important given that all exits from Lucas Heights are on narrow roads with bridge
crossings, and given that 200 000 people live in the Sutherland Shire with 30 000
people living within a few kilometres of the reactor. At the time of the RRR, the
most recent version of an emergency plan was still under development, which
the Review said was an "unacceptable situation" (pp.165-166). Over two years after
the completion of the RRR, A N S T O finally released a community leaflet for local
residents advising them what to do in case of an emergency at the A N S T O
facilities. The community leaflet was vague, uninformative, and inadequate
according to a m e m b e r of the Sutherland Shire Environment Centre (Priceman,
1996). Clearly A N S T O is concerned about the adverse publicity associated with
acknowledging the possibility of a major reactor accident.
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REGULATION OF A N S T O
Regulation is multifaceted, involving siting, design, commissioning, operation
and decommissioning of nuclear facilities; transportation and management of
nuclear materials; setting standards for ionising radiation doses to workers and
the public; and monitoring of emissions. (Research Reactor Review, 1993, p.227.)
These issues are clearly important but only the briefest summary follows.

The major nuclear regulatory agencies in the past decade have been the Nuclear
Safety Bureau (NSB) and the Australian Safeguards Office (ASO). From the early
1980s, the A A E C / A N S T O gradually tightened its o w n regulatory procedures, if
only to dampen criticism and to prevent a tighter and more independent regime
being imposed by government. However, even w h e n the N S B was m a d e a
statutory authority in 1992, problems of excessive self-regulation remained. For
example, even after 1992 the authorisation to operate A N S T O was issued by the
A N S T O Board not by the NSB. (RRR, 1993, pp.231-232.) Another problem has been
the transfer of staff to and from A N S T O , the N S B , and the A S O . The Review
(p.230) said that perceptions of potential conflicts of interest arising from
secondments of A N S T O staff to the N S B and the A S O were "well based".

The Review (pp.xxiii-xxiv) said that the regulatory regime for the nuclear ind
in Australia is unduly fragmented and unclear, and the scope of responsibility of
the N S B is too limited. It said that ANSTO's Ministerial direction should be to a
Minister different from the one responsible for reactor operations and regulation.
It said the arrangement whereby A N S T O operates under an authorisation issued
by the A N S T O Board, rather than a licence issued by the regulatory body, is
inconsistent with I A E A international principles and requirements. It said there is
scope for rationalisation of the separate safety and safeguards regulatory regimes. It
said the regulatory authority should have unambiguous and effective sanctions
powers, to ensure that conditions set by the regulatory authority are met by
ANSTO.
In short, the Review agreed with many nuclear critics that ANSTO was
inadequately regulated. Following the Review a governmental interdepartmental
committee was established to review nuclear regulation in Australia. (Wallace,
1993.) In 1995, the Nuclear Safety Bureau was merged with the Australian
Radiation Laboratory to form the Australian Institute for Radiation Protection
(AIRP). The AIRP has responsibilities for regulating A N S T O , including the
licensing of H I F A R and exposure to radiation, and ensuring compliance with
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safety standards. The A I R P was m a d e responsible to the Minister for Health.
( A N S T O , 1993-94, p.ll.)

COST OF A NEW REACTOR AND COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS
Over the years, claims have been routinely advanced about the economic benefits
of operating a research reactor. However the arguments are shallow: as the
Review argued (chs.10-11), a n e w reactor is certain to be an economic burden even
allowing for revenue-raising ventures such as silicon doping and radioisotope
sales.
Estimates of the cost of a new reactor put to the Review (ch.10) varied widely.
figure put forward by A N S T O w a s $150 million, but that figure did not include the
reactor components which could be produced in Australia. The Review (p.xvii,
ch.10) argued that the proposed n e w reactor would cost not less than $250 million,
and decommissioning and waste disposal costs would be extra. Decommissioning
H I F A R will cost anywhere from $27-192 million depending mainly on whether it
proceeds in the near future or is left for a period of up to 50 years. Then there are
costs - running into the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars - for disposal of
the radioactive waste generated by H I F A R and any future reactor, and the
eventual decommissioning of any future reactor.

It goes without saying that in a protracted period of global economic stagnation
funding is a key issue - perhaps more likely than any other issue to sway
government towards a decision not to replace HIFAR. That the capital costs of a
n e w reactor could be spread over a decade or more would be little consolation. It is
also worth noting that influential science and technology organisations, in
particular the C S I R O (1993), are concerned that funding for a n e w reactor not come
at the expense of usual science funding.
The major HIFAR-related commercial activities at Lucas Heights are radioisotope
production and silicon doping, with other relatively minor revenue from other
irradiation and neutron-activation activities. O n A N S T O ' s commercial activities,
the Review (p.xviii) said A N S T O ' s efforts to generate commercial revenue had
been successful with m a n y n e w but as yet immature activities. O n the other hand
the Review (pp.26-27) found that, in Australia as elsewhere, the links between
neutron sources and industry were not yet as pervasive and deep as the evidence
of scientific usefulness suggested they ought to be. The Review also noted that
industry rarely contributes to the costs associated with research reactors
operations.
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SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
The Review (p.25) argued that there are strong arguments for Australia to
maintain a neutron source, without which "Australia w o u l d lock itself out of
several rapidly advancing areas of science." H o w e v e r the Review w a s
inconsistent. In relation to the question posed by the Terms of Reference, whether
the science at A N S T O is of sufficient distinction and importance to Australia to
warrant a n e w reactor, the Review said (ch.6):
The Review is not convinced that that is the case - at least not yet
Nobody advanced the view that Australian scientists working at HIFAR
at the cutting edge of science

are

a picture of a vibrant field of science,

energised by young people excited by the challenges and opportunities, did
not emerge
The Review was not even convinced that (reactor-based)
science has been a major focus of ANSTO
activity. The full flowering of
recent vigour might not be evident yet in publications, but at present the case
for a new reactor on science grounds cannot be sustained, however
compelling the need for such science.
Another debate concerned the relative merits of various neutron sources and
accelerators. These debates were complicated and various permutations were
considered. The Review (pp.48-49) concluded that the "jury w a s out" on too m a n y
issues relating to non-reactor neutron sources:
Rapid advances in the technology of accelerator based spallation sources may
make such a source a worthwhile consideration, if scientific purposes are to

be the key reasons for a new reactor. A spallation source would be unlikely t
cost less than a new reactor. If a spallation source were to be chosen, a small
reactor of about one megawatt power for the production of radioisotopes
would also be necessary, unless advances in cyclotron technology make that
avenue the preferable course.
The Review (ch.5) also discussed options such as increasing access of Australian
scientists to overseas facilities, and floated the idea of developing a regional
neutron source in collaboration with other countries.
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PUBLIC OPINIONS
The Review commissioned two surveys of public opinions about A N S T O and
HIFAR, one by Reark Research (1993) and the other by Roy Morgan Research
(1993). Both surveys were very m u c h exploratory, involving only a small number
of people. The Roy Morgan survey found that nuclear issues in general, and the
nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights in particular, are not top-of-the-mind concerns for
people regardless of where they live. Medical applications of radioisotopes
generated the most positive reactions from respondents.
The Reark Research (1993) survey amounted to nothing more than an exercise in
pro-ANSTO push-polling. It said there w a s no top-of-the-mind concern about the
proposed n e w reactor, even in the Sutherland Shire, but "This does not, of course,
mean that concern could not be fanned by activist groups." It said that because
there was little understanding about research reactors or the levels of risk they
entail, and because of the paucity of "rational" discussion, m a n y would
spontaneously vote against a n e w reactor, preferring to err on the side of safety.
Thankfully, w h e n a "rational" approach was taken and w h e n respondents were
allowed themselves to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages, they almost
unanimously voted "yes": "The respondents were far more rational and willing to
have an open mind than might have been assumed from the more extremist
views that have appeared both in the press and via the local council in the case of
Sutherland Shire, as well as from those w h o have presented submissions to the
Reactor Review."

That the Review received about 150 submissions opposed to a new reactor, and in
m a n y cases critical of other aspects of ANSTO's operations, would seem to
indicate a modest level of public opposition at least; roughly 4 0 % of all
submissions were opposed to a n e w reactor. The Sutherland Shire Council (1993C)
claimed that 8 1 % of local residents were opposed to a n e w reactor, but without
providing any basis for the claim. More recently, a newspaper report says that a
recent survey commissioned by A N S T O found that people living near H I F A R
"expressed overwhelming support for a n e w reactor to be built somewhere remote
from h u m a n settlements." (Beale and Dayton, 1997.)
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4.5. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
PROPOSALS TO MERGE ANSTO WITH THE CSIRO
THE BAIN REPORT A N D ANSTO's MISSION REVIEW
THE HIFAR REPLACEMENT CONTROVERSY
PROPOSALS TO MERGE ANSTO WITH THE CSIRO
Before the RRR had even finished, the merry-go-round of reviews and
reorganisations w a s underway. Proposals to merge A N S T O with the C S I R O were
on the agenda. Such proposals had surfaced in the early 1980s and perhaps before
that. In 1986 the Collins Review addressed the issue of the organisational
separation of A N S T O and the C S I R O in 1986. It said there were no scientific
reasons for their separation but there were non-scientific reasons (Collins et al.,
1986):
For better or worse, nuclear energy occupies a special position in the minds of
humanity. Attitudes within the community

towards nuclear energy,

including nuclear science and technology, have developed which are
strongly polarised and firmly argued, in many cases without a very sound
logical basis. ANSTO,

with its responsibility for nuclear science and

technology can be seen in the social and political context to have a unique
of problems and challenges which are not scientific or technological, but
political, social and philosophical.
The organisational separation of ANSTO and the CSIRO dove-tails with the
H I F A R replacement controversy - the operation of a research reactor provides a
rationale for a greater degree of independence for A N S T O . Conversely, if A N S T O
was absorbed into the CSIRO, the advocacy for a n e w reactor might be more
diffuse - it is notable for example that the C S I R O (1993) said in its submission to
the R R R that it could not support a n e w reactor if funding w a s not additional to
usual government science funding. Incorporating A N S T O within the C S I R O
would be a further step in the transition of the A A E C / A N S T O from being the
main exponent of Australia's manoeuvring in the global nuclear arena to being
just another public-sector science agency.
National interest arguments also intersect with the issue of the separation or
merging of A N S T O and the CSIRO. Thus in 1989-90, Collins, arguing for a n e w
reactor and also for A N S T O ' s organisational independence from the CSIRO, said
( A N S T O , 1989-90, p.8):
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The international role played by the Australian Government in nuclear
matters, particularly nuclear non-proliferation, demands a high level of
scientific and technological support which can be readily identified.
Australia's voice in the nuclear debate has a much greater importance than
might be inferred from our participation in the nuclear fuel cycle. The
strength and credibility of Australia's position rests directly on the
infrastructural, scientific and technological capability which exists in
In 1993 the Minister for Science and Technology proposed absorbing ANSTO into
the CSIRO, with the objective of cutting costs. A N S T O management w a s hostile to
the idea. C S I R O management had no interest in being lumbered with a Trojan
horse along with problems such as radioactive waste management, H I F A R
decommissioning, and doubts about the commercial viability of a number of
ANSTO's ancillaries and joint ventures. A N S T O ' s critics, such as Friends of the
Earth, supported the merger. (Pockley, 1993; 1993B; A N S T O , 1993-94, pp.8-9.)
The uncertainty surrounding the proposed merger resulted in major initiatives
being put on hold at A N S T O . The merger did not proceed, with the government
deciding to take a non-legislative route to achieve closer links between A N S T O
and the CSIRO. A n e w A N S T O Board, including some members of the CSIRO,
was appointed in December 1993. The n e w A N S T O Board set up another review,
and another one after that.

THE BAIN REPORT AND ANSTO's MISSION REVIEW
A review was commissioned by the ANSTO Board in late 1993 to review
ANSTO's operations. The review w a s carried out by three organisations, Bain
International Inc., Batelle Memorial Institute, and Pacific Northwest Laboratories,
and the report (the Bain report) w a s released in 1994. (Bain International et al.,
1994.)
The Bain report proposed a rationalisation of ANSTO's activities, with some
activities to be transferred and some to be stopped altogether. The remaining
activities would fall within a number of "Key Research Areas" including
radioactive waste management, safety of nuclear installations, resource processing
and elimination of radionuclide contamination, applied accelerator technologies,
and environmental and industrial applications of radionuclides. The report
recommended discontinuing all nuclear physics applications, and transferring
some environmental science activities to more appropriate agencies. It also
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r e c o m m e n d e d that nuclear medicine programs including the Biomedicine and
Health research program, Australian Radioisotopes, and the National Medical
Cyclotron, be transferred out of A N S T O . (Bain International et al, 1994.)

The Bain report devoted considerable space to arguing for a new reactor to replace
HIFAR. The national interest w a s high on the agenda. The report said the
government places high priority on "influence and independence" in matters
across the nuclear fuel cycle. Independence w a s equated with independence from
other countries such as the U S in matters such as nuclear expertise and
intelligence gathering and analysis. The report (p.18) lists the elements of
A N S T O ' s involvement in "supporting nuclear policy across the fuel cycle":
underpinning an influential role in international bodies such as the I A E A and the
O E C D Nuclear Energy Agency; intelligence assessment of nuclear proliferation
and safety issues; formulation of nuclear policy; developing bilateral safeguards
agreements to enable responsible export of uranium; safety programming and
control for nuclear powered warships in Australian ports; and environmental
assessment and clean-up of radioactive sites (such as Maralinga and the uranium
mines). (Bain International et al., 1994.)
The Bain report argued that to support the government's nuclear policies,
A N S T O needed the experience derived from operation of a research reactor. It
m a d e cryptic statements (pp.100-101) such as that"

as a reaffirmation of

Australia's commitment to nuclear technology, it (a n e w reactor) would enhance
the nation's worldwide and regional status and provide a continuing capability to
effectively monitor nuclear developments." The report (p.98) argued that:
The wide range of skills, expertise and experience inherent in the continued
safe operation of HIFAR

and the research carried out on it enables ANSTO

provide sound, objective advice to the government. This, in turn, helps
government to interpret and respond to the nuclear issues and possibilities
by which it is confronted. It also provides government with a strong position

and a credible voice in the international setting. For instance, understandi
and adhering to the IAEA

standards and procedures for operating nuclear

reactors and handling radioactive material is of particular relevance to

Australia, given the nation's position as a signatory of the Non-Proliferatio
Treaty and its stance as a strong proponent of non-proliferation
internationally. Therefore, through its operation of a research reactor,
ANSTO

is able to contribute to the support of government's nuclear science

policies and international obligations.
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As discussed in chapter 4.4, these arguments are mostly overinflated. There is a
remarkable degree of circularity and tautology in the argument that a research
reactor is necessary to enable A N S T O to understand and adhere to standards and
procedures for operating nuclear reactors.

The Bain report (p. 100) considered four options - building a replacement reactor
upgrading H I F A R , running H I F A R d o w n , and building a different machine such
as a spallation source - and opted for the first option. The report (p.100) said that
more detailed costings of a replacement reactor have been carried out since the
RRR. The estimated total is $425 million over the n e w reactor's life of 40 years,
which would include construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning costs, and that figure would take into account off-setting revenue. The
report reproduced without critical commentary some creative accounting
provided by A N S T O to the effect that a saving of $23 million could be m a d e if a
decision on a replacement reactor was m a d e in mid 1996, instead of waiting the
five years recommended by the R R R , because of reduced capital costs, and costs
saved by operating H I F A R for two less years. Better still, if in addition to a decision
being m a d e in 1996 instead of 1998, the construction schedule for a n e w reactor
was reduced from ten to eight years, a total cost saving of $66 million could be
made, largely because of savings of $40 million in costs relating to HIFAR. There is
no mention of the potential savings of hundreds of millions of dollars by
abandoning the project altogether.

The Bain report did not seriously address the various objections to a new reactor
For example its comments (p.105) on radioactive waste comprised nothing more
than a throw-away comment that the disposal of high-level waste is a crucial issue
and one which A N S T O should be involved in addressing. The report (p.100) also
advanced the circular argument that a n e w reactor would enable the broadening
of waste management expertise. The Bain report had even less to say about issues
such as the safety and environmental impact of H I F A R or any future reactor.
ANSTO's response to the Bain review was, naturally, to set up another review,
this time an internal Mission Review. In response to the Mission Review, several
recommendations were implemented by the A N S T O Board including:
• termination and redirection of several research projects to better reflect core
activities;
• a series of measures, including capital improvements, to ensure the
continuance of Australian Radioisotopes as a business under A N S T O
management;
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•

continued biomedical research by maintaining 1) a research capability to
support the development and production of commercial and potentially
commercial radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals, and 2) a capacity to
produce labelled ligands in support of a national program of emission
tomography research;

• the appointment of a Director of Business Collaboration for improved
communication with industry and other users of A N S T O ' s research and
development and services;
• the appointment of a Canberra Liaison Officer to provide day-to-day
communication with government departments, to better enable A N S T O to
stay abreast of political developments and to play a role in shaping nuclear
science policy; and
• implementation of a range of structural changes to A N S T O to facilitate
improvements in effectiveness and efficiency.
It is notable that ANSTO has maintained its central involvement in medical
radioisotope production and nuclear medicine more generally, contrary to the
Bain report's recommendation that the Biomedicine and Health research
program, Australian Radioisotopes, and the National Medical Cyclotron, be
transferred out of A N S T O . Even if those transfers had taken place, A N S T O would
still have a central role in medical radioisotope production for so long as it
operates a reactor, but all the same it is to be expected that A N S T O will maintain
as significant a role in nuclear medicine as it possibly can given that such activities
provide an important ideological buffer against nuclear critics.

THE HIFAR REPLACEMENT CONTROVERSY
In late 1994 there was considerable debate and media comment on proposals to
build a research reactor in Kalgoorlie, Western Australia. The area had been shortlisted by the federal government as one of eight possible sites for a national
radioactive waste repository. Consequently there seems to have been some backroom bargaining - a reactor might be built in Kalgoorlie if a repository could also
be built in the area. The Western Australian government m a d e several cryptic
and sometimes contradictory statements about the alleged proposal. A N S T O ,
which has a strong preference for a n e w reactor to be built at Lucas Heights, seems
to have been opposed to the idea of a reactor being built in Western Australia,
saying there w a s no basis to such speculation and pointing to the R R R
recommendation that a decision be put on hold until 1998. After a month or so,
speculation about the proposal died down. (Rocchi, 1994; Davison, 1994; Rae, 1994.)
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The most significant change in the political landscape since the Research Reactor
Review w a s the election of the conservative Liberal/National Coalition in the
1996 federal election. A n open-slather uranium policy has been put in place, and
several mines are set to open or re-open as a result. The missile tracking station at
Pine G a p is to be upgraded and the treaty that governs its use is to be extended for
a further 10 years beyond the scheduled closure date of 1998. The Nurrungar base
is to be closed in the year 2000 because of outdated and redundant facilities. The
Coalition government has agreed in principle to a U S proposal to establish a relay
ground station for a U S space-based ballistic-missile early warning program.
(Sheridan, 1996.) Nuclear power has been ruled out by the Minister for Science
and Technology, as has a resumption of enrichment research (Uranium
Information Centre, 1996).
There has been no clear indication from the Coalition government in relation to
H I F A R and a possible replacement. O n e pointer m a y lie in the decision of the
government to cut every area of public spending (including science) with the one
exception of defence spending. To the extent that A N S T O is seen as just another
part of the science and technology infrastructure, it will not be i m m u n e from cuts
and it m a y not get its n e w reactor. However despite the trend over the past two
decades to view Australian nuclear technology in just those terms, there are still
aspects of nuclear science which are seen to be of considerable significance in
relation to foreign policy and security. To the extent that A N S T O and its allies can
convince the government of the benefits of a n e w reactor in terms of foreign
policy, military intelligence and security, and the sundry other aspects of the
"national interest" discourse, they will be on firmer ground, all the more likely to
secure government approval and funding for a n e w reactor.
ANSTO has been saying for some years - at least since 1990 and probably before
that - that it is imperative that a decision on a n e w reactor be m a d e as a matter of
urgency. This view is n o w widespread. The Nuclear Safety Bureau says that it will
not authorise A N S T O to operate H I F A R beyond 2003 unless a major upgrade of
safety-related equipment is carried out. A N S T O says that if an upgrade is to be
carried out and completed by 2003, it must begin in the 1996-97 fiscal year.
( A N S T O , 1995-96.) Alternatively, if a n e w reactor is to be built, it will take
something like 8-10 years to build. Continuity of A N S T O ' s reactor-based programs
m a y be interrupted even if a decision to proceed with a n e w reactor is m a d e soon.
In any case it is widely accepted that there is some urgency to the matter.
In early 1997 there were media reports concerning the future of HIFAR and the
possibility of a replacement reactor. A n interdepartmental committee review has
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evidently been reviewing the issue, including officers from the federal
Departments of Science and Technology; the Environment; Health; and Foreign
Affairs and Trade. The committee's review w a s held in secret with no requests for
public submissions. (Rees, 1997.)
The (reported) deliberations of an interdepartmental committee raises questions
about decision-making procedures and levels of public input and accountability. A
few comments follow on these topics, although I will not go into any detail. A
decision to proceed with a n e w reactor would almost certainly have to satisfy the
Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974. (The R R R w a s not
formally established under the terms of the Act, but if the Review had
recommended that a replacement reactor should be built, a second stage,
concerning issues such as siting, would probably have had to satisfy the Act.) A n
attempt to circumvent that Act would be likely to generate considerable
controversy and opposition within and beyond the federal parliament, and could
be subject to legal challenge. In any case letters I have received from successive
Ministers for Science and Technology, including the current Minister, are
unequivocal on the point that the Environmental Protection Act would be
satisfied.
The Act allows for one of four levels of assessment. The most closed option is
examination of an issue by the relevant government Department - from
conversations with personnel from the Department of Industry, Science and
Technology, and from A N S T O , it appears unlikely that this level of assessment
will be pursued in relation to the H I F A R replacement issue. There are two
intermediate options involving an Environmental Impact Statement or a Public
Environment Report; these provide for some level of public input though they
are not nearly as open as a public inquiry. The final level of assessment is a public
Commission of Inquiry.
It seems likely that one of the intermediate options will be pursued, involving
either an Environmental Impact Statement or a Public Environment Report, with
some level of public input. Nevertheless the Environmental Protection Act is
sufficiently open-ended that there is considerable scope for government to
manipulate the process to minimise public input if that is its intention. A 1996
letter from Peter McGauran, the current Minister for Science and Technology,
suggests that the intention m a y indeed be to minimise public input. McGuaran
writes that the R R R said that a decision on the issue should be m a d e in about five
years time, but that it "did not recommend that a n e w inquiry be undertaken."
However the Review (p.4) did indeed say that "if, at some later stage, a n e w reactor
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is envisaged, it should be assessed by a n e w panel possibly operating within the
Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act."
McGuaran says the government will make a decision on the replacement of
H I F A R in 1997 or early 1998.61 His public statements have been non-committal to
some extent, but he has argued that there is a good case for a reactor. Most of his
comments in support of a n e w reactor have concerned the production of medical
radioisotopes62:
We have full support for ANSTO and what it does. It plays a crucial role in
Australia for both health and manufacturing terms. So many thousands of
Australians owe their lives to the research carried out at ANSTO.
that ANSTO

Remembe

is Australia's only producer of radioisotopes

A senior NSW Liberal Party politician, and the federal Democrats, are calling for
Senate inquiry into the future and possible relocation of the Lucas Heights
facilities. (Hogarth and Cleary, 1997.)
HIFAR's age is creating a sense of urgency surrounding the issue of its
refurbishment or replacement. The issue of what to do with the spent fuel rods at
Lucas Heights, and the issue of waste management more generally, is even more
pressing. This is because A N S T O is likely to run out of storage space for spent fuel
rods in late 1998, and also because of the political backlash that would probably
greet a decision to proceed with a n e w research reactor before some sort of
solution (however temporary and inadequate) is found to A N S T O ' s radioactive
waste problems.
I will finish this chapter with some comments on the state of anti-nuclear
opposition. Opposition to the open-slather uranium policy and the reinvigorated
U S alliance has generally been tame. However there is still a large reservoir of
anti-nuclear sentiment that could be mobilised against future nuclear projects, as
demonstrated by the massive opposition to French testing in the Pacific in 1995.
Another variable is the Sutherland Shire Council, which w a s so important in the
campaign during the RRR. The make-up of the Council has changed. The Liberal
Party n o w has a dominant position following Council elections in 1995. That m a y
result in a less critical attitude to A N S T O ' s operations, and it m a y affect the

^ A s discussed in the postscript to this thesis (chapter 10), in September 1997 the government
announced a decision to replace HIFAR. However the decision is subject to an assessment under the
Environmental Protection Act 1974, and it is also subject to an investigation by a Senate Committee.
& Matters of Public Importance, 5 March, 1997. See also McGuaran, Questions Without Notice, House
of Representatives, 6 March.
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outcome of the controversy over the replacement of HIFAR. O n the other hand
some Liberal Party members were opposed to a n e w reactor at the time of the
RRR: it remains to be seen what role the Council will play in the controversy in
the coming years.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
THE RADIOISOTOPE INDUSTRY:
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY
5.1. INTRODUCTION
5.2. THE HISTORY OF RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION A N D NUCLEAR
MEDICINE

5.1. INTRODUCTION
The empirical scope and organisation of chapters 5-8 centres on the evaluation of
the relative merits of a n e w reactor in Australia for radioisotope production
versus alternative options. If H I F A R is permanently shut d o w n without
replacement, any combination of four options is possible. There could be greater
reliance o n domestic cyclotron production of radioisotopes. A second possibility is
greater reliance o n imported radioisotopes. For radioisotopes not amenable to
domestic cyclotron production or importation, there are two further options:
using alternative radioisotopes or non-radioisotope medical technologies. All
these options would almost certainly be pursued to a greater or lesser extent in the
absence of a domestic research reactor; they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed at
the m o m e n t there is s o m e usage in Australia of domestic cyclotron radioisotopes,
imported radioisotopes, and diagnostic and therapeutic technologies which
compete with nuclear medicine, along with HIFAR-produced radioisotopes.
In this chapter I briefly summarise the history of nuclear medicine. This summary
focuses on the central role of nuclear agencies in the development of nuclear
medicine, and the integration of radioisotope applications into the clinical practice
of medicine, primarily in the field of diagnostic imaging. Chapter six presents
empirical material o n reactor radioisotope production around the world. Chapter
seven presents an analysis of the global radioisotope industry, taking u p a range of
topics: radioisotope demand; production levels; the level of industry
concentration; vertical integration; private and public sector involvement;
dedicated production facilities; the links between radioisotope production and
nuclear development m o r e generally; technical innovations; and radioisotope
production using cyclotrons and linear accelerators. O n the basis of the material
presented in chapters 5-7, the question of future radioisotope production and
supply in Australia is addressed in chapter eight.
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ANALYSING N U C L E A R MEDICINE A N D T H E RADIOISOTOPE INDUSTRY
One way of proceeding with an analysis of future radioisotope production and
supply scenarios for Australia would be to consider each medical radioisotope
currently produced by H I F A R , collating information on the feasibility of
importation, domestic cyclotron production, or replacement with alternative
radioisotopes or non-radioisotope procedures. However this analysis proceeds
from a different direction, from a broader analysis of global production of and
trade in radioisotopes. Such a general understanding is essential for an adequate
assessment of future supply scenarios for Australia, and it provides a framework
from which analysis of any specific radioisotope can proceed. The only
radioisotope discussed in detail is technetium-99m (Tc-99m) and its parent
radioisotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99). Tc-99m is used in 70-80% of all nuclear
medicine procedures.
There is very little academic work concerning nuclear medicine or the
radioisotope industry, and the few studies that exist are more useful for
information than insight (e.g. Russell, 1979; Hamilton, 1982; Bronzino et al., 1990,
ch.7). Social analysts of nuclear industries rarely say m u c h about the radioisotope
industry. In some studies, radioisotope production is discussed in the context of
the various industrial, medical, and research activities of nuclear agencies (e.g.
Moyal, 1975). Such studies give some insight into the links between radioisotope
production and other aspects of nuclear programs. However that alone is
insufficient for m y purposes since m a n y aspects of the radioisotope industry such as processing, transport, and marketing - involve institutions other than
nuclear agencies and social and economic dynamics other than those which shape
the nuclear industry.

Nor is there much of relevance in the medical sociology literature. This literat
tends to focus more on the use and consumption of medical technologies, less on
production and trade. Studies of medical use and consumption take u p issues
such as the development of usage organisations and practices, professional
strategies used to advance or retard the development of a particular technology,
and medical technology evaluation. S o m e of this literature is useful. For example
use/consumption studies bridge into studies of technology regulation and
evaluation, in which the roles of state institutions and private companies come
into view alongside the more c o m m o n focus on medical personnel and
institutions. Moreover there is interaction between production and consumption,
supply and demand: for example professional struggles (turf battles) over the use
of medical radioisotopes have consequences for radioisotope d e m a n d which, in
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turn, affects production. H o w e v e r in the following analysis I do not look closely at
the level of professional practice, or medical micropolitics more generally; the
issue of future radioisotope supply scenarios for Australia invites an analysis
focused largely on the levels of radioisotope production and trade.
There are some sociological analyses of medical imaging modalities such as xradiology, computerised tomography, and magnetic resonance imaging (e.g.
Littrell, 1989), and there are hagiographic "in-house" histories of all of them. Once
again the focus is generally on the use and impact of imaging technologies rather
than production and trade. Nuclear medicine tends to be given little or no
attention in this literature. A typical example is Hamilton's (1982) Medical
Diagnostic Imaging Systems, a study of a range of imaging technologies including
nuclear medicine. This book has m u c h useful information and some useful
insights but it lacks any clear overall analysis of medical imaging and it deals only
with the U S market. Hamilton's book illustrates another blind-spot in the
literature: the discussion on nuclear medicine is focused solely on imaging
equipment and computers, with no discussion at all on radioisotope production
and trade. Another illustrative example is the lengthy and largely descriptive
account of medical imaging in Bronzino et al. (1990, ch.7). Insofar as this account
moves from description to analysis, the concern is with "lumpy" investment
decisions and other issues which concern imaging equipment not radioisotopes;
the comments on radioisotope production are brief and purely descriptive and
technical.
Medical sociology bridges into studies more clearly identifiable as STS-inspired.
Once again the STS literature dealing with medical imaging technologies is of
little value for this thesis. Barley's (1986) analysis of the introduction of
computerised tomography scanners into two different hospital radiology
departments is illuminating in its analysis of the different social dynamics
occasioned by computerised tomography vis a vis the division of labour in
radiology - but the work is narrow in scope. Similarly, the historical analysis of
the development of cyclotrons by Baird and Faust (1990) is narrowly focused. Their
aim is to urge a conception of scientific knowledge broad enough to include
scientific instruments and instrumental techniques; that is, a conception of
scientific knowledge which includes but goes beyond theory. That m a y be of some
interest in relation to the construction and negotiation of boundaries between
science and technology, but it has no relevance for the questions to be addressed in
this thesis. The analyses of the historical development of ultrasound by Yoxen
(1987) and Koch (1993) offer some useful insights - concerning for example the
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transfer of military technology to medicine - but mostly they rehash the wellworn themes of constructivist technology studies.
An STS analysis which is certainly of use is Stuart Blume's (1992) Insight and
Industry. A s discussed in chapter one, Blume's book does not directly address
nuclear medicine but the overall analysis of medical imaging is useful and
suggestive. Blume's analysis needs to be reworked in relation to the radioisotope
industry. Blume emphasises the evolution of an interorganisational structure at
the centre of which are the symbiotic interests of the producers (manufacturing
companies), purchasers (mostly hospitals), and users (radiologists) of imaging
equipment. A major difference between the radioisotope industry and the medical
imaging equipment markets analysed by Blume is the central involvement of
state-controlled nuclear agencies in radioisotope production. Whereas Blume's
analysis draws primarily from theory on the economics of innovation, and from
medical sociology, an analysis of the radioisotope industry will also need to be
alert to the sociology of nuclear development.

Of direct relevance to this thesis is the analysis of the global radioisotope ind
by Frans Berkhout (1993), an academic w h o has written widely on nuclear issues.
His study w a s commissioned by the Sutherland Shire Council for inclusion in the
Council's submission to the Research Reactor Review. Berkhout analysed the
level of concentration and competition in the radioisotope industry, and he m a d e
projections about future production levels. His analysis is particularly useful in
relation to radioisotope processing and retailing - in this domain he discusses the
changing structure of the industry, such as the shift towards regional
radiopharmacies and unit-dose supply of radiopharmaceuticals to hospitals, and
the vertical integration of the industry. Berkhout's study is brief, and it is focused
exclusively on the Mo-99/Tc-99m industry, but it is useful nonetheless - all the
more so since it w a s focused explicitly on the issue of future supply of the
Australian market.
In view of what has been said, analysis of the radioisotope industry must take
account of the following broad features. Firstly, analysis of the economics of the
industry is essential. Radioisotope production is often carried out on a noncommercial basis, but international trade is invariably carried out on a
commercial basis even where production is largely controlled by state institutions.
Secondly, the important role of nuclear agencies in radioisotope production must
be considered. Thirdly, the idiosyncrasies of medical markets - for example the
insulation of both sellers and buyers from price signals as a result of third-party
payment systems - must be considered.
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One last aspect of the analysis that should be mentioned is that for the most part I
assume the value of nuclear medicine and focus on the evaluation of alternative
production and supply scenarios. This is the approach adopted in virtually all
discussion on nuclear medicine in relation to the HIFAR replacement
controversy, whether from proponents or opponents of a new reactor. However
the issue is reframed at various stages in the following chapters, with some critical
analysis of the importance of nuclear medicine and its alleged irreplaceability vis a
vis alternative medical technologies. Thus some issues are addressed which arise
from structural critiques of medicine under capitalism - in particular iatrogenesis
and overuse. As for alternative technologies, claims that nuclear medicine is
unique as a functional diagnostic imaging technology, and thus immune from
competition in this medical domain, are scrutinised, and other aspects of
competition between imaging modalities are discussed. I also scrutinise the claim
that research reactors and cyclotrons are complementary rather than competing
radioisotope sources.

5.2. THE HISTORY OF RADIOISOTOPE
PRODUCTION AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE
RADIOISOTOPES: THE NUCLEAR CONNECTION
THE POST-WAR D E V E L O P M E N T OF MEDICAL IMAGING MODALITIES
NUCLEAR MEDICINE A N D T H E RADIOISOTOPE INDUSTRY

This section summarises the history of radioisotope production, nucle
medicine, and the broader context of medical imaging modalities. There is no
need in this thesis for a detailed history of these issues, and the following
comments serve mainly to provide some context for subsequent chapters and to
flag some issues that will be taken up in those chapters.

RADIOISOTOPES; THE NUCLEAR CONNECTION

From the discovery of radioactivity in the late nineteenth century un
the only radioisotopes available for medical (or any other) purposes were
naturally-occurring radioisotopes such as radium, polonium and radio-lead. Most
of these radioisotopes were (and are) rare, and methods for separating them were
crude. Consequently the use of radioisotopes for medical purposes was
uncommon and experimental.
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From the early 1930s, the development of artificial radioisotopes first took place
with the construction of a range of particle accelerators including cyclotrons. The
use of radioisotopes in medicine expanded. However radioisotopes were still hard
to get through the 1930s. Particle accelerator technology was in its infancy. S o m e
accelerators in the U S were used for uranium enrichment for weapons production
during World W a r II, and the three that existed in Japan were destroyed by the
invading U S army in late 1945. From the late 1920s until World W a r II, a nexus
had formed between particle accelerators and nuclear medicine, then during the
war accelerators were linked to nuclear militarism. These links were remoulded
during and after the war. S o m e ongoing effort was expended on the development
of particle accelerators, but they were developed primarily for physics research
including military research. Far more effort and funding was expended on the
development of fission technology using nuclear reactors. (Brodsky et al., 1995;
Stelson et al., 1995; Boyd and Lane, 1973; Sasaki, 1995; Freeman, 1981, ch.4;
Cockburn and Ellyard, 1981, ch.9.)
The production of medical radioisotopes became a subsidiary function of nuclear
research reactors. Inevitably, the U S w a s at the forefront of reactor radioisotope
production. Of the 65 research reactors in operation in 1957, only 10 were outside
the U S (Coleby, 1987). The U K also produced reactor radioisotopes from the mid
1940s. Not long after, research reactors were being used in the Soviet Union for
radioisotope production. Other countries with plans to develop nuclear power
and/or weapons also had a need for research reactors. A s research reactors become
more widespread, so too did reactor radioisotope production.
With perhaps just one exception - a small reactor built in the US for cancer
treatment and limited radioisotope production - research reactors were not built
specifically for medical purposes (Anon., 1959). Although medical radioisotope
production was a secondary concern, artificially-produced radioisotopes were
more widely available after World W a r II. There was a deluge of papers, speakers
and publicity; over 3000 articles were published relating to medical uses of
radioisotopes from 1945-50 around the world. (Croll, 1994; Bindon, 1988; Brodsky
et al, 1995; Coleby, 1987.)
Without the development of nuclear weapons and power programs, nuclear
medicine would not have become integrated into medicine so rapidly, and m a y
not have become a widespread medical application at all. Medical radioisotope
production was a secondary function and sometimes marginalised because of the
priority accorded to nuclear power and weapons research. Yet nuclear agencies
were keen to support the development of nuclear medicine, which served an
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important ideological, legitimating function. The production of medical
radioisotopes w a s accompanied by m u c h publicity focused on finding a cure for
cancer and spiced with swords-to-ploughshares rhetoric. (Kotz, 1995.)
Financial incentives had little to do with the early development of nuclear
medicine: there w a s little or no profit to be m a d e in such an immature market.
Radioisotopes were typically supplied at little or no cost - this occurred not just in
the capitalist countries pursuing major nuclear power and/or weapons programs,
but also in countries with modest nuclear research programs such as Australia
and a number of Latin American countries (Touya, 1987). Even before the end of
the 1940s, some private companies had carved out a niche as intermediaries
between bulk radioisotope producers (i.e. nuclear agencies) and users (hospitals),
but these companies did not play a significant role for some decades.
The radioisotope industry can usefully be considered as a product of the symbiotic
interests of nuclear agencies and medical professionals. M o r e broadly, class
interests were also at work, even if the profit motive w a s not an important
driving force. A s well as serving as an ideological prop for the nuclear industry,
radioisotope production and nuclear medicine fitted neatly with the ideologies of
technological and medical progress that were so prominent in the post-war
decades. These various ideologies were evident in the rhetoric surrounding
radioisotope production and nuclear medicine, such as the boastings of a former
director of the O a k Ridge National Laboratory about the Laboratory's role in
"saving lives and m o n e y with isotopes" (Weinberg, quoted in O R N L , 1996):
// at some time a heavenly angel should ask what the laboratory in the hills
of East Tennessee did to enlarge man's life and make it better, I dare say the

production of radioisotopes for scientific research and medical treatment will
surely rate as a candidate for very first place.
Much was made of the potential for radioisotopes to be used to cure cancer, but
nuclear agencies, governments, and the capitalist media were far slower to
acknowledge the dangerous and iatrogenic effects of radiation - whether from
weapons tests, reactor emissions, uranium mining or medical radioisotopes - and
nuclear critics were routinely accused of being communists (Wasserman et al.,
1982, ch.7).
For hospital managers/boards and doctors, the main motivations for
involvement in nuclear medicine were profit and prestige. Several specialties
within medicine began experimenting with radioisotopes: "The added prestige,
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training opportunities and facilities for clinical research which isotopes bring to
these special units is considerable." (McRae, 1963.) M u c h could be said about the
turf battles between different medical specialties and different occupations for
control over nuclear medicine, but that would serve little purpose in this thesis.
The symbiosis between nuclear agencies and medical institutions works both
ways. There is a long history of medical practitioners and researchers giving verbal
support to the development of nuclear power, weapons and so on. Thus Wagner
and Ketchum (1989), nuclear medicine specialists, blow the trumpet not only for
medical uses of radiation but also for nuclear power. Brodsky et al. (1995, p.813)
claim that the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima "seems to have saved
millions of lives", talk about "environmentally clean and safe nuclear power and
radioactive waste disposal", and are hostile to nuclear critics. Medical personnel
and institutions sometimes strayed from the topic of radioisotope supply in
submissions to the Research Reactor Review - for example the Flinders Medical
Centre (1993) argued that H I F A R is an "important and prestigious" national
facility, and failure to build a n e w reactor would result in a loss of international
status which could be seen as an indicator of Australia's continued slide towards
"banana republicanism" and third-world status.

In other cases the support of medical personnel and institutions is more tangible
such as through their involvement in radiation dosimetry research and
regulation; this encompasses medical radiation along with m a n y other radiation
sources such as reactor emissions and uranium mining. (Stelson et al., 1995;
Gofman, 1990).
The most sinister aspect of the symbiosis between medicine and nuclear programs
was a series of radiation experiments carried out in the U S from 1944-1974. The
experiments were funded by a range of institutions including the Defence
Department and the U S Atomic Energy Commission. At least 31 contentious
radiation experiments have come to light, affecting u p to 800 people. Dozens of
people, including prisoners, mental patients, children, and pregnant w o m e n , were
injected with small quantities of plutonium. S o m e cancer patients were injected
with uranium - to test the effects of uranium on tumours and/or to determine
safe levels of exposure a m o n g uranium miners. Between 1961 and 1972 the
military sponsored work in which at least 87 cancer patients were irradiated to test
the effects of radiation on cognitive and emotional processes. Justifications given
for some of the experiments referred to Cold W a r paranoia and overlapping
notions of subjecting a few individuals to risks for the good of society as a whole.
In addition to tests performed directly on individuals, a number of tests were
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conducted involving the deliberate release of radiation into the atmosphere.
(Roberts, 1994; Rhein, 1994; Advisory Committee on H u m a n Radiation
Experiments, 1996.) Predictably, the nuclear medicine community has tried to
distance itself from these experiments despite the involvement of the medical
profession - thus an article on the topic in The Journal of Nuclear Medicine w a s
titled "Not Nuclear Medicine" (Miller, 1994B).
Far more widespread than military-medical experiments was the misuse of
radiation (radioisotopes and x-rays) as a result of corporate and medical
profiteering, tied in with ignorance about the iatrogenic effects of radiation and a
willingness to use medical patients as guinea pigs for experimental procedures
without informed consent. Questionable experiments carried out in Australia in
the 1940s and 1950s, which have received some publicity recently, belong to this
category of misuse (Bonnyman, 1994).
While nuclear medicine personnel and institutions have generally been staunch
allies of all things nuclear, there has been the occasional dissent. For example in
1978, 74 doctors and scientists involved in nuclear medicine in Australia sent a
petition to the federal government expressing their concern, and urging a cautious
approach, to nuclear power on the grounds of waste disposal, radiation, pollution,
and genetic risks. The petition w a s a response to attempts by the Citizens for
Uranium Export to lobby doctors to support uranium mining and export.
(Williams, 1978.) In 1993 the International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear W a r called for a boycott on Siemens medical equipment (which includes
nuclear medicine equipment) because of aspects of the company's involvement in
the nuclear power industry. Siemens denies the boycott is having an impact but
"industry sources" say it is, particularly in Europe, according to a reporter in the
Movement Against Uranium Mining's magazine The Third Opinion. (Anon.,
19961.) Another falling out followed from the attempt of the Canadian Control
Board to raise permissible radiation levels for workers and the public in 1983-84.
All the major unions representing Canada's 200 000 radiation workers, including
medical radiation workers, banded together to oppose the changes which were
subsequently dropped. (Babin, 1985, p.17.) O n e further example is the work of a
number of dissident doctors and scientists working in the field of radiation
research and regulation (see chapter 8.3). Little is to be m a d e of these examples;
they are rare exceptions and there is no sign that the bonds between nuclear
medicine and nuclear agencies are becoming more troubled with time.
Despite the support of nuclear agencies in the development of nuclear medicine,
and the m u c h greater availability of radioisotopes from research reactors after the
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war, nuclear medicine w a s still a small and weakly-established branch of medicine
through the 1950s and early 1960s. Radiation detection equipment w a s
rudimentary and only a handful of applications for radioisotopes had been
developed such as the use of iodine-131 for thyroid disorders, chromium for
labelling red blood cells, potassium-32 treatment for leukaemia, and cobalt
treatment for megaloblastic anaemia. (Kotz, 1995.)

THE POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL IMAGING MODALITIES
From the 1890s until the late 1950s, x-radiology was the only medical imaging
modality to have progressed beyond a rudimentary stage of development. A
thriving industry had developed around x-radiology. Companies manufacturing
x-ray equipment were generally satisfied with incremental innovations.
Radiologists gradually carved out a secure and comfortable niche within the
division of medical labour, and were sufficiently challenged by incremental
innovations. In short there w a s not m u c h impetus for radical innovation in
medical imaging. Nevertheless, changes were looming.
Capitalist economies around the world experienced protracted growth in the post
World W a r II generation. Medicine w a s one sector for capital investment, and
companies were in a better position to be risking investment in the development
of expensive n e w technologies. Hospital boards/managers were willing to support
the introduction of n e w technologies, which promised profit and prestige. At the
level of medical practice, private and public-sector third-party payment systems
were developed and thus there w a s little or no incentive for doctors or patients to
limit the use of medical procedures. (Russell, 1979; Gelijns, 1989; Littrell, 1989;
Hancher, 1989; Blume, 1992.)

A variety of professionals gained scientific expertise during World War II and thi
impacted upon civil science and technology after the war. Atomic research w a s a
major priority in a number of countries in the post-war period; this facilitated the
further development of nuclear medicine and w a s also important in the
development of other imaging technologies such as magnetic resonance imaging,
ultrasound, and thermography. (Blume, 1992, pp.72-74; Yoxen, 1987.)
With the transfer of military technology and an external environment in many
ways conducive to the introduction of n e w technologies into medicine, there was
ample opportunity for the development of n e w imaging technologies. Industrial
and professional interests went to work on a range of technologies; several were
successfully integrated into the interorganisational structure of medical imaging
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though inevitably there were s o m e failures such as thermography. Ultrasound
and nuclear medicine, and to a lesser extent thermography, had taken shape by the
1960s. Computerised tomography (CT) scanning was just emerging; it w a s born of
and into the world of complex electronics and computers. Developments in those
fields opened u p possibilities for n e w imaging technologies and also greatly
influenced the speed and scope of existing technologies including nuclear
medicine. (Blume, 1992, pp.72-73, 157.)
Diagnostic tests of various sorts have been among the fastest growing areas of
medicine (Hamilton, 1982; Pinckney, 1985; Nelkin and Tancredi, 1989). Despite the
rhetoric a m o n g doctors that verbal consultation and physical examination are the
cornerstones of diagnostic medicine, diagnostics has become w e d d e d to a range of
technologies. A s Kothari and Mehta (1988, p.185) put it:
Given the ever-expanding arsenal of computerized electronic gadgets - CT
scan, auto-analyser, PET scan, NMR
scan, ultrasonography - the modern
medical man looks like a supersleuth, a Sherlock Holmes backed by a
Watson carrying with him the latest off the IBM assembly-line.
While professional and industrial interests were at the centre of the development
of imaging modalities, the role of the capitalist state w a s also crucial. This support
operated at different levels. State funded and/or controlled institutions such as
regulatory agencies, health departments, and public hospitals were directly
involved in research, regulation, and the application of imaging technologies. The
state provided considerable financial support for research and development of
n e w imaging technologies. Typically private-sector research, then as n o w , focused
on incremental innovations whereas the state played a greater role in radical
innovations (which m a y be taken u p by private enterprise). (Hamilton, 1982,
pp.199-200.)
The various arms of the capitalist state have contradictory goals with respect to
medical technologies. The state has an overall interest in maintaining a growing
economy and within that a viable medical industry. State support of medicine also
serves in the reproduction of labour power, and it dampens political unrest.
However the substantial growth of medical spending by the state is seen as an
economic burden which must be checked, particularly in the past generation in
the context of economic stagnation and the associated austerity drive. This can
lead to attempts to control the use of medical technologies and to limit the
introduction of n e w technologies. Thus there are conflicting agendas: promoting a
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profitable industry conflicts with regulatory goals such as setting safety standards
and keeping costs under control. (Renaud, 1975; Hancher, 1989.)

NUCLEAR MEDICINE AND THE RADIOISOTOPE INDUSTRY
Nuclear medicine caught the wave of development of medical imaging
technologies. Thus in Australia, the late 1960s and early 1970s w a s the
"honeymoon period" for nuclear medicine according to the Foundation President
of the Australian and N e w Zealand Society for Nuclear Medicine (Lander, 1972).
Interest w a s growing a m o n g doctors, other professionals, hospital administrators,
the general public, politicians, and private enterprise. The media w a s giving
"considerable time and space" to nuclear medicine. "Charitable Foundations" and
community organisations dug deep to finance nuclear medicine units, and some
"outstanding" contributions came from "altruistic individuals". Whatever the
motives, there w a s also some corporate benefaction - for example Searle
Nucleonics donated a g a m m a camera for clinical research. In the two years to 1972
the number of nuclear medicine g a m m a cameras in Australia rose from two to
fifteen and there w a s also a marked rise in the number of rectilinear and
conventional single-headed scanners. (Lander, 1972.)
The earliest uses of medical radioisotopes were therapeutic (and often iatrogenic)
- radioisotopes supplied energy rather than information. Until imaging
equipment w a s developed from the 1950s, nuclear medicine w a s limited to either
therapeutic procedures or diagnostic tests of function and flow which generally
required sampling body tissues and fluids to determine the distribution of
radioactivity, or alternatively the use of simple external counters to detect and
quantify radiation levels. Diagnostic procedures gradually became the most
frequent application of nuclear medicine. Within the field of diagnostic nuclear
medicine, tissue sampling and external quantitative scanning gave w a y to nuclear
imaging. This w a s facilitated by the development of increasingly sophisticated
scanners, research into radiopharmaceuticals which localise in specific organs, and
computer technology. (Ganatra and Nofal, 1986; McRae, 1963.)
Rectilinear scanners were the first pieces of equipment used for nuclear imaging.
These scanners, introduced in the late 1940s, gradually gave w a y to g a m m a
cameras from the late 1950s. Both work on the same principle - activation by
radiation striking a crystal, usually a sodium iodide crystal. However g a m m a
cameras produce a film without having to scan the patient physically, they can be
used for dynamic studies whereas rectilinear scanners cannot, and they give
superior resolution to rectilinear scanners, (van Herk, 1986; Ganatra and Nofal,
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1986; Boyd and Lane, 1973; Lull and Littlefield, 1993.) By the end of the 1960s,
g a m m a cameras were being produced on a commercial scale, often by the same
companies involved in the development of equipment for other imaging
modalities. A range of increasingly sophisticated imaging cameras has been
introduced based on the sodium iodide scintillation crystal - the rectilinear
scanner, the g a m m a camera, the whole body imager or multicrystal scanner, and
the single photon emission computed tomographic (SPECT) scanner. (Hamilton,
1982, pp.19-25.) The development of g a m m a cameras significantly expanded the
range of applications of nuclear medicine; similarly, the n e w generation of
g a m m a cameras, particularly those equipped with SPECT, resulted in a resurgence
of nuclear medicine in the 1980s. (Carretta, 1993; Hamilton, 1982, p.35.)

Major advances in computer data acquisition and analysis also took place from the
late 1960s, with significant implications for nuclear medicine. (Croft, 1990;
Dugdale, 1974; Flakus, 1981.)
Radioisotope production technology underwent considerable growth and
development from the 1960s. Reactor radioisotope production involves reactor
irradiation facilities, post-irradiation handling and processing (mechanical and
chemical), measurement, dispensing, packing, and transport. Innovations took
place across the spectrum of these activities. The development of a wider range of
radiopharmaceuticals, along with freeze-dried radiopharmaceutical kits which
required a m i n i m u m of preparation at the hospital, facilitated the growth of
nuclear medicine; no longer w a s it confined to large hospitals with direct access to
a radiopharmacy. Such innovations have also facilitated the gradual spread of
nuclear medicine to private clinics. (Khafagi, 1992.)
The development of a number of generator systems was particularly important,
with the desired radioisotope being "milked" from the longer-lived parent
radioisotope at or close to the point of use; this meant that transport time and
distance w a s less of an obstacle. Technetium-99m, drawn from Mo-99/Tc-99m
generators, became established as the most c o m m o n diagnostic imaging
radioisotope. This entailed research and development across a range of areas H E U target technology, target processing, generator technology, and conjugation of
Tc-99m with a range of molecules to produce an ever-wider range of Tc-99m
radiopharmaceuticals. Whereas in the formative years of nuclear medicine
doctors would take whatever radioisotopes they could get, Mo-99/Tc-99m became
the radioisotope of choice and supply of this radioisotope became increasingly
important. (Stelson et al., 1995; W e b b , 1988, pp.10-12; Egan et al., 1994.) Although
Tc-99m rapidly became the dominant radioisotope for diagnostic studies, the range
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of radioisotopes used in nuclear medicine increased considerably; some important
developments were the use of gallium-67 from 1969, thallium-201 (1975), and
fluorine-18 (1979). (Egan et al., 1994; Khafagi, 1993.)
Whereas the development of other imaging modalities depended primarily on
the symbiotic interests of manufacturing companies and doctors, the symbiosis in
radioisotope production and supply w a s between public-sector nuclear agencies
and doctors. A consequence of this w a s that financial interests were not nearly so
important as with other imaging modalities, as indicated by the supply of
radioisotopes free of charge. Over the decades this has changed, through two main
processes. Under the impact of economic rationalism, nuclear agencies have
commercialised radioisotope production and marketing. The practice of supplying
radioisotopes at no cost became less frequent though there remains a considerable
degree of subsidisation. Secondly, private companies have played an increasingly
prominent role in the radioisotope industry.
From the early post-war years a pattern was set in relation to the involvement of
private companies in the radioisotope industry. The pattern w a s (and is) for
nuclear agencies to produce radioisotopes and private radiopharmaceutical
companies to assume intermediary roles - processing , packaging, transport, and
finally supplying radioisotopes to hospitals. This pattern remains the norm today.
The radiopharmaceutical companies are involved in, or have links to, the
pharmaceutical industry, and they generally supply hospitals with radioisotopes
and pharmaceuticals or with pre-mixed radiopharmaceuticals. The
radiopharmaceutical companies have significantly affected the radioisotope
industry in a number of ways. They have played a role in product research and
thus increased the number of products being used in nuclear medicine. They have
consolidated and expanded the market for medical radioisotopes, in the process
securing nuclear medicine's place within the field of diagnostic imaging. They
have developed global supply chains: domestic producers increasingly find
themselves in competition with foreign suppliers. They act as a significant
constituency for public-sector radioisotope production (except w h e n it competes
with their o w n radioisotope production operations). A number of
radiopharmaceutical companies o w n and operate cyclotrons dedicated to
radioisotope manufacture, and some of the larger companies have begun to play a
greater direct role in reactor radioisotope production in the past decade.
As well as the movement of radiopharmaceutical companies into radioisotope
production, they have also assumed more of the functions previously carried out
in hospitals and n o w supply doctors with ready-to-use doses of radiopharma-
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ceuticals. In short, the divisions within the industry - bulk radioisotope
production (nuclear agencies), intermediary processing and transport
(radiopharmaceutical companies), and final processing (hospitals) - have become
far less neat.
The growth of a number of imaging modalities has slowed over the past 10-20
years. At the broadest level this has been a consequence of economic forces, with
capitalist economies moving in and out of recession. There has been less
opportunity for the development of n e w imaging modalities, with the cost of
developing n e w advanced systems having increased considerably. Market
saturation has occurred with some modalities, forcing some companies out of the
imaging industry. Another check on the growth of imaging modalities has been
cut-backs in government funding for R & D , and the various methods used by
governments to limit health-care spending, with expensive technologies being an
obvious target.
Radioisotope production has not been affected in the same way as other aspects of
the medical imaging industry, for reasons such as the primacy of public-sector
nuclear agencies in radioisotope production (and their partial immunity from
market forces), and the need for ongoing radioisotope supply which makes market
saturation less of a problem in comparison with imaging equipment. Nevertheless radioisotope production has felt the squeeze. Despite the fact that most of the
60+ countries to have operated research reactors have used them for radioisotope
production, a m o n g other purposes, the commercial export trade has always been
far more concentrated. There are m a n y reasons for this, such as the modest size of
the world radioisotope market and the inadequacy of m a n y research reactors for
production of high specific activity radioisotopes. In the early 1990s the
concentration was such that a Canadian company supplied almost all of world
demand for Mo-99; if there had been protracted problems with that operation
there could have been a major worldwide shortage of Mo-99/Tc-99m.
The Research Reactor Review (1993, p.91) neatly summed up the current, messy
situation in the radioisotope industry. It said that the global radioisotope market is
in a very dynamic state, and there is no certainty h o w things will change. All
aspects of supply, logistics, usage, and price are in flux. Enough reactors exist to
supply or even over-supply the market depending on priorities of reactor usage.
The Review said that the one predictable variable is that d e m a n d for radioisotopes
will increase, but even that is questionable in the m e d i u m to long term as will be
discussed in chapter seven.
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CHAPTER SIX:
CURRENT AND FUTURE REACTOR
RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
6.1. INTRODUCTION
6.2. THE MAJOR RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCERS
6.3. RESEARCH REACTORS A N D RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
6.4. REGIONAL SUMMARIES OF RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION

6.1. INTRODUCTION

In the absence of a research reactor in Australia, domestic cyclotrons will be able t
fill the void to s o m e extent for supply of medical radioisotopes, and perhaps in
time cyclotrons will supersede reactors for radioisotope production. In addition,
there would almost certainly be greater reliance o n alternative medical
technologies, in particular diagnostic imaging modalities other than nuclear
medicine, in the absence of a domestic reactor. Despite these alternatives, there
would certainly be considerable reliance o n imported reactor radioisotopes in the
absence of a domestic reactor, at least until such time as non-reactor production
methods are further advanced.
Whether a substantial reliance on imported radioisotopes is feasible depends on
reactor radioisotope production overseas. Since the global radioisotope industry is
in a state of considerable flux, and information o n the industry is scarce, a detailed
look at overseas reactor radioisotope production is necessary and that is the
purpose of this chapter. Firstly, the major radioisotope producers and exporters are
discussed. Then I turn to smaller radioisotope production operations, which
necessitates some general discussion of research reactors around the world,
followed by regional summaries of reactor radioisotope production.
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
As discussed in chapter 5.1, there have been hardly any critical analyses of the
radioisotope industry (or nuclear medicine). Several reasons can be suggested for
this. Firstly, the radioisotope industry is modest in scale. Similarly, nuclear
medicine accounts for only a small percentage (about 5-10%) of diagnostic imaging
procedures, and therapeutic nuclear medicine is even less c o m m o n , generally
accounting for just 1-2% of all nuclear medicine procedures. (Styles, 1993; Ell,
1992.) Secondly, the radioisotope industry is fundamentally different to the
industries associated with medical imaging equipment (in particular cameras and
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computers), and thus tends to be ignored in the literature on medical imaging and
even in the literature on nuclear medicine. Thirdly, inertia has no doubt played a
role - there have been hardly any attempts to even begin to analyse the
radioisotope industry and this has become self-perpetuating. A fourth reason is
that the industry is difficult to analyse because it is complex, fluid, and
fragmented.

A fifth reason for the paucity of analyses of the radioisotope industry is that it i
difficult to compile empirical information on the industry. Partly this is because of
the fluid and fragmented nature of the industry. Another reason is that, despite
the large number of radioisotope producers around the world, there are very few
organisations involved in the commercial production and export of the most
c o m m o n medical radioisotopes, in particular Mo-99. Thus the industry is, at one
and the same time, fragmented and concentrated. A s Berkhout (1993) and Travelli
(quoted in Rojas-Burke, 1993D) note, organisations involved in the commercial
radioisotope industry are few in number and reluctant to divulge information on
their activities. Apart from commercial confidentiality, another factor limiting
access to information is the culture of secrecy which has traditionally surrounded
nuclear agencies to a greater or lesser extent. I suspect that a third reason that a
number of organisations have refused or ignored m y requests for information is a
simple lack of interest in the academic pursuits of an Australian P h D student. O n e
final difficulty has been language barriers, which have limited and confused some
communications.
A number of organisations have more detailed information on radioisotope
production around the world than the following survey, but have not been
prepared to provide m e with that information. The following survey is, as far as I
know, the most comprehensive one available in the publicly-accessible literature.
The secrecy of commercial radioisotope producers is not absolute - many
organisations have responded to m y requests for information. In addition, m u c h
information is available in publicly-accessible literature such as professional
journals. Nevertheless, lack of information is certainly a limitation. In a volatile
industry where the future of just one (existing or planned) reactor can have
ramifications for radioisotope users around the world, it is of course important to
pay attention to the accuracy, currency, and comprehensiveness of information.
M y approach has been to put considerable effort into the acquisition of
information, and to m a k e it clear w h e n information gaps cast doubt on the
analysis.
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Specifically, the research strategies used to compile information for chapters 6-8
are as follows:
• analysis of books, journal articles (especially the nuclear medicine journals),
annual reports and other literature from nuclear agencies and
radiopharmaceutical companies; and
• phone calls and written correspondence with a wide range of people involved
in radioisotope production and processing (i.e. nuclear agencies and
radiopharmaceutical companies) in Australia and overseas, and to a lesser
extent with (nuclear and medical) researchers and doctors practising nuclear
medicine.
My primary concern has been to compile comprehensive, current and accurate
information on the major global radioisotope producers, which supply well over
9 5 % of the world market for medical radioisotopes (see section 6.2). Despite some
minor information gaps, this has been achieved.
In addition, I contacted nuclear agencies and/or radioisotope companies in all
countries operating m e d i u m or high-powered research reactors, asking for
(further) information on radioisotope production and supply. Approximately 5 0 %
of these requests were answered. While there are information gaps as a result of
the failure of some agencies/companies to respond, these gaps do not significantly
detract from the survey in this chapter or the analysis in chapter seven: sufficient
information has been obtained on the major global producers, and the available
information on other producers is adequate for m y purposes.

6.2. THE MAJOR RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCERS
NORDION INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE NATIONAL DES RADIOELEMENTS
MALLINCKRODT
AMERSHAM
SOUTH AFRICAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
NORDION INTERNATIONAL
In 1948 the Canadian government created a nuclear agency, Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited (AECL). Thus began the development of a major nuclear power
industry. The Radiochemical C o m p a n y , formed as part of A E C L , expanded and
diversified its operations and gradually became the world's leading supplier of
radioisotopes and nuclear-based industrial products. In 1988, as part of a broader
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trend towards divestment and privatisation of government activities, A E C L was
restructured and the Radiochemical C o m p a n y was privatised and renamed
Nordion International. ( A N S T O , 1993F, Annex 7.1.1.)
The NRU research reactor, which AECL uses to supply Nordion, is located at
AECL's facilities at Chalk River, Ontario. Nordion is based in Kanata, Ontario. It
has approximately 700 employees, with a further 100 employees based at
Nordion's European headquarters in Belgium. ( A N S T O , 1993F, Annex 7.1.1.)
As at 1993, Nordion was owned by the following groups: 80% by MDS Healthcare;
14.9% by Amersham; and the remaining 5.1% owned by former Radiochemical
Company employees. M D S bought Amersham's 14.9% share in March 1995 for
$C 17.6 million. ( M D S Healthcare, 1995.)
MDS revenue in the fiscal year 1994-95 was $C 689 million - but that figure
represents sales across a range of medical and life science technologies, not just
radioisotope sales. (Anon., 1996C.) Nordion and A E C L Annual Reports
mentioned radioisotope sales of $C 162 million in 1991/92, with 2 3 % annual
growth.^ ( A N S T O , 1993F, Annex 7.1.2.)

Nordion has a small number of subsidiary or affiliated organisations: Cyberfluor
Inc (100%); Medgenix Diagnostics (100%); Nordion Europe (100%); and Resolution
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (50%). ( A N S T O , 1993F, Annex 7.1.1.)
The extent of Nordion's current activities in Europe is unclear. In 1994
MDS/Nordion sold "certain contracts and intangible assets" relating to its
European radiopharmaceutical business to D u Pont. Thus D u Pont has assumed
sales and marketing responsibilities in Europe, with bulk supply from Nordion.
( M D S Healthcare, 1995.) Nordion (1994) says it is supplied with some radioisotopes
from four European reactors, which almost certainly ties in with an arrangement
it has with the Belgian Institute National des Radioelements (IRE) for back-up
supply. Nordion also has an a supply agreement with the operator of the Belgian
BR-2 reactor (discussed below).

Over 90% of Nordion's sales are to export markets in more than 100 countries. Al
of Nordion's production and processing facilities are located in North America
and Europe, but supply chains stretch all around the world. Nordion supplies
about two thirds of the world demand for reactor radioisotopes - including Mo-99

62 It is highly unlikely that this growth rate has been maintained. In the early 1990s, Nordion
profited from the closure of a number of reactors used by its competitors.
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and cobalt-60. Nordion also markets cyclotron radioisotopes. At its Vancouver
site, Nordion operates two cyclotrons which are dedicated to radioisotope
production, and Nordion also has access to the large production and research
cyclotron operated by T R I U M F (Tri University M e s o n Facility) in Vancouver.
Another two cyclotrons operate at Nordion's Belgian facilities. (Nordion, 1994.)
As well as supplying bulk radioisotopes, Nordion produces a "growing line of
finished radiopharmaceuticals". A s with other major radiopharmaceutical
companies, Nordion has close links with pharmaceutical producers including
some of its subsidiary organisations. Nordion also produces a range of clinical and
research irradiators and over half the world's g a m m a radiation processing
equipment. ( A N S T O , 1993F, p.7.4, Annex 7.1.1; Nordion, 1994.) In short Nordion
is a major producer of radioisotopes and equipment for medical and industrial
purposes.
Drawing on the NRU reactor in Canada, Nordion markets products based on the
following reactor radioisotopes: Mo-99, carbon-14, cobalt-60, iron-55, iodine-125,
chlorine-36, iodine-131, iridium-192, nickel-63, sulphur-35, xenon-127, xenon-133,
and yttrium-90. Products from European reactors are Mo-99, chromium-51,
iodine-131, and xenon-133. Using the cyclotrons located in Belgium and Canada,
Nordion markets products based on cobalt-57, gallium-67, indium-Ill, iodine-123,
strontium-82, and thallium-201. Nordion also sells 12 types of stable enriched
isotopes for use as cyclotron and reactor target material. (Nordion, 1994.)
Nordion has relied on two reactors in Canada, NRX and NRU, which are owned
and operated by A E C L . ( A N S T O , 1993F, p.7.4.) The National Research Xperimental (NRX) reactor w a s built in 1947. It was essentially a pilot factory for the
production of plutonium, which was supplied to the U S until 1963 (Babin, 1985,
pp.35-44). N R X was involved in an accident in 1952. A power excursion destroyed
the core of the reactor, causing some fuel melting. The core of the reactor was
buried as waste. Hundreds of U S and Canadian servicemen were ordered to
participate in the clean-up. (Edwards, n.d.) According to A N S T O (1993L, pp.3.163.17), the accident led to a significant release of radioactivity, but there were no
reported injuries. N R X was rebuilt and operated until early 1992 w h e n it was
permanently shut down. It was used for radioisotope production at various stages
of its life, primarily as a back-up to N R U .

The National Research Universal (NRU) reactor first went critical in late 1957. In
1958 there w a s a fire in the N R U reactor which badly contaminated the inside of
the reactor building with some release of radioactivity outside the building.
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(ANSTO, 1993L, pp.3.16-3.17.) Several fuel rods overheated and ruptured, one
catching fire. The ventilation system was jammed in the open position, thus
allowing the spread of radioactivity down-wind from the reactor site. The burning
fuel rod was extinguished by a relay team of scientists and technicians running
past the maintenance pit and dumping buckets of wet sand on it. Over 600 m e n
were involved in the clean-up. A E C L claims that very few m e n were exposed to
radiation doses exceeding the then permissible levels. It also claims that no
adverse health effects were caused by the exposures received. The methodology for
this second conclusion was the ostrich technique: no follow-up studies were
carried out, the m e n involved in the clean-up were told to observe strict secrecy
about the operation, claims that adverse health effects were linked to the clean-up
were vigorously denied, and A E C L has refused to supply information that would
assist in the location of m e n involved in the clean-up and thus facilitate followup studies. (Edwards, n.d.)
After this inauspicious beginning, NRU has had a less troubled history, though
not one without incident. Recently A E C L was boasting that N R U had achieved
1000 days of operation without a shut-down of more than 130 hours (AECL, 199495). A high-power (135 M W ) , high-flux (4.0 x 10 14 neutrons/cm2/second) reactor,
fuelled with 2 0 % L E U fuel, N R U is well suited for radioisotope production. N R U
produces most of Nordion's radioisotopes, with a smaller volume coming from
European reactors. Indeed N R U alone is capable of producing two times the world
requirements for medical isotopes including Mo-99 (Nordion, 1995, pers. comm.).
As well as being used for radioisotope production, N R U is used extensively for
testing of fuel and reactor components for power reactors ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.10).
Because of its role as the production facility for a high proportion of world
demand for radioisotopes, there has been concern that problems with N R U could
lead to radioisotope shortages around the world. Serious, protracted shortages are
less likely now, because a number of commercial producers have entered or reentered the market in the past few years, but in the late 1980s and early 1990s the
situation was precarious. A number of reactors used for commercial radioisotope
production, including Mo-99 production, were permanently shut d o w n within
the space of two years. These included the D I D O and P L U T O reactors in the U K ,
Nordion's N R X reactor, and the reactor in N e w York, owned by the Cintichem
company, which supplied about half the U S Mo-99 market (the other half
supplied by Nordion).
Since the late 1980s, when NRU assumed such importance, AECL managed to
maintain continuous supply of radioisotopes, except for one or two brief periods
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which caused no significant shortages. In 1988 the U S Department of Energy (DOE)
stopped supplying H E U targets for a few weeks but this did not stop production
(Harby, 1988). In January 1991, A E C L stopped production for two days due to a
leaking coolant pipe in the reactor building. In October 1991, there was no problem
with supply from A E C L but there was a labour strike at Nordion, during which
company managers processed radioisotope products. In a labour dispute at A E C L
in July 1992, management and union officials reached a settlement only hours
before the 150 reactor operators at the Chalk River facilities were set to strike.
(Rojas-Burke, 1992.) In April 1994 a fuel rod became stuck in N R U . Production
stopped for five days. Nordion maintained shipments by calling on its back-up
agreement with IRE in Belgium. (Rojas-Burke, 1995.) In mid 1995, a mechanical
system in N R U jammed and the reactor had to be shut d o w n for repairs.
Operation resumed within a few days. Once again Nordion drew on a back-up
agreement with a European producer (probably either IRE or the Belgian reactor
operator S C K - C E N ) to maintain supply. (Seidel, 1995.)
Plans were developed for a major refurbishment of NRU which would allow it to
operate well beyond its 50th birthday in 1997. These plans were dropped however,
and N R U will be permanently shut d o w n early in the next century. Nordion has
explored the possibility of securing contracts for bulk radioisotope supply (in
particular Mo-99) from overseas reactors. The mutual back-up agreement with IRE
was struck in 1993. Nordion has also considered collaboration with nuclear
agencies in the U S (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) and Peru, but these
negotiations led to nothing. During the threatened 1992 strike at A E C L , Canadian
embassy officials, a m o n g others, were negotiating possible shipments of H E U
targets to Indonesia for irradiation then shipment back to Nordion for processing.
In addition to some supply from Belgium, this m a y have averted supply shortages
in the case of a strike. (Rojas-Burke, 1992.)

Nordion's main strategy to maintain its market position beyond the operating life
of N R U has been to pursue the construction of n e w reactors in Canada. W h e n
Nordion was privatised in 1988, an agreement was reached for A E C L to supply
Nordion with radioisotopes for 23 years, extending to the year 2011. ( M D S
Healthcare, 1995.) In 1990, A E C L began construction of a Maple-X research reactor
which was to be dedicated to radioisotope production. A E C L reportedly spent $C 40
million on the Maple-X project, but by the mid 1990s the reactor itself had not
been built and A E C L decided to abandon the project, claiming that market
demand for radioisotopes was insufficient to justify the costs. (Radioactive waste
disposal problems m a y have been another factor.) Nordion and M D S Healthcare
took A E C L and the Canadian government to court over the issue. A n out-of-court
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agreement w a s finally reached in mid 1996. Under the 20 year agreement, the
Canadian government will directly provide $C 5 million for the construction of
two 10 M W Maple reactors and further radioisotope processing facilities, and it
will provide a fully-repayable, interest-free $C 100 million loan to MDS/Nordion.
The second Maple will be a back-up facility. A E C L will also contribute $C 12.5
million to the $C 140 million project. Thus the project is to be funded mostly by
MDS/Nordion, but with considerable support from the government and A E C L .
The reactors are to be built at Chalk River by A E C L , and operated by A E C L under
overall management from Nordion. The first Maple is expected to begin operation
in 1999 and the second a year later. N R U will not be shut d o w n until the Maples
are operating. (AECL, 1996; Anon., 1994D; 1996C; A N S T O , 1996B; Nordion, 1995,
pers. comm.)
The Maples will mainly be used to produce Mo-99, but may also produce other
radioisotopes such as cobalt-60, iridium-192, iodine-131, and iodine-125. Market
demand will determine volumes and variety. The 10 M W Maples are
considerably less powerful than N R X and N R U in terms of megawattage, but with
advances in technology, and the Maples being purpose built for, and dedicated to,
radioisotope production, Nordion will have the capacity to remain a major
producer and exporter of radioisotopes. In fact Nordion is likely to have the
reactor capacity to supply the entire world demand for Mo-99 for some decades to
come, but with competitors emerging its share of the market has already dropped
and m a y continue to do so. (Lewis, 1996; Anon., 1996C; Rojas-Burke, 1995.) The
(new) agreement between A E C L and Nordion expires in 2016 but it can safely be
predicted that the Maples will continue to be used for commercial radioisotope
production well beyond that date. According to M D S , the Maples will ensure
reliable, uninterrupted supply "well into the next century". (Anon., 1996C.)
As at 1993 the plan was to fuel the Maple-X reactor with 93% enriched HEU fuel
supplied by the U S (INSC, n.d.). Whether that is still the intention is unclear, but
it goes against the trend towards the use of L E U fuels for research reactors because
of the weapons implications of the H E U economy, and Canada is reliant on the
U S for enriched fuel since it has no enrichment facilities of its own.
The profitability of the Maple venture cannot be assumed. AECL appears to have
its doubts. According to an A m e r s h a m representative (quoted in Anon., 1995E),
Nordion would not break even on their investment in the Maple reactors and
processing facilities for at least 15 years. Recently Nordion increased prices to
generate funds to pay for its investment. The price increase was expected to be
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"40% or less" for Mo-99 according to a Nordion representative (quoted in Anon.,
1995E).

Evidently, neither the radiopharmaceutical companies nor users (hospitals,
clinics) have objected to Nordion's price increase, even though they are operating
in an environment of economic constraint. The return for the price increase is
greatly increased, long-term security of supply. Moreover bulk Mo-99 accounts for
only 30-60% (depending on generator size) of the cost of manufacturing Mo-99/
Tc-99m generators. (Rojas-Burke, 1995.) Thus increases in the price of bulk Mo-99
do not lead to directly proportional increases in generator costs - the expectation
was that Nordion's expected 4 0 % price increase would lead to generator price
increases in the order of 20-25% for large generators, 8-10% for smaller generators,
and 6-7% for unit doses of Tc-99m. The price for bulk Mo-99 breaks d o w n to just a
few dollars for each Tc-99m procedure. Some less commonly used radioisotopes
(e.g. iodine-131) are far more expensive per unit dose, and the pharmaceuticals
(localising agents, etc.) which are tagged with radioisotopes comprise a
considerable proportion of overall costs. Overall, it was expected that the price
increases for Mo-99 would have only a modest impact on overall
radiopharmaceutical budgets - about 3 % for large nuclear medicine departments
and up to 7 % for smaller departments. (Anon., 1995E; Rojas-Burke, 1995.)

Nordion is largely reliant on Canadian reactors. It also draws from the Bel
BR-2 reactor which is owned and operated by the Belgium Nuclear Research
Centre, SCK-CEN. A N S T O (1993F, Annex 7.1.1) says that Nordion has an exclusive
supply agreement in relation to the BR-2 reactor. It is a high-flux (up to IO15
n/cm2/sec), high-power (100 M W ) materials testing reactor using 9 3 % H E U fuel,
with facilities for simultaneous irradiation of up to nine targets for radioisotope
production. (Koonen, 1995.)

BR-2 first went critical in 1961. A major refurbishment of the reactor bega
1995. This has taken place under the oversight of SCK-CEN. The refurbishment
has more to do with safety and regulatory concerns than performance upgrading.
Operation was expected to recommence in April, 1997. Future radioisotope
production will depend on several factors. One is conflicting demands. According
to SCK-CEN (1997, pers. comm.), production of radioisotopes "will continue after
the refurbishment if compatible with the operating regime". However it is
unlikely that BR-2 will be so overwhelmed with conflicting demands that
radioisotope production will cease altogether. The reactor will remain capable of
substantial radioisotope production when it is restarted, and SCK-CEN (1997, pers.
comm.) expects to recommence Mo-99 production. Another variable is demand. A
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number of substantial commercial Mo-99 production ventures have begun in the
past few years, and thus the main role of BR-2 m a y be as a back-up. If there is little
demand for Mo-99, BR-2 m a y be used for production of other radioisotopes. It has
been used to produce iodine-131, xenon-133, cobalt-60, and others on demand
(SCK-CEN, 1997, pers. comm.). The operating regime will be reduced from 168
days per year (8x21) to about 105 (5x21), and this m a y be disadvantageous for
radioisotope production, especially for short-lived radioisotopes for which
continuity of production is particularly important. BR-2 is expected to operate
until about 2010-2015 (Gubel, 1995).

Nordion is able to use its strong position in the Mo-99 market to advantage. For
example D u Pont, a major radiopharmaceutical company, signed an agreement in
the early 1990s which commits it to using Nordion as sole supplier of bulk Mo-99
for 10 years. (Rojas-Burke, 1992; M D S Healthcare, 1995.) Nordion has a history of
being aggressive in the marketplace. It is likely to be still more aggressive in future
given the scale of its recent investment and the increasingly competitive
environment in which it will be operating.

INSTITUTE NATIONAL DES RADIOELEMENTS
A European firm, the Institute National des Radioelements (IRE) has been a
supplier of Mo-99 and other radioisotopes since 1978. IRE operates a plant in
Belgium. This plant relies on reactor irradiation of targets in four European
research reactors; the targets are purified and processed in Belgium. (Anon.,
1994B.) According to one report the four reactors are Osiris (France), H F R (probably
the 57 M W French H F R reactor), Siloe (France) and Petten (the Petten H F R reactor
in the Netherlands) (Iturralde, 1996). Evidently the Belgian BR-2 reactor is not one
of IRE's sources but that is not certain.
The exact relationship between Nordion Europe, IRE, and the operators of the
four European research reactors cannot be pieced together with certainty available information is incomplete and sometimes contradictory. According to
Berkhout (1993), IRE is part-owned by Nordion. Certainly there is a back-up
agreement between Nordion and IRE. Apart from the back-up agreement, it seems
that Nordion Europe distributes most of IRE's radioisotope products, negotiating
distribution agreements and market prices with potential consumers (Anon.,
1994B). The four European reactors which Nordion (1994) says it draws from are
almost certainly those which IRE draws from. Whether D u Pont has taken over
any of these functions from Nordion Europe is unclear but it is quite likely.
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Several years ago, IRE's weekly production w a s just over 1000 Ci/week of Mo-99
with possible production of u p to 3000 Ci/week. (Anon., 1994B.) Thus IRE's
annual output w a s roughly 50 000 Ci or close to 1 0 % of world production (up to
3 0 % at m a x i m u m production).

MALLINCKRODT
Mallinckrodt was formed in the 1880s as a chemical company. It began its
involvement in medical products in the early 1900s - an x-ray contrast m e d i u m
was one of its major medical products. Mallinckrodt w a s also involved in the
uranium industry from World W a r II to 1967, especially in enrichment.
(Mallinckrodt, 1996.)

Based in the Netherlands, Mallinckrodt has total global sales (as at the mid 1990s)
of about $ U S 2 billion p.a. in three divisions - Mallinckrodt Chemical,
Mallinckrodt Medical and Mallinckrodt Veterinary. A series of mergers and takeovers affected Mallinckrodt in the 1980s and 1990s. About 10 000 people are
employed worldwide. Mallinckrodt Medical is responsible for about half of total
staff and sales ($US 1 billion in fiscal 1995). (Mallinckrodt, 1996.) Radiopharmaceutical sales were $ U S 160 million in 1991 ( A N S T O , 1993F, Annex 7.1.3). The rest
of Mallinckrodt Medical's sales are spread across a range of products such as x-ray
contrast media and pharmaceuticals (some of which are supplied as "cold kits" to
be mixed with radioisotopes in hospitals).
Mallinckrodt has radioisotope processing facilities in the US (St. Louis) and at
Petten in the Netherlands. Over two dozen nuclear medicine products are
marketed, and Mallinckrodt is also involved in research leading to n e w products.
(ANSTO, 1993F, Annex 7.1.3.) A s well as its involvement in reactor radioisotope
production and processing, Mallinckrodt operates two cyclotrons at the Petten site,
one in operation since 1966 and another completed in 1993. Thus Mallinckrodt
produces and processes a range of reactor and cyclotron radioisotopes including
Mo-99/Tc-99m generators and radiopharmaceuticals based on gallium-67, indiumIll, iodine-123, iodine-131, phosphorus-32, rhenium-186, thallium-201, xenon133, and krypton-81. Mallinckrodt has traditionally played a greater role in
radioisotope processing and retailing rather than production. In the U S it operates
Diagnostic Imaging Services, a network of regional radiopharmacies that supply
pre-mixed, ready-to-use radiopharmaceuticals. (A similar network of
radiopharmacies probably operates in Europe.) Another facet of Mallinckrodt's
involvement in the industry in the U S is a subsidiary called Nuclear Medicine
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Associates, a team of medical physics consultants w h o offer expert advice on
issues such as federal licensing. (Mallinckrodt, 1996.)
Until recently Mallinckrodt has relied on Nordion for supply of bulk Mo-99 and
other reactor radioisotopes. From the early to mid 1990s Mallinckrodt has brought
to fruition a project to produce its o w n reactor radioisotopes. The reactor is the
HEU-fuelled High Flux Reactor (HFR) at Petten, which first went critical in 1961. It
is one of the few high-power (45 M W ) , high-flux (2.7xl014 n/cm 2 /sec), materials
testing reactors still in operation in Europe. (Anon., 1994; IAEA, 1994.) Most of the
impetus for this project has been Mo-99 production, but some other radioisotopes
are also produced.
Along with Mallinckrodt, two other organisations are involved in the Petten
nuclear facilities. O n e is the Energy Research Foundation E C N , which is involved
in research and development connected to various energy systems. The other is
the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, which uses H F R for
research, in particular for high-temperature materials research. The JRC (formerly
Euratom) is the owner and licensee of H F R but operation is entrusted to E C N .
(Mallinckrodt, 1996.) A N S T O (1993L, pp.3.24-3.25.) says that 1 3 % of H F R usage is
devoted to radioisotope production, without specifying h o w this figure was
arrived at.
Mallinckrodt's HFR venture almost certainly required some modification to the
reactor to facilitate target irradiation. It seems that a more expensive and
complicated aspect of the project w a s the building of facilities to process irradiated
H E U targets (for Mo-99, iodine-131, etc.). The processing plant is adjacent to the
reactor, with two lines of five hot cells for separation of Mo-99 from irradiated
targets. The targets are then returned to the U K for reprocessing. According to
Mallinckrodt (1996), the Mo-99 plant w a s built "together with ECN". According to
another report, Mallinckrodt formed a corporation with the Dutch government's
Radioactive Waste Research Centre to construct the plant (Anon., 1994C). This
Radioactive Waste Research Centre probably refers to E C N .
The financial relationship between Mallinckrodt, ECN, and the JCR is unclear, but
the project seems to have worked to the advantage of all three organisations.
Mallinckrodt has acquired a reactor production facility without having to start
from scratch. The JCR and E C N benefit from Mallinckrodt's involvement because
radioisotope production represents the main source of income from work from
third parties, and this is a "strong support" for the future of H F R (European
Commission, 1996).
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Vermeeren (quoted in Anon., 1994), General Manager of Mallinckrodt's nuclear
medicine division, said that the company was reluctant to get involved in bulk
Mo-99 production, mainly because the use of H E U (used as targets) is highly
regulated, and also because of the costs associated with handling and storage of
high-level waste. O n the other hand as a major supplier of Mo-99/Tc-99m
generators and radiopharmaceuticals, having its o w n production facility
potentially had cost and security-of-supply advantages. Moreover the H F R reactor
was available for use, and a company was already operating to remove high-level
wastes from the Petten site. (Anon., 1994; Mallinckrodt, 1996.)
Over the years Mallinckrodt has become a major supplier of radioisotopes and
radiopharmaceutical products to the European and U S markets. Using H F R ,
Mallinckrodt supplies over 6 0 % of European demand for medical radioisotopes this amounts to 5 million procedures p.a. (European Commission, 1996). In
addition, Mallinckrodt supplies about 2 0 % of the Mo-99 market in the US.
Overall, it supplied about 2 5 % of the world Mo-99 market as at 1995. (Rojas-Burke,
1995.)
In 1996 Mallinckrodt was the second largest commercial producer of medical
radioisotopes in the world, after Nordion, and it m a y maintain that position for
some years to come. It is not likely to challenge Nordion's dominance for the
simple reason that it seems not to be interested in competing with Nordion.
According to Vermeeren (quoted in Rojas-Burke, 1995), Mallinckrodt plans to
produce no more Mo-99 than will suffice for supply of their o w n customers in
Europe and the US. It could however produce more - Vermeeren said that in the
event of disruption of supply from Canada, "it would be possible for IRE and
Mallinckrodt to crank up production to supply the world." Possibly the reason
Mallinckrodt is not competing for Nordion's market share is to maintain good
relations - Nordion will be a back-up supplier in the case of problems with HFR.
(Anon., 1994).

In the early 1990s Mallinckrodt was involved in a project to produce Mo-99 in the
US. This involved negotiations with the U S Department of Energy (DOE), but
Mallinckrodt pulled out because those negotiations were troubled and protracted
and the possibility of using the H F R reactor emerged. A s at 1994, involvement in
bulk reactor radioisotope production in the U S remained a possibility (Anon.,
1994). That would seem to be even less likely n o w that the D O E has recently begun
a project for Mo-99 production in the U S without any direct involvement from
Mallinckrodt or other radiopharmaceutical companies.
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Despite its age, there is no sign that H F R will be shut d o w n in the near term major refurbishments have been carried out and more are in train (European
Commission, 1996). O n e possible cloud over the future of the reactor is that it uses
H E U fuel. In response to pressure from anti-nuclear groups, and enactment of a
U S law, further exports of H E U from the U S to the Petten site have been blocked.
This is potentially a problem but other suppliers of H E U can probably be found or
the reactor could be converted to L E U fuel. (Nuclear Control Institute, 1996;
Leventhal and Kuperman, 1995.) Another possible concern is that two slight
earthquakes in the neighbourhood of H F R , induced by natural gas exploitation,
have given rise to a review of earthquake safety (European Commission, 1996).

AMERSHAM
Amersham does not produce the same volume of radioisotopes as Nordion or
Mallinckrodt, but it is worth discussing for several reasons: it has some direct
involvement in reactor and cyclotron radioisotope production; it is one of the
biggest global processing/retailing radiopharmaceutical companies; and it is one of
a small number of foreign suppliers of the Australian market.
Amersham's involvement in the radioisotope industry dates from the 1940s. It
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the U K Atomic Energy Authority but was
privatised in 1982. (Amersham, 1993.) W h e n D I D O and P L U T O were permanently
shut d o w n in 1990, A m e r s h a m lost its domestic source of radioisotopes. Britain
changed from being a modest net exporter of radioisotopes to an importer, but this
did not have m u c h effect and A m e r s h a m posted its first profit since privatisation
in 1992. (Berkhout, 1993.)
Amersham's sales were over £270 million in 1991/92. (ANSTO, 1993F, Annex
7.1.3.) Medical products, such as radioisotopes and cold kits, comprise most of
Amersham's sales.
Amersham has radioisotope production and processing sites in the UK, Germany,
and North America. It n o w operates eight commercial cyclotrons dedicated to
radioisotope production. (Amersham, 1993; 1996.) A s for reactor radioisotopes,
Amersham's main strategy after the shut d o w n of D I D O and P L U T O was to
diversify its supply sources. A s at 1993 it was being supplied by eight or nine
reactors around the world, including reactors in Canada, Sweden, Belgium,
France, Russia, and possibly elsewhere. (Amersham, 1993; Diesendorf, 1993.)
Despite selling its 14.9% stake in Nordion to M D S in 1995, A m e r s h a m still has a
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long-term supply agreement and Nordion is no doubt one of Amersham's major
suppliers. According to the Research Reactor Review (1993, p.92), A m e r s h a m was
"in the process of seeking arrangements with
Indonesian reactors." This must
refer to the 30 M W R S G - G A S reactor in Indonesia.
Amersham is involved in a joint venture in Russia. After two years of
negotiation, Reviss Services w a s formed in April 1992 as a joint venture between
Amersham, the radioisotope producer M a y a k Production Association, and A O
Techsnabexport (the export trade organisation of the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Industry). The purpose of Reviss Services is to produce radioisotopes in Russia
and market them worldwide. The three organisations had collaborated for some
years but it w a s only in 1990 that a formal partnership became possible. A s at 1992,
the major radioisotopes produced and marketed by Reviss were cobalt-60 for
industrial and medical sterilisation, tritium for molecular labelling, caesium-137
for medical and industrial applications, carbon-14 for molecular labelling,
americium-241 for smoke detectors and krypton-85 for gauging. Radioisotopes
from Reviss are used by A m e r s h a m for radiopharmaceutical production, and
Reviss also supplies bulk radioisotopes to other manufacturers and research
organisations. A s well as using c o m m o n target irradiation techniques, some
radioisotopes are produced as by-products from nuclear fuel reprocessing
operations using chemical and ion exchange technology. (Latham, 1992.)
The Mayak complex is located at Chelyabinsk in the Ural mountains. It had
previously been a top-secret military installation - the city serving the plant did
not officially exist. O n e of the purposes of the plant was plutonium production,
with five reactors and a legacy of radioactive waste (some of it d u m p e d in the
nearby Lake Karachai). The Deputy General Manager of Reviss claims that funds
generated from the joint venture is available for investment in programs to
ameliorate the radioactive waste legacy. (Latham, 1992.)
Amersham is a 20% shareholder of Nihon Medi-Physics, one of the two major
radiopharmaceutical companies supplying the large Japanese market. (Nihon
Medi-Physics, 1995, pers. comm.) Also in Japan, A m e r s h a m K K , a 6 5 % owned
subsidiary of Amersham, is involved in marketing and sales of a range of
products including radiopharmaceuticals. A m e r s h a m also has a 5 1 % stake in
Medi-Physics, which has a network of more than 100 radiopharmacies across
North America and is one of the three major radiopharmaceutical companies
supplying the U S market. Both Medi-Physics and Nihon Medi-Physics
manufacture Mo-99/Tc-99m generators along with m a n y other products, and both
operate cyclotrons, but both are dependent on other organisations for supply of
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bulk reactors radioisotopes (as is A m e r s h a m to a large extent). (Medi-Physics and
Nihon Medi-Physics have no connection with each other apart from Amersham's
part ownership of both companies.) Amersham's radioisotope processing facility
in Germany is used to supply a number of Western and Eastern European
countries. Thus A m e r s h a m has significant involvement in supply of the three
major markets around the world - North America, Japan, and Europe. In total
Amersham has 15 foreign subsidiary companies and 40 distributors' offices,
delivering radioisotopes to over 150 countries. Historically Amersham's focus has
been on the U K and European markets but it has clearly extended its reach right
around the world. A m e r s h a m has, or at least claims to have, a very good record in
the research and development of n e w products. (Amersham, 1993; 1996; A N S T O ,
1993F, Annex 7.1.3.)

SOUTH AFRICAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
The South African Atomic Energy Commission (SAAEC) operates the 20 MW
multipurpose reactor, Safari I. It is one of the few reactors in the world used for
commercial, export production of fission-product Mo-99, and it is also used for
production of iodine-131 and a number of other radioisotopes. Processing facilities
enable manufacture of Mo-99/Tc-99m generators and various pharmaceutical
labelling kits. Production of fission Mo-99 began in 1993, and production levels
have increased to service a growing export market. A s at early 1997, the S A A E C
had routine (continuous) export contracts for Mo-99 (and some other
radioisotopes) with China, Israel, and India. In addition, the S A A E C has m a d e
many ad hoc shipments to Argentina ( C N E A ) , the Netherlands (Mallinckrodt),
Belgium (IRE), Australia (ARI) and Taiwan (INER). The S A A E C has submitted
"Drug Master Files" to regulators in Europe, the U S , and Australia, indicating a
willingness to supply these markets. A s at early 1997, there was a demonstrated
fission Mo-99 production capacity of 1500 Ci/week (6 days precalibrated), roughly
10-15% of world demand, and there is a short-term objective of supplying 15-20%
of the world market. (Anon., 1996E; S A A E C , 1996; Iturralde, 1996; S A A E C , 1997,
pers. comm.)

Safari I first achieved criticality in 1965. Despite its age, it is likely to outl
other reactors built in the 1960s. The reason for this is that the U S put an embargo
on supply of H E U fuel from 1976, in response to suspicions concerning the South
African nuclear weapons program. A s a result, reactor power and operating time
were drastically reduced for a number of years to preserve fuel stocks. Thus the
reactor is in better condition than m a n y others built in the 1960s. Indicative of this
is the reactor's high level of reliability: in the 10 years to 1996, unplanned loss of

196

operating time was just 0.4% of total operating time; and reactor production of
fission Mo-99 has been 100% efficient since it began in 1993. (Iturralde, 1996;
SAAEC, 1997, pers. comm.)
The SAAEC has facilities for uranium enrichment and fuel manufacture,
developed primarily to support the weapons program. Consequently the SAAEC
may be unique among fission Mo-99 producers in that it controls the entire Mo-99
production cycle - manufacture of targets and fuel assemblies, irradiation and
processing of targets, and waste storage. (Iturralde, 1996.)

The only cloud over the radioisotope production operations of the SAAE
possibility of reactor conversion to LEU fuel. With domestic supplies of H E U fuel
and H E U targets, there is no threat of supply blockage, a possibility which faces
other producers. Nevertheless, pressure is being put on the SAAEC to convert the
reactor in keeping with the Reduced Enrichment for Test and Training Reactors
program (see chapter 7.7). A feasibility study indicated that constraints to
conversion may be more financial than technological (Iturralde, 1996).
Conversion to LEU fuel would not jeopardise the viability of the whole operation,
but it might affect the economics of the operation and make the SAAEC less
competitive vis a vis competitors.

The SAAEC has a mutual back-up agreement with the IRE to ensure contin
supply during planned or unplanned reactor excursions. (SAAEC, 1997, pers.
comm.)

The SAAEC is the sole supplier of Amersham's products in South Africa.
However there is no reciprocal arrangement - Amersham does not market
SAAEC products overseas. (SAAEC, 1997, pers. comm.)

6.3. RESEARCH REACTORS AND
RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
RESEARCH REACTOR INFRASTRUCTURE
CLOSURES
RESEARCH REACTORS IN OPERATION
RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION

The major producers described in section 6.2 account for the bulk of c
radioisotope production around the world. There are many other producers
however, some of them commercial producers and exporters of radioisotopes and
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potential suppliers to Australia. The following discussion on research reactor
infrastructure and radioisotope production will serve as an overview of the m a n y
reactor radioisotope production operations around the world.

RESEARCH REACTOR INFRASTRUCTURE

The history and trajectory of research reactors was discussed in general terms in
chapter 2.4. S o m e more detail will be necessary for the purposes of this analysis of
the radioisotope industry.
Research reactors have been built in over 60 countries since World War II. Some
were built to study the fission process, some were experimental reactors, some
were designed for testing materials, fuels, and components for power reactors, and
some were prototypes of power reactors. ( A N S T O , 1993D, p.1.11; Amersham, 1993.)
It was those countries embarking on major nuclear power and /or weapons
programs that took the lead in the development of research reactors. Gradually
research reactors became more widespread, purchased for a variety of reasons but
frequently as a first step in longer-term plans to develop nuclear power and in
some cases nuclear weapons.
Research reactors are diverse in form and function. Moreover the term is
something of a misnomer. Historically research reactors were used primarily for
research, but m a n y have been used for a variety of other purposes including
radioisotope production, (other) commercial uses, and plutonium production in
support of covert weapons programs in some cases. In fact not all research reactors
are used even in part for research, while some are not even nuclear reactors in the
sense that they do not support a self-sustained fission reaction. The term
encompasses a host of facilities from subcritical assemblies to 500+ M W prototype
fast breeder reactors. ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.1.) Definitions vary, but research reactors
are generally considered to include all reactors except commercial (and sometimes
prototype) power reactors and dedicated weapons (plutonium) production
reactors.

About 600 research reactors have been built around the world in the past 50 years
The number in operation peaked in 1975 at 373 reactors. Construction peaked in
the 1960s, with 274 units commissioned during that decade compared to 84 in the
1970s and 35 during the 1980s. Shut-downs began to exceed commissions during
the 1970s. About half of the 600 or so research reactors ever built have since been
permanently shut d o w n . M a n y reactors n o w in operation are ageing: as at 1993,
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over two thirds of research reactors throughout the world were more than 20
years old. ( A N S T O , 1993L, pp.3.1-3.5.)
CLOSURES

Most research reactor closures (i.e. permanent shut downs) have been the result of
program changes and other such logistical factors relating to nuclear programs: in
particular, m a n y reactors used in support of nuclear power or weapons programs
were closed once they had served their purpose. Reflecting this pattern, 7 0 % of the
reactors listed as permanently shut d o w n in 1993 were in the U S (137 shut-downs
from a total of 231 reactors) or the U K (27 of 36). A similar pattern is in evidence in
France (12 of 31) and Germany (19 of 40). There are exceptions to this general
pattern: in Japan, for example, where the emphasis w a s on importation of power
systems, only two out of 23 research reactors had closed as at 1991, and one of them
has since restarted. ( A N S T O , 1993L, pp.3.14-3.16; IAEA, 1994.)
Other than program-related closures of research reactors, according to ANSTO
(1993D, p.1.12), closure has "occasionally" been because of defects giving rise to
safety concerns, "infrequently" a result of local community pressures, and "very
rarely" a consequence of accidents. Funding restraints have certainly played a role
in the closure of m a n y reactors.
Relatively fewer multipurpose reactors have been permanently shut down in
comparison with single-purpose reactors. This is a consequence of their functional
versatility and also their amenability to engineering modification to suit changing
requirements. ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.16.) Nevertheless a number of multipurpose
reactors have been permanently shut d o w n and this has had significant
consequences for radioisotope production (e.g. Cintichem, D I D O , P L U T O , N R X ) .

RESEARCH REACTORS IN OPERATION
The IAEA (1994) listed 297 research reactors in operation as at December 1994, in
countries.64 The I A E A (1994) data distinguishes "research" reactors (primarily
multipurpose research reactors) from a number of other categories (test, training,
prototype, critical assemblies, non-commercial electricity producing). Most
radioisotope-producing reactors are listed in the "research" category, but some are
listed in the test or training categories. There were 186 "research" reactors

64

The number had fallen to 288 by March 1996, and to 273 by December 1996. (IAEA, 1996; ANSTO,
1997). However I will use the more comprehensive 1994 data.
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operating in late 1994, with 111 reactors in the other categories - test (24), training
(49), critical assemblies (32), prototype (3), or electricity-producing reactors (3).

Advanced capitalist countries predominate in the operation of research reactors,
but not completely as the following table shows (drawn from I A E A (1994) data):
Operating
reactors (%)

Planned /
N u m b e r of countries
Under con- operating research
struction
reactors

183 (62%)

8

20

Former Soviet countries,
47 (16%)
Eastern Europe:

5

12

Asia:

37 (12%)

1

11

Latin America,
Africa, Middle East

30 (10%)

8

15

TOTALS:

297 (100%)

22*

58

North America,
Western Europe,
Industrialised Pacific
(Australia and Japan):
f

* Twelve under construction, 10 planned. This assumes that one of
AECL/Nordion's Maples is under construction and the other planned. It takes
account of the decision to abandon a project to build an Advanced Neutron
Source reactor in the US. A n d it takes account of recent plans to build a n e w
reactor in both France and Germany.
In addition, seven countries without operating research reactors have reactors
under construction or planned, five of these being African countries. Another
seven countries once operated research reactors but no longer do so and have no
research reactors under construction or planned.
RADIOISOTOPE P R O D U C T I O N

Of the 297 research reactors in use in 1994, about 130 were used for radioisotop
production. Research reactors are used for radioisotope production in about 50 of
the 58 countries operating research reactors.65
Leaving aside the IAEA's categories, all of the research reactors used for
radioisotope production are multipurpose reactors - in other words, there are no
65

Calculated from INSC (n.d.) data.
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dedicated radioisotope production reactors. Multipurpose reactors are diverse in
form, function, and power levels ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.2). Very few if any were built
primarily for radioisotope production, but because of their flexibility m a n y
multipurpose reactors have been modified for greater radioisotope production.
Modified reactors which were originally designed primarily for materials testing
play a particularly prominent role in radioisotope production, mainly because
they have high neutron flux levels (e.g. N R U / C a n a d a , HFR/Netherlands,
BR-2/Belgium).
There have been fewer closures of multipurpose reactors than of single-purpose
reactors, and consequently multipurpose reactors are generally a m o n g the older
research reactors. A s at 1992, 8 5 % multipurpose reactors were over 20 years of age
and nearly two thirds were over thirty years of age. ( A N S T O , 1993L, pp.3.4-3.7.)

Of the 130 or so reactors used for radioisotope production, a large majority produ
only low volumes of a limited variety of radioisotopes. A major reason for this is
the low power and neutron flux levels of most research reactors, as indicated by
figures on the power levels ( M W ) of research reactors operating in 1991 ( A N S T O ,
1993L, pp.3.11-3.13):

MW %
<1
1.1-5
6-20
23-70
>100

63.6
15.4
10.5
6.5
4
100%

Even the smallest reactors can be and often are used for radioisotope production.
Indeed about 50 reactors between 0.001-1 M W power are used for radioisotope
production (INSC, n.d.). However the volumes are so small that these reactors are
rarely if ever used to produce radioisotopes for export. Despite these limitations,
the numerous low-power reactors around the world are of some significance.
They are often used to supply a reasonable proportion of the (modest) demand for
medical radioisotopes in developing countries. Moreover in a number of cases,
particularly in Asia, very low-power reactors have been upgraded, in part to meet
growing d e m a n d for radioisotopes. In other countries, the operation of low-power
research reactors has facilitated the later development of more powerful reactors
and associated infrastructure (e.g. radioisotope processing facilities, transport
regimes). O n e last point to be m a d e in relation to the m a n y low-power reactors
operating around the world is that technologies are being developed - particularly
in relation to Mo-99/Tc-99m - which m a y encourage the more widespread
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production of Mo-99/Tc-99m using reactors with low to m e d i u m power and
neutron flux; this will be discussed in more detail later.
Now to consider medium and high-power multipurpose reactors. As at late 1992
there were 52 multipurpose reactors around the world of at least 5 M W power
(ANSTO, 1993L, pp.3.4-3.7). Their geographical distribution follows familiar
patterns:
Distribution of multipurpose reactors. >5 MW. 1992 (ANSTO, 1993L, pp.3.4-3.7):
Region Number
Industrialised Western countries 27
Former Soviet countries, Eastern Europe
Developing countries
Total:

14
11
52

Almost all of these 52 reactors are used for radioisotope production (among othe
functions): I N S C (n.d.) data indicates that about 48 reactors of >5 M W power are
used for radioisotope production. However in m a n y cases, volumes and variety
are limited, and in some cases the potential for increased production is minimal
for reasons such as competing demands, technical limitations, or reactor age and
other factors discouraging refurbishment. Overall A m e r s h a m (1993, p.4) is
probably right in saying that only 20-30 research reactors around the world could
be considered suitable for routine, large-scale production of radioisotopes.
Tied in with the issue of reactor power is neutron flux levels. Generally, lowpower reactors do not have sufficient flux for production of some important
medical radioisotopes. So too m a n y of the more powerful reactors do not have
sufficient neutron flux levels for production of radioisotopes of high specific
activity. For some radioisotopes this is not m u c h of a problem: a number of
medical applications do not require radioisotopes with high specific activity, such
as therapeutic bone agents (e.g. rhenium-186, samarium-153, holmium-166,
yttrium-90). However the small number of high-flux reactors is important in that
it limits the production of certain radioisotopes such as those required in the
emerging field of radioimmunotherapy using labelled monoclonal antibodies.
(Vera-Ruiz, 1993.) A longer-standing and more important problem has been
production of high specific activity Mo-99. The method used for commercial
production of Mo-99 is irradiation of H E U targets in high-flux reactors, but
suitable reactors are not c o m m o n and H E U targets are not freely available.
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6.4. REGIONAL SUMMARIES OF
RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
NORTH AMERICA
WESTERN EUROPE A N D SCANDINAVIA
ASIA
FORMER SOVIET COUNTRIES A N D EASTERN EUROPE
AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, A N D LATIN AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
This section presents regional summaries of research reactor infrastructure and
radioisotope production. I begin each section with data on research reactors and
radioisotope production, followed by commentary on current and future
production. The emphasis is on reactors which are, or could be, used for
production of significant volumes of radioisotopes for export (and might therefore
be able to supply the Australian market). Little or nothing will be said about the
dozens of small reactors used for limited or occasional radioisotope production.
Some assumptions made in this section need brief comment.

Firstly, the best indicator of radioisotope production potential is useable neut
flux - although in practice neutron beams are used for purposes other than
radioisotope production, in particular research. However data o n useable neutron
flux is hard to come by. Figures on steady thermal power levels ( M W ) are more
accessible. The link between useable neutron flux and power level is not direct
since it depends on other factors such as the size of the reactor core, the type of
fuel, the nature of the moderator, and the number and nature of irradiation rigs.
Nevertheless power level is a reasonable indicator of radioisotope production
capacity.

Secondly, reactors with greater power levels generally have a greater radioisoto
production capacity than less powerful reactors, but this correlation is complicated
by several factors. Powerful reactors m a y have a limited radioisotope production
capacity for technical reasons (e.g. flux, fuel type, limited or inappropriate
irradiation rigs) or for other reasons such as competing demands. Conversely
some medium-power reactors have a high radioisotope production capacity - for
example Nordion plans to maintain its hold on the world Mo-99 market using a
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single 10 M W Maple (with another for back-up), and the U S D O E once planned to
supply 4 0 % of the large U S Mo-99 market using an 8 M W reactor.

Thirdly, the longevity of research reactors cannot be predicted with any certai
The assumption m a d e here is that most of the reactors built in the 1950s and 1960s
will be permanently shut d o w n in the next 20 years, though some will last longer.
I return to the question of reactor longevity in chapter seven.

In sum, the reactors of greatest interest are the newer reactors with high power
and neutron flux levels, and those with a track record of use for commercial
radioisotope production. However other reactors cannot be discounted as
potential sources of export radioisotopes.
The following summaries are skewed in the sense that little mention is made of
particle accelerators (in particular cyclotrons), which are becoming increasingly
important for radioisotope production. Accelerators are discussed in chapters 7-8.
Lastly, brief comment needs to be made on the two main methods of reactor Mo99/Tc-99m production. The c o m m o n commercial method involves fission of
H E U targets. This produces high specific activity Mo-99 (hereafter fission Mo-99),
the preferred product. Production of fission Mo-99 requires high-flux reactors,
expensive processing facilities for handling uranium fission products, and it
produces large volumes of fission waste products. Another method is neutron
bombardment of natural molybdenum or enriched Mo-98 targets. This method
produces low specific activity Mo-99 (hereafter l.s.a. Mo-99). It does not require
H E U targets, it does not require the complex facilities for dealing with fission
products, and it produces less waste. However yields are low, and w h e n used in
nuclear medicine scans, Tc-99 derived from l.s.a. Mo-99 generally produces
inferior images and imparts a higher radiation dose to the patient. L o w specific
activity Mo-99 is produced in m a n y countries, but in limited volumes and little if
any is exported. I assume in the following summaries that there will continue to
be a strong demand for reactor-produced fission Mo-99, but this is a worst-case
scenario. Technical innovations m a y enable more widespread reactor production
of Mo-99/Tc-99m using L E U or molybdenum targets, and non-reactor methods of
producing Mo-99/Tc-99m m a y become more c o m m o n . These innovations m a y
enable ample production of Mo-99/Tc-99m of acceptable quality and with benefits
in terms of waste, complexity, cost, proliferation concerns, security of supply, and
other factors.
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NORTH AMERICA
RESEARCH REACTORS AS AT DECEMBER 1994 (IAEA, 1994):
Total "Research" / Under construction.
Research
multipurpose
reactors*
Reactors

+ [planned]

UNITED STATES 75 44 1+[1]

CANADA

9

8

2

TOTAL 84 52 3+[l]
* The figures in this column give a reasonable idea of the number of reactors
suitable for radioisotope production. However not all these reactors are used for
radioisotope production, and a few reactors which are used for radioisotope
production are not included in the IAEA's "research" category (instead being listed
in the IAEA's "test" or "training" categories).

RESEARCH REACTORS OF 5+ MW (IAEA, 1994):
COUNTRY NUMBER POWER
UNITED STATES 10 5, 5, 8,10, 20, 60, 60, 62, 85, 250 MW*
CANADA
2
5, 135 M W
* Most, but not all, of these reactors are multipurpose research reactors. The
applies for equivalent data in other countries.
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REACTORS USED FOR RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION:
COUNTRY N A M E

MW

AGE RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
D.O.C.

Age D.O.C: date of first criticality, given only for 5+ M W reactors.
M W : Steady thermal power levels.

CANADA

NRU

135

McMaster
MNR
Others:
USA

ACRR

30

HFBR
HFIR

60
85

ORR
30
(Oak Ridge)

MURR

10

(Missouri)
NBSR
Others:

20

1957 Mo-99, Ir-192,1-125, Co-60, C-14, Fe-155, Cl36,1-131, Ni-63, S-35, Xe-127, Xe-133, Y-90.
1959 Modest volumes, medical.
At least three very low-power reactors
produce radioisotopes.
1967 From 1997, fission Mo-99, possibly 1-125,
1-131 and xenon-133.
1965 Yes.
1965 Californium-252, potassium-43, palladium103, gadolinium-153, tungsten-188, Cf-252,
others.
1958 Various. Shut down in 1987 but could be
restarted.
1966 Ir-192 (70 KCi/year), P-32 (2.4), Au-198 (1),
Cr-51 (0.1), many neutron rich isotopes.
1967 Varied, occasional.
About 24 other reactors, mostly <1 M W ,
are used to produce radioisotopes. About
half of these are located on universities.

Note: The main source for the above table, and equivalent tables in following
sections, is the International Nuclear Safety Centre (INSC) database, which was
last updated in 1993 (INSC, n.d.). A number of changes have been made where
more comprehensive, current, or accurate information is available from other
sources. Apart from the INSC database, the only other publicly-accessible database
on reactor radioisotope production, as far as I am aware, is the IAEA's (1995C)
Directory of Nuclear Research Reactors, which was last updated in 1994. The
database is as short on detail as the INSC data; both rely on scanty information
supplied by reactor operators.
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CANADA
The A E C L / N o r d i o n facilities have been discussed in section 6.2.
A 5 MW reactor at McMaster University is used for medical radioisotope
production. It w a s to be shut d o w n but the University has recently secured
commercial contracts for sales of medical radioisotopes. ( A N S T O , 1996.) This
facility is of little significance given the small production volumes and the age of
the reactor - 40 years in 1997.
Ontario Hydro, one of the major nuclear power companies in Canada, has formed
an isotope sales division to expand its radioisotope business. It uses its C A N D U
power reactors for radioisotope production. Ontario Hydro produces a number of
radioisotopes, and is planning to increase its range, but the only medical
radioisotope currently produced is cobalt-60. (Anon., 1985.) The activities of
Ontario Hydro are something of an u n k n o w n but the company is unlikely to have
an important impact on the medical radioisotope industry since power reactors
are not well suited for radioisotope production. Power reactors are generally not
well equipped (if equipped at all) for insertion and removal of irradiation rigs. In
addition, research reactors usually generate higher neutron flux levels - especially
materials testing reactors, which are designed to test power reactor components in
m u c h less time than the proposed use.
Apart from the AECL/Nordion's NRU reactor, and the McMaster University
reactor, the only other research reactors in Canada are six very low power (20 k W )
Slowpoke reactors, and one other reactor at Chalk River Laboratories (ZED-2,
almost 40 years old). At least three of the Slowpokes are used for radioisotope
production, but volumes are very small.
UNITED STATES

In the post-war generation the US was at the forefront of development of researc
reactors and their use for radioisotope production. However the research reactor
infrastructure has been in steady decline - over 130 research reactors have been
permanently shut down. About 75 research reactors are still in operation,
including six reactors of 10 M W power or more and several others in the 5-10 M W
range. (IAEA, 1994.) However these reactors are mostly used for other purposes
(military, neutron beam research, nuclear power development), and m a n y of the
existing reactors are ageing and are likely to be permanently shut d o w n in the next
10-20 years. S o m e of the reactors which are used for radioisotope production are
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operated intermittently, and some are totally dependent upon physics funding
(DOE, 1992, p.46).

There are about 30 reactors producing radioisotopes in the US, but mostly in ver
small volumes (INSC, n.d.). Thus radioisotope users have been largely dependent
on imported radioisotopes. Since the Cintichem reactor was permanently shut
d o w n in 1990, all of the Mo-99, and about 9 0 % of all medical radioisotopes, have
been supplied by Nordion (with some supply from Mallinckrodt more recently)
(Anon., 1994E).

The situation of total reliance on Nordion for fission Mo-99, after the Cintiche
shut d o w n , led to efforts to increase security of supply one w a y or another. These
efforts have involved the Department of Energy (DOE), radiopharmaceutical
companies, reactor operators, and nuclear medicine professional societies. Most of
the effort has been to modify an existing reactor for Mo-99 production. There have
also been efforts to increase security of Mo-99 supply through negotiations with
operators of Russian and Canadian reactor facilities. (Carretta, 1994.)
The DOE succeeded in gaining an $US 8 million line of credit from Congress for
the Mo-99 project. In the early 1990s the plan was to use the O m e g a West reactor at
the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The D O E attempted to enlist the support of
the major radiopharmaceutical companies - D u Pont Merck (linked to Syncor),
Medi-Physics (51% owned by Amersham), and Mallinckrodt. However the
radiopharmaceutical companies pulled out of negotiations with the D O E after
making initial financial contributions of $ U S 40 000 each. They objected to some of
the terms being offered by the D O E , such as a five-year plan for the companies to
buy a certain percentage of Mo-99 from the D O E at a price in the upper bounds of
the commercial price range. They turned their attention elsewhere - Mallinckrodt
began its venture in the Netherlands, D u Pont signed a long-term contract to
purchase Mo-99 from Nordion, and A m e r s h a m continued to diversify its sources.
(Rojas-Burke, 1992B; 1993C; O R N L , 1995.)
A power surge accident at the Omega West reactor, and the later discovery of a
leaking coolant line, were partly responsible for the waning interest of the
radiopharmaceutical companies. They were also sceptical about the capacity of the
D O E to bring the project to fruition, claiming that the D O E did not have a good
track record in the radioisotope business and that there was a history of the D O E
giving priority to military programs over commercial customers' radioisotope
needs. Sometimes there were "unbusinesslike" price increases from the D O E ,
according to Vermeeren from Mallinckrodt (quoted in Rojas-Burke, 1992B). Later
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the D O E abandoned the O m e g a West project altogether, despite having invested
several million dollars in the project. (Rojas-Burke, 1992B; Anon., 1993C.)
After several more years of negotiation and planning, a Mo-99 plan was settled
upon in 1996, using existing facilities in N e w Mexico. The D O E will fabricate
Mo-99 targets at the Los Alamos Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility. The
targets will then be transported to the Sandia Laboratories, for irradiation in the 30
M W Annular Core Research Reactor ( A C R R ) and target processing using an
existing hot cell facility. The reactor m a y also be used to produce other medical
radioisotopes including iodine-125, iodine-131 and xenon-133. The cost for the
Sandia project is estimated at between $ U S 10-20 million - initial D O E estimates
were $ U S 11.4 million. (DOE, 1996; German, 1996; Rojas-Burke, 1995B.)
The Sandia project seems likely to reach fruition. The requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act have been fulfilled. W o r k has already begun
on the project. By late 1997 it is expected that the n e w facilities will be able to
supply 1 0 % of the U S market and eventually they will be able to supply the entire
U S market "if needed". Modifications to reach full production capacity could be
completed by 1998. (DOE, 1996.)
The lack of interest of the radiopharmaceutical companies, and some nuclear
medicine professionals and professional associations, in the Sandia project is
ironical given that these were the groups that had initially been the main
advocates of another Mo-99 source. Their view is that there are n o w sufficient
overseas producers to guarantee security of supply. The radiopharmaceutical
companies have outwardly supported the DOE's Mo-99 project, but they are still
unsure about h o w reliable shipments will be and what prices will be charged.
None of the three major radiopharmaceutical companies in the U S has given the
D O E firm commitments to buy Mo-99 from Sandia. (Kotz, 1996.) A n alternative
suggestion has been to use the Sandia m o n e y to ensure supply of radioisotopes
other than Mo-99. (Rojas-Burke, 1995B.)

The long term future of the New Mexico project is unclear. One variable is the a
of the reactor, which was built in 1969. Another variable is the DOE's long-term
commitment to the project. The D O E says that federal support of the project will
terminate w h e n U S , Canadian, or other suppliers establish new, reliable sources of
Mo-99. A D O E representative (quoted in Kotz, 1996) says that there is a need to
have a reliable back-up supply at least until Nordion's Maples are operating.
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The D O E might decide to continue to operate the facilities - major, reliable
alternative suppliers notwithstanding - if the project begins to turn a profit. In
the initial stages the capital costs (e.g. reactor modification) will be borne by the
D O E and the Mo-99 will be sold at something similar to market prices. A more
likely scenario than continued D O E operation of the Mo-99 production facilities is
that the venture will be privatised. The D O E (1996) says that it will "actively
encourage the early privatization of this production capability". The eagerness to
privatise the venture seems to be a result of a government policy of no publicsector competition with private producers. In any case, with the facilities
operating, and the D O E keen to privatise the venture, there must be a reasonable
likelihood that privatisation will go ahead. Several radiopharmaceutical
companies might be interested. Mallinckrodt, for example, w a s still considering a
Mo-99 production plant in the U S A in 1994, even though its venture in the
Netherlands w a s already operational (Anon., 1994C). Amersham/Medi-Physics
and D u Pont/Syncor could be other contenders, given that they have less direct
involvement in (and thus control over) Mo-99 production than both
Mallinckrodt and Nordion.
If the New Mexico venture is privatised, production volumes might be increased.
For the time-being, the D O E (1996) insists that the reactor will be used solely as a
back-up source. It is intended that m a x i m u m production will be sufficient to
supply the entire U S Mo-99 market. In fact m a x i m u m production capacity m a y be
sufficient to supply m u c h more than the U S market. A s m a n y as 37 targets (steel
tubes coated with uranium-235) can be irradiated at any one time. Each target will
be irradiated for a "few days" and each will generate up to 800 Ci of Mo-99.
(German, 1996.) Assuming irradiation for a "few days" equates to 100 irradiations
per year, then overall production could reach 37 x 100 x 800 = 2.96 million Ci/year.
This is roughly four times current annual global demand. Inevitably there will be
inefficiencies - even during irradiation there is considerable decay of Mo-99
(which has a half life of 66 hours), and decay between production and use can also
account for a significant percentage of initial radioactivity. Nevertheless it is
possible that this reactor could be used to supply significant volumes for both
domestic and export markets.

To date the DOE has emphasised that the Sandia facility will only be used for ba
up supply of the domestic market. However w h e n the plan w a s to develop the
O m e g a West reactor, the D O E w a s interested in the possibility of foreign orders.
(Rojas-Burke, 1992D.) There is no obvious reason w h y the D O E would not be
prepared to supply other countries. Export would be even more likely in the case
of privatisation.
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The D O E currently produces isotopes at six locations using reactors, accelerators,
and calutrons. These sites include the Los Alamos, O a k Ridge, Idaho, Brookhaven,
and Sandia National Laboratories. (Kotz, 1996.) O a k Ridge National Laboratories
( O R N L ) uses the 85 M W HFIR reactor for radioisotope production. In late 1996 the
U S federal government announced that $ U S 10 million would be provided to
upgrade the HFIR reactor ( A N S T O , 1996). It will not produce Mo-99 but it is likely
that it will produce other medical radioisotopes. There are some other powerful
reactors operated by the Laboratories with some potential for development to
increase radioisotope production. These include the ORNL's 30 M W O a k Ridge
Research Reactor, and the 60 M W H F B R reactor at Brookhaven National
Laboratories. ( O R N L , 1995.)
The DOE has a long history of involvement in radioisotope production.
Government agencies were at the forefront of radioisotope production in the postwar period. Then as commercial producers emerged, the government largely
withdrew from radioisotope production. Government facilities were prohibited
from competing with private producers, and the D O E was further limited by a law
which m a d e the D O E fund its radioisotope program through sales. Then a
number of commercial producers pulled out of radioisotope production.
Consequently, there has been pressure for the D O E to assume more responsibility
for radioisotope production in the past 10 years or so, one example of which is the
Sandia project. ( O R N L , 1995; Anon, 1996D; Rojas-Burke, 1992C; D O E , 1996B;
O'Leary, 1995.)
The cycle of public then private-sector production seems set to repeat itself.
D O E (n.d.) has been pursuing efforts to privatise its radioisotope programs in the
past few years. In response, it received 30 responses and proposals, ranging from
proposals to take over the Department's entire isotope production program, to
specific proposals concerning specific facilities or isotopes. The only deal which
has been struck to date is that a company has bought exclusive rights for isotope
production (especially iridium-192) using a reactor (and possibly another test
reactor) at the Idaho National Laboratory. (Kotz, 1996.) The company, M A C
Isotopes, claims to be the only commercial (private-sector) producer of
radioisotopes in the US, and this m a y be true except for the commercial cyclotrons
operated by radiopharmaceutical companies.
The major radiopharmaceutical companies are adopting a wait-and-see position,
to see h o w privatisation works. O n e issue is regulation. For example the D O E has
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insisted that M A C Isotopes hire labour represented by the Oil, Coal and Atomic
Workers Union and pay workers union rates and benefits. (Kotz, 1996.)
The Sandia venture goes against the grain of the DOE's current push to privatise
radioisotope production. Part of the motivation of the D O E would seem to be a
desire to be involved in the production and sale of a radioisotope for which there
is a substantial market, and potentially profits. That could facilitate - in effect
subsidise - the production of other, unprofitable radioisotopes, including m a n y
low-volume radioisotopes used for research. (Rojas-Burke, 1992C.) However it
must be doubtful whether Sandia will be profitable. Another complication for the
D O E has been the policy of no public-sector competition with the private sector there has always been the possibility that after spending millions of dollars on a
project, it would be moth-balled in the event of a private producer emerging.
As a result of the cost recovery and no-competition policies, there was no
incentive, and very little funding available, for the D O E to produce radioisotopes
which were unprofitable. Recently the cost recovery policy has been relaxed. This
has improved the situation somewhat, but if the DOE's radioisotope programs are
largely privatised, the same problem is likely to emerge again. O n e option
discussed for the DOE's isotope program is an internal program partially funded
by government and partially from sales. Another option is a non-profit joint
venture involving government agencies, industry, researchers, and professional
societies. This would decide which unprofitable radioisotopes are important
enough to produce. A c o m m o n view is that isotope production cannot be left to
government or private enterprise alone. Another line of thought is that
radioisotope production should largely be a public-sector responsibility, with no
more "fantasies" about profitability (Atcher, quoted in Rojas-Burke, 1993C).
Apart from the DOE's radioisotope program, and radioisotope production by MAC
Isotopes, very few reactors produce significant quantities of radioisotopes. The
University of Missouri reactor ( M U R R ) produces substantial quantities of
radioisotopes for research and medicine; it is the only university research reactor
which produces radioisotopes in large volumes. (Rojas-Burke, 1995B.) The M U R R
reactor has been used to produce large volumes of iridium-192 but that m a y stop
given the no-competition policy and the M A C Isotopes venture in Idaho.

Running in parallel with projects to increase radioisotope supply have been plans
and negotiations to build a n e w reactor, or a very large accelerator, primarily to
accommodate the 1000 or so neutron science researchers in the U S . O n e of the
most fully-developed proposals w a s for a 350 M W reactor, k n o w n as the
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Advanced Neutron Source, at the O R N L . However this proposal has recently been
abandoned. Reasons given were the estimated cost ($A 3-4 billion), and the
proposed use of H E U fuel which contradicts the U S policy to limit the use of H E U
fuels. ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.22; Nuclear Control Institute, 1995.)

Accelerator production of radioisotopes is taken up in greater detail in chapter
but a little should be said here about the use of accelerators for radioisotope
production in the U S . The overall picture with respect to the high-power
accelerators appears to be m u c h the same as for research reactors: infrastructure is
declining, the future of some existing facilities is in doubt, and supply of some
accelerator-produced radioisotopes, including some used in nuclear medicine
procedures and research, is in jeopardy. There is no dedicated accelerator for
radioisotope production in the U S apart from the commercial cyclotrons of the
radiopharmaceutical companies. O n e proposal under development for several
years w a s for a high-power (100 M e V ) particle accelerator (either a cyclotron or a
linear accelerator) to be k n o w n as the National Biomedical Tracer Facility.
However that project w a s dropped. O n e project still in train is upgrading of the
large "BLIP" accelerator at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (Rojas-Burke,
1992B, 1993,1994; D O E , 1992.)
Now to sum up radioisotope production in the US. There is at least some chance
that the Sandia venture will produce Mo-99 for export markets. A few other
reactors are producing reasonable volumes of a limited range of radioisotopes.
There is some potential for the development of existing large reactors, including
those that have shut d o w n , but in all these cases the reactors are ageing. There is a
small possibility of the construction of a large reactor which would be primarily be
for research but m a y be of some consequence in relation to radioisotope
production.
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WESTERN EUROPE AND SCANDINAVIA
R E S E A R C H R E A C T O R S A S A T D E C E M B E R 1994 (IAEA. 1994):
Total
Research
Reactors
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
DENMARK
FINLAND
1
FRANCE
19
GERMANY*
20
GREECE
ITALY
NETHERLANDS 2
NORWAY
PORTUGAL
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND 3
TURKEY
UK
TOTALS:

76

"Research"/
multipurpose
reactors

Under construction.
+ [planned]

1
8
8

[1]
[1]

39
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Adjusted to account for closure of the 15 M W FRG-2 reactor.

RESEARCH REACTORS OF 5+ M W (IAEA, 1994):
COUNTRY

NUMBER

POWER

AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
DENMARK
FRANCE
GERMANY
GREECE
NORWAY
SWEDEN
TURKEY

1
1
1
9
3
1
1
1
1

10 M W
100 M W
10 M W
14, 25, 35,40,
5.10, 23 M W
5 MW
25 M W
50 M W
5 MW

* This list includes the 120 M W B W R prototype reactor and a 563 M W Phenix Fast
Breeder. Most or all of the other reactors are multipurpose reactors.
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REACTORS USED FOR RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION:
COUNTRY N A M E

MW

AGE RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
D.O.C.

Age D.O.C: date of first criticality, given only for 5+ M W reactors.
M W : Steady thermal power level.
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM

ASTRA
BR-2

10
100

Others:

D E N M A R K DR-3
FRANCE

14
Orphee
70
Osiris
35
Siloe
Phenix Fast
Co-60
(563)
Breeder
Other:

G E R M A N Y FRG-1
FRJ-2
Others:

GREECE
ITALY

10

1960 Some radioisotope production, future
uncertain.
1961 Mo-99, perhaps others, future usage
undecided until 1997 restart.
Two small reactors used for radioisotope
production.
1960 Na-24 (2 GBq), Cu-64 (6 GBq),
Br-82 (1300 GBq)
1980 Yes.
1966 Yes, probable shut down 2000-2010
1963 Yes, probable shut down 2000-2010

5
23

1958
1962

BER-II

10

1973

GRR-1

5

1961

One small reactor used for radioisotope
production.
Various.
Co-60 (10 K Ci), Zr-95, Ir-192/194.
At least five other small reactors used for
radioisotope production.
Mostly for scientific research, possibly for
limited isotope production.
1-131, Au-198, Tc-99m (l.s.a. Mo-99)
Three small reactors used for radioisotope
production.

NETHERLANDS
1961Mo-99,1-131, P-32, Xe-133.
45
HFR/Petten Fission
Two small reactors used for radioisotope
Others:

NORWAY HBWR

25

Others:
SWEDEN

R2-MTR

TURKEY
TR-2
UNITED K I N G D O M
PORTUGAL, FINLAND,
SWITZERLAND

50

production.
1959 Some production, mostly research.
One <5 M W reactor used for radioisotope
production.
1960 Iridium-192 (250 000 Ci/year), Sr-89, Na-24,
P-32, S-35, others.
1981 Tc-99m, Ir-192.
Three small reactors used for radioisotope
production.
One <5 M W reactor used for radioisotope
production in each country.
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GENERAL C O M M E N T S
The significant radioisotope production facilities in Belgium (IRE/Nordion, SCKCEN) and the Netherlands (Mallinckrodt) were discussed in section 6.2.

Over a quarter of the world's research reactors are in Western Europe
half of these in France and Germany. In many respects the situation in Western
Europe is much the same as in the US. The research reactor infrastructure has
declined markedly over the years - more reactors have been shut down than are
currently operating. There are no research reactors under construction and just
two in the planning stages. However there have been some significant
refurbishments allowing increased radioisotope production, including BR-2
(Belgium) and H F R (Netherlands).

The radioisotope production operations in Belgium and the Netherlands
significant sources of Mo-99, and some other radioisotopes, for the next 10-20 years

at least. Outside of those countries it is difficult to predict if there will be any major
producers and exporters in the coming decades. Planned reactors in Germany and
France may be the next most likely candidates.
GERMANY

The reactor infrastructure has declined in Germany and more shut down
expected in the coming 10-20 years. Generally, what impetus there exists for the
construction of new research reactors in Western Europe stems from the scientific
research community. For example in Germany, about 600 scientists work in the
field of neutron research. Moreover while there are some facilities elsewhere in
the region, in particular the 57 M W Institut Laue-Langevin reactor in France,
these are saidtobe inadequate for the estimated 3500 neutron researchers in
Europe. Under pressure from the research community, the German government
has formalised $US 500+ million plans to build a 20 M W research reactor, FRM-II,
at the Technical University of Munich. This project is being pushed through
despite considerable public opposition - evidently some funding will come at the
expense of the Bavarian state budget for education, and some will come from a
special federal budget originally intended to support poor students (Anon., 19961).
The reactor will use H E U fuel; this is one of the objections of public opponents
and has also drawn criticism from the US government. The proponents of the
new reactor have said much about the medical applications of the reactor - in
particular neutron beam cancer therapy - to encourage acceptance of the project.
However the reactor design is to be maximised for thermal and cold neutron
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research, not for medical applications. The reactor will probably only be a modest
radioisotope producer although that could conceivably change, if for example
there are radioisotope shortages. (FRM-II Project Group, 1995; A N S T O , 1995F; 1996;
1996B; Nuclear Control Institute, 1995B, Leventhal and Kuperman, 1995.)
FRANCE
Radioisotope production in France is modest, although it is one of the few
countries producing fission Mo-99 (or at least irradiating targets for fission Mo-99
production). The 35 M W Osiris and 70 M W Siloe reactors, and possibly also the 57
M W H F R reactor, are used to irradiate targets for processing by IRE in Belgium
(Iturralde, 1996.)
In 1996 the French Atomic Energy Agency (CEA) announced plans for a new
research reactor, Reacteur Jules Horowitz (RJH), at Cadarache. Operation is
expected to begin in 2005. It will be used for testing in support of French and
European nuclear power programs, medical radioisotope production, silicon
irradiation and neutron research. The feasibility studies are considering a 100 M W
reactor with initial cost estimates of $ U S 192-384 million. This reactor will replace
Siloe and Osiris, both of which are ageing and will be permanently shut d o w n in
the next decade. ( A N S T O , 1996B.)

The loss of the Siloe and Osiris reactors is unlikely to have an impact on fissi
Mo-99 supply around the world as their role w a s modest and other producers will
easily cover the loss of these reactors. It is certainly possible that the high-power
RJH reactor could be an important source of export radioisotopes, even if
radioisotope production is not the primary function, but that cannot be assumed
at this early stage and in the absence of more information.
The 14 MW Orphee reactor, which went critical in 1980, is used for radioisotope
production and m a y be of some significance. Other large reactors are ill-equipped
for radioisotope production, are committed to other purposes, or are ageing and
thus of little interest. These reactors include the 40 M W Phebus (1978), the 100
M W Scarabee reactor (1982), the 25 M W Cabri reactor (1963), a 120 M W boilingwater power prototype, and the 563 M W Phenix Fast Breeder (which does
however produce some cobalt-60).
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SWEDEN
Studsvik Nuclear operates a 50 M W , high-flux reactor, R2-MTR. It is used
primarily for neutron b e a m research and fuels and materials testing. In addition
there is some radioisotope production, including strontium-89, sodium-24,
phosphorus-32, sulphur-35, and iridium-192. Bulk production of iridium-192, in
the range of 250 000 Ci/year, was expected to begin in early 1997. Cobalt-60 has been
produced but not n o w because there is an excess of it on the market. Similarly
gadolinium-153 is no longer produced because of a lack of buyers. (Lundstrom,
Studsvik Nuclear, 1996, pers. comm.)
As for Mo-99 production, l.s.a. Mo-99 was produced when Sweden had its own
radiopharmaceutical production facilities. Fission Mo-99 can be produced - the
reactor has sufficient neutron flux and there are suitable reactor irradiation
facilities. However there are no processing facilities for separation of Mo-99 from
other fission products. Separation could conceivably be carried out overseas, but
Sweden is too remote for that sort of production regime - international transport
of bulk Mo-99 is c o m m o n enough, but to transport unprocessed, highlyradioactive fission products over long distances would be excessively difficult and
expensive. According to the Products and Production Manager of the Irradiation
Services division of Studsvik Nuclear, fission Mo-99 could be produced in
commercial quantities if a radiopharmaceutical company built a separation plant
in Studsvik. (Lundstrom, 1996, pers. comm.)
Most of medical radioisotopes used in Sweden, including fission Mo-99, are
supplied from abroad - mainly from Amersham, Nordion, and Mallinckrodt.
(Lundstrom, 1996, pers. comm.) There is also some export: according to Diesendorf
(1993), Sweden is one of Amersham's suppliers.

The R2-MTR reactor first went critical in 1960. The reactor vessel was changed in
1986 and Studsvik Nuclear plans to operate the reactor for another 20 years or
more. (Lundstrom, 1996, pers. comm.)

DENMARK
Denmark has a nuclear research program based on a 10 MW research reactor, a
sister reactor to HIFAR. ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.23.) It is operated by the Riso National
Laboratory and one of its uses is production of large volumes of a few
radioisotopes - sodium-24, copper-64, and bromine-82. The reactor first went

218

critical in 1960 and for that reason it is unlikely to be an important source of export
radioisotopes in the future.

NORWAY
The Institute for Energy Technology (IFE) operates a 2 MW reactor and a 25 MW
reactor ( H B W R ) . These reactors are used for a number of functions including
radioisotope production. H B W R is owned and operated by IFE but it is funded as a
co-operative research project between ten O E C D countries. ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.23;
IAEA, 1994.) The H B W R is unlikely to be of significance for commercial
radioisotope production in future because it is primarily used for research
(especially fuels testing) and it first went critical in 1959.
AUSTRIA

As at 1995 there were two small research reactors, one of them a training reacto
as well as an ageing 10 M W multipurpose reactor (ASTRA, first criticality in 1963).
These reactors are located at a Research Centre which is required to earn half its
revenue from contract work. The A S T R A reactor produces medical radioisotopes
among its other purposes. A s at 1993 funding problems had limited operation to
one week per month, and the reluctance of the U S to accept spent reactor fuel had
also cast a shadow over future operation of A S T R A . ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.23; IAEA,
1994.)
BELGIUM

Apart from the SCK-CEN's BR-2 reactor, the processing of bulk radioisotopes from
other European reactors (by IRE and Nordion), and Nordion's two cyclotrons,
there are just two small (<5 M W ) reactors used for radioisotope production in
Belgium.
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ASIA
RESEARCH REACTORS AS AT DECEMBER 1994 (IAEA. 1994):

BANGLADESH
CHINA
INDONESIA
INDIA
NORTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA
MALAYSIA
PHILIPPINES
PAKISTAN
THAILAND
VIETNAM

Total
Research
Reactors

"Research"/
multipurpose
reactors

1
13
3
5
1
2*
1
1
2
1
1

1
10
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
1
1

Under construction.
+ [planned]

ill

INDUSTRIALISED PACIFIC:
AUSTRALIA
TAPAN

1
19

1
11

3±U]

TOTAL:

51

38

31+21

Adjusted to account for the permanent shut down of two small reactors in 1995.

RESEARCH REACTORS OF 5+ M W (IAEA, 1994):
COUNTRY

NUMBER

POWER

CHPNA
INDONESIA
INDIA
NORTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA
PAKISTAN
AUSTRALIA
TAPAN

4
1
2
1
1
1
1

5. 5.15.125 M W
30 M W
40,100 M W
5 MW
30 M W
9 MW
10 M W
5.10. 20. 50.100 M W
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REACTORS USED FOR RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION:
COUNTRY REACTOR
NAME

M W

AGE RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
D.O.C.

MW: Steady thermal power levels. Age: Date of first criticality.

AUSTRALIA
HIFAR
CHINA

10

HFETR

125

MJTR
HWRR-II

5
15

Others:

INDIA

Cirus

40

Dhruva

100

Other:

INDONESIA
RSG-GAS

30

Other:

JAPAN

JRR-2
JRR-3M

10
20

JMTR

50

Others:

NORTH
IRT-DPRK
KOREA
SOUTH
HANARO
KOREA
PAKISTAN PARR-1
TAIWAN THOR
TRR-II
THAILAND

5
30
9
10
30

BANGLADESH, VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES, M A L A Y S I A

1960 Mo-99,1-131, Cr-51, Co-60, Cu-64, Br-82,
Dy-165, Y-90, Ir-192.
1979 Co-60, Sn-113, Mo-99, Ir-192, C-14. Annual
total 500 K Ci.
1991 Mo-99,1000 Ci. p.a.
1958 L o w volumes of Tc-99m, Co-60,1-131,1-125,
Au-198.
Four <5 M W reactors used to produce
radioisotopes.
1960 Mo-99, Cr-51, Hg-203,1-131, Co-60, Ir-192,
Hg-197, Sr-85, Tl-204, P-32, S-35, Ca-45.
50 000 Ci p.a. total production.
1985 1-131, Cr-51, Mo-99,1-125, Ir-192, H-3, C-14,
1-125.
One <5 M W reactor used to produce
radioisotopes.
1987 Fission Mo-99,1-31, Xe-133, Ir-192,1-125,
P-32, S-35, Cr-51, Fe-59, others.
One <5 M W reactor used to produce
radioisotopes.
1960 P-32, K-42, Gd-153, Au-198, Ir-192, etc.
1990 P-32, Cr-51, Ir-192, S-35, Yb-169.
Total annual production = 300 TBq.
1968 Co-60, Ir-192, C-14, Au-198, Cr-51, C-14,
several others.
Three <5 M W reactors used to produce
radioisotopes.
1965 11 000 Ci p.a. I, P, CR, S, Au, Te, Ca, Co, Fe,
Se, Ir, Sb.
1994 Mo-99, Co-60, Ir-192, Au-198, Fe-59, P-32,
S-32, Cr-51,1-125,1-131, C-14.
1965 Au-198 (10 Ci), 1-131 (10 Ci), Tc-99m (2 Ci),
H g (1.5 Ci), Cr-51 (0.5 Ci).
1961 Yes.
1973 Shut d o w n in 1987, restart planned.
One <5 M W reactor usedtoproduce
radioisotopes, one 5 M W reactor planned.
One <5 M W reactor used to produce
radioisotopes in each country.
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GENERAL C O M M E N T S
Fourteen countries in the region produce reactor radioisotopes. Mostly these
operations involve low-power reactors, which have in a number of cases been
upgraded (usually to between 2-5 M W ) , in part to enable increased radioisotope
production. (McDonald, 1992.)
There are some medium to high-power reactors in the region, though considerably fewer than in North America, Western or Eastern Europe. Of the larger
producers, China produces large volumes of a limited range of radioisotopes using
a 125 M W reactor but only modest volumes of Mo-99; Indonesia began operation
of a 30 M W reactor in 1987 and this produces modest volumes of export
radioisotopes (possibly larger volumes in future); India has an ageing 40 M W
reactor, a 100 M W reactor in operation since 1985, and ambitions to establish
export markets; Japan produces modest volumes of radioisotopes but no Mo-99;
Taiwan is planning to restart a 30 M W reactor; South Korea's n e w 30 M W reactor
may be a source of significant volumes of export radioisotopes; and ANSTO's
future as a radioisotope producer and supplier is of course dependent on whether
a replacement reactor is built.

Overall the research reactor infrastructure in Asia is younger than other regi
in the world. Fifteen research reactors were under 10 years old as at 1992. All of the
older research reactors in the Asia Pacific have undergone refurbishment.
(McDonald, 1992.) For these reasons Asia m a y become a more important source of
export radioisotopes in the future.

The Japanese market accounts for 80-90% of total Asian demand for radioisotopes
and about 2 5 % of world demand (ANSTO, 1993F, p.7.5). Radioisotope markets are
growing at a considerable rate in other countries in the region, but from low
starting points. According to Berkhout (1993), Nordion predicts that it will be a
decade before the Asian market (outside Japan) becomes significant.
China, India, South Korea, and Japan all have plans to significantly increase
nuclear power generation, and plans have been in train for m a n y years to
introduce nuclear power into Indonesia. To the extent that this involves further
development of nuclear infrastructure (e.g. research reactors, fuel supplies,
regulatory regimes) this might encourage increased radioisotope production.
However the links between nuclear power programs and radioisotope production
are ambiguous - for example existing research reactors might be put to greater use
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in support of nuclear power programs to the detriment of radioisotope
production. These links are taken up in chapter seven.

Of the five research reactors under construction or planned in the region - four
Japan, one in Thailand - some will produce radioisotopes but it is unlikely that
any will be used to supply export markets to any significant extent.
In sum, there is no radioisotope producer in the region which will certainly be
producing significant volumes of radioisotopes for export markets, but there are
some possibilities of large export producers emerging such as South Korea. There
is little likelihood of a major production venture in Japan, but it is possible that a
major export venture could be developed using imported bulk radioisotopes.
Other production and export ventures of some significance might emerge Indonesia, India, and China are candidates. Lastly, A m e r s h a m (1993) claims that it
will be sourcing fission Mo-99 from one or two reactors in the region by the time
HIFAR is shut d o w n and this could have a significant impact on supply of the
Asian market.
SOUTH KOREA

As at 1994 South Korea had four research reactors including a zero power trainin
reactor at Suwon, and two low-power Triga reactors at the Korea Atomic Energy
Research Institute (KAERI) in Seoul. The two Trigas were permanently shut d o w n
in 1995. O n e of them w a s a 2 M W reactor which had been used for radioisotope
production, including l.s.a. Mo-99/Tc-99m.
The fourth reactor is HANARO, which first went critical in early 1995. It has a
high power level (30 M W ) and high neutron flux (maximum core thermal flux of
4.5 x 10 14 n/cm 2 /sec). It uses 19.75% enriched L E U fuel. H A N A R O was built to
replace the two small reactors in Seoul. It is the first reactor to have been
completed based on the Canadian Maple design. The functions of the reactor are
fuels and materials testing in support of the nuclear power program (30%),
neutron physics experiments (28%), radioisotope production (22%), neutron
activation analysis (16%), and silicon doping and neutron radiography (4%).
(KAERI, n.d.; A N S T O , 1990, p.18; 1993L, p.3.30; 1993F, Annex 7.2.2; 1995D; IAEA,
1994; Kim, 1995.)

HANARO has substantial beam facilities and radioisotope processing facilities a
will be used for production of a range of medical radioisotopes. In KAERI's (n.d.)
words, the facilities for radioisotope production are "ample". A s at late 1996 a
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feasibility study w a s underway for commercial production of fission Mo-99 using
H E U or L E U targets. The expectation is that production of Mo-99 will begin in the
year 2000 and some of it will be exported to Asia-Pacific countries. K A E R I is
already producing a range of other radioisotopes - including iodine-131,
phosphorus-32, samarium-153, holmium-166 - and can export these
radioisotopes. (KAERI, 1996, pers. comm.)

The HANARO facility is not likely to nearly as significant as major ventures suc
as those of Nordion or Mallinckrodt, given the numerous other functions of the
H A N A R O reactor and its use in support of the nuclear power program. However
it is possible that a high-flux, high-power reactor such as H A N A R O could be used
as a major radioisotope producer along with its other functions. Moreover the
Vice President of K A E R I says that m u c h basic research will have already been
carried out within a few years, and thus radioisotope production (and medical
radioisotope research) will become a "major application" for H A N A R O towards
the end of the 1990s and into the next century. (Kim, 1995.)
KAERI hopes to use HANARO as the basis of an international research centre. Cooperation agreements already exist between K A E R I and JAERI (Japan) and A E C L .
(Kim, 1995.) Both of these connections could be important in relation to
radioisotope production. It could be to the advantage of Japanese companies and
agencies to have another supplier of Mo-99 and other radioisotopes given their
heavy reliance on Nordion. The proximity of South Korea and Japan would be an
added advantage. A E C L was involved in the construction of H A N A R O and there
is ongoing collaboration of some sort or another between K A E R I and A E C L . This
could be of consequence given AECL's connections to Nordion. Nordion might
see H A N A R O as a useful back-up supplier. Amersham could also be interested in
collaboration with K A E R I and m a y have H A N A R O in mind w h e n saying that it
expects to have one or two sources of fission Mo-99 in the Asia Pacific within a
decade or so (Amersham, 1993).
The construction of experimental and production facilities for HANARO had
been slowed by lack of finances from the government, but this work was
proceeding steadily, facilitated by "discussions and communications with user
groups." (Kim, 1995.) This is a further reason for thinking that collaboration
between K A E R I and radiopharmaceutical companies m a y eventuate, or might
already be in train.
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INDONESIA
B A T A N , the National Atomic Energy Agency of Indonesia, operates a 30 M W ,
high-flux, multipurpose reactor (RSG-GAS) at Serpong. It is used for a range of
functions including radioisotope production. The reactor has been in operation
since 1987. There is also a cyclotron at the Serpong site and radiopharmaceutical
processing facilities. ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.29.)
There was some debate during the Research Reactor Review as to whether the
RSG-GAS reactor could be used to supply the Australian market for a number of
radioisotopes including fission Mo-99. It is possible that this reactor m a y be used
for production and export of large quantities of fission Mo-99 and other radioisotopes in the future. However this would require modification of the reactor
facilities and further development of processing facilities. Conceivably this could
occur in collaboration with - and with a capital injection from - one of the major
radiopharmaceutical companies. According to the Research Reactor Review (1993,
p.92), A m e r s h a m has negotiated with B A T A N in relation to bulk radioisotope
supply. O n e submission to the Review, from an Australian nuclear medicine
professional, flagged the possibility that Amersham, Nordion, the U S D O E , or
A N S T O , might collaborate with B A T A N to use R S G - G A S for commercial
radioisotope production and export (Morris, 1993).
ANSTO disagreed with suggestions that it might collaborate with BATAN to use
RSG-GAS for radioisotope production and other purposes such as neutron
research. A N S T O claimed that the Serpong facilities are inadequate for ANSTO's
radioisotope production and research purposes. A N S T O also claimed that the
potential of the reactor to be developed as a major radioisotope producer is limited
as it will become increasingly important for nuclear power related applications as
Indonesia's nuclear power program gains m o m e n t u m . ( A N S T O , 1993G, pp.2.1-2.4;
1993F, Annex 7.2.3.) Perhaps so, but this is not certain - the Indonesian regime
might opt, for example, for turn-key power reactors with minimal local input, or
it might abandon plans for nuclear power and choose instead to develop its large
reserves of fossil fuels. In early 1997 a Nuclear Energy Bill was approved by the
Indonesian parliament and signed by the President, establishing a legislative
framework for the introduction of nuclear power, but the Research and
Technology Minister has since said the first power reactor could be delayed, citing
discoveries of natural gas ( A N S T O , 1997).
Whether or not RSG-GAS is used for a major commercial export venture, it will
certainly be used to produce sufficient fission Mo-99, and other radioisotopes, to
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satisfy local d e m a n d and for modest exports in the region. In fact this is already the
case. B A T A N ' s production of fission Mo-99 w a s 12 000 Ci in 1996 (roughly
equivalent to A N S T O ) . That capacity can still be increased somewhat without
major upgrading of the reactor. There was some export of Mo-99 to Malaysia and
China in 1996. B A T A N also produces a range of other reactor and cyclotron
radioisotopes - iodine-131, iridium-192, phosphorus-32, xenon-133, gallium-67,
thallium-201, l.s.a. Mo-99/Tc-99m, iodine-123, sulfur-35, chromium-51, and others
on request. ( B A T A N , Radioisotope Production Division, 1997, pers. comm.)
As at late 1997, a consortium between BATAN and a private Indonesian company
was investigating the feasibility of building a 10 M W dedicated radioisotopeproduction reactor. This proposal was subject to a market survey. (Hastowo, 1997.)
CHINA
Currently, reactor radioisotope production is dominated by a 125 MW, high-flux
reactor (HFETR). It is considerably younger than comparable reactors around the
world, having been in operation since 1979. A 5 M W reactor has been in operation
since 1991, and produces some Mo-99, and four smaller reactors are used for
limited radioisotope production.
In the early 1990s, production of l.s.a. Mo-99 was 2000 Ci/year with plans to
increase this to 10 000 Ci/year by the turn of the century. In addition, 1000 Ci/year
of fission Mo-99 w a s produced in 1993, with plans to increase this to about 3000
Ci/year by 1995. ( A N S T O , 1993D, pp.1.13-1.14; 1993F, Annex 7.2.2.) These volumes
amount to no more than 1-2% of world production. The remainder of the
demand for Mo-99 has been supplied by Nordion and, more recently, by
Indonesia.
As with so many other countries, the future of radioisotope production in China
is difficult to predict. The H F E T R reactor could be operating well until the next
century, and it has the power and flux levels for major radioisotope production,
but from what little is k n o w n there seems to be no intention to develop a
radioisotope export business. Perhaps this is because of the other uses of the
reactor - the familiar range of neutron beam physics research, fuel and materials
testing, and so on.
The nuclear medicine market in China is growing at about 20% p.a., though from
a very low starting point ( A N S T O , 1993F, Annex 7.2.2). This could conceivably
spur greater domestic radioisotope production. Another development which
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might encourage greater radioisotope production is the shifting focus of China's
nuclear programs. The China National Nuclear Corporation w a s formed in 1987
to co-ordinate a shift from a defence role to economic/industrial functions. The
Corporation has over 200 enterprises, a staff of 300 000, and responsibility for every
aspect of the nuclear industry including radioisotope production. ( A N S T O , 1990,
p.4.) Certainly such a shift would be compatible with increased radioisotope
production and export. However the research reactor infrastructure is modest
apart from the H F E T R reactor, no n e w research reactors are under construction or
planned, and the existing infrastructure (including the H F E T R reactor) m a y be
used increasingly in support of the nuclear power program.
JAPAN
As at 1995 there were 20 research reactors operating in Japan. The Japan Atomic
Energy Research Institute (JAERI) uses a number of reactors to produce a
considerable variety of radioisotopes, but only in modest volumes. All of Japan's
demand for Mo-99 is met by Nordion. T w o Japanese companies - Nihon MediPhysics and Daichii - import bulk Mo-99 from Nordion and use it to produce
generators as well as instant Tc-99 radiopharmaceuticals. Nihon Medi-Physics
operates cyclotrons dedicated to medical radioisotope production. The Japanese
Radioisotope Association - which combines the roles of a professional peak body
and a science R & D institution - also operates cyclotrons. ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.22;
1995C; Japanese Society of Nuclear Medicine, 1995, pers. c o m m ; Nihon MediPhysics, 1995, pers. comm.)
Some projects to upgrade research reactors or to build new reactors have been
completed in recent years or are in progress. A 10 M W reactor, JRR-3, was rebuilt
as a 20 M W reactor (JRR-3M) at a cost of over $ A 400 million. The upgraded
reactor is equipped with facilities for radioisotope production but only limited
volumes are produced. A 30 M W engineering test reactor is under construction
but will not be used for radioisotope production. O n e other research reactor is
under construction but there is no indication that it will be a major radioisotope
producer. ( A N S T O , 1995C; McMillan and Silver, 1993; Japanese Society of Nuclear
Medicine, 1995, pers. comm.)
In the past 10-20 years there has been sporadic production of both fission Mo-99
and l.s.a. Mo-99. However the volumes were modest and production ceased some
years ago. The main difficulty is that the reactors have low operational efficiencies
- for example the JRR-3M and J M T R reactors operate for just 182 days each year.
There is also considerable competition for reactor space and time between
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radioisotope production and other functions (in particular R & D in support of
nuclear power). It is because of these limitations that the radiopharmaceutical
companies import all Mo-99. Another consideration is the large volume demand.
In 1994 the market value for in vivo radiopharmaceuticals w a s $ A 425 million,
with about 1800 g a m m a cameras and growth at 10%. The Mo-99/Tc-99m market is
about $ A 50 million p.a., representing 50 000 Mo-99/Tc-99m generators (Japanese
Society of Nuclear Medicine, 1995, pers. comm.) Maximising domestic production
using existing facilities would still satisfy only a small part of d e m a n d unless
major refurbishments and upgrading of reactors and processing facilities took
place, or unless other research reactor programs were scaled down.
The Director of the Department of Radioisotopes at JAERI's Tokai Research
Establishment says that in the case of Nordion's supply of Mo-99 looking doubtful,
Japanese radiopharmaceutical manufacturers would probably look to alternative
overseas sources in preference to establishing domestic facilities. Discussions with
IRE in Belgium, for supply of fission Mo-99, have not progressed because of IRE's
limited production volume. (Yamabayashi, 1996, pers. comm.)
As in the US, public-sector research reactor operators are not allowed to compete
with the private sector in Japan (Cook, 1993, p.83). Government policy is to
privatise JAERI's radioisotope production, but to maintain existing facilities and
to maintain production of radioisotopes for research purposes. (Japan
Radioisotope Association, 1997, pers. comm.)

In sum, there is little if any concern about the reliance on imported radioisotopes
in Japan, and little if any m o m e n t u m to increase domestic reactor radioisotope
production. Despite this, Japan m a y indeed become a radioisotope exporter. A s at
early 1997, Nihon Medi-Physics (pers. comm.) had established an International
Sales Department and w a s investigating the Asia/Oceania market. If an export
venture were to be established based in Japan, it would presumably be importing
bulk radioisotopes, carrying out processing functions such as Mo-99/Tc-99m
generator manufacture, and then exporting to regional countries. This sort of
supply regime has parallels in Europe and North America, such as with
Amersham's diverse chain of radioisotope supply and export. In fact Amersham,
as a part-owner of Nihon Medi-Physics, would almost certainly be involved in the
establishment and operation of an export venture in Japan.
INDIA

As at 1995 India had five research reactors. Of these only two are of interest. The
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40 M W Cirus reactor, based on the Canadian N R X design, has a range of functions
including radioisotope production although it is better k n o w n as a source of
plutonium for India's weapons program. The 100 M W Dhruva reactor is used for
large-scale production of high specific activity radioisotopes along with neutron
physics research, materials testing, and so on. Despite the operation of these two
powerful reactors, Mo-99 production in India is very modest, about 1500 Ci/year,
and this is probably l.s.a. Mo-99. (McMillan and Silver, 1993, p.12; Anon., 1994E;
A N S T O , 1990, p.10; 1993L, p.3.28; IAEA, 1994.)

The Cirus reactor is unlikely to be of significance in the future given its a
began operating in 1960. The Dhruva reactor on the other hand is very powerful
and young by research reactor standards (operating since 1985). Perhaps the major
limitation in relation to radioisotope production is that both Cirus and Dhruva
are used extensively in support of the nuclear power program.

The Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology (BRIT), a division of the Indian
Department of Atomic Energy, is the sole manufacturer and supplier of
radiopharmaceuticals and radioimmunoassay kits in India, supplying 300 nuclear
medicine centres. BRIT markets about 40 diagnostic products. It has recently been
looking to expand and diversify its product range and to secure export contracts.
(BRIT, 1995.)
TAIWAN
Taiwan operates three small research reactors, none of which produce
radioisotopes. The 40 M W T R R reactor, which had functions including
radioisotope production, was shut d o w n in 1987. However there are plans to
rebuild this reactor (TRR-II) with a power level of about 30 M W . (ANSTO, 1990,
p.22; 1993L, p.3.32; McMillan and Silver, 1993, pp.31-32.) This reactor could
conceivably be used for commercial radioisotope production and export, but it is
more likely to be used primarily in support of the nuclear power program.
OTHER ASTAN COUNTRIES
Some Asian countries operate low to medium-power reactors which are used for
radioisotope production. It is unlikely they will be used for commercial
radioisotope production and export, but they are worth passing mention.
As at 1994 Thailand had one 2 MW research reactor. One of its functions is
medical radioisotope production, including l.s.a Mo-99. A N S T O supplies a further
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3-4 Mo-99/Tc-99m generators per week. In 1989 the government decided to close
the existing research centre and research reactor and to build n e w nuclear facilities
at a n e w site. A n e w reactor of about 5 M W power is to be built. $ U S 100 million
had been allocated to the project, which will include facilities for radioisotope
production. Once that project is complete, the 2 M W reactor will be permanently
shut down. (McMillan and Silver, 1993, p.33; A N S T O , 1990, p.23; 1993L, p.3.32;
1993F, Annex 7.2.3; Rees, 1997.)
As at 1994 Pakistan had two research reactors - a 9 MW reactor and a very lowpower reactor. The 9 M W reactor (PARR), located at the Pakistan Institute of
Nuclear Science and Technology, is used for various functions including the
production of small volumes of radioisotopes for medicine, industry and
agriculture. ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.31; McMillan and Silver, 1993.) The P A R R reactor
is 30 years old and it is unlikely that a reactor of this power, built using 1960s
technology, will be of m u c h significance to radioisotope users outside Pakistan.
In North Korea, there was one research reactor as at 1994, with 5 MW power.
(IAEA, 1994.) Its functions include medical radioisotope production. A cyclotron
has been constructed to broaden the range of radioisotopes available. ( A N S T O ,
1990, p.4; 1993L, p.3.27-3.28.)
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FORMER SOVIET COUNTRIES
AND
EASTERN EUROPE
RESEARCH REACTORS AS AT DECEMBER 1994 (IAEA. 1994):
Total "Research" / Under construcResearch multipurpose
Reactors reactors

tion + [planned]

BULGARIA
CZECH REPUBLIC
HUNGARY
KAZAKHSTAN
LATVIA
ROMANIA
RUSSIAN FED.
SLOVAK REPUBLIC

2
3
1
2
27
1

1
3
1
1
21
1

44

33

1

ir+n
1[+1]

UKRAINE
UZBEKISTAN
YUGOSLAVIA
TOTALS

31+21

RESEARCH REACTORS OF 5+ MW (IAEA, 1994):
COUNTRY NUMBER POWER
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1 10 MW
HUNGARY
1
KAZAKHSTAN
3
LATVIA
1
ROMANIA
1
RUSSIAN FED.
14
UKRAINE
UZBEKISTAN
YUGOSLAVIA

1
1
1
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10 M W
10. 10. 60 M W
5 MW
14 M W
6.8.8.10.10.10.12.15.
18. 40. 40. 60.100.100 M W
10 M W
10 M W
6.5 M W

REACTORS USED FOR RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION:
COUNTRY REACTOR M W
NAME

AGE RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
D.O.C.

MW: Steady thermal power levels.
Age: Date of first criticality, given only for reactors of 5+ M W reactors.
CZECH.
REPUBLIC

LWR-15

10

1957 Radiopharmaceuticals, IR, SI, U E N R .

Budapest
Research
Reactor
EWA
Maria

10

1959 Na, P, Ca, Au, M o , I, Xe, H g , Co, 2000 Ci p.a.
Upgrade completed in 1992.

10
30
14
8
10

1958
1974
1979
1958
1954

IR-8
MR
MIR-M1
SM-2

8
40
100
100

1957
1963
1966
1961

WWR-M
Gatchina
WWR-TS
Other:

18
12

1959 Yes.
1964 Mo-99, Xe-133.
O n e <5 M W reactor used to produce
radioisotopes.
1960 Radioisotopes for technology.

HUNGARY

POLAND

ROMANIA Triga II
RUSSIA
BR-10
AM

UKRAINE W W R - M
UZBEKISTAN

10

W W R - C M 10
YUGOSLAVIA
R-A
6.5
BULGARIA,
SLOVENIA

Yes.
Co-60,1-131,1-125, P-32, Ir-192, Yb-169.
Ir-192 (6000 Ci), Co-60 (1000 Ci), Si.
BR-10 + A M : Fission Mo-99, Sr-89, S-35,
Cs-137, ruthenium-106, zirconium-95,
barium-140,1-125,1-131, C-14, Y-90, In-113m
generators, Au-198, P-33, P-32, Xe-133,
caesium-137, m a n y stable isotopes.*
Hg-197, Au-198, Tc-99m, others.
Medical radioisotopes.
M I R + SM-2: P-33, S-35, Cr-51, Sr-89, Sn-113,
Gd-153, W-188, Cf-252. Fission Mo-99 from
1998.**

1959 P-33, P-32, Y-125, Au-198, S-35.
1959 Eu-152,154, Co-60,1-131, etc.
O n e <5 M W reactor used to produce
radioisotopes in each country.

* These are the radioisotopes produced by the Institute of Physics and Power
Engineering (IPPE) using the BR-10 and A M reactors.
** These are the radioisotopes produced by the Institute of Atomic Reactors,
Dimitrovgrad.
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GENERAL C O M M E N T S
About 1 5 % of the world's research reactors are in the former Soviet states and
Eastern Europe. There are a considerable number of multipurpose research
reactors of 5 M W power or more. However of the 5+ M W reactors used for
radioisotope production, 13 of 15 were built in the 1950s and 1960s, and none
achieved first criticality later than 1979. (IAEA, 1994; INSC, n.d.)

The situation with radioisotope production is complex and contradictory. On t
one hand, there is a large nuclear infrastructure, an interest in foreign currency,
some production facilities producing significant volumes of radioisotopes and
exporting some of this product, and some potential for the development of new
projects using existing reactors. O n the other hand the research reactors are ageing
and in some cases in disrepair. In addition funding is scarce for the up-keep of
existing facilities, and in most cases foreign investment would probably be
required for refurbishments, upgraded radioisotope processing facilities, or other
such ventures.

Five research reactors are under construction or being planned in these regio
(IAEA, 1994). These include a 200 M W reactor under construction in Kazakhstan,
a 100 M W reactor under construction and another 100 M W planned in the
Russian Federation, a very low power reactor under construction in the Slovak
Republic and a training reactor planned for the Slovak Technical University.

Other than in Russia, it seems that there is little if any production of radi
on a commercial, export scale in the region. According to one report, there m a y be
fission Mo-99 production in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic (Iturralde,
1996). The 30 M W Maria reactor in Poland, and the 14 M W Triga II reactor in
Romania, are the only radioisotope-producing reactors in the region which began
operation after the 1960s. The Hungarian reactor (Budapest Research Reactor) is
notable in that it was upgraded from 2 M W to 5 M W in 1967, then to 10 M W in
1986, and there were plans at that time for a future upgrade to 20 M W (INSC, n.d.).
It is used for m a n y purposes including radioisotope production. It is not an
important source of export radioisotopes, but it illustrates the general point that
even ageing, low-power reactors could potentially have some impact on the
radioisotope industry if the necessary investments are made.

There are some high-power reactors in the region which are not currently used
radioisotope production, but could possibly be developed, for example the 60 M W
reactor in Kazakhstan (1972) and some of the Russian reactors discussed below.
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RUSSIA
There are seven reactors in the 8-100 M W range used for radioisotope production
in Russia. A number of other large reactors are in operation and could conceivably
produce radioisotopes on a commercial basis in the future. However nearly all of
the reactors date from the 1950s or 1960s.
Reviss Services, the joint venture between Amersham, the Mayak Production
Association, and A O Techsnabexport, is possibly the major source of export
radioisotopes from Russia (see section 6.2).
The Soviet Union had a long history of commercial export of stable isotopes
(some of which are used as targets for radioisotope production). S o m e facilities for
production of stable isotopes in the U S were closed in part because of cheaper
Soviet supply to the U S market. This supply seems to have continued in the postSoviet era - in the early 1990s the DOE's share of the world market for stable
isotopes fell from about 9 0 % to 5 0 % because of competition from Russian
suppliers. (Rojas-Burke, 1993C; Amersham, 1993; Anon., 1996D.)
In the early 1990s, the US DOE considered some sort of joint venture using
Russian facilities for fission Mo-99 production. Nothing eventuated from this
however. (Carretta, 1994.) Given Amersham's venture and the DOE's passing
interest, perhaps there are further possibilities for collaborative ventures.
Berkhout (1993) mentions reports of potential n e w fission Mo-99 suppliers in
Russia but gives little detail, saying only that there are enough suitable reactors
and enough interest in foreign currency for Russia to supply a substantial
proportion of European and Asian markets.
The nuclear infrastructure in Russia is geared around a number of large stateowned institutes involved in various facets of nuclear programs; this
arrangement is similar to the DOE's national laboratories. Brief summaries follow
of the institutes of most significance in relation to radioisotope production. The
institutes liaise with each other to co-ordinate radioisotope production.66
The State Scientific Centre of the Russian Federation Institute of Physics and
Power Engineering (IPPE) is the major producer of medical radioisotopes a m o n g
the various institutes. It produces a wide range of medical radioisotopes using the
8 M W high-flux reactor called BR-10, which first went critical in 1958, and also a 10
& Data on research reactors at the various institutes is drawn from Anon., 1996B.
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M W reactor called A M (1954). It also produces several dozen types of stable
isotopes. The IPPE already exports some of its product, could supply the Australian
market with a number of radioisotopes, and is planning to increase production.
(IPPE, 1996, pers. comm.)

The Institute of Atomic Reactors, Dimitrovgrad, operates at least five resear
reactors with m e d i u m to high power levels: M I R (100 M W ) and SM-2 (100 M W ) ,
both used for radioisotope production, and also RBT-10/1 (10 M W ) , RBT-10/2 (10
M W ) , and RBT-6 (6 M W ) . The Institute produces and sells about eight
radioisotope products. Production of fission Mo-99 is planned to begin from 1998,
with the intention of supplying Russian and overseas customers. The fission M o 99 will meet "Drug Master File" quality standards being developed by the
European Community. (Institute of Atomic Reactors, 1996, pers. comm.)

The Kurchatov Institute operates about eight research reactors, including a 4
reactor (MR) and an 8 M W reactor (IR-8), both of which are used for radioisotope
production.

The St. Petersburg Institute of Nuclear Physics operates two or more research
reactors including W W R - M (18 M W , used for radioisotope production) and PIK
(100 M W ) .
The Ural Nuclear Centre, Ekaterinburg (a branch of the Research and
Construction Institute for Energy Technique, Moscow) operates a 15 M W reactor,
I W - 2 M . (This Centre m a y be the site of the reactor(s) used by Reviss Services.)
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AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST,
AND LATIN AMERICA
RESEARCH REACTORS AS AT DECEMBER 1994 (IAEA, 1994):
Total
Research
Reactors

"Research"/
multipurpose
reactors

Under construcction + [planned]

0

0

ill

1

LATIN AMERICA
ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
ECUADOR
JAMAICA
MEXICO
PERU

AFRICA A N D THE MIDDLE EAST:
ALGERIA
EGYPT
GHANA
IRAN
ISRAEL
LIBYA
MADAGASCAR
MOROCCO
NIGERIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SYRIA
TUNISIA
ZAIRE

1
1
4
2
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

1
1
2
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

TOTAL:

31

21

1

II]
1

m
i
rn

4 + [41

RESEARCH REACTORS OF 5+ M W (IAEA, 1994):
COUNTRY

NUMBER

POWER

CHILE
PERU
ALGERIA
IRAN
ISRAEL
LIBYA
SOUTH AFRICA

1
1
1
1
2
1
1

5 MW
10 M W
15 M W
5 MW
5, 26 M W
10 M W
20 M W
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REACTORS USED FOR RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION:
COUNTRY REACTOR M W AGE RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
D.O.C.
NAME
MW: Steady thermal power levels.
Age: Date of first criticality, given only for reactors of 5+ M W reactors.

PERU

RP-10

10

SOUTH
AFRICA
CHILE

Safari I

20

La Reina
Rech-1

5

BRAZIL
ARGENTINA, IRAN
COLOMBIA, EGYPT,
MEXICO, ZAIRE

1988 Iodine-131, samarium-153 (both exported);
iridium-192 (from 1997); l.s.a. Mo-99
1965 Fission Mo-99, Na-24, Si-131, Ar-41, Co-60,
Br-82,1-131, Ir-192, Au-198.
1974 Tc-99m, 1-131, Ir-192, P-32.
Two <5 M W reactors used for radioisotope
production.
One <5 M W reactor used to produce
radioisotopes in each country.

GENERAL COMMENTS
Despite the number of countries in these regions operating research
overall research reactor infrastructure is small. There are eight research reactors of
5 M W power or more, and some of these reactors (and some smaller reactors) are
used for limited radioisotope production.

It is notable that seven research reactors are under construction or
in these regions. These include reactors of 2 M W or less under construction in
Iran, Morocco and Syria. The reactors planned for Madagascar, Nigeria and
Tunisia will be the first reactors for these countries and are unlikely to be of
consequence to radioisotope users outside these countries. A 22 M W reactor under
construction in Egypt, to be operated by the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority,
could conceivably be of significance in relation to future radioisotope production
and export. Egypt has recently begun producing Mo-99/Tc-99m generators,
presumably using Mo-99 produced in the one operating reactor, which has a
power level of just 2 M W .
According to one report, the Argentinian nuclear agency (CNEA) is a fission
Mo-99 producer (Iturralde, 1996), though almost certainly only a modest producer
since there are no high-power research reactors operating in Argentina. Two more
important producers are the nuclear agencies operating in South Africa (discussed
in section 6.2) and Peru.
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PERU
A high-flux 10 M W reactor, k n o w n as RP-10, has been in operation in Peru since
1988. The reactor, situated 40 k m s from Lima, is operated by the Nuclear Research
Centre, R A S C O , which is an organisation within the Peruvian Institute of
Nuclear Energy, IPEN. A radioisotope processing plant is located alongside the
reactor. The RP-10 reactor has attracted attention from time to time because it has
sufficient power and flux (core m a x i m u m flux of 2 x IO 14 n/cm 2 /sec) for
production of fission Mo-99, it is relatively young, and the reactor operators are
interested in using the reactor for commercial radioisotope production. It w a s seen
as a potential back-up facility in the early 1990s w h e n there were questions over
Nordion's supply. Nordion sent a team to visit the Peruvian facilities but
evidently is no longer interested in a joint venture. There are a number of
obstacles to fission Mo-99 production in Peru: the project would need foreign
investment; competition with the major global suppliers; and political instability.
The President of Peru w a s pushing a large-scale privatisation of government-run
industries in the early 1990s and this has probably encouraged R A S C O to pursue
commercial radioisotope production. (Anon., 1992.)
As at late 1996, the RP-10 reactor was producing iodine-131 and samarium-153,
both of which were being exported. There was also some production of l.s.a. M o 99/Tc-99m for domestic use. There were short-term plans to produce iridium-192
for domestic use and for export. A s for commercial production of fission Mo-99,
the situation had not changed. R A S C O is interested, but a joint venture would be
necessary to provide additional investment. The radioisotope processing plant is
capable of processing m u c h greater volumes of radioisotopes than it is currently
handling. R A S C O plans to upgrade the reactor to 15 M W . ( R A S C O , 1996, pers.
comm.)
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
ANALYSIS OF THE RADIOISOTOPE INDUSTRY
7.1. FUTURE RADIOISOTOPE DEMAND
7.2. FUTURE PRODUCTION LEVELS
7.3. CONCENTRATION OF RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION
7.4. PUBLIC A N D PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
7.5. VERTICAL INTEGRATION
7.6. DEDICATED PRODUCTION FACILITIES
7.7. LINKS BETWEEN RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION A N D NUCLEAR
POWER, WEAPONS, A N D RESEARCH PROGRAMS
7.8. TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS
7.9. CYCLOTRONS A N D LINEAR ACCELERATORS

The analysis in this chapter pulls together a number of issues w
introduced in the preceding two chapters, and takes up some other issues which
need consideration before considering options for the future supply of the
Australian radioisotope market in chapter eight.

7.1. FUTURE RADIOISOTOPE DEMAND

In the preceding two chapters I have said far more about radioisotope production
than about the demand side of the market (i.e. health-care systems and the clinical
practice of nuclear medicine). That emphasis will continue through the following
two chapters but some general comments should be m a d e on growth trends and
future demand for medical radioisotopes.
There are no reliable figures on the world market for radioisotopes, or for
processed radiopharmaceuticals, in the publicly-accessible literature. M u c h data on
sales is kept confidential by private companies. This problem is compounded by
the concentration of the industry with a small number of organisations holding
the lion's share of the market.
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Using a variety of sources, A N S T O (1993F) arrived at the following figures for the
total radiopharmaceutical imaging market in 1992:
Country /Region Market %
($A million)
USA 530 40
Europe
Tapan
Other Asia
Other

360.
360
20
45

27
27
2
4

Totals: $A 1315m. 100%

In addition, the total market for therapeutic radiopharmaceuticals is estimated to
be about $ U S 50-60 ($A 70-90) million p.a. ( A N S T O , 1993F, Annex 7.2.1).
The above figures are the retail markets for processed radiopharmaceuticals; the
market for bulk radioisotopes is far smaller, roughly 10-20% of the radiopharmaceutical market.
The practice of nuclear medicine is highly uneven around the world. Advanced
capitalist countries account for over 9 5 % of the world market. ( A N S T O , 1993F,
Annex 7.1.4, 7.2.1.) Some efforts have been m a d e by the advanced capitalist states
to stimulate the growth of nuclear medicine in developing countries. However
the practice of nuclear medicine in developing countries is minimal, uneven, and
plagued by problems such as a lack of trained personnel and obsolete and rund o w n equipment. The practice of nuclear medicine, and thus the demand for
radioisotopes, is growing in m a n y developing countries, but from such low
starting points that the growth is of little consequence for overall global
radioisotope demand. (Nofal, 1985; 1987; Cuaron, 1994; W a n g and Chou, 1988;
Touya, 1987.)
Even considering only the advanced capitalist countries, and using figures which
take account of population differences between countries, there are variations of
an order of magnitude or more in the practice of nuclear medicine, as indicated by
figures on the number of g a m m a cameras per thousand hospital beds in various
countries (Ell, 1992) and the density of g a m m a cameras per million inhabitants in
various Western European countries (Askienazy, 1993). Historically there were
correlations between the scale of nuclear medicine and the existence of domestic
research reactors (which in turn correlated with nuclear power and weapons
programs), but those correlations have weakened over the years with the growth
of the international trade in radioisotopes. The main reasons for the differences in
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the scale of nuclear medicine practice between capitalist countries are mostly to be
found at the level of economic arrangements for the funding of medical care.
Variations in government licensing and regulation requirements are also
important.
The picture generally presented by practitioners and advocates of nuclear
medicine is one of substantial growth of nuclear medicine around the world.
A N S T O (1993F, Annex 7.1.4) says that an overall growth rate of 8 % is expected for
the total global radioisotope market, but without substantiating the figure. There
is clear, substantiated evidence of substantial and steady growth of nuclear
medicine in m a n y countries around the world. This includes Western Europe and
Japan, two of the major markets. In Western Europe, figures on sales of nuclear
medicine equipment indicate substantial growth of nuclear medicine in the late
1980s and early 1990s - as m u c h as 10-20% p.a. in some countries (Askienazy,
1993). Accurate data on the radiopharmaceuticals market in Japan is compiled, and
the figures show an annual growth rate of about 1 0 % in recent years (Japanese
Society of Nuclear Medicine, 1995, pers. comm.).
Some underlying reasons contribute to the growth of nuclear medicine. Patients
subjected to nuclear medicine procedures are heavily skewed to those over 45
years of age. The ageing of populations in capitalist countries (numbers of elderly
people as a proportion of the overall population) is likely to stimulate further
growth of nuclear medicine ( A N S T O , 1993, pp.4.12-13). Technical progress is
continuing on several fronts; developments in fields such as molecular and
immunological nuclear medicine m a y provide a boost to the overall practice of
nuclear medicine. According to one commentator, products based on radiolabeled
monoclonal antibodies are expected to account for the second largest growth
among medical radioisotopes, after cardiac imaging (Anon., 1993). Further
progress can also be expected in areas such as computer imaging equipment and
this m a y promote greater usage. Another spur to the further growth of nuclear
medicine, and various other diagnostic technologies, has been the threat of
litigation (Patton, 1993; Roebuck, 1996; Nelkin and Tancredi, 1989).
From what has been said it would appear that the future of nuclear medicine is
likely to be one of sustained growth. However there are a range of forces operating
to curtail the growth of nuclear medicine. Particularly important are restraints
stemming from economic stagnation (in particular the efforts of governments
around the world to reduce medical spending), and also increased competition
from alternative technologies. To date these pressures appear to have been felt
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most keenly in the U S , though they are evident in m a n y other countries
including Australia.
According to Shanahan, a nuclear medicine professional writing in The Journal of
Nuclear Medicine in 1995, fewer and fewer nuclear medicine physicians,
technologists, and scientists are entering the field in the U S ; the profession is
ageing at a rapid rate; and the number of nuclear medicine procedures is declining
every year with nuclear medicine under fire from competing technologies.
(Shanahan, 1995,; see also Carretta, 1993; O'Leary, 1995.)
Actually the claim that the number of nuclear medicine procedures is in decline
in the U S is not shared by other commentators. Khafagi (1992) says the overall
annual growth of nuclear medicine in the U S is 3%. Data on sales of nuclear
imaging equipment from 1987-1991 indicated considerable growth (Anon, 1993F).
Kasses (1995) says the growth rate for radiopharmaceutical sales in the early 1990s
was about 1 0 % p.a., with the growth rate of nuclear medicine procedures about 5 %
p.a. (Presumably the difference was because of stronger growth of in vitro
diagnostic studies.) Kasses (1995) goes on to say that only nuclear cardiology is
growing; virtually all other fields are flat or in decline. Even in cardiology,
echocardiology w a s performed seven times as frequently as nuclear perfusion
imaging, and had a growth rate of 2 5 % compared to 1 2 % for nuclear cardiology.
Another notable article in The Journal of Nuclear Medicine is Vermeeren's (1995)
contribution to a series of articles on "Strategies for Survival" for nuclear
medicine in the US. That such a debate is taking place at all is significant.
Vermeeren - Chairperson of the Corporate Committee of the American College of
Nuclear Physicians and the Senior Vice President of Mallinckrodt Medical - says
there is a growing trend to using imaging modalities less expensive than nuclear
medicine in the U S . Nuclear medicine will be forced to compete with other
modalities with both medical value and cost being taken into consideration and
this could emerge as a "critical" variable in nuclear medicine's future. Vermeeren
goes on to say that future growth of nuclear medicine is not certain despite growth
in the past generation, and that radiopharmaceutical suppliers report a flat market
despite the introduction of n e w products.
Vermeeren (1995) notes that the underlying market fundamentals are not very
attractive in the radioisotope industry: a relatively small market; flat growth rates;
a history of low profit margins; enormous competitive intensity, especially in
distribution channels; and the negative environmental impact due to radioactive
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waste. In these circumstances companies are cutting costs by eliminating
unprofitable activities and by staff reduction. (Vermeeren, 1995.)
Ell (1992), writing in the journal Nuclear Medicine Communications, notes that
the market for radiopharmaceuticals is far smaller than the market for m a n y
(other) pharmaceuticals - the annual turnover of a pharmaceutical company can
be about 50 times that of a radiopharmaceutical company. This has considerable
consequences for nuclear medicine. The cost of registration of n e w products is
independent of the projected market size. This is a substantial impediment to the
development and clinical use of n e w products for nuclear medicine. There are
m a n y low-volume specialist products used in nuclear medicine, "perhaps too
many" according to Ell (1992, p.70).
Bringing new radiopharmaceuticals to market has always been limited by the
market size, and development costs have escalated making n e w product
development still more difficult. Products introduced since 1988 accounted for
only 8 % of nuclear medicine procedures in 1993 in the U S . Regulatory standards
for the demonstration of efficacy of radiopharmaceutical products n o w require
either more or more extensive pre-approval studies or significantly limit the
proposed uses of such agents. The cycles for developing n e w products are
becoming longer and more costly. These factors increase development costs and
reduce the return on investment. (Kasses, 1995; Kotz, 1995B.)
Miller (1994), a nuclear medicine professional writing in The Journal of Nuclear
Medicine, backs up m a n y of the points already m a d e and also points to the push
from health-care reformers towards generalist medicine and away from specialist
medicine, and the increasing importance of debates over cost-effectiveness in the
n e w managerial environment. (Miller, 1994.)
Overall it would appear that there is substantial growth in medical radioisotope
markets around the world, but the growth is very uneven, and whether it will be
sustained cannot be predicted with confidence.
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7.2. FUTURE PRODUCTION LEVELS
OVERVIEW
PRODUCTION OF Mo-99
PRODUCTION OF OTHER RADIOISOTOPES
NEW REACTORS A N D REFURBISHMENTS
CONCLUSION
OVERVIEW
A commonly expressed view is that the research reactor infrastructure is in
decline around the world, there are m a n y obstacles to the development of n e w
radioisotope production ventures, and that future supply of medical radioisotopes
is therefore insecure. The survey of radioisotope production in chapter six
supports some aspects of this general argument, but not others; most importantly,
the overall security of supply of medical radioisotopes is not likely to be nearly so
precarious as is c o m m o n l y argued, especially for the small number of
radioisotopes that account for over 9 5 % of all nuclear medicine procedures.

It is certainly the case that the worldwide research reactor infrastructure is in
decline, particularly w h e n the overall number of reactors is taken as the criterion.
This trend is certain to continue. M a n y of the reactors built in the 1950s and 1960s
face closure in the coming 10-20 years. In a number of cases reactors are still
operating despite shut-down schedules having been exceeded (Lagunas-Solar,
1993; Egan et al., 1994). Of the reactors of 5 M W or more used for radioisotope
production, the dates of first criticality (D.O.C.) are as follows (drawn from I N S C
(n.d.) data):
D.O.C. Number %
of Reactors
1950-1969:
1970-1979:
1980-1989:
1990-1994:

39
6
5
3

Totals

53

74
11
9
6
100%

It is also true that there are considerable obstacles to the construction of n e w
reactors or the refurbishment of existing reactors. There are three important,
interlinked obstacles: financial costs, waste storage and disposal costs and
problems, and (in some cases) public opposition.
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The potential for shortages of supply cannot be dismissed in light of the overall
decline of reactor infrastructure and the obstacles to n e w reactors and
refurbishments. H o w e v e r the future of reactor radioisotope production is not
nearly so bleak, for the following reasons.

Firstly, the decline in reactor infrastructure is not so rapid as to be of immediat
concern. The decline has proceeded from a starting point of a very large number of
reactors. A m e r s h a m (1993) noted in its submission to the Research Reactor
Review that "world capacity for reactor space directly available for isotope
generation is actually at a high level and this capacity is under utilised." Contrary
to the c o m m o n view, reactor space and time is no great obstacle to radioisotope
production, nor is it likely to be a crucial limitation in the coming decades. A
more important factor is the commitment, of radiopharmaceutical companies and
nuclear agencies in particular, to use existing facilities for radioisotope production.
This can require s o m e investment, for example reactor modification to facilitate
target irradiation, or construction or upgrading of radioisotope processing
facilities.
In the future a likely scenario is more efficient usage of a more modest overall
reactor infrastructure. The U S illustrates the broader trend, with numerous
projects in train to maximise usage of existing infrastructure for radioisotope
production, neutron b e a m research, commercial activities such as silicon doping,
and so on. The situation that existed in the U S during the first half of the 1990s with dozens of research reactors but little radioisotope production - will probably
become less c o m m o n in the U S and elsewhere.
Secondly, the obstacles to the construction of new radioisotope production
facilities, including research reactors, or the refurbishment of existing facilities, are
substantial, but s o m e n e w reactor projects are underway and certainly
refurbishments are c o m m o n enough. It is likely, though not certain, that the
decline in the n u m b e r of operating research reactors m a y reach a point of
equilibrium, with the impact of shut d o w n s being matched by refurbishments, the
odd n e w reactor, more efficient use of existing facilities, and further development
of non-reactor methods for radioisotope production - and all this without any
major problems with respect to radioisotope production and supply.
Thirdly, a number of technical innovations could ameliorate concerns over future
production and supply. These include innovations enabling more efficient and
widespread reactor production of radioisotopes; n e w types of reactors which m a y
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be less expensive and generate less waste; further development of non-reactor
methods of radioisotope production (esp. cyclotrons, linear accelerators, spallation
sources); research into radioisotopes which m a y replace Mo-99/Tc-99 as the
workhorse of nuclear medicine; and further development of alternative imaging
modalities and other diagnostic and therapeutic technologies which do not
require radioisotopes. These innovations are discussed in more detail in section
7.8.
It needs to be taken into account when assessing claims of imminent shortage of
radioisotope supply that these claims sometimes have an element of self interest
and fear mongering. Such arguments can be overstated to persuade governments
to fund n e w reactors or refurbishments, not least in Australia. In other cases
similar arguments are deployed to support increased research into cyclotron
radioisotope production (e.g. Lagunas-Solar, 1993; Egan et al., 1994). Once again
some overstatement m a y be at work - though a good case can certainly be m a d e
for greater emphasis on non-reactor methods of radioisotope production.

PRODUCTION OF Mo-99
Concerns over future radioisotope production and supply often reflect the
problems encountered with Mo-99 supply in the early 1990s. Those concerns were
well-founded at the time. However since then a number of major projects have
reached fruition, and in hindsight the tenuous Mo-99 supply situation in the early
1990s was less an indicator of future supply problems than a result of a
conjunction of specific factors: unforeseen closure of several important reactors; a
higher level of concentration of fission Mo-99 production than had previously
been in evidence or is likely to be repeated; and rapid increase in d e m a n d through
the 1970s and 1980s.

Another factor leading to the tenuous state of Mo-99 supply in the early 1990s wa
a lack of consciousness a m o n g radioisotope users and radiopharmaceutical
companies that a potential supply problem w a s looming. This complacency was,
as Lagunas-Solar (1993, p.2) says, a result of the "excellent" record of availability of
fission Mo-99 in most regions of the world and the reasonable prices being charged
for Mo-99/Tc-99m generators. The problems of the early 1990s have underpinned,
or at least hastened and given m o m e n t u m to, a number of n e w ventures for
reactor production of fission Mo-99 and also a number of innovative research
projects which m a y resolve some of the fundamental difficulties with fission
Mo-99 production such as the need for high-flux reactors and H E U targets.
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Worldwide supply of Mo-99 will be secure for some decades to come. Indeed there
will be a glut, or at least the capacity to produce Mo-99 considerably in excess of
demand. The reactors in Canada (Maples), Belgium (BR-2), the Netherlands
(HFR), the U S (ACRR), and South Africa (Safari I) will by themselves guarantee
worldwide security of supply for the next 20 years and possibly longer.

There will soon be fission Mo-99 production in about 12 countries, perhaps a few
more. Information on production levels is limited for a number of reasons but the
following estimates give at least some idea. (The figures are at-delivery volumes,
which are lower than production volumes because of decay.)
COUNTRY PRODUCTION OF FISSION Mo-99 (Ci/year)
Canada 600 000+, up to 100% of world demand
Netherlands
150 000+++, most or all of world demand if required67
Belgium
50-150 000
South Africa
50-150 000
USA .
Eventual capacity 200-300 000+
South Korea
Production from the year 2000; some export planned
Australia
13 000
Indonesia
12 000
China
3 000
Russia
? (Probably modest, growing)
France
? (Probably modest)
Argentina
? (Probably modest)
Poland, Hungary, Egypt,
& Czech Republic
? (Possible production)
Peru, Sweden,
several others
None, but potential for development
According to ANSTO's (1993F, p.7.5) calculations, world demand for Mo-99 in the
early 1990s was 560-730 000 Ci/year.68 Even allowing for sustained, substantial
growth in demand, it is highly unlikely that there will be shortages of fission M o 99 for the next 20 years or so.

If the major existing suppliers of fission Mo-99 are unable to meet demand, whic
is highly unlikely, then a string of other modest producers will probably increase
production and other producers are likely to emerge. There has been considerable
interest from a number of countries in producing and exporting fission Mo-99,
including Argentina, Peru, and Indonesia. (Rojas-Burke, 1993D.) In some cases

®- According to Russ Knapp (1996, pers. comm.), a researcher at the O a k Ridge National Laboratory,
Mallinckrodt's Mo-99 production capacity is 20 000 Ci/week, well in excess of world demand.
62
1 will use the A N S T O figures though other estimates differ. Iturralde (1996) gives a figure of 5 700
Ci/week as the world demand for Mo-99, equivalent to 285 000 Ci/year or roughly half of ANSTO's
estimate.
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this interest is highly ambitious. In Argentina, for example, the most powerful
research reactor has a power level of just 2.8 M W and an equally modest flux
level.
There is no question about security of supply of Mo-99 in the coming decades.
Indeed a more revealing question is w h y there is likely to be such an over-capacity
for fission Mo-99 production. The short answer is that fission Mo-99 is one of the
few radioisotopes for which there exists a sizeable world market, and thus the
potential for profitable production. Another issue which follows from the overcapacity of fission Mo-99 production is whether all the production facilities will
maintain financial viability, or whether there will be some consolidation with the
less competitive (and less well subsidised) producers being forced out of the
market.

PRODUCTION OF OTHER RADIOISOTOPES

There is little discussion in the publicly-accessible literature on radioisotopes
than Mo-99/Tc-99m. Nevertheless two conclusions can be drawn from the
available information in relation to other radioisotopes. Firstly, there is very little
likelihood of shortages of the most commonly used medical radioisotopes in the
foreseeable future. Secondly, availability of some radioisotopes, for which there is
little d e m a n d and thus little profit to be m a d e from production and supply, has
always been precarious and this is not likely to change.
Dozens of different radioisotopes are used for both diagnostic and therapeutic
nuclear medicine procedures; n e w applications are being developed all the time
with n e w radioisotopes coming into use (or n e w applications of existing
radioisotopes being developed), while others go out of fashion. There is no need
here to elaborate on the wide range of radioisotopes used in nuclear medicine suffice it to m a k e a few comments on the most frequently used radioisotopes. A
few radioisotopes - Mo-99/Tc-99m, thallium-201 (Tl-201), and gallium-67 (Ga-67)
- account for well over 9 5 % of all nuclear medicine procedures. Another
significant radioisotope is iodine-131, which accounts for 9 0 % or more of all
therapeutic nuclear medicine procedures (although therapeutic procedures
account for just 1-2% of all nuclear medicine). Iodine-131 is also used for some
functional imaging procedures. It accounts for only a small percentage of all
nuclear medicine procedures, but it is far more expensive than most other
radioisotopes.
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Radiopharmaceutical markets (data drawn from Morris, 1993; Egan et al., 1994):
Radioisotope Mo-99 Tl-201 Ga-67 1-131
Estimated world
market ($US million)*:

300

350

50

300

Percentage of nuclear
medicine procedures:

80-90

10-15

<5

<5

Percentage of world
market by cost:

30%

35%

5%

30%

Production method: Reactor Cyclotron Cyclotron Reactor

* These are retail figures for processed radiopharmaceuticals (including Mo-99/Tc
99m generators). The markets for bulk radioisotopes are far smaller. For example
the worldwide bulk Mo-99 market is estimated at about $ U S 50 million p.a.
(Anon., 1995E).
Summing the markets for these four radioisotopes gives a total of $US 1 billion.
This is roughly equivalent to A N S T O ' s (1993F, Annex 7.2.1) figure of $ U S 910
million ($A 1315 million) for the total radiopharmaceutical imaging market. All
these figures should be treated as rough estimates because of factors such as
commercial confidentiality and the fragmented and fluid nature of radioisotope
production and markets.

There is no likelihood - at least for the next 20-30 years or so - of a shortage o
any of these four radioisotopes. Mo-99 has been discussed. Thallium-201 and
gallium-67 are widely produced using cyclotrons. High specific activity iodine-131,
along with some other radioisotopes including xenon-133 and iodine-125, can be
produced as by-products of fission Mo-99 production. All fission-product
radioisotopes will benefit from the various projects to increase production of
fission Mo-99. Indeed given the over-capacity of Mo-99 production, some
producers m a y put more effort into sales of other fission-product radioisotopes.
Iodine-131 is the second most important fission-product radioisotope after Mo-99,
and both fission-product iodine-131 and l.s.a. iodine-131 will, according to
Amersham (1993), be freely available worldwide for the foreseeable future.
Apart from these four major radioisotopes, other radioisotopes used for clinical
nuclear medicine or medical research can be considered in two broad categories.
Firstly there are radioisotopes which are reasonably easy to produce, whether
using particle accelerators (especially commercial cyclotrons) or reactors. In some
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cases there is substantial d e m a n d for particular radioisotopes for industrial uses,
and additional production for medical markets can be achieved easily and
profitably, e.g. iridium-192. Overall, the subsidisation of reactor radioisotope
production, and the modest marginal costs of producing radioisotopes using
existing facilities, has facilitated the production and supply of the wide range of
radioisotopes that are currently in use.

The second category comprises those radioisotopes which are less freely availab
for various reasons: they are difficult to produce (e.g. requiring high-flux reactors,
limited availability or high cost of target material); they are too short-lived for
widespread transport and use; and/or the market is small and there is little or no
opportunity for profitable production. Radioisotopes used for research are
particularly prominent in this second category. Inevitably, availability of these
radioisotopes tends to be limited and precarious, even in countries such as the U S
with a large reactor and accelerator infrastructure and a high level of clinical
nuclear medicine and research. Government funding is almost always necessary
for these radioisotopes to be available. Sometimes private companies produce
these radioisotopes in the hope of stimulating the development of a profitable
market, but predicting d e m a n d for m a n y radioisotopes is difficult and this deters
investment (O'Leary, 1995).
NEW REACTORS AND REFURBISHMENTS
There are several obstacles to the construction of research reactors and the
refurbishment of existing reactors, in particular cost, radioactive waste problems,
and sometimes public opposition. For n e w reactors the question of cost is
particularly salient. To satisfy neutron beam researchers, reactors of ever-higher
neutron flux, equipped with all sorts of gadgetry (e.g. cold sources to change the
wavelength of neutron beams) are in demand. Thus the price tags for n e w reactors
are often extremely high: over $ A 500 million for the G e r m a n FRM-II, and $ A 3-4
billion or more for the (abandoned) Advanced Neutron Source project in the US.
Despite the obstacles, a number of research reactors are under construction or
planned.
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RESEARCH REACTORS UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR PLANNED
(IAEA, 1994; 1995):
Under Planned Power (MW)
construction
Russian Fed.
Slovak Republic
Canada
United States
Tapan
Kazakhstan
Egypt
Iran
Morocco
Svria
France
Germanv
Tunisia
Nieeria

1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1

1 **
i **

1
1
1
1
1

Thailand
Ecuador
Madagascar
Totals:

1
1
1*

12

100.100
<1, no data
10.10
<1
30. <1. <1
200
22
<1
2
<1
100
20
no data
1
5
no data
no data

10

* This is the back-up Maple, not included in the IAEA data.
** The R J H and FRM-II reactors, not listed in I A E A data.

Of these 22 reactors, the two Canadian Maples are of great significance in rela
to future radioisotope production. The French and German reactors will be highpower, high-flux reactors but probably only modest radioisotope producers. The 5
M W reactor in Thailand will produce modest volumes of radioisotopes. The three
reactors under construction in Japan are primarily for research and testing in
support of the nuclear power program, and will thus have little impact on the
radioisotope industry. The two high-power reactors in the Russian Federation
might be used for commercial radioisotope production but I have little
information. Both aretobe operated by the Russian Federation Atomic Energy
Ministry. O n e has been under construction since 1976, which suggests the project
may have stalled, and perhaps the planned reactor will be a long time coming or it
will be abandoned. The 200 M W reactor under construction in Kazakhstan is
listed in the IAEA's "test" category, which makes it less likely to be of significance
in relation to radioisotope production (most radioisotope-producing reactors are
listed in the "research" category). There is at least some possibility that the
Egyptian 22 M W reactor will be used for commercial radioisotope production and
export. Most of the other reactors under construction or planned are <1 M W
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reactors and are therefore of no interest. O n e reactor not listed above is the 50 M W
research reactor under construction at Khusab in Pakistan (see chapter 2). This
reactor is not listed in I A E A data - perhaps it is not classified as a research reactor.
In any case the reactor is unlikely to be of importance in relation to radioisotope
production and export.
In the nuclear power industry, emphasis is being placed on more efficient and
longer-term usage of existing facilities as an alternative to the construction of n e w
reactors. A similar trend is in evidence with research reactors, a recent expression
of which w a s the 1996 I A E A seminar on enhancement of research reactor
utilisation, which dealt with radioisotope production a m o n g other things.
Refurbishments are undertaken for the following reasons: repair or replacement
of failed, w o r n or obsolescent parts; accommodation of n e w user facilities;
upgrading or modernising systems; and/or responses to evolving safety and
regulatory requirements. In m a n y cases, a number of these factors have led to a
number of reactor refurbishments over the years. (McDonald, 1992.)

The trend to refurbish research reactors, as an alternative to building new reacto
or simply going without, has implications for future radioisotope production. O n e
consequence is that reactor refurbishments have enabled the development of a
number of radioisotope production ventures around the world and thus increased
security of supply. Fission Mo-99 illustrates the trend. The five biggest fission M o 99 producers over the next 10-20 years will probably be Nordion, S C K - C E N ,
Mallinckrodt, the U S D O E , and the S A A E C . Four of these five ventures involve
refurbished reactors, with only Nordion using n e w reactors.

A related issue is the longevity of refurbished reactors. Since the first research
reactors were built just over 50 years ago, predicting the longevity of refurbished
reactors is a dubious science. A s with power reactors, research reactors inevitably
suffer the effects of ageing, such as radiation-induced alloy embrittlement,
temperature and pressure effects, fatigue and wear, corrosion, and erosion (Krull,
1994B). In other words research reactors cannot be operated indefinitely. O n the
other hand the cost of refurbishment for research reactors is not nearly as high as
for power reactors. In m a n y cases, design limitations, tied in with program-related
redundancies, are m o r e important life-span determinants for research reactors
than costs associated with operation or refurbishment. (Krull, 1995.)
Considerable resources have been invested in the refurbishment of a number of
reactors around the world. These refurbishments would not have occurred if
there was not some expectation of continued operation for, say, 10-20 years or
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more. However what little empirical evidence there is suggests that refurbished
reactors are not expected to last m u c h longer than 10-20 years. The Belgian BR-2
reactor will operate for just another 15 years despite a major, recent refurbishment
involving a shut d o w n of the reactor for 12-18 months. In Sweden, Studsvik
Nuclear plans to operate the R 2 - M T R reactor, which first went critical in 1960, for
another 20 years; in other words it m a y have a life span of 60 years or possibly
more. It is expected that the G e r m a n FRG-I reactor will be used until the year 2010,
by which time it will have operated for over 50 years (Krull, 1995).
Another consideration is that longevity depends in part on the commitment of
reactor operators to refurbish reactors and the willingness of governments to fund
such projects: sometimes extremely costly and time-consuming refurbishments
have been carried out to allow for continued operation. In a review of research
reactors in the Asia / West Pacific region, McDonald (1992), an A N S T O employee,
concludes that with careful maintenance, operation, and refurbishment, even the
oldest research reactors might be used for m a n y more years.
Almost three quarters of the 5+ MW reactors currently used for radioisotope
production were built in the 1950s or 1960s. M a n y of these are certain to be
permanently shut d o w n in the next 10-20 years. However on the strength of what
has been said it can be predicted that the closure of this cohort of reactors will be
spread out over a longer period; some, particularly those built in the mid to late
1960s, are likely to be in operation for another 30+ years.

Returning to the specific case of fission Mo-99, reactors in a number of countri
will probably face closure before, say, 2020. These include some reactors which are
or promise to be major producers of fission Mo-99 - BR-2, H F R (Belgium), A C R R ,
and Safari 1. S o m e reactors used for modest production levels will also face
closure, including reactors in Australia, Russia, and perhaps elsewhere. However
a number of high-power, high-flux reactors will remain in operation beyond 2020.
Nordion should be able to continue to meet a large part of world demand using
the two dedicated Maples. In addition, reactors in the following countries will or
could be producing fission Mo-99 beyond 2020, though production levels are in
doubt: Indonesia (30 M W , first criticality in 1987), South Korea (30 M W , 1994),
Peru (10 M W , 1988), China (125 M W , 1979), and possibly the reactors planned in
Germany and France. In addition there m a y be some "dark horses" a m o n g
recently-built reactors, and some n e w reactors m a y be built and have an impact.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, it is highly unlikely that declining research reactor infrastructure will
cause serious shortages of radioisotopes over the next 20 years. In the longer term,
declining research reactor infrastructure m a y be felt more keenly but this is b y no
means certain. A t least s o m e of the technical innovations discussed in section 7.8
will balance the impact of declining reactor infrastructure. Another important
factor is that if the declining reactor infrastructure is the Achilles heel of
radioisotope production, this is balanced b y the nature of reactor radioisotope
production, with the potential for a very small number of reactors (just one in the
case of the Canadian N R U reactor) to produce the entire world d e m a n d for
radioisotopes.

7.3. CONCENTRATION OF RADIOISOTOPE
PRODUCTION
OVERVIEW
MOLYBDENUM PRODUCTION: A MONOPOLY TO A CARTEL?
OVERVIEW
A number of radioisotope producers have pulled out of the industry over the
years. Ice (1995) offers the following reasons: market forces; an "inordinate" array
of regulations; difficulties in locating and establishing production facilities; and
radioactive waste problems and costs. Despite the loss of a number of producers,
commercial radioisotope production for export markets is not as concentrated
n o w as it w a s in the early 1990s; there have been increases in both the number of
producers and the n u m b e r of facilities.
The first argument to be developed here is that a reasonably high level of
concentration in the industry is not entirely problematic; indeed it m a y be the
most conducive situation for sustained radioisotope production and security of
supply for radioisotope users. Another issue to be considered here concerns the
relations between Mo-99 producers; in simple terms it could be argued that the
near-monopoly of the early 1990s has given w a y to something resembling a cartel.
The level of reliance on Nordion in the early 1990s was problematic, but a
substantial degree of concentration is not entirely problematic in terms of overall
production levels and security of supply. This issue has s o m e parallels in broader
debates about the relationship between industry concentration and technological
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innovation. A reasonably high degree of concentration can encourage technological innovation because of the high costs and risks that are often involved: large
firm size, and a high degree of control over a market, can insure against loss. O n
the other hand complete monopolisation can have a negative impact: firms m a y
sit on an existing product if they have captured the market and are secure and
satisfied with the situation, and conversely the existence of threats or even
potential threats from smaller companies can encourage innovation throughout
an industry. There is no clear evidence of a generally valid relationship between
concentration and levels of innovative activity, but m u c h of the research supports
the generalisation that innovation is usually highest w h e n industry structure is
somewhere between complete monopolisation and even competition between a
number of companies. (Baldwin and Scott, 1987; Hard, 1993, pp.422-423.)
The issue of reactor radioisotope production levels and security of supply is in
some respects different from the issue of technological innovation in that the
former m a y depend primarily on the use of existing technologies rather than
innovation. Nevertheless the issues are similar, and the evidence from the
radioisotope industry suggests that a reasonably concentrated though not totally
monopolised industry is the situation most conducive to continuity of production
and security of supply. Recent history suggests that only the companies with a
major share of the world market - Nordion, Mallinckrodt, and A m e r s h a m - are
in a position to be undertaking substantial upgrading of radioisotope production
facilities including (in Nordion's case) the construction of n e w reactors. In this
sense concentration facilitates increased production and greater security of supply
around the world. (The U S D O E (Sandia) and the S A A E C go against this trend, but
those ventures were crucially dependent on the existence of suitable facilities and
also public-sector funding.) In the absence of investments from the major private
companies, there would either be greater problems with availability of
radioisotopes or a greater level of public-sector production and subsidisation than
currently exists.
Concentration in the radioisotope industry is in some respects an impediment for
would-be producers or small producers to invest in n e w production facilities or to
upgrade existing facilities: the major producers enjoy economies of scale which
make it difficult for smaller competitors to enter the market or to increase their
market share. Nevertheless more modest production ventures are proceeding,
most of them publicly-funded and using existing research reactor facilities.
To sum up, it might be the case that further marginal shifts in the level of
concentration in the radioisotope industry would improve future security of
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supply, but it is unlikely that a substantial swing in one direction or the other
would do so.
MOLYBDENUM PRODUCTION: A MONOPOLY TO A CARTEL?

Firstly, I will discuss the issue of Nordion's near-monopoly position as suppl
80-90+% of the world demand for fission Mo-99 from the early to mid 1990s. Has
Nordion used its strong position in the market to its advantage and to the
disadvantage of competitors, would-be competitors, hospitals, patients, and other
interested parties? The two most obvious ways it could do this would be to
discourage the establishment of other fission Mo-99 production ventures, or
secondly to use its strong position to charge unduly high prices.

It is possible that Nordion may have used its position to curtail the developme
of new fission Mo-99 projects. D u Pont's agreement in the early 1990s to buy
Mo-99 exclusively from Nordion for a period of 10 years m a y be an example. If not
for that agreement, D u Pont m a y have put more effort into negotiations with the
U S D O E towards the conversion of the O m e g a West reactor. Several other
radiopharmaceutical companies have long-term supply agreements with
Nordion, but they are not exclusive supply agreements. Overall, there is no
evidence of Nordion attempting to limit the development of n e w fission Mo-99
production facilities beyond the one, ambiguous case of the D u Pont agreement.

As for prices, it does not seem that Nordion was charging unduly high prices in
the early 1990s. It is true that Mallinckrodt's venture in the Netherlands was
motivated partly by a desire to protect itself against price increases, but it seems
that those concerns were hypothetical in nature. In the abundant literature on
efforts to re-establish domestic fission Mo-99 production in the U S (or to increase
security of supply some other way), there is no mention of Nordion charging
excessive costs nor that the DOE-led Mo-99 project would act as a check on price
increases. It is also notable that Nordion's first substantial price increase for some
years came in 1996, w h e n there was already greater competition, and this increase
was specifically linked to the Maple project.
Nor is there much evidence that Nordion's strong position in the bulk Mo-99
industry had any important effect on the retail arm of the industry. A m e r s h a m
might have had hopes of preferential treatment given its 14.9% stake in Nordion,
but A N S T O (1993F, Annex 7.1.3) says that A m e r s h a m did not receive preferential
treatment in relation to pricing. M a n y of the major radiopharmaceutical
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companies had (and still have) long-term contracts with Nordion and there is no
indication that any were given preferential treatment.
Anything that might be said about Nordion's near-monopoly position in the early
1990s is largely redundant n o w given the n e w production ventures. Of more
pressing concern is the cartel-like manoeuvrings between Nordion and other bulk
Mo-99 producers. The issue is basically that there seems to be only limited interest
among the n e w producers in competing with Nordion for established markets,
particularly in the US. Thus a D O E representative (quoted in Kotz, 1996) says that
the D O E will be competing "in a small way" with Nordion (and Mallinckrodt) in
the U S market, but "small" is certainly the operative word given that the D O E will
only provide a back-up service, it will not be under-cutting private suppliers in
relation to prices, and it is keen to privatise the venture or it m a y moth-ball the
Mo-99 production facilities w h e n the Canadian Maples are operating. Similarly
Mallinckrodt has m a d e a large investment in the Petten project but claims that it
will only use Petten-produced Mo-99 to supply existing customers, not to compete
for Nordion's customers. W h y this is so is a matter of speculation: possibly
Mallinckrodt's reliance on Nordion as a back-up supplier is the key factor.
Another example is the radioisotope operations in Belgium. The complicated
arrangements between Nordion, IRE, and the reactor operator S C K - C E N are
difficult to piece together, but it seems that SCK-CEN's BR-2 reactor will be used
mainly as a back-up facility, and IRE's major role is as a back-up supplier. Perhaps
the modest role of S C K - C E N and IRE has more to do with limited market
opportunities and modest production capacity than with cartel-like manoeuvring
in the industry. In addition, the limited use of the production and processing
facilities in Belgium to compete for export markets m a y reflect Nordion's
involvement - evidently Nordion has an exclusive supply agreement in relation
to the S C K - C E N , which would limit the latter's capacity to compete for markets,
and IRE has a back-up agreement with Nordion and m a y even be part-owned by
Nordion.
The South African Atomic Energy Commission (SAAEC) seems to have
maintained some distance from the collusion between the producers just
mentioned. It has a mutual back-up supply arrangement with IRE, but that is
unremarkable. The S A A E C has plans to increase its export sales and presumably
expects to do this at the expense of other bulk producers. It has yet to break into the
large markets of Western Europe or North America: it is unclear whether this is
because of limited opportunities or for some other reason. The S A A E C does not
appear to be interested in competing with A N S T O for the Australian market,
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although it supplies A N S T O during routine H I F A R shut downs. The S A A E C
(1997, pers. comm.) says that " W e view A N S T O / A R I as a m u c h valued customer
and have no intention to compete with them in the Australian radioisotope
market." O n e could speculate that the S A A E C does not like its chances of breaking
ANSTO's stranglehold on the Australian market, and considers it preferable to
maintain good relations to secure its position as a back-up supplier.
Indicative of the level of cooperation between the major Mo-99 producers (and
some other radiopharmaceutical companies), w a s the establishment in the mid
1990s of a body called the Council on Radionuclides and Radiopharmaceuticals,
Inc. ( C O R A R ) . The members of C O R A R are the major radiopharmaceutical
manufacturers in the U S - D u Pont, Mallinckrodt, Medi-Physics, Amersham, and
Nordion. (Seidel, 1995.) O n e of the objectives of C O R A R is to ensure continuity of
supply through back-up agreements between the m e m b e r organisations. N o doubt
it pursues the collective interests of the industry in other ways, such as lobbying
government.

Clearly there is a good deal of cooperation between the major producers of fissi
Mo-99. Whether this is problematic, and whether the arrangements qualify as a
cartel, is another matter. It is possible that Nordion's recent price increase, of 4 0 %
or less, was facilitated by the unwillingness of other producers to compete for its
markets. However as discussed (in chapter 6.2) the price increase seems to be less
an opportunistic manoeuvre than a legitimate means of funding the n e w Maples,
and it will have only a minor impact on hospital radiopharmaceutical budgets.

Certainly there is nothing objectionable in the major producers establishing bac
up agreements; indeed that is essential given that all reactors are subject to routine
shut downs. Nor is it unusual or inherently sinister for competitors in any
particular industry to establish a peak body such as C O R A R .

The collusion/cooperation exists alongside a degree of competition. It appears t
it is the U S market where there is the least competition, with both the D O E and
Mallinckrodt showing little inclination to compete with the third supplier,
Nordion. Supply of the European market m a y be more competitive, notwithstanding the complicated w e b of back-up agreements, supply agreements
(sometimes exclusive), and cross-ownership between Nordion, Mallinckrodt, IRE,
and SCK-CEN. There is no indication in the publicly-accessible literature of cartellike collusion in relation to markets in the Asian region, although it is notable
that the S A A E C says it will not compete with A N S T O for the Australian market.
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To the extent that the intermediate, processing /retailing segment of the
radioisotope industry can still be distinguished from bulk production, it seems
that there is still considerable competition at this level. Indicative of this w a s the
1994 decision of Amersham/Medi-Physics that it would no longer distribute
products in the U S through Syncor/Du Pont. Syncor's response w a s to look for
alternative suppliers, and the most likely outcome of this w a s intense competition
between Syncor and A m e r s h a m for supply of customers previously supplied by
Amersham-via-Syncor. (Funari, 1995.)
The falling out between Amersham/Medi-Physics and Syncor/Du Pont could be
indicative of things to come, and there must also be a reasonable likelihood that
the intense competitiveness in the intermediate segment of the industry will
become more c o m m o n in relation to bulk production. Given the substantial overcapacity of radioisotope production which has emerged in the past few years, and
the modest size of the international radioisotope export market, there is a good
chance that some producers will struggle to m a k e a profit and to maintain
viability in the coming years. This could easily result in fiercer competition.

7.4. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
In the 10-20 years after World War II, radioisotope production was dominated by
state-controlled institutions - in particular science research organisations and the
newly-developing nuclear agencies. Radioisotope production w a s closely tied to
military programs, under tight regulation, and shrouded in secrecy. O n e
illustration of this is that in the U S , shortly after the war, shipments of medical
radioisotopes from the reactor at O a k Ridge National Laboratories were diverted
to the Berkeley cyclotron facility, then shipped to hospitals from Berkeley and
advertised as having being produced using the cyclotron. The reason for this was
that reactor flux could be calculated from the specific activity of the radioisotopes,
and for plutonium production that w a s a secret parameter. (Smathers and Myers,
1985; Smathers, 1996, pers. comm.)
Since then the links between radioisotope production and nuclear weapons and
power programs have weakened and private companies have assumed a more
important role in radioisotope production. A range of public, private, and hybrid
structures n o w exist in relation to bulk radioisotope production, and private
companies dominate in the downstream segments of the industry. Here I will
discuss the extent to which private companies have become involved in
radioisotope production. Then I will briefly canvass debates over the politics of
ongoing state support for reactor radioisotope production.
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There are t w o main pressures leading to the privatisation and commercialisation
of radioisotope production. O n e is economic stagnation, with governments
around the world less willing to fund nuclear programs and radioisotope
production. A second driving force is that private radiopharmaceutical companies
have s h o w n at least s o m e willingness to invest in research reactor facilities (and a
greater willingness to invest in cyclotrons dedicated to radioisotope production).
As a response to economic problems, a common response from governments has
been to privatise public assets as a short-term financial fix. Governments are
particularly keen to privatise public institutions and programs that are nonprofitable, but these are of course the very institutions and programs that the
private sector is least interested in. In lieu of privatisation, governments have
pursued such strategies as corporatisation - reshaping public institutions to run
on a more commercial basis, either as an end in itself or as a first step to
privatisation - or partial privatisation of profitable components of public-sector
programs.
There has been limited potential for governments to privatise civil nuclear
programs based on research reactors. There istightregulation of such programs
because of issues such as reactor safety, the potential for covert weapons
development, the possibility of terrorist actions directed at research reactors, and
so on. Moreover the private sector has been reluctant to invest in research reactor
facilities.
According to ANSTO (1993L, p.3.13), about ten research reactors around the world
are owned and operated by private companies and are used for commercial
purposes. These reactors go against the grain. In all probability they are low-power
reactors with specific functions related to nuclear power or weapons programs. A s
for multipurpose reactors, there has been m u c h less private-sector interest. The
Research Reactor Review (1993, p.119) found only one overseas example of a
company contributing to the costs of a research reactor, and that w a s only for the
costs of a specific instrument to improve the quality of silicon doping. At most
other research reactor facilities, the Review went on to say, industry has been
given free access initially and charged only subsequently, and then usually at
subsidised prices. Actually there are s o m e examples of radiopharmaceutical
companies contributing to the costs of research reactor projects - n e w reactors m
Nordion's case and refurbishments in other cases (e.g. Mallinckrodt, A m e r s h a m ) .
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Given the extremely limited potential for full-scale privatisation of research
reactor programs, governments have pursued a number of alternative strategies
to lessen the financial burden of these programs. Funding reductions, resulting in
rationalisation of research reactor programs, have been c o m m o n . M a n y shut
downs of research reactors have been partly or largely a result of funding cuts.
Another option is partial privatisation of aspects of research reactor programs.
There are some notable examples of this in relation to radioisotope production.
Nordion and A m e r s h a m were originally attached to A E C L and the U K Atomic
Energy Authority, respectively, and both were privatised.
A weaker form of privatisation is corporatisation, with the commercial operations
of nuclear agencies being refashioned as commercial entities though still
connected to the nuclear agency. Typically this is associated with a reduction or
withdrawal of state funding; the corporatised entity is expected to support itself
through radioisotope sales or other commercial activities. A n example of
corporatisation is Australian Radioisotopes, established in 1987 as a commercial
subsidiary of A N S T O though still supported and subsidised by A N S T O (and
indirectly by the government). A similar process has been carried out in the U S on
occasions: companies are paid to run government nuclear facilities but must keep
government price controls and turn over any profit to the D O E (Kotz, 1996). As
the examples of A m e r s h a m and Nordion demonstrate, corporatisation can be a
step along the road to privatisation.
Forms of commercialisation, weaker than both privatisation and corporatisation,
can take place without any significant structural change to the agencies involved.
This is w h e n nuclear agencies, usually under direction from government, place
greater emphasis on cost reductions and cost recovery through sales. This has
taken place in dozens of countries including Australia, Austria, China, South
Africa, Russia, the U K , and the U S .
Another solution to the financial burden of research reactor programs has been
cost-sharing collaborations. For research reactors used primarily for neutron beam
research (often in support of nuclear power programs), the tendency has been for
governments of different countries to pool resources. O n e example is the Institute
Laue-Langevin in France, a collaboration between six European countries which
operates the 57 M W H F R reactor ( A N S T O , 1993L, pp.3.25-3.26). Another example
is the 25 M W H B W R reactor in Norway, which is funded as a co-operative
research project between ten O E C D countries ( A N S T O , 1993L, p.3.23; IAEA, 1994).
A third example is the Petten H F R reactor in the Netherlands, which is used for
neutron b e a m research as well as radioisotope production. The research is under
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the direction of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, and also
involves the Energy Research Foundation. (Mallinckrodt, 1996.) A fourth example
is the South Korean H A N A R O reactor, which K A E R I hopes to operate as an
international research centre. There are also a number of examples of
collaborative ventures involving high-power accelerators.
With respect to radioisotope production, there is a similar trend towards
collaborative ventures, but the collaborations are different in nature. Rather than
being collaborations between governments (and state institutions such as civil
nuclear agencies), radioisotope-production collaborations generally involve major
radiopharmaceutical companies and nuclear agencies. The most significant
examples here are Nordion's collaboration with A E C L , Mallinckrodt's
collaboration with the operators of the Petten reactor, and Amersham's venture
in Russia. There are a number of other reactors around the world which have
some potential for collaborative development of this nature, such as those in
South Korea, Peru, Sweden, the U S (Sandia), and Indonesia.

It is possible to argue that public subsidisation of radiopharmaceutical companies
has been excessive, that the radioisotope industry is another example of
government industry policies "opening the coffers of the state to plunder by
industrialists w h o could claim large subsidies for doing what they had fully
intended to do anyway." (Holmes and Sharp, 1989, pp.1-2.). Private companies
have become used to supply from government-owned reactors and have been
unwilling to invest resources themselves. That reluctance has been amply
illustrated with the fission Mo-99 saga in the U S over the past five years, and it
was evident in Nordion's dispute with A E C L . In the absence of publicly-funded
alternatives, the radiopharmaceutical companies have s h o w n some willingness to
invest resources themselves.
Another form of strong and arguably excessive support of private radioisotope
producers has been the restrictions operating in the U S and Japan on public-sector
competition with private producers. To give an example of problems arising from
this policy, in 1989 the D O E pulled out of production of enriched oxygen-18 water
(which is used to produce radioactive fluorine-18, one of the most important
radioisotopes for positron emission tomography). This left a single company,
Isotec, producing the product. Prices rose markedly and Isotec w a s unable to meet
demand. (Anon., 1993D.)

Whatever might be said about public-sector subsidisation of corporate interests in
the radioisotope industry, it is clear that radioisotope markets are not sufficiently
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large, w h e n weighed against the capital and operating costs of production facilities,
for radioisotope production to be satisfactorily left to the private sector alone.
Supply of low-volume, unprofitable radioisotopes in particular requires publicsector support. Although radiopharmaceutical companies have s h o w n some
willingness to invest in reactor facilities, the overall picture is that some degree of
state support is essential for research reactor programs and for reactor radioisotope
production. Nordion's investment in the n e w Maple reactors is the closest
example of a reactor radioisotope production venture which has been largely
funded privately. H o w e v e r even in that example, there is some capital
investment from the government and A E C L , an interest-free loan to Nordion,
and Nordion will undoubtedly m a k e use of the publicly-funded nuclear
infrastructure, especially for waste storage/disposal. Mallinckrodt and A m e r s h a m
have m a d e even m o r e extensive use of publicly-funded nuclear infrastructure,
including the use of existing reactors.

While it is true that ongoing state support is necessary for radioisotope productio
(some radioisotopes more than others), this need not be taken as an argument for
domestic production. Rather, there is a need for state support whether this
involves domestic production or importation or a mixture of both.

7.5. VERTICAL INTEGRATION

Vertical integration is a typical method by which companies secure their place in a
market and maximise profits by reducing uncertainties and increasing efficiencies.
It has affected the development of a number of diagnostic imaging modalities
(Blume, 1992, p.45). Vertical integration in the radioisotope industry has involved
several overlapping processes. O n e has been m o v e m e n t "downstream", with
radiopharmaceutical companies assuming more of the functions previously
carried out in hospitals. A n associated aspect of downstream integration has been
closer integration between the radioisotope and pharmaceutical industries.
Another aspect of the vertical integration of the radioisotope industry has been for
radiopharmaceutical companies to extend their activities "upstream" into bulk
radioisotope production.
I will focus most of these comments on the fission Mo-99 industry, but most of the
companies discussed are also major suppliers of other radioisotopes, and most of
the changes in the industry have had similar effects for other radioisotopes.
Before considering the radioisotope industry, some brief comments on imaging
equipment and reactor construction. The radioisotope industry is neatly separated
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from the industries producing imaging equipment (esp. cameras and computer
systems). Companies such as Siemens and Toshiba are involved in both the
imaging equipment industry and research reactor construction, but they are not
involved in radioisotope production. S o m e other organisations are involved in
both research reactor construction and radioisotope production, including General
Atomics (USA), the U S D O E , Techsnabexport (Russia), and A E C L would qualify
here given its close association with Nordion. These links are of no great
significance however. They involve very large, multifaceted organisations, and in
most cases research reactor construction and radioisotope production are largely
separate aspects of their operations. Moreover there is no sign of a trend for
research reactor constructors to m o v e into the field of radioisotope production,
and conversely it would of course be an enormous leap for companies focused on
radioisotope production to m o v e into reactor construction. The most important
link between reactor construction and radioisotope production is that some
constructors of power reactors have put more emphasis on construction and sales
of research reactors in response to the decline in the nuclear power industry (see
section 7.7).
No more needs to be said about the reactor construction and imaging equipment
industries. A s for the radioisotope industry, it has historically been split between
three levels:
i) bulk radioisotope production;
ii)
intermediate functions (e.g. generator manufacture, supply of cold kits,
retailing, marketing, etc.), generally carried out by the radiopharmaceutical
iii)

companies and some nuclear agencies (e.g. A N S T O , S A A E C ) ; and
final processing functions, producing ready-to-use radiopharmaceuticals,
historically carried out in hospitals but increasingly carried out by regional
radiopharmacies o w n e d and operated by radiopharmaceutical companies.

The radioisotope industry is undergoing major and fairly rapid change. The
industry is no longer neatly split between these three levels. O n e of the most
important processes has been for radiopharmaceutical companies to m o v e
"upstream" into radioisotope production. Given the costs and other restrictions
associated with reactors, the most c o m m o n method for radiopharmaceutical
companies to m o v e into bulk radioisotope production has been to purchase
cyclotrons which are used for commercial radioisotope production, and
sometimes also research. Most or all of the major radiopharmaceutical companies
operate cyclotrons: A m e r s h a m , Nordion, Mallinckrodt, and the Japanese company
Nihon Medi-Physics each operate between one and eight. The capital costs of
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cyclotrons run into the tens of millions of dollars, but capital and operating costs
are far less than for reactors, they generate far less radioactive waste, and they are
cheaper and less problematic than reactors in relation to liability in the case of
accident.
As for reactors, there are several examples of upstream integration into bulk
radioisotope production. O n e is Mallinckrodt's venture in the Netherlands.
Another is Nordion, the first radiopharmaceutical company to have invested
funds towards the construction of a n e w reactor. A m e r s h a m has pursued a
number of strategies to increase its involvement in radioisotope production or to
increase security of supply by other means: it o w n e d a 14.9% stake in Nordion for
some time; it has secured a long-term contract with Nordion; it is involved in the
joint venture in Russia; and it has agreements of some sort with other reactor
radioisotope producers. Other companies seem to be satisfied to maintain nothing
more than an arms-length involvement in reactor radioisotope production. D u
Pont has a 10-year contract for Mo-99 supply with Nordion, and it has
strengthened its role in the processing /retailing arm of the industry through its
agreement to take on Nordion's sales and marketing operations in Europe. It
should be noted that D u Pont does not seem to be totally uninterested in more
direct involvement in reactor radioisotope production; its involvement with the
D O E project to develop the O m e g a West reactor facility in the early 1990s indicates
a willingness to tread the same path as its competitors. M o r e recently, the decision
of Amersham/Medi-Physics not to supply Syncor (linked to D u Pont) with
proprietary products might encourage Syncor/Du Pont to m o v e upstream into
reactor radioisotope production.
More direct involvement in radioisotope production has potential advantages in
terms of radioisotope costs and security of supply. The costs of research reactor
construction, refurbishment, and operation set limits on the extent to which
upstream integration can be pursued. Nevertheless there is a clear trend in this
direction, with collaborations between radiopharmaceutical companies and
operators of existing reactors being more likely than n e w reactors. Radiopharmaceutical companies are also likely to continue to purchase cyclotrons.
One consequence of upstream integration is that there is now greater competition
in the business of bulk radioisotope production, with a number of producers
challenging Nordion's position. Against this, there is the curious lack of
competitive spirit in the industry discussed previously, but the point holds to
some extent. A second consequence of upstream integration is that there is greater
overall production - it is unlikely that a number of important ventures would

266

have gone ahead without the direct involvement of radiopharmaceutical
companies (e.g. Mallinckrodt, Nordion, Amersham).
Now to consider the processing/ retailing (intermediate) arm of the industry, in
particular Mo-99/Tc-99m generator manufacture. Six companies compete in the
business of building and supplying Mo-99/Tc-99 generators in Europe Amersham, Mallinckrodt, CIS, Sorin, Hoechst, and D u Pont. The three major
suppliers of the U S market are Medi-Physics/Amersham, Mallinckrodt, and
Syncor/Du Pont. (Berkhout, 1993.) The biggest radiopharmaceutical companies in particular Mallinckrodt and A m e r s h a m - supply most other countries around
the world with generators. The most important exception is Japan, where Nihon
Medi-Physics and Daichii manufacture generators using bulk Mo-99 from
Nordion. Other exceptions are countries such as Australia and South Africa where
there is domestic production of fission Mo-99 and also domestic generator
manufacture.

Historically there has been fierce competition in the manufacture and retailing o
Mo-99/Tc-99m generators. It is no surprise that some manufacturers have been
pushed out of the industry. O n e example is E.R. Squibb and Son, which was once a
large supplier of Mo-99/Tc-99m generators. There has also been a tendency for
companies to focus on particular market segments. For example, A m e r s h a m /
Medi-Physics focuses on supply of large generators for central radiopharmacies,
while D u Pont and Mallinckrodt focus on the supply of hospital/clinic size
generators. (Carretta, 1994.)
The fierce competition in the generator industry is on the wane because of the
changing nature of the radioisotope industry. The emphasis is shifting in a
number of directions: upstream integration into bulk radioisotope production;
(horizontal) integration with the pharmaceutical industry; and downstream
integration into final processing functions. O n e consequence of this is that there
does not seem to be m u c h m o v e m e n t of bulk producers into the intermediate
segment of the radioisotope industry including generator manufacture. Indeed
Nordion has lessened its involvement in this segment of the industry through its
arrangement with D u Pont.
Apart from the manoeuvring between the levels of bulk production and
processing/retailing, there has been further integration downstream with bulk
radioisotope producers and radiopharmaceutical companies assuming more of the
final processing functions which were previously carried out in hospitals.
Historically mixtures of radioisotopes and reagents were produced close to the
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point of use, in hospitals. Hospitals required the facilities and the trained
personnel for complex radiochemistry. Increasingly cold kits containing preprocessed chemicals for subsequent labelling with radioisotopes were m a d e
available. This most recent phase of integration extends that process - hospitals
(and private clinics) are often n o w supplied with ready-to-use unit doses of
radiopharmaceuticals.
Mallinckrodt is the clearest example of the various, interconnected trends,
focusing less effort on generator manufacture and sale, and moving both
upstream into radioisotope production and downstream into unit-dose
radiopharmaceutical production. It m o v e d downstream by establishing Diagnostic
Imaging Services, a network of "nuclear pharmacies" in the U S that supplies
ready-to-use radiopharmaceuticals (Mallinckrodt, 1996). It is very likely that
Mallinckrodt's supply to the European market is also organised in this manner.
Nordion also illustrates these processes. It plans to continue to be a major
producer of bulk radioisotopes, its has sold its processing/retailing operations in
Europe to D u Pont, and Nordion recently claimed that it n o w produces a "growing
line of finished radiopharmaceuticals". (Nordion, 1994.) The same general points
apply to Amersham. It has m o v e d upstream into radioisotope production
through a number of manoeuvres, though not so directly as Mallinckrodt and
Nordion. It has also m o v e d downstream into unit-dose radiopharmaceutical
manufacture and supply, particularly through its part-ownership of Medi-Physics
and Nihon-Medi-Physics.
The downstream integration into unit-dose radiopharmaceutical production has
changed the structure of the radioisotope industry. Hospital radiopharmacies are
smaller where they exist at all, with regional radiopharmacies, such as
Mallinckrodt's Diagnostic Imaging Services, and a network of radiopharmacies in
60 U S cities operated by Syncor/Du Pont, increasingly c o m m o n . Physicians place
orders with the regional radiopharmacies which generally arrive on the same day
or the following day. (Carretta, 1994.) Former Mo-99/Tc-99m generator producers
- such as Mallinckrodt, Syncor and Medi-Physics - have been transformed to
some extent into radiopharmacy companies though they have not pulled out of
generator manufacture altogether (Berkhout, 1993).
One impetus for this trend to regional radiopharmacies is shortages of skilled
personnel in hospitals and also increased hospital labour costs. The cost for
hospitals of buying pre-mixed radiopharmaceuticals is only slightly greater than
buying radioisotopes and chemicals/pharmaceuticals direct from manufacturers.
Overall it is cheaper given that hospital radiopharmacies can be further scaled
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down or done a w a y with. (Anon., 1993.) Centralised, regional radiopharmacies are
better able to manage the regulatory and waste disposal expenses than hospital
radiopharmacies (Knapp and Mirzadeh, 1994).

In the US, regional radiopharmacies were preparing about 64% of all doses by 1991
(Anon., 1993.) According to Lagunas-Solar (1993C), radiopharmacies are also
commonplace in Western Europe. Over half the supply of Mo-99/Tc-99m in Japan
is in the form of Tc-99 solutions - the radiopharmaceutical companies operate big
generators into which bulk Mo-99 is loaded, with daily elution and supply to users
(Yamabayashi, 1996, pers. comm.). These three markets account for about 9 0 % of
world radioisotope usage, suggesting that market size is important to the
economics of establishing regional radiopharmacies. In other countries regional
radiopharmacies have generally not been established and supply of hospital-size
generators remains the norm.
Another reason for downstream integration, and the establishment of
radiopharmacies, is that the greatest profits are being realised in this part of the
industry. Increasingly the chemicals and pharmaceuticals which are attached to
radioisotopes - e.g. for organ localisation or therapeutic effect - are becoming
more profitable than the radioisotopes per se. These products can be up to 50 times
as expensive as the Tc-99m according to Berkhout (1993) although the difference is
usually less. This has led to closer integration between the radioisotope and
pharmaceutical industries. M a n y of the radiopharmaceutical companies including D u Pont, Mallinckrodt, Hoechst, Nordion, and A m e r s h a m - have longstanding involvement in pharmaceuticals and these links are becoming
increasingly important. A number of processes have increased the integration
between the radioisotope and pharmaceutical industries - radioisotope producers
moving into pharmaceutical production, pharmaceutical companies moving into
the radiopharmaceutical industry and looking to secure supply of radioisotopes
through contracts, mergers, take-overs, and so on.
The major consequence of vertical integration is that a small number of very
large, integrated operations dominate the global radiopharmaceuticals industry.
Smaller ventures, such as those of A N S T O and the S A A E C , are integrated
themselves to a considerable extent, but m a y find it increasingly difficult to
compete with the larger operators. Other consequences of vertical integration
include the establishment of regional radiopharmacies and the impact of this on
technical innovation, such as the development of very large generators for supply
of regional radiopharmacies.
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7.6. DEDICATED PRODUCTION FACILITIES
Multipurpose reactors are not ideal for radioisotope production for several
reasons. Conflicting d e m a n d s can limit radioisotope production. A n u m b e r of
logistical and technical factors affect radioisotope production, such as low neutron
flux levels, or limited or inappropriate irradiation facilities. These limitations are
all the more c o m m o n because reactors have almost always been designed
primarily for functions other than radioisotope production. Refurbishments can
overcome s o m e of these problems, but limitations generally remain. Conversely,
maximising reactor usage and facilities for radioisotope production impedes
research and other reactor functions. Another difficulty with multipurpose
reactors is that, because of the array of reactor facilities required to satisfy various
projects, they have relatively high maintenance requirements in comparison with
simpler, single-purpose facilities. Consequently, there is a need for frequent
routine shut downs. Multipurpose reactors are also prone to a greater number of
unplanned shut d o w n s than single-purpose reactors, and this further limits
continuity of radioisotope production and supply. The age of so m a n y of the
reactors used for radioisotope production further reduces efficiency and increases
costs.
Because of the limitations of multipurpose reactors, particularly the ageing
reactors currently in operation, there has been s o m e m o m e n t u m towards the
development of dedicated radioisotope production reactors in recent years.
Berkhout (1993) argued in his contribution to the Research Reactor Review that
intensified competition in the radioisotope industry is forcing Mo-99 suppliers to
develop dedicated production reactors. Certainly Nordion's n e w Maples will be
dedicated to radioisotope production, and possibly dedicated to Mo-99 production
depending o n factors such as d e m a n d and prices. At the time that Berkhout m a d e
his analysis there w a s also a possibility that the U S D O E would convert the O m e g a
West reactor into a dedicated radioisotope-production reactor, although it w a s a
lack of producers rather than intensified competition driving that project.
Berkhout also alluded to Russian reactors, but it is highly unlikely that there are
dedicated radioisotope production reactors in Russia. The most likely candidates
would be the reactor(s) which have been converted to supply the A m e r s h a m /
Mayak joint venture - but A m e r s h a m (1993) said that there w a s no reactor in the
world totally dedicated to radioisotope production some time after the M a y a k
project w a s underway.
In short, Nordion's Maple reactors will be the first research reactors in the world
to be dedicated to radioisotope production. It cannot be said from this one case that
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there is a trend towards dedicated production reactors. Certainly cyclotrons
dedicated to radioisotope production have become more important in the past 1020 years, but that is a different issue.
In the US, efforts to re-establish domestic Mo-99 production, and to build a new
neutron source for research, have been separated to some extent. This could be
seen to be indicative of a trend towards the development of dedicated radioisotope
production facilities, but it is more likely that the separation of the two projects
has been due to logistical factors. Specifically, there w a s greater urgency to reestablish domestic Mo-99 production, and a widespread view that existing facilities
would suffice for the job. Bringing to fruition plans for a powerful neutron source
for research, such as the Advanced Neutron Source, w a s always likely to take far
more time, negotiation, and funding, than the Mo-99 project. Furthermore, there
was some speculation that the Advanced Neutron Source could be a long-term
solution to Mo-99 supply problems, in which case the two projects would not
have been separated. For Mo-99, the concern w a s simply to increase security of
supply. Whether this involved a dedicated or multipurpose reactor, domestic or
foreign facilities, or reactors or particle accelerators, were all secondary issues.
A similar separation between radioisotope production and other research and
commercial reactor functions is taking place in Canada. Along with the dedicated
radioisotope-producing Maples, there are ongoing efforts to develop an
"Irradiation Research Facility" (IRF), also based on Maple design. The IRF will be
used for research and testing in support of the nuclear power program, and for
other research projects. (AECL, 1996.) Both projects are replacements for the
multipurpose N R U reactor. W h y the two projects have been separated is unclear,
but the Canadian situation is a special case in that there is a large, multifaceted
nuclear program, and a large, established market for commercial radioisotopes.
Undoubtedly there is a desire among radiopharmaceutical companies and nuclear
medicine professionals for dedicated radioisotope-production reactors. The major
problem is funding. It is difficult for dedicated radioisotope-production reactors to
be "piggy-backed" on better-funded nuclear power and weapons programs, as so
much radioisotope production has been and continues to be. The only scope for
cross-program subsidisation of that sort is conversion of existing reactors to enable
dedicated radioisotope production, and possibly some subsidisation in areas such
as waste storage and disposal. M o v e m e n t towards dedicated radioisotopeproduction reactors not only reduces the potential for radioisotope production to
be piggy-backed on nuclear programs, but also for cost-sharing collaborations.
(Rojas-Burke, 1993B.)

271

Radiopharmaceutical companies are generally not in a position to be funding
dedicated reactors given the extremely high costs and the modest size of the
radiopharmaceutical market. There is a small possibility of other dedicated
reactors in the future, if radioisotope markets grow and industry concentration
puts one or another major supplier in a position to be pursuing such a project. A s
for government funding of reactor projects, it will almost certainly continue to
make more economic sense to build or refurbish multipurpose reactors than to
fund the construction of dedicated reactors. Against that, the cost of dedicated
radioisotope production reactors m a y be considerably lower than multipurpose
reactors, as Nordion's Maples would seem to indicate - $ C 140 million for two
reactors plus processing facilities. This is because neutron research tools such as
cold sources comprise a significant proportion of the cost of multipurpose reactors.
Nevertheless the cost of funding multipurpose reactors will, as a rule, be less than
separate funding of facilities for radioisotope production, neutron b e a m research,
and other functions.
While the prospects for new, dedicated radioisotope-production reactors are slim,
other than the Maples, there are better prospects for the conversion of existing
reactors for dedicated radioisotope production. The literature on the Sandia Mo-99
project does not m a k e it clear whether the A C R R will be dedicated to radioisotope
production, but it m a y be, and there m a y be similar conversions in future.

7.7. LINKS BETWEEN RADIOISOTOPE
PRODUCTION AND NUCLEAR POWER,
WEAPONS, AND RESEARCH PROGRAMS
THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR POWER, WEAPONS, AND RESEARCH
PROGRAMS O N RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION LEVELS
PUBLIC OPPOSITION
THE REDUCED ENRICHMENT FOR RESEARCH A N D TEST REACTORS
PROGRAM
RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Some of the links between nuclear medicine and the broader nuclea
have been discussed, such as the development of radioisotope production as a
spin-off from nuclear power and weapons programs, and the symbiosis between
medical and nuclear institutions. Here I will discuss several more links: firstly, a
fuller discussion o n the relationships between nuclear power, weapons, and
research programs and radioisotope production levels; secondly, the impact of
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public opposition to research reactors on radioisotope production; thirdly, the
impact of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program; and
fourthly, the impact of radioactive waste problems on radioisotope production.

THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR POWER, WEAPONS, AND RESEARCH
PROGRAMS ON RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION LEVELS
It is commonly argued that the decline in nuclear power and weapons programs is
responsible for the declining research reactor infrastructure, with dire
consequences for radioisotope production. However the links between nuclear
programs and radioisotope production levels are complex and contradictory and
do not allow for simple generalisations. It is worth bearing in mind that global
medical radioisotope production has increased several fold over the past 20 years
to meet increasing demand, despite (and in some cases because of) the decline of
many nuclear power programs around the world. Similarly a number of
important radioisotope production ventures have been brought to fruition despite
the end of the Cold W a r and the down-scaling of some nuclear weapons
programs. T o a large extent the increases in radioisotope production have
occurred despite, not because of, the down-scaling of power and weapons
programs, but they have occurred nonetheless.
A closer analysis of the relationships between nuclear programs and radioisotope
production will serve two purposes. Firstly, it is of some value in the
development of a better overall understanding of the radioisotope industry.
Secondly, it can be of use in debunking the fear-mongering arguments sometimes
put forward by proponents of various reactor projects about imminent shortages
of radioisotopes.
In the post-war generation it was those countries with major nuclear power and
weapons programs that took the lead with radioisotope production, in particular
the US, the U K , and the Soviet Union. These countries had the research reactors
and the scientific and engineering expertise for substantial radioisotope
production. Funding for nuclear power and weapons programs w a s orders of
magnitude ahead of that specifically set aside for civil radioisotope production.
Radioisotope production w a s "piggy-backed" on power and weapons programs
without m u c h additional expense and with some clear gains in terms of public
relations.
The historical process of radioisotope production being piggy-backed on power and
weapons programs w a s clear enough. The patterns in the past generation have
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been more complex. I will consider nuclear power first. Apart from the U S , the
UK, and the Soviet Union, other countries have piggy-backed commercial
radioisotope production on nuclear power programs in the past generation,
including Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, and South Korea.
Thus there is still some correlation between nuclear power development and
radioisotope production, simply because these countries have the appropriate
nuclear infrastructure. The historical patterns are not all the same. In Japan the
research reactor infrastructure was closely matched to the needs of the power
program and there w a s less scope for subsidiary radioisotope production. In
Sweden, a large nuclear power program was pursued but only three research
reactors were built and Sweden is a net importer of radioisotopes. A substantial
nuclear power program was pursued in Spain, with nine power reactors operating
in 1995, but only two research reactors were built and both have been closed.
Piggy-backing radioisotope production on nuclear power programs has proved a
mixed blessing in that downturns in power programs have had a negative impact
on radioisotope production. Thus for example the U K and the U S are no longer
major producers and exporters of radioisotopes. With the downturn in their
nuclear power (and to some extent weapons) programs, there is less incentive for
the continued operation of research reactors or the construction of n e w reactors.
The pattern is m u c h the same in France and Germany.
On the other hand downturns in power programs have facilitated some
radioisotope production ventures. In some cases this occurs because reactor time
and space, and other resources such as trained personnel, are freed up. There are
several examples of this process, including the increased production of
radioisotopes by the A A E C once the Jervis Bay project was abandoned. A different
example is the nuclear power company Ontario Hydro, which has increased its
isotope sales business, partly as a result of the downturn in the nuclear power
industry.
Another mechanism by which radioisotope production has increased as a result of
downturns in power programs concerns reactor constructors. The striking
example is Canada, where research reactor construction, including the n e w Maple
design, as well as radioisotope production, have all been boosted in part because of
the decline in the nuclear power industry (Lewis, 1996). Another example is the
UK, where reactor constructors were unable to break into the power reactor export
market but sales of research reactors compensated for this to some extent
(Camilleri, 1984, p.230). A third example is Babcock and Wilcox, a heavy
engineering firm whose prospects in the nuclear power industry plummeted
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because of its involvement in the construction and operation of the Three Mile
Island reactor. A recent initiative of Babcock and Wilcox has been research into a
dedicated radioisotope-production reactor (see section 7.8). More generally, the
historical process of nuclear supplier states seeking to stimulate and supply n e w
markets for nuclear power often involved the supply of research reactors, on
generous terms in m a n y cases, and this strategy became all the more important as
the nuclear power industry went into decline.
The down-scaling of nuclear power programs has been gradual and uneven.
Moreover there has been some modest, regional growth in nuclear power,
especially in Asia. In some cases these plans have encouraged the construction of
research reactors, with a positive impact on radioisotope production. The notable
examples are the 30 M W reactors in South Korea and Indonesia. The proposal to
rebuild a shut-down reactor in Taiwan, with a power level of 30 M W , probably
also fits this pattern. O n the other hand plans to further develop nuclear power
programs can absorb research reactor time and b e a m space to the detriment of
radioisotope production; this has happened in Japan to some extent.
Now to consider the links between nuclear weapons and radioisotope production.
The historical pattern of radioisotope production being piggy-backed on weapons
programs took place in a number of the countries. The process was clearest in the
US, where most of the isotope production facilities, in particular the numerous
National Laboratories, were developed for military programs. (Kotz, 1995.) Spillover funding for civil radioisotope production w a s readily available, though the
military program took precedence and there was a tendency for supply of
commercial customers to be interrupted because of this (Rojas-Burke, 1992B).
The overall impact of the scaling back of weapons programs in recent years has
probably been a reduction in radioisotope production. However the evidence is
ambiguous, not least because the down-scaling of weapons programs has been
ambiguous and uneven. There are not too m a n y swords-to-ploughshares projects
to report. South Africa is the most important case of swords-to-ploughshares.
Whether or not the Safari I reactor w a s used directly in support of the weapons
program, H E U fuel supply w a s cut off thus limiting opportunities for radioisotope
production and research reactor projects more generally. N o w , with a stock-pile of
H E U from the weapons program to use for research reactor fuel and H E U targets,
the S A A E C is an important supplier of fission Mo-99 and other radioisotopes.
There are some other, less striking examples of swords-to-ploughshares. The
modest radioisotope production in Argentina - and the ambitions to increase
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production - might o w e something to the abandonment of the covert weapons
program.
In the US, there are probably one or two examples of military cut-backs freeing up
reactors and other resources for radioisotope production - the Sandia Mo-99
project might be one. H o w e v e r the overall effect has been decline in infrastructure
and decline in spill-over funding for radioisotope production (Kotz, 1995).
Moreover the overall decline in funding and infrastructure has meant greater
competition for existing facilities and consequently the pattern of radioisotope
production being disrupted by military programs continues - for example the Los
Alamos M e s o n Physics Facility, a high-power accelerator used for radioisotope
production a m o n g other functions, w a s recently given over to a military project
concerning tritium production (Rojas-Burke, 1994). Nuclear power projects are
also caught in the squeeze, and probably take priority over radioisotope
production as a rule. The 40 M W Fast Flux Test Facility illustrates the priorities this reactor, which first operated in 1980, w a s built to support the U S fast breeder
power program, then it w a s used for production of a number of medical research
radioisotopes, then radioisotope production w a s stopped in 1992 and the reactor
was put on standby to produce plutonium-238 for power generators in space
probes, and most recently the reactor has been put on "hot standby" to produce
tritium for weapons purposes. (Rojas-Burke, 1992C; A N S T O , 1997.)
The pattern in the UK (and possibly also France) has been similar to the US, with
some decline in nuclear weapons spending, an overall decline in nuclear
infrastructure, and less radioisotope production. The situation in Russia is
probably similar but not quite as negative for radioisotope production, in part
because of some swords-to-ploughshares projects such as Reviss Services. In
China, civil nuclear applications have historically been dwarfed by the weapons
program; what little radioisotope production has occurred has been piggy-backed
on the weapons program. This probably remains the case. For example militaryaffiliated institutions play a leading role in nuclear medicine research (Yeh, 1993),
and it is unlikely that this is a case of swords-to-ploughshares. The situation in
China is complicated by the substantial nuclear power program and the
commercialisation of parts of the overall nuclear program. The pattern in India is
not dissimilar to that in China.
The correlation between nuclear weapons programs and civil radioisotope
production has generally been weaker than for nuclear power. In some cases this
has been because of efforts to separate civil from military programs. M o r e
generally the correlations are weaker because far fewer countries have pursued
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nuclear weapons programs in comparison with nuclear power. Thus a number of
the major radioisotope-producing countries have nuclear power programs but
have never developed nuclear weapons, including Canada, Belgium, and the
Netherlands.
International non-proliferation initiatives designed to stop production of
weapons-grade fissile materials could have an impact on radioisotope production.
In particular, some dedicated plutonium-production reactors would be suitable for
radioisotope production including production of fission-product radioisotopes.
Indeed the reactor(s) used by Reviss Services in Russia were probably dedicated to
plutonium production.
In sum, the correlations between nuclear power and weapons programs and
radioisotope production are ambiguous. Overall there is probably still a positive
correlation between power programs and radioisotope production - countries
with nuclear power programs are more likely to produce and export commercial
radioisotopes, and conversely down-scaling of power programs has an overall
negative impact on radioisotope production - but this correlation is weakening
with time. The connections between nuclear weapons and radioisotope
production are both weaker and weakening.

More generally, there is no neat correlation between numbers of research reactors,
even numbers of high-flux multipurpose reactors, and radioisotope production as
the example of the U S shows. Perhaps the main reason that general patterns and
trends do not have a predictable effect on radioisotope production is the capacity
for a small number of reactors to supply the entire world demand; the
radioisotope production industry is inherently idiosyncratic and unpredictable
because of this. Substantial radioisotope production and export depends primarily
on two variables. The first is the state of development of nuclear infrastructure primarily research reactors but also radiochemical processing facilities, facilities for
waste storage, and so on. The second variable - more subjective and arguably
more important - is the determination of key institutions, such as nuclear
agencies and radiopharmaceutical companies, to produce and export radioisotopes
and the ability of these institutions to secure government support and
subsidisation.

As for the future, there is little prospect of a significant upturn in the nuclear
power industry. Similarly it is likely that weapons development has reached a
plateau, perhaps a modest decline, and there is no indication of a major shift in
this situation though it is unpredictable. If either of these situations should
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change, the impact on radioisotope production is difficult to predict but it m a y not
be so great. Partly this is because of the varied, contradictory nature of the links.
Partly it is because there has been a modest trend towards disentangling
radioisotope production from power and weapons programs, either with reactors
or cyclotrons dedicated to radioisotope production. A third consideration is that
the huge w a v e of research reactor construction from the 1950s to the 1970s w a s a
phenomenon specific to the first generation of the nuclear age. A w a v e of
construction of anything like that magnitude is unlikely to be repeated.
Putting aside the links between nuclear power and weapons programs and
radioisotope production, there are also a host of complex relationships between
radioisotope production and neutron b e a m research and commercial applications
such as silicon doping. Within the scope of revenue-generating functions, there is
generally no great preference for radioisotope production. The major m o n e y
spinners are contracts for testing of fuels and materials for the nuclear power
industry, silicon doping, and some others such as colour enhancement of
gemstones. Revenue from radioisotope production can be significant but is
generally m u c h less. ( A N S T O , 1993D, pp.1.14-15; 1993L, pp.3.33-3.34.)
It might be expected that revenue-generating functions including radioisotope
production would take precedence over non-commercial research, especially in
the cost-cutting environment of the past 20 years. There is some evidence of this,
not least in Australia with the cost-recovery targets set for A N S T O . Predictably
enough, there are also claims from the non-commercial research community that
commercial programs have been given precedence; one such researcher in the U S
(quoted in Rojas-Burke, 1992D) claims that radiopharmaceutical companies have
more "clout" w h e n it comes to using D O E facilities. However this does not seem
to apply as a rule. Certainly weapons and power-related research generally takes
priority, but it is also the case that m u c h of the impetus for research reactor
construction and refurbishment stems from the (non-commercial) neutron b e a m
research community whose work is only loosely connected to power and weapons
programs if connected at all. This is particularly clear in Western Europe, with
neutron b e a m research the main reason for plans for n e w reactors in France and
Germany, but it also applies elsewhere.
The overall decline in research reactor infrastructure in many countries has
exacerbated competition for reactor time and space, and this competition promises
to sharpen in the future. H o w e v e r the relationship between radioisotope
production and (other) commercial and research functions is not all competitive,
at least in relation to refurbishments and n e w reactor projects. The different
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functions can be complementary. In the case of the G e r m a n FRM-II, there would
be no plans for a n e w reactor, and thus no radioisotope production (however
modest), if not for the m o m e n t u m developed by the neutron science research
community: radioisotope production will essentially be piggy-backed on neutron
science. In other cases the relationship is more than complementary, it is
synergistic - refurbishments or n e w reactor projects would not proceed if only to
satisfy one function and constituency, but in combination sufficient m o m e n t u m
can be developed to bring projects to fruition. The proposed n e w French reactor
might be an example of this synergy, and several refurbishments could be given as
examples.
PUBLIC OPPOSITION

There are a sufficient examples of significant public opposition to research reac
to claim with some confidence that they have become more contentious over the
decades. The issues taken up include cost, weapons proliferation concerns, and
public and environmental safety (Lagunas-Solar, 1993; Egan et al, 1994). S o m e
examples are the growing concern over the operation of research reactors in
Australia, opposition to the G e r m a n FRM-II reactor, and a major dispute in
Mexico, in the early 1980s, over a proposed nuclear research centre which was
abandoned in response to public opposition (de la Court et al., 1982, pp.43-44).
There has also been some opposition to research reactors in Canada - for example
residual bitterness over the impact of the N R U and N R X accidents in the 1950s,
and a controversy generated by AECL's plan to "donate" (at taxpayers' expense) a
Slowpoke research reactor to a hospital ( C C N R , 1991). N o doubt there are other
examples of public opposition to research reactors.

In addition to public opposition, there are examples of state opposition to resea
reactors, usually relating to the potential or actual uses of research reactors in
nuclear weapons programs. For example the U S government objects to the use of
H E U fuel in the planned G e r m a n FRM-II reactor, and Iraq's research reactors have
been bombed several times.
While it is very likely that research reactors have become more contentious over
the past generation, it is difficult to m a k e any confident claims in relation to the
overall level of public opposition to research reactors. There is little discussion on
opposition to research reactors in literature such as the newsletters and journals
published by anti-nuclear groups, the more academic social m o v e m e n t literature,
or in the more technical nuclear literature such as the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists. It seems clear enough that research reactors are considerably less
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contentious than the big-ticket items of nuclear weapons and power and other
nuclear fuel cycle industries such as uranium mining and reprocessing.
Nor can it confidently be predicted to what extent public opposition will affect
research reactor programs in the future and what affect this will have on
radioisotope production.

Direct public opposition to research reactors may not be as important an obstacl
other factors affecting research reactor programs, such as financial restraints. O n
the other hand, the indirect impact of public opposition is important. Public
opposition has forced improved public and environmental safety regulation,
which in turn increases capital and operating costs. Similarly, public concerns and
campaigns concerning weapons proliferation or radioactive waste management
are likely to have an important indirect effect on research reactor programs.

THE REDUCED ENRICHMENT FOR RESEARCH AND TEST REACTORS
PROGRAM
The Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program dates
from the 1978 U S Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. A s discussed in chapter 2.4, it is
an initiative designed to reduce production of and trade in H E U because of
weapons proliferation concerns.
The main aim of the RERTR program is to develop the technologies for
conversion of HEU-fuelled reactors to L E U fuel without significant penalties in
terms of performance, economics, or safety. A related aspect of the program has
been for the U S to take back spent research reactor fuel. A third aspect of the
program involves the development of L E U targets for radioisotope production to
replace H E U target technology. (Travelli, 1995; Leventhal and Kuperman, 1995;
Nuclear Control Institute, 1996; Krull, 1994.)
REACTOR CONVERSION AND ADVANCED FUEL DEVELOPMENT
Conversion of research reactors to LEU fuels is the most important aspect of the
RERTR program. The program has had some success in relation to reactor
conversion. A large majority of research reactors, both in the U S and elsewhere, of
at least 1 M W power and having previously used H E U fuel supplied by the US,
have been converted or are in the process of being converted. This amounts to 37
reactors converted or in the process of conversion. Since the U S has historically
been the major supplier of H E U for civilian use, the R E R T R program has reduced
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H E U trade. The U S government has entered into agreements with Russia and
China to work on conversion of reactors operating in, or supplied by, these
countries. The Russian program is in a developmental phase. A Statement of
Intent has been signed between Chinese and U S officials. (Travelli, 1995.)
Whether conversion to existing LEU fuel types affects reactor performance is a
contested issue. Those closely involved in the R E R T R program argue that
performance losses are modest, and a small price to pay for the non-proliferation
gains (e.g. Travelli, 1995). S o m e reactor operators are not convinced - an operator
of a German research reactor claims that performance losses of less than 1 0 % have
rarely been achieved and that most operators have experienced a "severe"
decrease in overall performance (Krull, 1994).
Whatever problems exist with LEU fuels may be resolved with further research.
The development of advanced fuels has been a stop-start affair in the U S - in fact
the entire R E R T R program w a s scaled back considerably during the Bush
administration. Nevertheless some research is proceeding in the U S , and also in
South Korea (KAERI) and France ( C E R C A ) (Il-Hiun, 1996; Tissier, 1991; Travelli,
1995.)
Thus far it seems that the reactor conversion program has had only a limited
impact on radioisotope production - certainly the issue is not a major talking
point in the nuclear medicine professional literature. Partly this is because some
important radioisotope-producing reactors - including BR-2 (Belgium), Safari I
(South Africa) and H F R (Netherlands) - are still using H E U fuel. (The expectation
at A N S T O is that H I F A R will be shut d o w n in the next decade, but conversion to
L E U fuel will be necessary if H I F A R is refurbished.) The preference of some
reactor operators for H E U fuel, and their unwillingness to convert to L E U fuel,
seems to relate mainly to research projects, but it m a y be the case that radioisotope
production is a concern. The production of some radioisotopes requires a high
neutron flux, and while fuel enrichment is not the only variable impacting on
flux levels it is certainly an important one. Moreover radioisotope production was
one of the reasons that the use of H E U fuels in research reactors became
commonplace historically (Muranaka, 1983). Radioisotope production operations
may partly explain the reluctance to convert reactors such as Safari I, the Petten
HFR, and the Belgian BR-2 reactor, despite the pressure that is being applied to
operators of these reactors to convert to L E U fuel. O n the other hand the fact that
AECL/Nordion's N R U reactor uses 2 0 % enriched L E U fuel and plays such an
important role as a radioisotope supplier suggests that fuel type is not a
particularly important variable for radioisotope production. That fuel type m a y
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not be a very important variable in relation to radioisotope production is further
indicated by A N S T O ' s (fading) hopes of becoming a major radioisotope producer
using a n e w LEU-fuelled reactor.
TOW ENRICHED URANIUM TARGETS
Another aspect of the RERTR program is to develop LEU targets to replace HEU
targets for production of fission-product radioisotopes - such as Mo-99, iodine-131
and xenon-133 - without significant losses in terms of yield or specific activity,
and without greatly increased costs.
According to Rojas-Burke (1993D), HEU targets, which are 90% enriched, are
available only from the U S . However there are probably some other countries
producing H E U targets, if only for domestic reactors - South Africa, possibly
Russia, and possibly China. Certainly there are enrichment facilities operating in
several countries outside the U S (Hardy, 1996, ch.9).
While HEU targets have generally been made available by the US to the major
radioisotope producers, there is no guarantee of secure supply in the future. As
with reactor conversion, the U S can encourage use of L E U targets through the use
of both carrot (LEU target technology development, spent fuel take back) and stick
(refusal to supply H E U targets). In 1988, the U S D O E stopped supply of H E U targets
to Cintichem and to A E C L . Clearly this was of concern, but no disruption in
supply of Mo-99 occurred, and H E U target supply was re-started after several
weeks. There w a s speculation that the embargo was initiated because of allegations
that H E U had been diverted from Germany to Libya and Pakistan. (Harby, 1988;
Anon., 1988B.) More recently, the U S Congress m a d e a three-year agreement to
supply Nordion with H E U targets conditional on continued development of L E U
fuel and target technology in the U S ; this gave some n e w m o m e n t u m to the
R E R T R program after some years of decline. (Rojas-Burke, 1993D.)
Whereas the use of LEU fuel may not to be a major limitation for radioisotope
production, there is definitely a strong preference for H E U targets. Research into
L E U targets has been a secondary concern of the R E R T R program, with priority
given to reactor conversion and the development of advanced L E U fuels. Funding
for target technology research w a s scaled d o w n in the U S , and stopped altogether
in 1992, but some funding has been provided since then. (Rojas-Burke, 1993D.)

Production of fission-product radioisotopes using LEU targets is feasible, but th
general view is that it increases production costs. The radiopharmaceutical
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companies claim - perhaps for self-interested reasons - that the cost is
prohibitive. For example w h e n Cintichem w a s producing Mo-99, it claimed that it
would be forced to terminate Mo-99 production if H E U targets became
unavailable. (Rojas-Burke, 1993D.) H o w e v e r it is not certain that the increased
costs associated with the use of L E U targets would be significant, and further
research could certainly change this situation. Nor is it clear that the profit
margins of Mo-99 producers are so low that the use of L E U targets would threaten
the viability of any but the most marginal production operations. Travelli (quoted
in Rojas-Burke, 1993D), w h o is closely involved with the R E R T R program, says
that although the Mo-99 business is cut-throat, profit margins are not as narrow as
producers claim. Certainly it is unlikely that the major producers would stop
production if forced to use L E U targets. Another consideration is that all Mo-99
producers are subsidised, and producers could m a k e a good case to governments
or government agencies to subsidise conversion to L E U target technology given
that it is a non-proliferation initiative.
Radiopharmaceutical companies have also questioned whether the marginal
reduction in H E U circulation brought about by conversion to L E U targets would
have any significant effect in relation to weapons proliferation. However the
amounts of H E U involved are not insignificant. Nordion uses about 20-25 kg of
H E U for targets each year. (Rojas-Burke, 1993D.) This is sufficient for at least one
nuclear weapon or for several cruder devices.
Ongoing research may reduce or negate the performance gap between HEU and
L E U targets. Several possible processes are under investigation at a number of
facilities including B A T A N in Indonesia, the University of Illinois, and the U S
Argonne National Laboratory. The 30 M W reactor in Indonesia has been used for
prototypical irradiation of a L E U metal foil target for Mo-99 production. Another
line of research is for dissolution and processing of L E U silicide targets; in 1995
this method w a s ready for demonstration on a full-size target. (Travelli, 1995.) In
South Korea, K A E R I is testing the possibility of commercial production of fission
Mo-99 using H E U or L E U targets.
The research effort is to make new processes compatible with existing facilities
know-how. According to Aliludin et al. (1995), research carried out to date suggests
that L E U targets (either natural or depleted uranium spiked with irradiated H E U )
can be used with little or no modification of production facilities. However a
number of different technical solutions m a y need to be found since different
producers use different technologies to produce Mo-99 from H E U targets (RojasBurke, 1993D).
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The I A E A has given some support to the development of L E U target technology,
partly because it might facilitate radioisotope production in developing countries
which have difficulty securing H E U targets from the US. (Rojas-Burke, 1993D.) If
the technologies are successfully developed, it is possible that L E U target
technology could have an important effect on the fission Mo-99 industry, with
new producers entering an industry which is already promising to be oversupplied for the next generation. However this depends entirely on the
development of efficient and economical L E U targets. It is likely that despite
mounting political pressure, conversion to L E U targets m a y drag on for years, and
it still remains a secondary concern to converting reactors to L E U fuels. (RojasBurke, 1993D.)

RADIOACTIVE WASTE
The generation of radioactive waste by research reactors is minimal in comparison
with waste generation associated with nuclear power and weapons programs.
However it is not a trivial issue, and it certainly has implications for radioisotope
production.

According to an article in the IAEA Bulletin, accurate figures are not available o
the amount of spent fuel from research reactors in storage, but m a n y operators of
research reactors find themselves in a "crisis situation" because of waste
management problems. The crisis has been precipitated by the cessation of
practices to take back spent research reactor fuel by the countries where they were
originally enriched (mainly the U S and Russia). Waste problems have slowed,
stopped, or put in jeopardy the operations of m a n y research reactors in m a n y
countries. These problems have been exacerbated by the R E R T R reactor
conversion program, primarily because of the greater throughput of L E U fuels.
(Takats et al., 1993.) The R E R T R program involves a trade-off: conversion to L E U
fuel lessens the possibilities for weapons proliferation but it exacerbates the
problems associated with radioactive waste.
There are fleeting signs of partial resolution of some of these problems - for
example the resumption of U S take back of spent fuel. Acceptance of spent fuel by
the U S has been used as an inducement to cooperate with the R E R T R program.
(As a further inducement, agreements have been struck to take back L E U spent
fuel from converted reactors.) The program of spent fuel return to the U S has
been on and off for m a n y years, but is n o w proceeding. A number of countries
have already returned some spent fuel, and the plan is that a total of 41 countries
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will be able to do so. The volume involved is about 20 metric tons of fuel
containing about 5 metric tons of H E U . This is a tiny fraction of the 30 000 metric
tons of commercial spent fuel managed in the U S , but a m u c h larger percentage of
H E U waste. (Takats et al., 1993.)
Take back of spent research reactor fuel by the US is a minor development in the
context of worldwide radioactive waste problems: all that can be said is that it will
facilitate research reactor operations in those countries able to rid themselves of
waste stockpiles. In addition the resumption of spent fuel return to the U S is not
certain to proceed - decisions to proceed with the program have been m a d e
before, only to be blocked by legal challenges and other tactics employed by antinuclear activists in the U S . Recently, anti-nuclear groups in the U S have
threatened to sue the government if it attempts to defray the cost of this initiative
by reprocessing the spent fuel. (Uranium Information Centre, 1996.) According to
Takats et al. (1993), a protracted delay could lead to the closure of important
research facilities, particularly in several Western European countries where
operating license extensions are tied to successful resolution of spent fuel
problems.
Apart from US take back of spent fuel, there is also some potential for the
establishment of waste repositories in some countries after decades of stockpiling.
However it can be safely predicted that waste disposal problems will continue to
affect research reactor operations and thus radioisotope production for m a n y years
to come.

Apart from spent fuel generated as a result of reactor operations, the irradiation
targets and the processing of radioisotopes generates significant volumes of
radioactive wastes. Mostly this is low and intermediate-level waste, but some
high-level waste is generated through irradiation and processing of H E U targets
(see chapter 4.4).
As with reactor conversion to LEU fuels, increased waste is also a burden that
comes with the use of L E U targets for radioisotope production instead of H E U
targets. L E U targets require a greater volume of uranium to m a k e up for decreased
enrichment levels. Processing m o r e uranium means handling more radioactive
by-products - 3-6 times the volume of dissolver solution, about six times more
dissolver salts, six times more fission-product salts, and up to 3 0 % more waste at
the end of all processing steps. (Rojas-Burke, 1993D.) A s yet this is not an issue
because few if any producers of fission-product radioisotopes are using L E U
targets.

285

Another issue worth brief mention is radioactive waste from hospitals. In some
cases this is returned to reactor operators - for example used Mo-99/Tc-99m
generators are returned to A N S T O . Other wastes from the use of radioisotopes in
hospitals or universities are stockpiled at numerous sites (Senate Legal and
Constitutional Legislation Committee, 1994). This is a contentious issue in
Australia, although it does not seem to have affected the practice of nuclear
medicine. In the U S the issue is more pressing. Landfill owners in the U S are
screening incoming trash for radioactivity. Hospital operators have borne
increased costs for setting u p screening procedures and for dealing with rejected
loads. In a n u m b e r of cases hospitals have been able to negotiate agreements with
landfill owners to allow for disposal of low-level waste, but in other cases the
problems and added costs have threatened the viability of nuclear medicine
practice. (Culver et al., 1993.)
In chapter 4.4,1 noted ANSTO's tactic of "playing up" the connection between
radioactive waste and nuclear medicine in order to pacify public concern and
opposition. In the U S , the links are more tangible, with nuclear medicine
professional associations actively involving themselves in the establishment of
low-level waste repositories. Often this involves conflict between the professional
associations on the one hand, and public campaigns and government regulatory
agencies on the other. (Shanahan, 1993.)
In the US, and possibly elsewhere, the lack of availability of low-level waste
repositories, and the expense of storage and disposal, has prompted the search for
alternatives to radioisotope techniques, for research purposes in particular. A
number of chemical and biological alternatives to radioisotopes are not only better
in terms of waste disposal, but can also offer better sensitivity, increased safety, and
reduced costs. In general, each of the alternatives for any particular purpose will
have some advantages and s o m e disadvantages. There is also some effort to
replace longer-lived radioisotopes with shorter-lived radioisotopes because that
reduces storage time before transport to waste disposal sites. (Party and Gershey,
1995.)
A number of research projects are underway to reduce the substantial waste
problems associated with reactor production of fission Mo-99, mostly involving
new production methods; this research is taken u p in the following section.
Another issue is that nuclear medicine is operating in an increasingly competitive
environment vis a vis alternative imaging modalities, and the radioactive waste
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problems associated with nuclear medicine do nothing to secure its place (see
chapter 8.3).

7.8. TECHNICAL INNOVATIONS
REACTOR IRRADIATION OF MOLYBDENUM TARGETS
SPALLATION S O U R C E S
LIQUID F U E L R E A C T O R S
C Y C L O T R O N P R O D U C T I O N O F Mo-99/Tc-99m
Here I will discuss several research projects, which are largely though not
exclusively concerned with Mo-99/Tc-99m production. Research into n e w
methods of producing Mo-99/Tc-99m reflect the problems with current methods
of production of fission Mo-99 - the need for high-flux reactors, the weapons
proliferation implications of H E U , the complexity and cost of facilities for
irradiating and processing H E U targets, and waste generation. The waste issue is
particularly salient and the four alternative methods of Mo-99/Tc-99m discussed
below all hold the promise of marked reductions in waste generation.

REACTOR IRRADIATION OF MOLYBDENUM TARGETS

Here I return to the relative advantages of high specific activity fission Mo
versus low specific activity (l.s.a.) Mo-99. Fission Mo-99, produced by the U-235(n,
fission)->Mo-99 reaction, is the preferred product because of its high specific
activity - the high proportion of Mo-99 in relation to contaminants. Production
yields using the fission method are far higher than for the Mo-98(n,u)->Mo-99
method. The Tc-99m generated from fission Mo-99 provides better images and
imparts a lower radiation dose to the patient and medical staff. Another reason
that fission Mo-99 is preferred is that generator technology developed hand-inhand with fission Mo-99 production, such that the c o m m o n commercial
generator types cannot use l.s.a. Mo-99. In fact l.s.a. Mo-99 has usually been used
for production of "instant" Tc-99m, without the use of generators. Because of the
relative half lives of Mo-99 (66 hours) and Tc-99m (6 hours), instant Tc-99m must
be delivered and used quickly and thus cannot be transported over long distances
because of decay.

The Mo-98(n,u\)->l.s.a. Mo-99 method, which uses molybdenum targets, requires
less complex and expensive facilities; generates less waste; is suitable for low to
medium-flux reactors; and results in lower radiation exposure for reactor and
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processing staff. According to Egan et al. (1994, pp.4-5), waste generation is only 5 %
that of the fission method.
Low specific activity Mo-99/Tc-99m is produced in many countries. It is produced
in at least some, and probably most, of the dozen or so countries which also
produce fission Mo-99, because some users prefer instant Tc-99m. It is also
produced in another dozen or so countries: Bangladesh, Chile, Greece, Hungary,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Slovenia, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, Zaire, and
probably a few other countries besides (INSC (n.d.) data). L o w specific activity
Mo-99 /Tc-99m is generally produced in small quantities, because of the
limitations of the process and because demand is low in m a n y of the countries
where it is produced.
The following table summarises the two processes:
Fission Mo-99

Mo-98in.u>>Mo-99

Targets
Product

HEU

Generators

Chromatographic,
several other types
High
High
High
High
About 12

Natural "moly" or enriched Mo-98
Instant Tc-99m, increasingly Mo-99
for generators
Gel, others types under
development
Low
M u c h lower
L o w , medium, or high
Low
20-30

Yield
Waste
Reactor flux
Specific activitv
No. countries

Mo-99 -> generators

Research has been taking place for some years, in a number of countries, to
facilitate Mo-99/Tc-99m production using molybdenum targets and to improve
the supply logistics (especially generator technology). In fact the relatively
widespread production of l.s.a. Mo-99 probably reflects the early fruits of this
research. Research has focused on three, interconnected areas. O n e is increasing
the yield, for example by using enriched Mo-98 targets instead of natural
molybdenum. The enriched targets are more expensive but the increased yield
may make it worthwhile. A second research area is increasing specific activity, or
alternatively devising methods for the extraction of useable, carrier-free Tc-99
from Ls.a. Mo-99. The third research area is generator technology.
The I A E A has funded and co-ordinated research into Mo-99/Tc-99m generators
which can use l.s.a. Mo-99 produced by low to medium-flux reactors. Scientists
from India, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Vietnam, Belarus, Germany, Peru,
Hungary, and Thailand have been involved in the I A E A program. A number of
generator types have been explored - two or three show promise, with the most
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promising being gel generators - polymolibdate gels with extraction of Tc-99m by
a low-temperature sublimation process. (IAEA, 1995D; K n a p p and Mirzadeh,
1994).
In China, gel generators have already been used in over 100 hospitals. According
to the I A E A (1995B), "Clinical results have been as good as those w h e n the
technetium is obtained from fission process generators." The expectation is that
when gel-generator technology is further improved, there will be still less demand
for fission Mo-99 generators. A n I A E A technical cooperation project is working to
overcome some of the current limitations, which include standardising gel
production, reducing contamination with natural molybdenum, and streamlining
the process. (IAEA, 1995B.)

The gel generator is not the only possibility under investigation. In Japan resea
is underway into a highly absorbent polymer which m a y enable generator
construction using l.s.a Mo-99. (Yamabayashi, 1996, pers. comm.)
Another line of research, to overcome the low specific concentration of Tc-99m
derived from l.s.a. Mo-99, concerns solvent extraction of carrier-free Tc-99m from
l.s.a. Mo-99. This approach requires central processing facilities having the
necessary hot cells and processing facilities. (Knapp and Mirzadeh, 1994.)
Development of this technology could dove-tail with the spread of regional
radiopharmacies, already commonplace in the U S , Europe, and Japan.
In addition, new, improved methods of Tc-99m extraction, yielding higher specific
activity Tc-99m than current methods, might be developed to the point that less
complex hospital radiopharmacies could be supplied with l.s.a. Mo-99/Tc-99m
generators and carry out the final processing. The Health Sciences Research
Division of the O a k Ridge National Laboratory ( O R N L ) has developed two simple,
efficient methods for the concentration of Tc-99m solutions obtained from elution
of generators prepared with l.s.a. Mo-99 from irradiation of molybdenum targets.
The O R N L has recently licensed these technologies, which are still proprietary.
(Knapp, O R N L , 1997, pers. comm.) If the process is simple enough, it might not
require complex and therefore centralised processing facilities. This would
facilitate deployment of the n e w technology in countries, particularly developing
countries, where sophisticated radiopharmacies are rare.
The development of gel-generator technology and improved methods of Tc-99m
extraction have improved the potential for producing generator-grade Mo-99
using reactors of low to m e d i u m neutron flux. Reactors with a relatively low
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thermal neutron flux - of the order of IO 13 neutrons/cm 2 /second - can be used
for this production route (Knapp and Mirzadeh, 1994, p.1152). Reactors with this
flux are commonplace. I A E A (1994) data indicates that about 130 reactors of at least
this flux level were in operation in 1994. N o doubt dozens of those reactors would
be unsuitable for l.s.a. Mo-99 production for one reason or another, but the general
point holds: development of this method could enable far more widespread
reactor production of Mo-99/Tc-99m.
Since the research effort has recently been focused on production of generators
using l.s.a. Mo-99, rather than instant Tc-99m, there is the potential for
international trade of n e w generator types based on l.s.a. Mo-99. The n e w
generator types could be imported into Australia. Alternatively the greater use of
l.s.a. Mo-99 in some countries could free u p fission Mo-99 and m a k e importation
of the latter all the more viable an option for Australian users. Another advantage
with gel generators is the potential for reduced transport costs, as gel generators
may not require the bulky lead shielding used for conventional generators (IAEA,
1995B).
There is considerable research in a number of countries into the use of l.s.a.
Mo-99. This research has already borne fruit, for example in China. It seems likely
that the technologies will be further improved and more widely applied. The
biggest obstacle will probably be loss of m o m e n t u m and lack of opportunity given
the likelihood of ample fission Mo-99 production to meet world d e m a n d for the
next 20 years at least. Either way, reliance on imported Mo-99 will be a viable
option for Australian users.

SPALLATION SOURCES
Spallation sources comprise a particle accelerator (usually a cyclotron) which is
used to direct a proton b e a m onto a heavy element target (e.g. uranium, lead,
bismuth). Proton bombardment of this target (the primary spallation target)
generates neutrons. The primary spallation target is surrounded by a moderator
(e.g. water) and a neutron reflector. The moderator-reflector systems vary greatly
depending on the primary application of the facility and the method of operation.
(Boldeman, 1995.) Essentially, spallation sources generate a neutron flux without
the need for a self-sustained fission reaction as in a reactor.
Spallation sources have been competitive with research reactors for neutron beam
research for 15 years or so. About five are operating around the world, mostly used
for condensed matter research. Other potential applications of spallation sources
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have been discussed in the literature for m a n y years, but further development was
impeded by limitations in the performance of accelerators. These limitations have
been overcome to a considerable extent with advances in accelerator technology.
Consequently, a number of projects are being proposed and developed to build
new varieties of spallation sources, and these proposals have a m u c h higher
probability of being realised given the improvements in accelerator technology.
(Boldeman, 1995.)
Several possible applications of spallation sources are being explored, including
research, transmutation of radioactive waste, power generation, and radioisotope
production. A s for radioisotope production, there has been very little use of
spallation sources for radioisotope production. The Los Alamos M e s o n Physics
Facility is a m e d i u m energy nuclear physics facility which, a m o n g its other
functions, provides proton beams for a spallation neutron target and has been
used for radioisotope production. There has also been parallel development of
"superconducting" cyclotron facilities, essentially the same as spallation sources,
for neutron b e a m cancer treatment (Anon., 1989).
As for future radioisotope production using spallation sources, one project in
particular warrants mention. This is the "Adonis" project - Accelerator-Driven
Operated Nuclear Isotope System. This project is a collaboration between the
Belgium Nuclear Research Centre S C K - C E N , and Ion B e a m Applications (IBA), a
company which manufactures cyclotrons (SCK-CEN, 1995; Egan, 1995; Yongen,
1995).

The Adonis system shares the same general features of other spallation sources. It
comprises two main parts. It is envisaged that radioisotope production would be
one of the major applications of Adonis. Indeed the second phase of the research
project has involved Mo-99 production.
Without providing any substantiating evidence, SCK-CEN (1995) asserts that one
Adonis system could produce 4 0 % of world d e m a n d for Mo-99. Egan (1995) arrives
at similar figures, and provides supporting calculations and assumptions. Those
figures assume 9 3 % H E U secondary targets. If 1 2 % enriched L E U secondary targets
are used, production could drop by a factor of 30-40 according to Egan's
calculations, but the output of one system using 1 2 % L E U would still comfortably
satisfy Australian d e m a n d for Mo-99.
Effort has been made to make the system match current fission Mo-99 reactor
production regimes as closely as possible, for example by using identical H E U
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targets as those used in (some) reactors for Mo-99 production. Thus there would be
no need to develop n e w target technologies, and existing downstream processing
technologies and facilities could be used. This has obvious advantages in terms of
logistics and costs.
An important advantage of this system over reactor radioisotope production is
accident safety. Adonis does not require a self-sustained uranium fission reaction;
in fact design features exclude the possibility of uranium fission criticality. Unless
uranium is used in the primary spallation target, the only uranium required is for
the secondary targets. Since the initial power source is an accelerator rather than
the uranium fission reaction of a research reactor, the Adonis system offers major
advantages over reactors in relation to radioactive waste and weapons
proliferation concerns, notwithstanding the use of small amounts of H E U for the
secondary targets. Waste generation would probably be increased if L E U secondary
targets were used as a non-proliferation measure or because of lack of availability
of H E U targets.
Theoretical calculations indicate that one Adonis system could produce most or
all of world d e m a n d for Mo-99. Capital costs are expected to be considerably less
than a commercial 10 megawatt (thermal) reactor. (For comparison, A N S T O
expects the proposed n e w 14-20 M W reactor will cost $300 million.)
Decommissioning costs would be considerably cheaper, as would waste
management and disposal costs. (Yongen 1995.)
The production of Mo-99 using Adonis, permitting widespread distribution
including supply of overseas markets, gives it a major advantage over the Tc-99m
production techniques under development by Lagunas-Solar and colleagues
(discussed later).
While the Adonis system is extremely promising, no pilot plant has been built as
yet. The third phase of the Adonis research program is underway and is expected
to yield detailed engineering and economic information. IBA's involvement is
significant; presumably the company sees some commercial potential in the
project. It is also notable that there is considerable development of accelerator and
spallation source technology taking place for purposes other than radioisotope
production. It is likely that radioisotope production applications will be facilitated
as spin-offs from this research.
During the Research Reactor Review (1993, ch.5), there was some debate as to
whether a spallation source might be a more appropriate investment than a n e w
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research reactor. O n e argument against a spallation source w a s that it w a s
unsuitable for radioisotope production, and difficult to combine radioisotope
production with other functions. Research in the past few years suggests that
spallation sources are becoming increasingly attractive as neutron b e a m research
tools, and that they m a y also be suitable for commercial radioisotope production.
Spallation sources are varied in design, and they are more flexible technologies
than research reactors - parameters such as neutron flux can be varied through
adjustments to the accelerator or the primary and secondary targets. This increases
the potential for development of multipurpose spallation sources.
The flexibility of spallation sources also increases the potential for production
wider range of radioisotopes. With the potential to generate a range of charged
particle beams from the accelerator, and neutron beams from the primary
spallation target, spallation sources have the potential to be all-in-one
radioisotope production machines, capable of producing a wider range of
radioisotopes than reactors or cyclotrons alone.

LIQUID FUEL REACTORS
The heavy engineering and reactor construction company Babcock and Wilcox are
working on the design of a Medical Isotope Production Reactor (MIPR), which
m a y be used for dedicated production of Mo-99 and other fission-product
radioisotopes. Essentially the system involves a low-power reactor with a liquid
fuel. It eliminates the need to prepare a target and secondly to dissolve it; instead
of target irradiation, fission products are derived from the fissioned fuel itself. The
system comprises a Zircaloy cylinder for the reactor, which is immersed in a large
pool of water. The fuel is a 1 9 % L E U uranyl nitrate solution. At this concentration,
and with the correct geometry, fission takes place within the solution. The water
acts as a heat removal m e d i u m and as a reflector and radiation shield. (Ball, 1995.)
Overall the system has the potential to produce large quantities of high specific
activity fission Mo-99 using a very low power reactor and without the need for
H E U fuel or H E U targets. In the usual system for reactor production of fission M o 99, fission products (including Mo-99) created in the "driver" reactor are wasted only the fission products in the target are retrieved, and over half of this material
is lost because of decay in the time that the target is in the reactor. Recovering
fission products from the fuel, as occurs with the M I P R , is far more efficient and,
according to Ball (1995), it offers the potential for a hundred-fold reduction in
uranium consumption and radioactive waste generation. Another potential
advantage is safety, because the M I P R has an extremely large negative power
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coefficient of energy, a c o m m o n characteristic of aqueous homogenous reactors.
(Ball, 1995.)
Babcock and Wilcox's "reference" MIPR operates at 200 kW(t) and produces 2000
Ci of Mo-99 per day within the solution, with daily extraction of Mo-99. Using
these figures, output could be 2000 x 365 = 730 000 Ci/year of Mo-99, roughly
equivalent to current world demand. Downstream processing is m u c h the same as
for the usual method of reactor production of fission Mo-99. (Ball, 1995.)
The MIPR test and demonstration phase was set to begin in 1996. This phase was
to demonstrate heat removal capability in the bulk water; ability to extract Mo-99
as the solution ages; capability for gas recombination and storage; and corrosion
resistance of components. (Ball, 1995.)

Babcock and Wilcox is not the only organisation involved in research along these
lines. In the U S , the O a k Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has a long history of
work on liquid fuel reactors for diverse uses, and some of this work has been
carried out in conjunction with Babcock and Wilcox and also Russian
organisations. S o m e of the ORNL's research work on liquid fuels reactors has
concerned the production of Mo-99 and other fission-product radioisotopes with a
uranyl sulfate liquid fuelled, low-power (50-100 k W ) reactor. However there is no
effort being expended on this research at present, in part because of the ORNL's
commercial venture concerning concentration of Tc-99m solutions obtained from
l.s.a. Mo-99. ( O R N L , 1995; Kerr, O R N L , 1997, pers. comm.)
CYCLOTRON PRODUCTION OF Mo-99/Tc-99m
It is technically feasible to produce instant Tc-99m and Mo-99 using proton
bombardment of Mo-98, Mo-100, or uranium-238. According to Lagunas-Solar
(1993), several accelerators (including cyclotrons) have produced small amounts of
Mo-99 and Tc-99m for research purposes. However cyclotron Mo-99/Tc-99m
production has not been developed on a large-scale, commercial basis. There is
considerable debate as to whether this could be achieved, and some ongoing
research into the issue.
The debate over cyclotron production of Mo-99/Tc-99m was prominent during the
Research Reactor Review.69 A N S T O and a few doctors argued that technical
62 For R R R submissions and other literature supporting the case for cyclotron production of Mo-99/
Tc-99, see Egan, 1993; 1995; Egan et al., 1993; 1994; Lagunas-Solar 1993; 1993B; 1993C; 1997; LagunasSolar et al., 1991; 1996; 1996B; Friends of the Earth, 1993B. For the "no" case see Boyd, 1993; 1993B;
Black, 1993; 1993B; A N S T O , 1993B; 1993C; 1993D.
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limitations m a d e the process unviable at present and there were at best slim
prospects that further research would resolve the problems. O n e of the major
limitations is that it is agreed by all that the prospects for large-scale cyclotron
production of Mo-99 are slim; the more promising line of research is direct
production of Tc-99m with minimal co-production of Mo-99. This raises questions
about supply logistics given the six-hour half life of Tc-99m. Various groups and
individuals opposing a n e w reactor argued in favour of cyclotron production of
Mo-99/Tc-99m, as did some scientists involved in research projects concerning
cyclotron Mo-99/Tc-99 production. The most prominent of these scientists were
Manuel Lagunas-Solar, from the Crocker Nuclear Laboratory at the University of
California, and Gary Egan from the cyclotron and positron emission tomography
(PET) centre at the Austin Hospital, Melbourne.
The Review (1993, pp.46-48) sat on the fence:
the Review was presented with claim and counter-claim about the
possibilities for Tc-99m production via cyclotrons. It explored the issues to
the extent possible and can do no more than conclude that only time and
further research will illuminate this question further.
Debates over cyclotron Mo-99 /Tc-99m production revolve around a number of
interconnected technical, logistical, and economic factors. These debates concern
production yields and rates, target cooling, target purity, specific activity and purity
of cyclotron-produced Mo-99/Tc-99m, the logistics of supplying remote areas, and
last but not least, cost. Suffice it here to say that the overall debate, and each of the
component debates, w a s highly polarised during the Research Reactor Review.
One sub-debate which w a s not contested w a s radioactive waste generation - there
is no doubt that cyclotron Mo-99/Tc-99m production generates far less waste. This
applies both to target irradiation and processing, and also fuel since cyclotrons are
powered with electricity.
There have been small pockets of research into cyclotron production of Mo-99/
Tc-99m over the years. Probably the most significant research in recent years has
been a collaborative project involving the two Australian cyclotron centres (in
Sydney and Melbourne), and the Crocker Nuclear Laboratory at the University of
California. Lagunas-Solar is heavily involved in this work, as w a s Egan for some
time. A m e r s h a m has provided funding and other assistance for some of the
research into cyclotron production of Mo-99/Tc-99m at the Crocker Nuclear
Laboratory. (Egan et al., 1994; Lagunas-Solar et al., 1996B.) Through its
involvement in the National Medical Cyclotron in Sydney, A N S T O has some
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involvement in the research project. This is surprising given that A N S T O was
such a strong opponent of cyclotron Mo-99/Tc-99 production during the Research
Reactor Review, and since its deeply pessimistic attitude seems not to have
changed since then ( A N S T O , 1996D). Public controversy over the issue appears to
be one reason for A N S T O ' s involvement (Lambrecht et al., 1994). The research
project has the following specific objectives (Egan et al., 1994):
• to determine the low energy region (<20 M e V ) for optimum cyclotron
production of Tc-99m from enriched Mo-98;
• to determine the m e d i u m energy region (<40 M e V ) for optimum cyclotron
production of Tc-99m from enriched Mo-100; and
• to determine the acceptable levels of specific activity and impurities in
cyclotron produced Tc-99m which does not increase patient dosimetry or
degrade image quality, compared to reactor produced Tc-99m.
As at late 1995, studies at the Crocker Nuclear Laboratory revealed a lower than
expected Tc-99m yield using a 99.45% enriched Mo-98 target. However good
production yields of 15 C i / m A h were achieved using a 97.4% enriched Mo-100
target with low to m e d i u m energy (<25 M e V ) proton beams, with low levels of
impurities. (Egan, 1995; Lagunas-Solar et al, 1996B.)

A related line of research involves high energy proton induced fission of natural
uranium targets, with proton induced fission of uranium-238 yielding Mo-99
among other fission products. This cyclotron technique is being studied at the
Crocker Nuclear Laboratory in collaboration with the Canadian T R I U M F
laboratory. The proton-induced fission method has some advantages over
neutron-induced fission in reactors - reduced costs of installation, operation,
maintenance, and decommissioning. It is also preferable to Tc-99m production
using Mo-98 or Mo-100 targets given the short half life of Tc-99m and the logistical
difficulties that entails. Downstream processing would be m u c h the same as for
Mo-99 produced by neutron-induced fission in reactors. Research results at the
Crocker Nuclear Laboratory have been promising with respect to yield and purity;
a full technical and economic comparison with reactor methods is n o w underway.
(Egan, 1995; Egan et al., 1994; Lagunas-Solar, 1993; 1993B; Lagunas-Solar et al., 1996.)
The IAEA may provide funding or other forms of assistance for research into
cyclotron production of Mo-99/Tc-99m. A n I A E A Consultants' Meeting on the
topic was held in South Africa in April 1997. (Lagunas-Solar, 1997, pers. comm.)
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7.9. CYCLOTRONS AND LINEAR
ACCELERATORS
INTRODUCTION
THE HISTORY OF PARTICLE ACCELERATORS
CURRENT USE OF CYCLOTRONS
COMPARING CYCLOTRONS A N D REACTORS
INTRODUCTION
The most important accelerators for radioisotope production are cyclotrons.
Cyclotrons have a n u m b e r of advantages over reactors for radioisotope
production, such as safety, cheaper capital, operating and decommissioning costs,
and generation of far less radioactive waste than reactors. For these and other
reasons, cyclotrons have assumed an increasing important role for radioisotope
production.
Cyclotrons belong to a class of machines called particle accelerators. There are two
basic types of particle accelerators - linear accelerators (linacs) and cyclotrons. Both
types accelerate charged particles to high velocities, and the particle b e a m s can
then be directed at targets for research, radioisotope production, and other
purposes.

THE HISTORY OF PARTICLE ACCELERATORS
As discussed in chapter five, particle accelerators were developed from the early
1930s and one of their early uses w a s medical radioisotope production. H o w e v e r
accelerators were marginalised during and after World W a r II, with far more
effort expended o n reactor technology. The marginalisation of accelerators for
radioisotope production became self-perpetuating. Thus Boyd (1977), an A A E C
employee, wrote in 1977 that
Cyclotron production of radionuclides is usually avoided because of the
expense and the relatively lower yield when compared to that of a nuclear
reactor. However

if a cyclotron-produced radionuclide can be shown to have

an ideal combination of physical and biochemical properties which lend
themselves to a diagnostic task not otherwise satisfied by a reactor-produced
radionuclide then considerable justification exists for its manufacture.
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The important role of reactor radioisotopes w a s firmly entrenched with the
establishment of Tc-99m as the workhorse of nuclear medicine.
Accelerators were marginalised, but not entirely. There was an ongoing thread of
development and innovation. A s with research reactors, this w a s often connected
to nuclear power or weapons programs and involved radioisotope production as a
subsidiary function.
At one end of the spectrum of accelerator technology is the development of evermore powerful accelerators for physics research. This frontier research is having a
dramatic impact on the more traditional applications of accelerators, including
medical cyclotrons. (Boldeman, 1995.)
Very high energy linacs are sometimes used for production of medical radioisotopes. For example the Los Alamos M e s o n Physics Facility produces Sr-82 (via a
spallation reaction, used in Sr-82/Rb-82 generators), xenon-127, Ge-68, and copper67. The Brookhaven Linac Isotope Producer has produced medical radioisotopes
including xenon-127, iodine-123, Sr-82 and Ge-68. (Saha et al., 1992; Ice, 1995.)
However the developmental work of integrating radioisotope processing
technology with a commercial linac has not been carried out. (Egan et al., 1994.)
Since linacs are generally used for physics research, including military R & D ,
medical radioisotope production is a subsidiary function and has been given low
priority. Less powerful linacs are widely used to produce photon beams for
radiation cancer therapy (Blosser, 1993).
Some small cyclotrons were built and used for radioisotope production and cancer
treatment from the 1940s and 1950s. There have been several arms of R & D with
medical cyclotrons. O n e is proton and alpha particle radiotherapy. Another is the
use of cyclotrons (and reactors) to generate neutron beams for cancer treatment. A
third is diagnostic proton radiography. (Smathers and Myers, 1985.) These three
cyclotron applications have limited and in some cases precarious niches in
medicine. A more important field has been cyclotron production of radioisotopes
for use in diagnostic nuclear medicine, and to a lesser extent radioisotope therapy.
Cyclotron production of medical radioisotopes has undergone a resurgence in the
past 20-30 years. This has been led by cyclotron manufacturers and radiopharmaceutical companies. In the mid 1960s A m e r s h a m w a s the first radiopharmaceutical
company in the world to install a cyclotron dedicated to the routine commercial
production of radioisotopes (Bindon, 1988). Other companies have followed suit,
including Nordion, CIS, Mallinckrodt, Nihon Medi-Physics, and probably others.
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M e d i u m energy (usually 30-45 M e V ) cyclotrons are favoured by the radiopharmaceutical companies and produce the majority of commercial cyclotron
radioisotopes (Egan et al., 1994).

There are several reasons for the resurgence of cyclotron radioisotopes. One is t
advantages of cyclotrons over reactors in relation to safety, cost, and radioactive
waste generation. Advances in cyclotron technology have also been important,
including the development of cyclotrons with several beams, allowing
simultaneous bombardment of several targets, and with high flux levels. These
innovations have improved radioisotope yields, historically an important
limitation. (Egan et al., 1994.)
Recently there has been a trend to develop more compact and less expensive
cyclotrons, with power levels of 3-10 M e V , for hospital-based P E T radioisotope
production (Sajjadd and Lambrecht, 1993.) At lower energies, m a n y of the
radiation hazards associated with high-energy cyclotrons are avoided and less
shielding is required. To supplement short-lived P E T radioisotopes produced on
site, radioisotopes with a longer half life or those that can be milked from a
longer-lived parent can be purchased commercially from reactors or larger
cyclotrons. (Smathers and Myers, 1985; Vera-Ruiz, 1985.)

For both small hospital cyclotrons and larger cyclotrons operated by radiopharmaceutical companies, technical improvements have occurred in areas such as target
design and chemical synthesis allowing alternative reactions. These innovations
have expanded the range of radioisotopes that can be produced with cyclotrons,
and enabled more efficient, reliable production. (Smathers and Myers, 1985; Egan
et al, 1994.)

Another field of innovation has been the use of cyclotrons to indirectly generate
neutron beams, as in spallation sources.

CURRENT USE OF CYCLOTRONS
About 150-200 cyclotrons are operating worldwide. About 35 of these are operated
by radiopharmaceutical companies and are used solely for production of medical
radioisotopes. Another 25 are used in part for radioisotope production. (CERN,
1995; Amersham, 1993.)

Reflecting the worldwide trend, two medical cyclotrons were built in Australia in
the early 1990s. The National Medical Cyclotron ( N M C ) is located at the Royal
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Prince Alfred Hospital (RPAH) in Sydney. The 30 M e V N M C was purchased from
the Belgian company Ion Beam Applications. It began operation in 1992, with
capital costs of $20 million. It is used in connection with adjacent PET facilities at
the R P A H . A N S T O operates the N M C and the associated radioisotope production
laboratories, while the R P A H operates the PET centre. In addition to supply of
short-lived P E T radioisotopes for use at the R P A H , the N M C produces
radioisotopes for commercial supply (through A N S T O / A R I ) to nuclear medicine
departments around Australia, with some radioisotopes also being exported. The
N M C produces a range of radioisotopes. It produces enough thallium-201 (160
GBq, 2 days precalibration) to supply the entire Australian market (although some
is still imported by radiopharmaceutical companies). It produces a high proportion
of domestic demand for gallium-67 (60 GBq, 4 days precal). Iodine-123 (25 GBq, 24
hours precal.) and fluorine-18 are produced. Some other PET radioisotopes are
produced, such as nitrogen-13. Indium-Ill production is under development.
Sales of N M C radioisotopes have been expanding steadily. In 1995, sales were over
$2.7 million, a 1 4 % increase over the previous year. (Anon., 1994G; A N S T O , 1989;
1996E; 1995-96; Egan et al., 1994; Boyd, 1992; ARI, 1997, pers. comm.)
A smaller, 10 MeV cyclotron has been in operation in Melbourne since 1992,
adjacent to PET facilities at the Austin Hospital. It is used primarily for production
of PET radioisotopes such as fluorine-18, nitrogen-13, and oxygen-15. (Egan,
1993B.)

The trend towards using cyclotron radioisotopes is shown in the following table:
Nuclear medicine procedures in Australia (%) (adapted from ANSTO, 1993):
1970 1980 1990
Technetium-99 (reactor): 533 89J) 83.5
Thallium-201 (cyclotron):
0
Gallium-67 (cyclotron):
0
Iodine-131 (reactor):
3L1
Others:
15,6
Total reactor produced:
100
Total cyclotron produced:
0.

Li
2JQ
09
65
96,4
3i)

11.9
31)
02
L4
84.6
15.4

Clearly there has been a trend towards greater usage of cyclotron radioisotopes.
However the percentage figures do not reveal another important pattern: there
has been growth in the use of both reactor and cyclotron radioisotopes. Cyclotron
radioisotopes have replaced reactor radioisotopes only to a limited degree. The rest
of the growth of cyclotron radioisotope procedures has resulted from the
development of n e w tests, or at the expense of alternative (non-radioisotope)
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clinical technologies, and it is not u n c o m m o n for two or more different diagnostic
tests to be performed on the same patient.
The following list gives summary details of the most important cyclotron
radioisotopes:
Thallium-201 - half life 72 hours - myocardial studies and tumour localisation still some importation but most Australian d e m a n d is n o w met by the N M C .
Gallium-67 - half life 78 hours - soft tissue cancer diagnosis and staging,
diagnosis of infection, other uses - currently imported by increasingly d e m a n d is
met by domestic cyclotrons.
Iodine-123 - half life 13 hours - various diagnostic studies - one of the most
commonly used cyclotron radioisotopes - potential to replace iodine-131 for
various studies (reduces radiation exposure by a factor of 100 in comparison to I131) - also potential for growth in usage as production methods have recently
been improved to rid it of impurities - also some potential to replace Tc-99m for
some studies but the short half life of 1-123 limits transport.
Indium-Ill - half life 67 hours - various in vivo and in vitro studies - labelling,
C N S studies, other uses - one of the most commonly used cyclotron radioisotopes
- potential to replace iodine radioisotopes for antibody radiolabelling for diagnosis
and therapy of cancer - potential to replace Tc-99m for some antibody-labelling
studies - reactor or cyclotron produced - already imported into Australia, and
domestic cyclotron production of indium-Ill for use in S P E C T is in train at the

NMC.
Fluorine-18 - half life 110 minutes - brain studies, cancer diagnosis and prognosis
- the most important diagnostic radioisotope for P E T studies - can be used at a
site up to six hours travelling time from the cyclotron - produced in compact
cyclotrons including the N M C .
Rubidium-81 - lung ventilation studies - half life 78 hours.
Krypton-81m - vascular studies, lung studies - half life 13 seconds, extracted from
rubidium-81 (half life 4.6 hours) generators.
Oxygen-15 - oxygen metabolism and blood flow studies - produced in compact
cyclotrons and used for metabolism and blood flow with P E T - half life two
minutes.
Nitrogen-13 - heart studies - produced in compact cyclotrons and used for P E T
radiopharmaceuticals - half life 10 minutes.
Carbon-11 - brain imaging, clinical P E T - produced in compact cyclotrons - half
life 20 minutes.
Copper-67 - produced in large (say, 30 M e V ) cyclotrons and used for molecular
genetics research.
Potassium-38 - produced by compact cyclotrons, cardiovascular studies.
Titanium-45 - produced in compact cyclotrons, n e w class of radiopharmaceuticals.
Iodine-124 - radioimmunospecific therapeutic radioisotopes - produced in
compact cyclotrons, used for P E T dosimetry for iodine-131 cancer therapy .
Rubidium-81 - half life 78 hours - diagnostic studies.
Potassium-43 - half life 22 hours - potassium metabolic studies.
Iron-52 - half life 8.2 hours - iron uptake studies.
Yttrium-87 - half life 80 hours - decays to Sr-87m for bone scans.
Gallium-68 - half life 68 minutes - scanning and localisation of tumours - from
Ge-68 parent generator system.
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COMPARING CYCLOTRONS A N D REACTORS
SAFETY. WASTE. A N D W E A P O N S

In terms of accident safety, waste generation, and weapons proliferat
cyclotrons have important advantages over reactors.

Since cyclotrons are powered by electricity, and reactors by uranium
is far less scope for serious accidents with cyclotrons, and the worst case accident is
far more serious for a reactor. Another advantage with cyclotrons is that their
emergency shut-down systems are much simpler than those of reactors.
(Mukerjee and Cochrane, 1992; Boyd, 1991, p.15.)
Cyclotrons do not generate any high level radioactive waste, and far
intermediate-level waste than research reactors. There are no fission fuel wastes
from cyclotrons. In addition, cyclotron production methods enable flexible control
of beam energy, beam optics, and targetry, enabling maximum relative production
of the desired radioisotope and thus minimising waste production; research
reactors are less flexible. (Egan et al., 1994).
Historically, linacs and cyclotrons played an important role in the
nuclear weapons, no more so than during the Manhattan project. Linacs are still
used for weapons research and production, for example by the DOE. However
there is little or no use of cyclotrons for weapons research or production. Certainly
the cyclotrons operated by radiopharmaceutical companies or in hospitals are of
no concern in relation to weapons proliferation because of their design and
relatively low power levels.
PATIENT SAFETY

Some cyclotron radioisotopes, in particular the very short-lived radi
impart lower radiation doses to patients than reactor radioisotopes, and thus
reduce the risks of iatrogenic effects such as cancer. The use of very short-lived
radioisotopes has other advantages: clinical procedures can be repeated over short
periods to obtain multiple views or to measure rapid responses to physiological or
pharmacological intervention; there is no interference to subsequent radioisotope
procedures in the same patient; and the radioactivity administered to the patient
can be increased thereby improving the accuracy of the measurement and the
fidelity of the visual information. (ANSTO, 1992B, p.ll.)
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While some cyclotron radioisotopes are advantageous in terms of patient safety,
others are not. For example, commonly-used thallium-201 and gallium-67 scans
impart a radiation dose of about 18 millisieverts (mSv), whereas c o m m o n Tc-99m
scans impart a dose of about 3-4 mSv. (Perkins, 1995.)
COSTS
Capital, operating, and decommissioning costs are generally considerably cheaper
for cyclotrons than for research reactors (Egan et al, 1994, p.10). There are large
variations in the costs of both cyclotrons and reactors, but the point holds as a
generalisation. The cost benefits of cyclotrons do not translate into comparably
cheaper prices for cyclotron radioisotopes w h e n compared to reactor radioisotopes.
This is because of lower yields in cyclotrons, lower demand, and other factors such
as greater state subsidisation of reactors than cyclotrons. A N S T O (1993, p.4.12)
claims that cyclotron radioisotopes cost "1 or 2 orders of magnitude" more than
reactor-produced radioisotopes. That m a y or m a y not be overstating the difference.
The gap is likely to narrow as cyclotron technology advances.
COMPLEMENTARY OR COMPETING TECHNOLOGIES?
During the Research Reactor Review the general debate was whether cyclotrons
and research reactors are complementary or competing/alternative technologies
for radioisotope production. The implications of this are clear enough: to the
extent that cyclotrons can replace reactors, the case for a n e w reactor is diminished.

To support its case for a new reactor, ANSTO repeatedly argues that cyclotrons and
reactors are complementary - that cyclotrons produce neutron-poor radioisotopes,
reactors produce neutron-rich radioisotopes, and there is little scope for cross-over
(e.g. A N S T O , 1993, pp.4.9-10). However there is some overlap in the radioisotopes
that can be produced using either cyclotrons or reactors, and the degree of overlap
is increasing with advances in cyclotron technology. Fluorine-18 is a good example
of the variety of methods that can be used to produce radioisotopes. In a reactor,
neutron bombardment of lithium carbonate gives rise to tritium which, in turn,
bombards the oxygen in the carbonate producing carrier-free fluorine-18.
Cyclotron production of fluorine-18 can be achieved by several methods including
alpha, proton, or helium particles on oxygen, or deuterons on neon. (Ice, 1995.)
Most cyclotron radioisotopes are produced using protons to bombard targets, but
other particles such as deuterons or alpha particles are also used, thus extending
the range of radioisotopes that can be produced. (Perkins, 1995.) In fact because of
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the variety of particle types that can be used, cyclotrons can produce a wider range
of radioisotopes than reactors, which are limited to neutron bombardment. The
coupling of cyclotrons to spallation sources to generate neutron beams is the
technology which offers the greatest potential for cyclotron technology to replace
reactors for radioisotope production. Since cyclotrons can thus be used to generate
neutron beams, they are theoretically capable of being used to produce all reactor
radioisotopes. H o w e v e r there is some distance between theoretical feasibility and
practical application. For example some therapeutic radioisotopes can be produced
(for the time being at least) either in reactors, or in high-power accelerators which
are few in number. Overall the picture is that some radioisotopes traditionally
produced in reactors can n o w be produced in cyclotrons (e.g. fluorine-18), and
commercial-scale cyclotron production of others m a y be possible in future (e.g.
Tc-99m, iodine-131).
REPLACING Tc-99m WITH CYCLOTRON RADIOISOTOPES
One line of R&D to overcome the problems associated with fission production of
Mo-99 concerns n e w methods of producing Mo-99/Tc-99m, whether using
cyclotrons, spallation sources, conventional reactors with L E U or molybdenum
targets, or liquid-fuel reactors. Another set of solutions, discussed here, is to
replace Tc-99m with radioisotopes that are less problematic to produce.
There are several reasons why Tc-99m is used for 80-90% of nuclear medicine
procedures: its g a m m a energy, which is suitable for imaging with devices such as
g a m m a cameras; the lack of particulate radiation, which minimises radiation dose
and improves image quality; the relatively short half life of Tc-99m, which
minimises radiation dose; the convenience and affordability of Mo-99/Tc-99m
generators; and the chemical versatility of Tc-99m which enables it to be
synthesised into a range of radiopharmaceuticals which can be targeted to specific
body organs. ( A N S T O , 1993E, p. 2.57; Research Reactor Review, 1993, p.83.)
Diagnostic agents for all major organs have been developed with Tc-99m
chemistry. Technetium imaging techniques are being improved in existing fields
(e.g. heart and brain studies), and are expanding into n e w fields such as Tc-99mlabelled peptides and monoclonal antibodies. (Carretta, 1994; Knapp and
Mirzadeh, 1994.)
The dominant role of Tc-99m has become self-perpetuating. The thrust of research
into n e w radiopharmaceuticals, even w h e n initial research involves radioisotopes other than Mo-99/Tc-99m, is towards a situation where doctors can simply
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"shake and bake" pharmaceuticals with Tc-99m (Khafagi, 1993, pp.449-450). Often
this involves a transfer from initial research with cyclotron radioisotopes to the
development of agents which can be labelled with Tc-99m.
Despite its advantages, there are two sets of limitations with Mo-99/Tc-99. First
the various problems associated with reactor production of fission Mo-99 - waste,
H E U targets, and so on. A second set of problems concerns the clinical limitations
of Tc-99m. Given the wide range of radioisotopes which can be used in nuclear
medicine studies, and the range of potential clinical applications, there are
inevitably some clinical procedures for which radioisotopes other than Tc-99m are
better suited. O n e such area is therapeutic nuclear medicine; the criteria for
selection of therapeutic radioisotopes are very different to the criteria for
diagnostic radioisotopes, and Tc-99m has no uses in therapeutic nuclear medicine.
Another area is functional diagnostic studies. Although Tc-99m is widely used for
functional studies, there is s o m e m o m e n t u m towards the use of other
radioisotopes.
Under the impact of competition from alternative diagnostic technologies (e.g. CT,
MRI), nuclear medicine has m o v e d a w a y from anatomy to focusing on functional
studies. O n this topic, Boyd (1992, p.4), an A N S T O employee, says that:
As this evolution occurred it became obvious that the dynamics of human
physiology and metabolism place additional requirements on the choice of
tracer substance. This, coupled with the fact that technetium is not a biologic
element, led to the realisation that the goals of nuclear medicine would be
achieved only with the help of other radioisotopes besides technetium-99m.
The cutting edge of functional imaging involves PET radioisotopes which mimic
biological molecules, in particular carbon-11, oxygen-15, nitrogen-13, and fluorine18. All of these can be produced in cyclotrons, and some can only be produced in
cyclotrons (or linacs).
PET provides a series of cross-sectional image slices (tomographs) which can be
used to generate a three-dimensional image using computers. To date the
development of P E T has been limited by the expense of P E T cameras and
computing equipment, and the need for an on-site cyclotron for production of
very short-lived radioisotopes. A range of innovations are making P E T more
affordable and accessible, including the development of increasingly compact and
inexpensive cyclotrons, automated radiopharmaceutical production facilities, and
generator radioisotope systems enabling the use of P E T radioisotopes without an
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on-site cyclotron. (Ell, 1992; Coleman, 1993; Sajjadd and Lambrecht, 1993.)
Radiopharmaceutical companies are involved in the supply of longer-lived P E T
radioisotopes; for example Syncor/Du Pont announced in 1996 that it was
investing $ U S 14 million in a radioisotope supply network for P E T in the U S
(Anon., 1996F).
The growth of PET has been gradual at best. The number of PET facilities
worldwide rose from 29 in 1984 to 134 in 1995 ( N H T A P , 1984; Cafarella, 1995)7°
There is no certainty that the growth will be sustained, m u c h less that it will
seriously challenge conventional nuclear medicine systems using Tc-99m and
various other reactor and cyclotron radioisotopes. The main impediment is the
cost of existing P E T systems and the scarcity of R & D funding. Another limiting
factor has been medical turf battles, with some nuclear medicine professionals
viewing P E T as a threat to their established positions and technologies (Cafarella,
1995). Because of the high financial costs, P E T has to date been "science fiction" as
Cuaron (1994) puts it - science in industrial countries and fiction in developing
countries.
Of the cyclotron-produced PET radioisotopes, a fluorine-18 labelled compound,
fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG), shows the most promise as an alternative to Tc-99m
for some studies. Until recently the use of F D G has required P E T facilities. While
it is possible that P E T facilities m a y become more c o m m o n and challenge
conventional nuclear medicine systems to a greater extent, a more promising
development is modification of single photon emission computed tomography
(SPECT) g a m m a cameras to enable F D G imaging.
SPECT gamma cameras have become fairly common in hospitals in advanced
capitalist countries including Australia, gradually replacing conventional g a m m a
cameras. Like PET, S P E C T can produce three-dimensional images, showing the
planar distribution of a radiopharmaceutical within the body slice-by-slice;
conventional g a m m a cameras cannot do this. S P E C T has some disadvantages in
relation to PET. It cannot use biological tracers, i.e. radiopharmaceuticals
equivalent to, or closely matching, substances involved in physiological processes.
SPECT also has lower sensitivity than PET, and is less suitable for quantitative
studies. The main advantage of S P E C T over P E T is that S P E C T facilities are
cheaper, more versatile, and more widely available. S P E C T uses more readily
available, longer-lived radioisotopes such as Tc-99, thallium-201 , gallium-67,
xenon-133, and iodine-123. Because these radioisotopes have longer half lives
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The N H T A P (1990) said there were 200 P E T facilities worldwide in 1990 - this probably includes
facilities used entirely for research rather than clinical applications.
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than most of the P E T radioisotopes, and because some of them are reactor
produced anyway, S P E C T does not require an on-site cyclotron as is generally
necessary for PET. In short, S P E C T w a s developed in part as a superior alternative
to conventional g a m m a cameras, in part as an inferior but more practical
alternative to PET.
A number of research projects have been underway in recent years to enable the
use of F D G with S P E C T cameras. The modified camera can still be used for routine
nuclear medicine studies, an important advantage. (Drane et al., 1994.) F D G S P E C T
is an attractive alternative to dedicated P E T facilities, and it is doubly attractive
given its potential to replace some Tc-99m studies.
FDG can be used for heart studies, many of which use cyclotron-produced
thallium-201. Thallium-201 imparts a considerably higher radiation dose to
patients than most other diagnostic nuclear medicine procedures (Roebuck, 1996).
In part because of the radiation dose of thallium-201, there has been m o m e n t u m
towards the use of Tc-99m instead of thallium-201. F D G has advantages over both
Tc-99m and thallium-201 in that it is both cyclotron produced and imparts a low
radiation dose.

Overall, heart studies using thallium-201 and Tc-99m account for 20% of nuclear
medicine procedures in Australia, although not all of these various heart studies
may be vulnerable to replacement by F D G . In the US, nuclear cardiology is more
prominent, accounting for almost two thirds of radiopharmaceutical sales in the
U S in 1991 (Anon., 1993). Apart from its use in heart studies, F D G has been used
extensively in diagnosis and prognosis of primary brain tumours. In other areas of
oncology, the usefulness of F D G imaging is being explored. (Drane et al., 1994.)
The use of FDG SPECT has already taken hold to a limited extent in clinical
practice. It is also the subject of a number of research projects around the world
and there has been interest and financial support from manufacturers of imaging
equipment such as Siemens, Philips, and D u Pont (Noelpp et al, 1994). Modifying
existing S P E C T equipment to enable and improve F D G S P E C T studies is the crux
of the research and thus the involvement of these companies is important. There
is also some research into the possible uses of F D G with modified conventional
g a m m a cameras (Noelpp et al., 1994), which are more widespread than S P E C T
cameras and far more widespread than P E T facilities.

Fluorine-18 has a half life of 110 minutes, and thus FDG can only be used withi
certain radius (about 6 hours travelling time) from the point of production. It can
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be produced using reactors or cyclotrons; either w a y the replacement of Tc-99m
with F D G is advantageous given the problems with reactor production of fission
Mo-99, and cyclotron production is particularly advantageous given the more
general problems with reactors.
Iodine-123 is another radioisotope which has some potential to replace Tc-99m for
some studies. It has numerous uses - thyroid, kidney, and brain studies,
measurement of blood flow in stroke patients and possibly epilepsy patients, and
localising tumours of the adrenal glands. The full potential of iodine-123 has yet
to be realised, in part because methods to produce high-purity iodine-123 have
only been available for the past 5-10 years. A N S T O (1992E) says that iodine-123
should eventually replace iodine-131 for m a n y diagnostic applications. A N S T O
(1992B) also say that iodine-123 is superior to Tc-99m in its overall diagnostic
accuracy. Iodine-123-labelled molecules have numerous targets that cannot be
reached with Tc-99m (Anon., 1994). Iodine-123 can be used with P E T equipment
and is also ideal for transfer to S P E C T (Lambrecht et al, 1994).
Historically the use of iodine-123 was limited because of its production with
cyclotrons. This created problems such as high cost and limited availability. Thus
there was some m o m e n t u m towards replacement of iodine-123 with Tc-99m for
some studies (e.g. brain studies). Given the increasing availability of cyclotrons,
and also the technical improvements enabling production of high-purity iodine123, the m o m e n t u m could swing the other way, towards replacement of Tc-99m
with iodine-123 for some studies.

There is a long history of various imaging/diagnostic technologies finding clinica
niches, sometimes pushing other technologies out in the process, sometimes
being overtaken themselves. Within the field of nuclear medicine there is a
highly fluid process of radioisotopes finding niches, being replaced, and so on. A s
mentioned the m o m e n t u m within nuclear medicine has been towards evergreater reliance on Tc-99m. If a sustained trend away from Tc-99m does occur, it is
unlikely to happen quickly. It is conceivable but unlikely that any particular
radioisotope (or system such as PET) will emerge to rapidly and fundamentally
alter the practice of nuclear medicine, overtaking Tc-99m along the way. If a trend
away from Tc-99m does develop, it is more likely to be gradual and uneven. A s
with research into n e w production methods, the likelihood of ample supplies of
fission Mo-99, for the next generation at least, m a y act as a brake on efforts to
replace Tc-99m with other radioisotopes.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
FUTURE SUPPLY OF RADIOISOTOPES
IN AUSTRALIA

8.1. HISTORY AND CURRENT SUPPLY OF THE AUSTRALIAN RADIOISOT
MARKET
8.2. FUTURE SUPPLY IN THE ABSENCE OF A DOMESTIC REACTOR
8.3. FUTURE RESEARCH INTO NUCLEAR MEDICINE AND THE
RADIOISOTOPE INDUSTRY

On the basis of the information and analysis presented in chapters 5-7, the issue
future radioisotope supply in Australia can n o w be addressed. I begin this chapter
with a brief discussion on the history and current supply of the Australian market,
focusing on the reasons for the current dominance of A N S T O and Australian
Radioisotopes (ARI). Then I evaluate the scenario of radioisotope production and
supply in Australia in the absence of a domestic reactor, drawing on the material
presented in the preceding chapters and also taking u p issues such as costs and
reliability of supply. Then I discuss potential roles for various organisations in the
absence of a domestic reactor, including A N S T O / A R I and private companies.
Nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry have been the subject of very
little sustained analysis and this thesis is by no means exhaustive in its analysis of
these topics. Thus I conclude this chapter with some suggestions for future
research and summarise some of these issues, in particular iatrogenesis, overuse
of nuclear medicine, and alternative medical technologies.

8.1. HISTORY AND CURRENT SUPPLY OF TH
AUSTRALIAN RADIOISOTOPE MARKET
HISTORY OF SUPPLY
CURRENT SUPPLY
HISTORY OF SUPPLY
There have been four phases in the supply of the Australian radioisotope market.
Until H I F A R began operation in 1960, most radioisotopes used in Australia were
imported. Importation of medical radioisotopes w a s funded by the federal
government, and it w a s not substantial in quantity. ( A N S T O , 1993, p.4.7.) In
addition to imported radioisotopes, there w a s some sporadic mining of radium
which was used in cancer therapy, and in medical and beauty treatments
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purporting to cure all things from rheumatism to "double chin". (Cawte, 1992,
ch.l.)
The second phase began with the construction and routine operation of HIFAR
from 1960. H o w e v e r radioisotope production w a s minimal and ad hoc.
Radioisotopes were imported unless that w a s a problem because of short half lives
or excessive transport costs or unavailability: nothing was to interfere with the
power-reactor research. A turning-point w a s 1967 w h e n the Commission decided
that its operations should include the regular production and processing of
radioisotopes, and radiopharmaceutical production laboratories were
commissioned. With the abandonment of the Jervis Bay nuclear power project,
radioisotope production w a s further expanded. In 1973 the A A E C s Radioisotope
Production Laboratories were upgraded. In fact radioisotope production,
processing, and research facilities have been improved a number of times over the
years, most recently with the completion of a $3.3 million radiopharmaceuticals
laboratory in 1995. (Boyd, 1968; Moyal, 1975, p.380; A N S T O , 1995G)
This second phase was a period of considerable growth. In 1975 sales of
radiopharmaceuticals exceeded $1 million for the first time; in 1980 sales exceeded
$2 million. From the late 1960s, w h e n the A A E C systematised radioisotope
production and processing, radioisotopes were imported only if they could not be
manufactured by the A A E C . There were a number of disincentives facing foreign
suppliers, not least the A A E C s provision of medical radioisotopes at no cost to
users. By 1976/77, 9 5 % of medical radioisotopes used in Australia originated from
the A A E C , with total subsidisation from the National Welfare Fund. ( A N S T O ,
1993E, p.2.58; 1993D, p.2.14; 1993, p.4.7.)
The federal government decided that from 1 January 1978, the Commonwealth
Department of Health would no longer be involved in radioisotope procurement,
the government would no longer distribute radioisotopes free of charge, and
market forces should be allowed to determine prices. These decisions had the
effect of ending the A A E C s "virtual monopoly" for its radioisotope products and
opened the door to increased competition from foreign suppliers ( A N S T O , 1993,
p.4.7). Thus began the third phase of supply of the Australian radioisotope market.
The A A E C s share of the Australian market dropped considerably. In 1984 the
National Health Technology Advisory Panel (1984, p.14) said:
Overseas competition has been very significant in the case of reactorproduced radioisotopes. The AAEC
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has had difficulty in maintaining a

satisfactory market share for these radioisotopes, and imported products
account for a high proportion of the Australian market.
The AAECs share of the Mo-99/Tc-99m market also dropped markedly (National
Health Technology Advisory Panel, 1984, p. 14):
Molybdenum generators used for technetium-99m production may be
purchased from the AAEC. Overseas products are however highly
competitive and a high proportion of the generators used in Australia are
imported.
The AAECs share of the Mo-99/Tc-99m market, and of the overall market for
radiopharmaceuticals, slipped to about 3 5 % in the early 1980s (AAEC, 1982-83, p.15;
A N S T O , 1993E, p.317).

In the fourth phase of supply of the Australian radioisotope market, from the mi
1980s, the A A E C regained its prominent position. A technical improvement
strengthened the A A E C s position: in the mid 1980s the Commission developed
the capacity to produce Mo-99 /Tc-99m generators of sufficient quality (sterility) to
enable it to compete more successfully with foreign suppliers. These generators
were marketed at a cheaper price than the imported products, and the A A E C s
share of the generator market increased to 8 5 % within a few years. (Turner, 1993,
p.780; A N S T O , 1993, p.317.)
Apart from this specific technical improvement, the AAEC reorganised its
radioisotope operations through the 1980s to improve its competitive position.
The 1979 review of the A A E C by the National Energy Research Development and
Demonstration Council ( N E R D D C ) said that the A A E C s radioisotope program
was not as cost-effective as it might be, and that radioisotope production,
distribution, and marketing should be separated from the rest of the Lucas Heights
research establishment and m a d e part of an organisation such as the
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories. Radioisotope production was not removed
from the A A E C s responsibilities, but in response to the criticism by the N E R D D C ,
and also in response to increasing competition from foreign suppliers, the A A E C
reorganised its resources to produce a more commercial structure. This eventually
culminated in the establishment of Australian Radioisotopes (ARI) as a
commercial subsidiary of A N S T O in 1987. ( A N S T O , 1993, p.4.8.)
ANSTO (1993, pp.4.17-4.18) offer a string of reasons for their dominance of the
market over the past decade: A R T s products are considered comparable in quality
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to imported products; there is an "overall cost advantage"; the local market
supports an indigenous industry; A R I provides a comprehensive and personal
service to users; A R I has the flexibility to m o v e with the changing demands of the
market; there is continued liaison with major hospitals through research and
development programs; A N S T O supports A R I with research and licensing; the
relatively small size of the Australian market deters and delays foreign companies
from making the necessary investments to satisfy Australian licensing regulations
for n e w and improved products; and finally, HIFAR's irradiation facilities enable
not only routine production but also specialist products for research.
A number of these claims need comment. As for ANSTO/ARI's comprehensive
and personal service, its flexibility to m o v e with changing demands, and its
continued liaison with hospitals, these m a y be fair generalisations - the tone of
the numerous medical submissions to the Research Reactor Review suggests so,
even though m a n y of the submissions were solicited. However there is some
evidence to the contrary. The 1994 Bain report argued that ARI, along with
ANSTO's Biomedicine and Health research program, should be removed from
ANSTO's control, because of problems stemming from the physical separation
and cultural isolation of A N S T O / A R I from the health and medical community
(Bain et al., 1994, p.44). This separation and isolation, the Bain report went on to
say, was a "strong barrier" to more effective collaboration. It seems that nuclear
medicine professionals said one thing to the Research Reactor Review panel and
another to the organisations which produced the Bain report.
The manner in which "the local market supports an indigenous industry" is a
euphemism for national chauvinism, fuelled by fear-mongering from A N S T O .
As m u c h was acknowledged by a nuclear medicine professional in a verbal
submission to the Research Reactor Review (Turner, 1993, p.780). Professor
Turner noted that in Western Australia, there w a s competition between
A N S T O / A R I and foreign suppliers for supply of a number of radioisotopes. The
Australian products were of inferior quality, and A m e r s h a m and Mallinckrodt
brought their prices d o w n to a level comparable with the domestic product.
Turner (1993, p.780) goes on to say that:
Western Australia, for purely chauvinistic reasons, elected to go with the

ANSTO product, because there was a threat that, if they did not have a
market, they would close down their production facility for radioisotopes i
Australia

In fact, the multi-national companies were considering legal

action under the Trade Practices Act, because they considered that what we
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were doing was not in the interest of freedom of trade and, indeed, I guess it

was not, but it was in the national interest as we perceived it at that time.
ANSTO notes that the relatively small size of the Australian market deters and
delays foreign companies from making the necessary investments to satisfy
Australian licensing regulations. In the absence of domestic reactor production,
the licensing costs in relation to the size of the market for imported products
would be less of a burden. The growth of the Australian market would be a
further incentive; according to A N S T O (1993, p.4.12), in the early 1990s annual
growth in the number of nuclear medicine procedures w a s 10%.
CURRENT SUPPLY
All of the suppliers of the Australian market, including ANSTO/ARI, are coy
about their activities to a greater or lesser extent, but a reasonably accurate picture
can be pieced together.
According to ANSTO (1993, p.4.17, 4.20), ARI maintained (as at 1993) a market
share of "around 8 0 % overall" for radioisotope products and 9 5 % of the
Australian market for Mo-99/Tc-99m generators. In 1991-92, about 55% of ARI's
sales were of H I F A R radioisotopes and the rest were sales of products imported by
ARI or sales of non-radioisotope products. In the past few years, A R I has also
played a role in the sale of radioisotopes produced by the National Medical
Cyclotron.
Amersham is the only foreign licensed supplier of Mo-99/Tc-99 and thus
ANSTO/ARI's only competitor in the Australian Mo-99/Tc-99m market. It
supplies about 15 Mo-99/Tc-99m generators each week, manufactured in the U K .
Amersham (1996, pers. comm.) also imports thallium-201, gallium-67, cobalt-60
sources, and perhaps a few other radioisotope products. According to Diesendorf
(1993), A m e r s h a m supplies 1 0 % of the Australian market. According to
Amersham (1996, pers. comm.), they supply roughly 10-15% of the Australian
market. It is notable that, according to A m e r s h a m (1996, pers. comm.), there is
greater demand for the company's Mo-99/Tc-99m generators in Australia than it
is willing to supply. This reluctance is because of the very low profit margins
associated with generator sales. In particular, profits are low for large generators
which must be returned to the U K because of non-proliferation regulations
concerning the depleted uranium contained in the shields of these generators.
Many hospitals require these larger generators, and most or all are supplied by
A N S T O / A R I . It is not apparent w h y A m e r s h a m has not simply increased its
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prices to satisfy demand; perhaps the situation is further complicated by
competition with and manoeuvring by A N S T O / A R I .
Mallinckrodt supplies Australia with some products manufactured in Europe and
North America. According to Mallinckrodt, its supply of the Australian market is
roughly equivalent to Amersham's. However the product range is different. It
supplies a range of cold kits for labelling in hospitals with radioisotopes, but its
supply of radioisotopes is limited to thallium-201, gallium-67, an indium-Ill
labelled radiopharmaceutical, and perhaps one or two others. Mallinckrodt used
to have a license to supply Mo-99/Tc-99m generators, but let the license lapse.
(Mallinckrodt, 1996, pers. comm.)
Over the years, Nordion has supplied Mo-99 (and other radioisotopes) during
routine H I F A R shut downs, and during the extended shut downs which take
place every few years. More recently the South African Atomic Energy
Commission has become a significant back-up supplier w h e n H I F A R is
temporarily shut d o w n ; for example in December/January 1996-97, four
shipments were m a d e to A R I totalling 301 Ci of Mo-99. (SAAEC, 1997, pers.
comm.)
There may be one or two other smaller suppliers of radioisotope products to the
Australian market; for example the American company Manicrop was listed as a
supplier in one submission to the Research Reactor Review (Waggett, 1993, p.428).

8.2. FUTURE SUPPLY IN THE ABSENCE OF A
DOMESTIC REACTOR
OVERVIEW
RADIOISOTOPE COSTS
RELIABILITY OF SUPPLY
RADIOISOTOPE HALF LIVES & SPECIFIC RADIOISOTOPES
ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
OVERVIEW
From the analysis and information presented in chapters 5-7, it can be concluded
that the prospects for greater reliance on imported radioisotopes are good.
International trade in radioisotopes is well established, with supply networks
stretching all around the world. Bulk production of the most commonly used
reactor radioisotopes will be sufficient to meet world demand for at least the next
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generation. Several large, vertically-integrated operations - in particular Nordion,
Mallinckrodt, and A m e r s h a m - have m a d e significant investments in recent
years and will continue to dominate the global market. Other producers and
suppliers, such as IRE and the S A A E C , will also play a significant role in the
international market, and in s o m e cases will also act as back-up suppliers in the
case of disruption of supply from the major producers and suppliers. These
smaller producers can be seen as a reservoir from which significant radioisotope
production and export ventures might emerge in future.
There is sufficient research reactor capacity to supply world demand many times
over, and the overall decline in research reactor infrastructure is unlikely to have
a significant impact for several decades, if at all. Upswings or downturns in
nuclear power and weapons m a y have some impact on research reactor
infrastructure and thus radioisotope production, but the effects are variable and
unlikely to be of m u c h consequence overall.
Technical innovations are likely to reduce or negate any impact caused by
declining reactor infrastructure. The use of L E U or m o l y b d e n u m targets is likely to
enable more widespread reactor production of Mo-99/Tc-99m generators,
increasing the opportunities for reliable, affordable importation. Innovation
continues in the field of cyclotron technology - there are good prospects for
continued growth in the use of cyclotron radioisotopes, and some potential for the
replacement of Tc-99m procedures with cyclotron radioisotopes such as F D G and
iodine-123. The impact of other research areas - cyclotron production of M o 99/Tc-99m, and production of Mo-99/Tc-99m and other radioisotopes using
spallation sources and liquid fuel reactors - cannot be confidently predicted but
they m a y be of consequence.
One issue which needs comment is the argument that importation is parasitic. In
its submission to the Research Reactor Review, Kylwind Pty. Ltd. (1993) m a d e the
following blunt c o m m e n t about importation:
This is a parasitic case of the NIMBY syndrome. If Australia decides that it
needs to use radio-isotopes, then it is morally bound to accept the problems
that the production of such isotopes incurs.
Greenpeace (1993) made a similar point, but connected to its advocacy of greater
reliance on cyclotrons. There m a y be specific cases w h e n it would be appropriate to
refuse supply from particular countries or particular suppliers on moral/political
grounds, but the overall argument is flawed. Taken to its logical extreme the
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argument would be that every country with a d e m a n d for reactor radioisotopes is
morally bound to build and operate research reactors. Given the manifold
problems associated with research reactors - radioactive waste problems, weapons
proliferation, and so on - it makes far more sense to operate no more reactors
than is necessary. In the longer term the solution is to reduce reliance on research
reactors for radioisotope production. A N S T O could assist in this long-term
solution, for example by pursuing with greater vigour research into the
production and use of cyclotron radioisotopes. Building a n e w reactor in Australia
would only add to the problems associated with research reactors and perpetuate
reliance on reactor applications.
Greater reliance on imported radioisotopes would bring with it some minor
problems or potential problems, discussed below. Nonetheless, in relation to
radioisotope production, a n e w reactor in Australia promises to be superfluous
over the next generation and it m a y , in the face of changes in the global
radioisotope industry and technical innovations, be an anachronistic white
elephant beyond that.

RADIOISOTOPE COSTS
It was frequently claimed during the Research Reactor Review, by organisations
such as A N S T O , hospitals, and nuclear medicine professional associations, that
the cost of importing radioisotopes is significantly greater than domestic
production. The implication w a s that the costs of importation are excessive, or
even prohibitive, and that a n e w reactor should therefore be built.
The Review (1993, p.93) reproduced figures supplied by the Royal Brisbane
Hospital indicating that imported products were roughly twice as expensive as
A N S T O / A R I products. The Concord Hospital (1993) said that during periodical
shut downs of H I F A R , the cost of raw materials doubled and most of this increase
was absorbed by A N S T O / A R I , with user price increases of about 30%. A number
of other hospitals, nuclear medicine professionals, and professional associations
claimed that prices would increase significantly in the absence of a domestic
reactor, as did A N S T O and A N S T O ' s consultants.71
Comments made to the Review on the costs of importation were not unanimous.
Little data on relative costs of A N S T O versus imported products w a s (or is)
available, largely because producers are reluctant to m a k e this knowledge publicly
^Khafagi, 1993; Australian and New Zealand Association of Physicians in Nuclear Medicine, 1993;
Australian and N e w Zealand Society of Nuclear Medicine, 1993; A N S T O , 1993D, p.2.29; 1993, p.4.40;
1991; Coopers and Lybrand Consultants, 1993, p.16, pp.71-72.
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known, and thus m a n y of the claims were unsubstantiated. Claims varied widely,
from modest costs increases to five-fold increases for imported products. There
were a few dissenters, not just from opponents of a n e w reactor but also from a
small number of medical professionals (e.g. Silink, 1993). A hospital-based nuclear
medicine department m a d e the pertinent observation - which escaped most
other medical and pro-reactor submissions - that the costs of building a reactor
might be factored into the equation: "It could undoubtedly be argued that the cost
to the community of purchasing radioactive materials from overseas suppliers
would still be less than the cost of building a n e w reactor." (Flinders Medical
Centre, 1993.) The Sutherland Shire Council (1993B, p.57) compared 1993 retail
prices of A m e r s h a m and A N S T O . A N S T O ' s prices were significantly cheaper for
some products, significantly more expensive for others.
One of the concerns of medical professionals and institutions was expressed by a
nuclear medicine professional (Chatterton, 1993, pp.811-812):
One of the fears of the nuclear medicine doctors is that if radioisotopes were

to become more expensive, Medicare schedule fees would not automatically
reflect this, certainly not immediately. So increased costs would be absorb
by patients and/or practitioners.
The major problem with the numerous claims made in support of a new reactor
on the basis of increased costs of imported radioisotopes was the failure to
consider the subsidisation of A R I by A N S T O (which is in turn funded mostly by
the federal government). This subsidisation w a s noted by critics of a n e w reactor
(e.g. Sutherland Shire Council, 1993B, p.56; Friends of the Earth, 1993B; Berkhout,
1993; see also Egan et al., 1994, p.5.)
Before 1992-93, only the marginal cost of reactor fuel was charged to ARI. ANSTO
(1993, p.4.4) claims that since then, the "full" marginal costs have been charged to
ARI - the costs of extra fuel, labour and materials required to produce radioisotopes. A N S T O (1993, p.4.4) further claims that subsidisation of radioisotope
production is a thing of the past: "ARI has emerged into an era that has allowed it
to become self-sustaining and unsupported by subsidy

"

Despite ANSTO's claims, ARI is still subsidised in a number of ways. The fee
charged to A R I does not consider the capital costs of H I F A R , on which point the
Research Reactor Review (1993, p.92) said: "Inasmuch as the capital invested in
the H I F A R reactor is a sunk cost this is not unreasonable, but would not be
appropriate for a n e w reactor." A N S T O ' s charges to A R I also do not consider
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depreciation costs, decommissioning costs, site costs, waste management costs, or
the costs of research (which are mostly subsumed under the A N S T O ' s
Biomedicine and Health program).

Estimating the extent of the subsidisation of ARI is difficult. It is not immediat
apparent h o w the various costs associated with a multipurpose reactor should be
factored into pricing for one particular program. S o m e of these factors can be
quantified by estimating the extent to which H I F A R (or a n e w reactor) is used for
radioisotope production as opposed to other functions. But even this calculation is
complex and contestable. It might include consideration of reactor time, reactor
neutrons, and staff time and engineering effort devoted to radioisotope
production. A N S T O bases its assessment of reactor usage devoted to radioisotope
production on the claim that 1 0 % of HIFAR's neutrons are devoted to
radioisotope production. Friends of the Earth (1993B) took issue with this during
the Research Reactor Review, saying that a greater percentage of HIFAR's
irradiation rigs (25%), operating staff time and effort are devoted to radioisotope
production. Debates over other aspects of A N S T O ' s subsidisation of A R I are
equally complex - it would be particularly difficult to reduce the economic, social,
and environmental costs associated with radioactive waste management and
storage to an economic figure to be factored into costs charged to ARI.
To attempt to quantify the extent of subsidisation of ARI would be complex and
contentious, given the numerous assumptions it would entail. Suffice it here to
note that the costs associated with reactor construction, "back-end" costs such as
reactor decommissioning and waste management, and other costs not factored
into ARI's prices, are large. For example, if 1 0 % of HIFAR's neutrons are used for
radioisotope production, as A N S T O claims, then it would be appropriate for ARI
to contribute $42.5 million (10%) to the capital costs of a n e w reactor.72 This is 4-5
times as m u c h as A R I recovers in annual sales revenue, and this alone could add
5-10% to ARI's prices over the 40-50 year life-span of a n e w reactor.
It should also be noted that even with ARI being charged only for marginal fuel,
labour, and materials costs, it has struggled to generate revenue in excess of costs
and was further subsidised with an "Operational Subsidy" from A N S T O until
recently. It is highly unlikely that A R I could operate on a commercial basis
without the various subsidies it enjoys.

The $425 million figure was put forward by the Bain report (1994). See chapter 4.4.
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All overseas radioisotope producers are subsidised, but that is of no consequence
when evaluating the relative costs of domestic production versus importation for
supply of the Australian market.
Another issue is competitive manoeuvring in the radioisotope market.
Sometimes foreign suppliers have discounted heavily to get a toe-hold in the
Australian market (Chatterton, 1993, pp.799-800). Conversely, it m a y be the case
that in the absence of domestic production and competition, prices charged to
Australian radioisotope users would increase as a direct consequence of the lack of
competition - for example a nuclear medicine professional told the Research
Reactor Review that sometimes A N S T O begins to produce products once they are
already on the market and the imported price can be reduced by a factor of two or
more (Kelly, 1993, p.501). Against this, the weakening of Nordion's stranglehold
on bulk radioisotope production, and the competitive nature of the radioisotope
processing/retailing industry, would act as brakes on opportunistic price increases
in the absence of a domestic reactor.
The cost of imported Mo-99/Tc-99m would be considerably less if, instead of
importing generators, bulk Mo-99 w a s imported with domestic generator
manufacture. A N S T O ' s comparison of its generator prices, in comparison with
Amersham's prices, fails to acknowledge this. In the absence of a domestic reactor,
A N S T O could use its facilities to manufacture generators from imported bulk M o 99, and/or a radiopharmaceutical company such as A m e r s h a m might establish
facilities for generator manufacture.
As discussed in chapter 6.2, Nordion has increased its price for bulk Mo-99, but
this was expected to have only a small impact on hospital radiopharmaceutical
budgets because bulk Mo-99 accounts for only 30-60% of the cost of manufacturing
generators, because other radioisotopes are more expensive than Mo-99 per unit
dose, and because non-radioactive components of radiopharmaceuticals comprise
a considerable proportion of radiopharmaceutical costs. Overall, it was expected
that a 4 0 % price increase would increase radiopharmaceutical budgets by about 3 %
for large nuclear medicine departments and up to 7 % for smaller departments.
(Anon., 1995E.) Neither generator manufacture, nor non-radioactive components
of radiopharmaceuticals, need be affected in the absence of a domestic reactor.
Another important factor is that radiopharmaceutical costs comprise only a small
percentage of overall nuclear medicine costs which also include imaging
equipment, salaries and fees, and sundry other costs. S o m e indication of the
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relative costs in Australia w a s presented to the Research Reactor Review by a
nuclear medicine professional (Chatterton, 1993, p.803):
Radioisotope costs: $7 million p.a.
Non-radioisotope component
of radiopharmaceuticals:
$5 million p.a.
Other costs (e.g. salaries)
$48-60 million p.a.
$60-72 million p.a.
Total nuclear medicine costs:
The situation is much the same overseas. For example radiopharmaceutical costs
in the U S are less than 1 0 % of average procedure charges, and that percentage
figure has declined since the mid 1980s. Moreover radiopharmaceutical prices are
increasing at a rate less than the consumer price index in the U S . (Kasses, 1995.)

If radioisotope costs in Australia were doubled in the case of greater reliance on
imports, which would probably be a worst-case scenario, overall nuclear medicine
costs would increase by just 1 0 % or so. Moreover this does not even begin to take
into account the substantial subsidisation of ARI, a particularly salient issue at a
time w h e n a n e w reactor is under consideration.
RELIABILITY OF SUPPLY
ANSTO, and a number of nuclear medicine professionals and institutions, argue
against greater reliance on imported radioisotopes, and conversely in support of a
new reactor, because of the alleged unreliability of importation (e.g. A N S T O ,
1993D, p.2.29; Royal Brisbane Hospital, 1993).
Claims of unreliability can be unpacked into several different arguments. The
major argument is that because of delays and misplacements, failure of timely
delivery occurs too often with imported radioisotopes. These problems cause
inconvenience to medical staff and patients, for example by prolonging hospital
stays. Another component of these arguments is that A N S T O ' s delivery of its
products is reliable and rapid.
Undoubtedly there are sometimes problems with international transport of
radioisotopes, because of pressures imposed by the short half lives of some
radioisotopes. There are other problems too. Radioisotope shipments require
shielding and this has limited importation, especially for Amersham's large
generators with depleted uranium shields (see section 8.1). Another possible
problem concerns regulations which limit the volumes of radioactive materials
that can be transported in any one aircraft.
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Whether these problems are c o m m o n and important enough to significantly sway
the argument in favour of a n e w reactor is another matter. A s for delayed or failed
deliveries, the Royal Brisbane Hospital (1993) m a d e the unsubstantiated assertion
that between 5-20% of imported radioisotopes do not arrive "within an acceptable
time window". The Australian and N e w Zealand Society of Nuclear Medicine
(1993) claimed that nuclear medicine departments using imported Mo-99/Tc-99m
generators experience delivery failures about two times each year - assuming
weekly delivery, this is a modest failure rate of about 4%. It is just as easy to find
claims that overseas delivery is very reliable. For example Bindon (1988), writing
in The Nuclear Engineer about Amersham's export operations from the U K ,
claims that "All arrangements are so well organised as to guarantee practically
100% delivery to most parts of the world within 48 hours of dispatch of the
consignment from Amersham." Delivery from the South African Atomic Energy
Commission is remarkably reliable. With routine shipments to China, India, and
Israel, the frequency of transport delays from the S A A E C to its customers is less
than 0.5% of all shipments, and the delay is usually less than 30 hours (SAAEC,
1997, pers. comm.).
Most of the radioisotopes used throughout the world are imported from other
countries. For example the U S , Japan, and the U K all rely heavily on imported
radioisotopes. Together these three countries account for over two thirds of world
usage of medical radioisotopes. There is no indication that delayed or failed
delivery is c o m m o n in these countries. Such problems would be taken up in the
nuclear medicine professional literature if they were of great concern. However
these issues rarely if ever surface in the European or American professional
literature; the contrast with the depth of concern expressed by a number of
submissions to the Research Reactor Review is striking and suggests that the
problems were overstated in Review submissions. There would also be m u c h
more pressure for domestic radioisotope production around the world if
importation w a s problematic.
Proponents of a new research reactor in Australia have pointed to the Mo-99
project in the U S as evidence of the importance of domestic radioisotope
production. This w a s reflected in the Research Reactor Review's (1993, p.92)
sweeping statement that "As might be expected, the lack of a domestic supply of
technetium-99m worries Americans." However the emphasis in the U S has been
on increasing security of Mo-99 supply; whether this involved domestic
production was a secondary consideration. O n e source from a
radiopharmaceutical company in the U S put it thus (quoted in Rojas-Burke,
1992B): "We'd like to have a domestic supplier of molybdenum, but w e don't
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have to have a domestic supplier." Given the existing research reactor
infrastructure in the U S , domestic production w a s the obvious option, but
possibilities for developing overseas facilities were also explored. That the three
major radiopharmaceutical companies supplying the U S market have pursued
ventures overseas or sought out foreign suppliers, and are n o w largely
uninterested in the Sandia venture, is further evidence that security of supply was
more of an issue than domestic production per se.
The supply chains, technologies (e.g shielding), and regulatory apparatus for
international radioisotope trade are in place. Several organisations around the
world have experience and expertise in the establishment and routinisation of
long supply lines; Nordion's radioisotopes, for example, are used in over 100
countries all around the world and A m e r s h a m supplies 150+ countries. The high
level of competition in the processing/retailing segment of the industry is an
incentive for these companies to ensure reliability of supply. Vertical integration
of the industry is likely to further improve reliability of supply by streamlining
regimes of production, processing, and transportation.
Another line of argument advanced by ANSTO (1993, p.4.41) was that supply
might be efficient in Europe and North America, but supply to Australia and
other Asia Pacific countries is likely to be less efficient because of the distances
involved. H o w e v e r the supply from South Africa to China is remarkably reliable.
Similarly, Japan has few problems importing all of its Mo-99, and most of its other
radioisotopes, from Nordion's Canadian facilities. The Director of the Department
of Radioisotopes at the Japanese Tokai Research Establishment says that
(Yamabayashi, 1996, pers. comm.):
The import from Nordion is quite stable and regular. It has been working
so for more than 10 years without serious problems apart from occasional
delay of flight schedule in the season of heavy snow.
In addition, the long-term supply contracts between Nordion and the Japanese
radiopharmaceutical companies are secure, and there is little d e m a n d from these
companies or from nuclear medicine professionals for domestic production of
fission Mo-99 in Japan. (Yamabayashi, 1996, pers. comm.)
Yet another argument put to the Review in a number of submissions was that
because of the relatively small size of the Australian market, suppliers would be
likely to interrupt Australian supply in the case of shortages rather than disrupt
supply to the larger, more lucrative markets. This w a s speculation at best, and
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perhaps just clutching at straws. The Review (1993, p.94) noted that there w a s no
evidence of this having happened. Moreover this argument assumes shortages of
supply which are unlikely to occur, at least for the most commonly used isotopes
and at least for the next generation.
Whatever problems are currently experienced during importation of radioisotopes would most probably be reduced in the case of ongoing reliance on
imports as an alternative to domestic reactor production. A s supply chains to
Australia are routinised, and teething problems overcome, problems would
become increasingly infrequent. For example, radioisotope shipments to Australia
are sometimes unnecessarily unloaded w h e n planes are delayed for one reason or
another; this further delays shipment and can also result in completely failed
delivery. Potential suppliers could probably be induced to sign long-term supply
contracts with penalties for failed deliveries. A N S T O (then the A A E C ) w a s a
world pioneer in establishing regular radioisotope delivery across large areas: it
might put that expertise and initiative to good use in solving some of the
complications arising from greater reliance on imported products. M a n y other
strategies could be pursued to minimise problems - diversifying supply sources,
inter-institutional arrangements between hospitals/clinics to minimise problems
when failed or late deliveries do occur, and so on.

RADIOISOTOPE HALF LIVES & SPECIFIC RADIOISOTOPES
It is commonly claimed that a number of important radioisotopes would not be
available in the absence of a domestic reactor because their half lives are too short
for importation (e.g. A N S T O , 1993F, p.7.4). However exactly which radioisotopes
would be unavailable is rarely spelt out. Here I will m a k e some general comments
on the availability of specific radioisotopes in the absence of a domestic reactor,
and then briefly discuss the potential for importation (or domestic cyclotron
production) of the most important medical radioisotopes.
There is widespread international trade of the four most commonly used medical
radioisotopes, Mo-99/Tc-99m, gallium-67, thallium-201, and iodine-131. In fact it is
in part because of their amenability to long-distance transport that they are so
commonly used. It is the plethora of less commonly used radioisotopes that might
be in jeopardy in the absence of a domestic reactor. Generally it is those
radioisotopes with short half lives that are most difficult to import, for obvious
reasons. M a n y of the important short-lived radioisotopes are cyclotron produced,
and are (or could be) produced in Australia using cyclotrons. In sum, it is shortlived, infrequently-used reactor radioisotopes that are in question.

323

Many infrequently used radioisotopes can in fact be imported. S o m e already are
imported because d e m a n d is too low for A N S T O / A R I to be interested in
producing them. Moreover A N S T O / A R I has rationalised its product line "to its
financial advantage" in recent years. ( A N S T O , 1993, p.4.8.) At A N S T O / A R I , as
elsewhere, there is m u c h more interest in producing radioisotopes which can be
sold at a profit. If A R I continues d o w n the path of commercialisation, it m a y be
the case that even with a n e w reactor, m a n y infrequently used radioisotopes will
either be imported or will not be available because A N S T O / A R I will not produce
them at a loss.
Since complaints about unavailability of radioisotopes in the absence of a
domestic reactor tend to be non-specific, some assessments of which radioisotopes
are most important will be useful. A m e r s h a m (1993) says that the most important
medical radioisotopes for present day usage are Mo-99/Tc-99m, iodine-125,
iridium-192, iodine-131, chromium-51, and yttrium-90. Morris (1993), a nuclear
medicine professional, says the five most important radioisotopes are Mo-99/Tc99m, thallium-201, gallium-67, fluorine-18, and iodine-131, with the next most
important being iodine-123 and indium-Ill. There should be no problems with
supply of any of these radioisotopes in the absence of a domestic reactor - they can
all be imported and/or produced in domestic cyclotrons:
Mo-99/Tc-99m - reactor produced - half life 66/6 hours - many applications several producers could supply Australia with bulk Mo-99 or generators.
Iodine-125 - reactor or cyclotron produced - half life 60 days (ample for
importation) - research and clinical applications such as radioimmunoassay,
kidney studies - some imported, also produced by the National Medical Cyclotron
- Amersham (1993) says there would be no difficulty supplying 1-125 in research
and clinical grades from reactors in the Pacific Basin.
Iridium-192 - reactor produced - half life 72 days (ample for importation) radiographic cancer treatment - A m e r s h a m (1993) claims to be the largest
consumer of bulk Ir-192 in the world and could supply high-quality Ir-192
sufficient to meet Australian d e m a n d - several bulk producers, e.g. in Russia,
Sweden, the U S (Isotec).
Iodine-131 - reactor produced - half life 8 days (ample for importation) numerous applications in imaging and treatment - at least one submission to the
Research Reactor Review (Endocrine Society of Australia, 1993) questioned the
reliability and timeliness of supply of imported iodine-131, however both fissionproduct and irradiation-generated iodine-131 will be available in large quantities
around the world for the foreseeable future according to A m e r s h a m (1993).
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Chromium-51 - reactor produced - imaging (e.g. kidney) - half life 28 days
(ample for importation) - produced in about 9 reactors around the world (INSC
(n.d.) data.) - already imported.
Yttrium-90 - reactor produced - treatment of cancer and arthritis - half life 64
hours (sufficient for importation) - already imported because of patent
restrictions - generator system under development using the parent strontium-90
(half life 29 years).
Thallium-201, gallium-67, fluorine-18, iodine-123, indium-Ill - all cyclotron
produced - all can be produced using domestic cyclotrons and/or imported.
A number of other radioisotopes have secure, if small, niches in nuclear
medicine. Once again it is difficult to find any radioisotopes that could not be
imported or produced using domestic cyclotrons:
Xenon-133 - reactor produced - half life 53 days (ample for importation) inhalation and blood flow studies - already imported - produced as a U-235
fission product and will become more readily available as a by-product of ventures
to increase production of fission Mo-99.
Phosphorus-32 - reactor produced - half life 14 days (ample for importation) treatment - already imported.
Iron-59 - reactor produced - half life 45 days (ample for importation) - iron
metabolism - already imported.
Cobalt-60 - reactor produced - half life 5 years (ample for importation) radiotherapy - produced in about 15 research reactors around the world and some
power reactors.
Selenium-75 - reactor produced - half life 120 days (ample for importation) pancreatic imaging - already imported.
Rhenium-186 and Samarium-153 - half lives 89 hours and 47 hours respectively
- reactor produced - candidates for future use in treatment or palliation Amersham (1993) says possible supply solutions could be found using Pacific
Basin or European reactors despite the relatively short half lives.
Copper-64 - reactor produced - half life 5 years (ample for importation) - genetic
diseases affecting copper metabolism.
Strontium-89 - reactor produced - treatment - half life 50 days (ample for
importation).
Gold-198 - reactor produced, cancer treatment - half life 65 hours (sufficient for
importation).
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Many other radioisotopes could be imported in the absence of a domestic reactor.
The following radioisotopes were imported into Australia as at 1993, whether by
ANSTO/ARI or other organisations (Nuclear Waste Management, 1993):
Americium-241

Curium-244

Phosphorus-32

Cadmium-109

Gallium-67

Caesium-137

Hydrogen-3
Indium-Ill

Plutonium-238
Selenium-75

Calcium-45
Califomium-252
Chromium-51

Iodine-125
Iron-59

Thallium-201
Xenon-133
Yttrium-90

Ongoing research into parent-daughter generator systems promises to further
increase the international trade in radioisotopes and lessen the need for domestic
reactors and accelerators. As with Mo-99/Tc-99m generators, the parent
radioisotopes have half lives which allow for long-distance transport in most
cases. A variety of diagnostic radioisotope generator systems are already available.
Generators for therapeutic radioisotopes have not been commercially developed
as yet, but this is likely to change since it is one of the most vibrant areas of
generator research. This is particularly significant since most or all therapeutic
radioisotopes are reactor produced. Another area which has attracted considerable
research interest is PET radioisotope generators. Some PET radioisotopes still
require an on-site cyclotron because of the short half-lives of the radioisotopes and
the lack of availability of generator systems. However a number of PET
radioisotopes are available from generators, and this can be a cheaper, convenient
alternative to an on-site cyclotron. (Knapp and Mirzadeh, 1994.)
Generator systems are being developed - or are already available following radioisotopes (Knapp and Mirzadeh, 1994):
PARENT

HALF-LIFE

Therapeutic radioisotopes:
Lead-212
10.6 hours
Osmium-194
6 years
Ruthenium-103 40 days
Strontium-90
29 years
Tungsten-188
69 days
PET radioisotopes:
Germanium-68
271 days
Selenium-72
8.4 days
Strontium-82
25 days
Titanium-44
47 years
Zinc-62
9.1 hours
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DAUGHTER

HALF-LIFE

Bismuth-212
Iridium-194
Rhodium-103m
Yttrium-90
Rhenium-188

61 mins.
19 hours
65 mins.
64 hours
16 hours

Gallium-68
Arsenic-72
Ribidium-82
Scandium-44
Copper-62

68 mins.
26 hours
1.3 mins.
3.93 hours
9.7 mins.

PARENT

HALF-LIFE

DAUGHTER

SPECT radioisotopes for ventilation
Cadmium-109
453 days
Rubidium-81
4.58 hours
Mercury-195m
40 hours
Osmium-191
15.4 days
Tungsten-178
21.6 days

HALF-LIFE

and cardiac stndipsSilver-109m
39.8 sees.
Krypton-81m
13.1 sees.
Gold-195m
30.6 sees.
Iridium-191m
4.96 sees.
Tantalum-178
9.3 mins

Most of these parent radioisotopes have half lives sufficient for international
transport.

Overall, it is clear that a very wide range of radioisotopes would still be avail
in the absence of a domestic reactor, including all of the most commonly-used
radioisotopes. Radioisotope half lives prohibit international transport in very few
cases. It is more likely that difficulties would arise because of limited government
funding for importation of radioisotopes which cannot be imported on a
commercial basis.
As for radioisotopes which might be difficult to supply in the absence of a
domestic reactor, one is dysprosium-165, which has a half life of 140 minutes. This
radioisotope m a y find a use in the management of arthritis but this research is
still in the experimental stages; there is no certainty that it will be significantly
more useful than existing radioisotopes used for this purpose (esp. yttrium-90).
Bromine-82 is a reactor radioisotope used for a small number of diagnostic
procedures. Its half life of 35 hours m a y complicate or prohibit importation. It is
produced in about 10 reactors around the world, but none of these reactors are
located in the Asia Pacific. A third radioisotope which might not be available in
the absence of a domestic reactor is gadolinium-159, which has limited use in
cancer treatment and has a half life of 18 hours.
Almost certainly there would be some other radioisotopes that it would be
difficult or impossible to obtain other than the three just listed. In Australia, and
all around the world, nuclear medicine professionals have access to some
radioisotopes but learn to deal without others, and so it will remain. The lack of a
domestic reactor need not have anything more than a marginal negative impact.
If, to compensate for the lack of a domestic reactor, there is further investment in
cyclotron technology and research in Australia, the loss of a reactor could be more
than compensated for. It is also worth noting that there are usually alternative
radioisotope procedures that can be used w h e n particular radioisotopes are not
available. For example a string of radioisotopes have applications in bone cancer
therapy or palliation - phosphorus-32, strontium-89, samarium-153, rhenium327

186, and to a lesser extent holmium-166 and dysprosium-165. Often there are
alternative imaging technologies (e.g. C T , M R I ) or diagnostic technologies which
involve neither imaging nor radioisotopes (see chapter 8.3).

It is doubtful that there is a single radioisotope that would not be available in t
absence of a reactor that has been s h o w n to be markedly better than alternative
radioisotopes or alternative imaging/diagnostic technologies; advocates of a n e w
reactor have yet to identify any such radioisotope. Concerns expressed during the
Research Reactor Review focused on radioisotopes that could in fact be reliably
supplied (e.g. iodine-131), or have yet to find a secure clinical niche and in some
cases could probably be supplied anyway (e.g. samarium-153).
A problem related to radioisotope half lives is that it would be more difficult to
supply products at short notice without a domestic reactor. Again this is not a
major problem. There is rarely such urgency for nuclear medicine procedures that
a delay of a few days, or even a w e e k or two, will impact on patient outcome. With
time and effort, m a n y of the logistical problems associated with importation can
be resolved. A N S T O / A R I can draw on its long history of resolution of logistical
difficulties in supplying the Australian market. Suppliers (and users) can also
learn from the vast international experience of supply of countries where there is
little or no domestic reactor radioisotope production.

ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
To sum up the issues thus far addressed. Reliability of supply of imported
radioisotopes would probably be only a minor problem in the absence of a reactor.
Problems relating to short half lives affect so few radioisotopes that this is of very
little concern. The issue of costs of imported radioisotopes is an unknown, but
even in a worst-case scenario of a doubling of radioisotope costs, this amounts to
something like a 1 0 % increase in overall nuclear medicine costs, and the
comparison would be far less flattering for domestic production if not for the
subsidisation of ARI.
There are numerous issues that would need to be resolved in making a transition
to importation of reactor radioisotopes supplemented by domestic cyclotron
radioisotopes. The issues which need consideration are the roles to be played by
radiopharmaceutical companies, A N S T O / A R I , and other parties; supply of both
profitable and unprofitable radioisotopes; nuclear medicine research; and research
relating to radioisotope production.
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C O M M E R C I A L SUPPLIERS
It is worth briefly reiterating the general situation with radioisotope production
and supply in Asia. Radioisotope markets are growing at a considerable rate in the
Asian region, though mostly from very low starting points. The major, global
radiopharmaceutical companies supply a number of Asian countries and can be
expected to increase supply as the markets grow. In addition, some commercial
operations in the region (e.g. Indonesia) already supply export radioisotopes
(including fission Mo-99) to other countries in the region or are likely to do so in
the near future (e.g. South Korea). These developments will facilitate supply of
the Australian market in the absence of a domestic reactor in Australia.
Nordion has a history of aggressive marketing, is looking to make a return on its
investment in the two Maples, is continuing its role as a major bulk radioisotope
producer and also moving into the downstream segments of the industry (if
unevenly), has some familiarity with the Australian market through its supply
during H I F A R shut downs, and for all these reasons could be expected to increase
its supply of the Australian market.
Similarly Mallinckrodt is looking to make a return on its investment in the
Petten facilities, already has a toe-hold in the Australian market, and would
probably look to increase its supply of the Australian market.
Amersham in particular would certainly play a more prominent role in the
absence of a domestic reactor. Amersham's (1993) interest in increasing its
involvement in Australia w a s m a d e abundantly clear in its submission to the
Research Reactor Review. A m e r s h a m said that it could supply a considerable
variety of radioisotopes to Australia in the absence of domestic production,
including deliveries 3-4 times per week of Mo-99/Tc-99m generators. A m e r s h a m
would be in a particularly good position to increase its share of the Australian
market, already supplying 10-15% of the Australian market including supply of
Mo-99/Tc-99m generators, with eight or nine reactor sources worldwide,
established supply chains stretching right around the world, and plans to produce
or at least source fission Mo-99 from reactors in the Asia Pacific in the coming
years. Moreover A m e r s h a m (1996, pers. comm.) would consider establishing
radioisotope processing facilities in Australia in the absence of a domestic reactor,
instead of supplying products produced in Europe and North America; indeed
Amersham already operates a small processing pharmacy in Sydney.
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Amersham (1993) says that an option would be for it to organise bulk supply
arrangements to A N S T O / A R I based on its existing global network of radioisotope
procurement. A N S T O / A R I operations could continue largely unperturbed. With
Amersham's extensive global operations, and ANSTO/ARI's long history of
supply of the Australian market, collaboration between these organisations could
greatly facilitate the change-over to greater reliance on imported reactor
radioisotopes.
Many other more modest commercial suppliers might compete for the Australian
market in future, including those in South Africa, Indonesia, Russia, possibly
South Korea, possibly India, possibly the U S (Sandia), and so on. The South
African Atomic Energy Commission does not intend to supply Australia except
during H I F A R shut downs, but in the absence of a reactor in Australia it would be
a likely supplier.
MOLYBDENUM SUPPLY
ANSTO/ARI could play several roles in ensuring continuity of supply of
Mo-99/Tc-99m even without being a producer. Obviously its operations would
need to take account of supply by the radiopharmaceutical companies. O n e option
is that there m a y be some role for A N S T O / A R I to play in the importation and
supply of generators manufactured overseas, either in competition or
collaboration with other generator suppliers. However, given the expense of
importing generators, a better solution would be importation of bulk Mo-99.
A N S T O / A R I could import bulk Mo-99 from whichever bulk producer offers the
best price as well as security and reliability of supply. This opens up two further
options - generator manufacture in Australia, or supply of instant Tc-99m drawn
from imported bulk Mo-99.
About 10% of hospitals/clinics currently prefer instant Tc-99m to generators.
Almost all users of this service are located in Sydney and Melbourne. (ANSTO,
1993, figure 4.10.) The reason for this preference appears to be that their volume
demands are too low to warrant purchase of generators. A N S T O (1993, p.4.34)
argues that its instant Tc-99m service would be stopped in the absence of a n e w
reactor. However it need not be stopped. Instant Tc-99m could be drawn from
imported bulk Mo-99; over half of the supply in Japan occurs this way. A N S T O
says this would be possible but prohibitively expensive because of the distance
between A N S T O / A R I and interstate users. If current users place such a premium
on availability of instant Tc-99m, they can pay the added costs. In the worst-case
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scenario of non-availability of instant Tc-99m, current users of this service will
make do with small generators. Since almost all of the current users of instant
Tc-99m are in Sydney or Melbourne, another alternative is that Tc-99m
procedures can be carried out at other institutions in those cities. Overall, the fuss
made by A N S T O about its instant Tc-99m service is ridiculous given that it is at
worst a very minor issue.
The geographical spread of the Australian radioisotope market, and possibly also
the small size of the market, limits the potential for A N S T O / A R I to operate as a
central radiopharmacy supplying various ready-to-use radiopharmaceuticals
(including instant Tc-99m) to users around Australia. Probably the only w a y this
could occur would be for A N S T O / A R I (or a private company) to set up facilities in
several states for processing of bulk Mo-99 and other radioisotopes; this is the
regional radiopharmacy arrangement which is becoming the norm in the U S ,
Europe and Japan. This is a possibility, but it m a y not be an economical or efficient
option given the geographical size of the market.
Probably the best option for Mo-99/Tc-99m supply would be importation of bulk
Mo-99 and centralised generator manufacture. A N S T O / A R I has the necessary
facilities for generator manufacture and would probably continue this operation
in the absence of a domestic reactor, especially if no private company builds
facilities for generator manufacture.

The Research Reactor Review (1993, p.xv) said that if five conditions were met, it
would be appropriate to m a k e a positive decision on a reactor in about five years
time (see chapter 4.4). O n e of the five conditions w a s that a n e w reactor might be
indicated if there has been no "practical initiation" of a cyclotron anywhere
worldwide to produce Tc-99m. There has been no initiation of cyclotron
Mo-99/Tc-99m production on a large-scale basis in the intervening years, and it is
certain that A N S T O will use this fact as an argument in support of a n e w reactor
in the coming years. H o w e v e r the Review's condition concerning cyclotron M o 99/Tc-99m production w a s inappropriate. The Review (1993, p.224) noted that
countries importing radioisotopes had either overcome logistical problems with
importation, or found them not to be a problem in the first place. Then this
possibility is ignored in the Review's overall conclusions including the five
conditions. There is no need for a n e w reactor in Australia for Mo-99/Tc-99m
production. A more appropriate strategy would be to import Mo-99 for the time
being, and at a later date to assess the various lines of research currently underway
- cyclotron Mo-99/Tc-99m production, spallation sources, liquid fuel reactors,
replacement of Tc-99m with cyclotron radioisotopes, and so on. Moreover
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A N S T O / A R I could and should pursue research areas which promise to reduce
reliance in imported radioisotopes.
A good case can be made for Australian research organisations to involve themselves in innovative research projects concerning production of Mo-99/Tc-99. Of
the various options being researched around the world, cyclotron production m a y
not be the most promising but it has potential advantages over all other methods.
Specifically, cyclotron irradiation of Mo-98 or Mo-100 targets uses neither uranium
fuel nor uranium targets. It is far preferable to reactor production in terms of
waste, and also probably better than spallation sources and liquid fuel reactors in
terms of waste generation. Cyclotron production of Mo-99/Tc-99m is probably the
best option in terms of minimising the potential for nuclear weapons proliferation, although enrichment of isotopes (such as molybdenum isotopes) requires
enrichment facilities which can be of use in nuclear weapons programs (see
chapter two).
Whether cyclotron Mo-99/Tc-99m production is developed to the point of being
an attractive alternative to reactor production depends on the commitment of
governments and various research agencies to fund and conduct research to
improve the technology. Around the world, what little interest exists m a y wane
given that fission Mo-99 is likely to continue to be freely available for some
decades to come at least. That is no reason for current Australian research to be
discontinued however. Even if fission Mo-99 is freely available, it would be
preferable to develop alternative methods because of the various problems
associated with reactor production of fission Mo-99. A N S T O and the two
Australian cyclotron centres already have some involvement in this research,
which could and should be continued. In addition, A N S T O has also been
involved in gel generator research for l.s.a. Mo-99; this m a y enable generator
manufacture using cyclotron-produced Mo-99 and possibly there is scope for
further research in this area.
UNPROFITABLE RADIOISOTOPES
The most commonly used medical radioisotopes are produced in numerous
reactors or accelerators around the world. O n the other hand production and
supply of low-volume, unprofitable radioisotopes, including research
radioisotopes, tends to be erratic and precarious. This is most obvious in the US,
where the subject is frequently debated in the professional literature, but it is
certainly a more widespread problem. The existence or lack of domestic
production facilities is one variable determining availability of unprofitable
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radioisotopes. H o w e v e r as the U S situation demonstrates, a more important
variable is the willingness of governments (or nuclear agencies) to fund
production of these radioisotopes. In the U S and Australia, two options have been
pursued. O n e is that production of these radioisotopes has been scaled d o w n or in
some cases stopped because of funding restraints. A second option has been cross
subsidisation, with profits from commercial radioisotopes (e.g. Mo-99, iodine-131)
being used to subsidise production of unprofitable radioisotopes. Thus A N S T O
(1993D, p.2.29; 1993, p.4.40) claims that loss of profits from its Mo-99/Tc-99m
generator business would impinge on the development of n e w products.
Cross-subsidisation is a precarious solution, depending as it does on continued
profitability (or the illusion thereof) in other areas. A better solution is firstly to
acknowledge that m a n y radioisotopes simply cannot be produced at a profit, and
to establish appropriate decision-making processes to decide which radioisotopes
are important enough to warrant public-sector production or ear-marked
subsidisation of private production. O n e option being floated in the U S is a nonprofit body, involving government, industry, researchers, and professional
societies, which would decide which unprofitable radioisotopes are important
enough to produce (Rojas-Burke, 1993C). A similar body could be established in
Australia to decide which reactor radioisotopes are important enough to warrant
publicly funded/subsidised importation. There should be no pretence of this being
a commercial venture, though some cost recovery could occur through charges
made to users. Rather, it would specifically be designed to address problems
associated with limited production and supply of certain radioisotopes from
commercial operations. N o r should this operation be jeopardised by cross-subsidy
arrangements. A s well as providing a mechanism for ongoing supply of
unprofitable radioisotopes, such a collaborative body might go some small w a y to
overcoming the cultural isolation that the Bain report (1994) claims exists at
A N S T O and A R I and acts as a barrier to more effective collaboration with medical
institutions.
RESEARCH
In terms of research into the clinical applications of radioisotopes, one issue
follows directly from the issue of supply of unprofitable radioisotopes. Obviously
radioisotopes which are in the experimental stages of their careers are unlikely to
be money-spinners, though s o m e find a niche in nuclear medicine and m a y then
be produced on a commercial basis. A N S T O , particularly through its Biomedicine
and Health Program, undertakes research into a range of radioisotopes and
radioisotope applications. This could continue with a m i n i m u m of disruption in
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the absence of a domestic reactor, so long as processes are in place for importation
of unprofitable, research radioisotopes. A s discussed previously, radioisotope half
lives prohibit importation of very few radioisotopes.

As discussed in chapter 7.8, radioactive waste problems have given impetus to the
search for chemical and biological alternatives to radioisotopes. This would be an
appropriate line of research for A N S T O / A R I and other research organisations.

As for research into radioisotope production technologies, as discussed previous
a good case can be m a d e for A N S T O to pursue research into cyclotron production
of Mo-99/Tc-99m. That could be coupled to a more general development of
cyclotron technology and thus assist in shifting the balance away from reliance on
reactors in Australia and elsewhere.
Similarly, a case can be made for ANSTO/ARI to pursue research into generator
systems for which l.s.a. Mo-99 will suffice, whether the l.s.a. Mo-99 is produced in
cyclotrons or reactors (including low to medium-flux reactors). That might be
coupled to a more general pursuit of research into generator systems. A N S T O has
undertaken some research into generator systems (e.g. Mo-99/Tc-99m generators,
tungsten-188/rhenium-188, dysprosium-166/holmium-166). Generator systems
enable the more widespread usage of short-lived radioisotopes, which is already
important given the geographical spread of nuclear medicine around Australia
and will be more important in the absence of a reactor. Regardless of Australian
input into generator research, various types of generators could be imported, or
manufactured in Australia from imported reactor radioisotopes or cyclotron
radioisotopes. A further reason for involvement in generator research is that the
generator systems attracting the most attention involve therapeutic and P E T
radioisotopes, two of the most promising fields of development within nuclear
medicine.
OTHER ROLES FOR ANSTO/ARI
Berkhout (1993) suggests that ANSTO/ARI could look to Amersham as a model
for its future in the absence of a reactor. There are some clear parallels, with
Amersham having dealt with the closure of domestic reactors (in the U K ) , as
A N S T O / A R I m a y do, and with A m e r s h a m having been privatised and ARI
heading in that direction. O n the strength of this, A N S T O / A R I can obviously
learn from Amersham's experience. Moreover as mentioned there would be
considerable potential for collaboration between A m e r s h a m and A N S T O / A R I in
the absence of a domestic reactor. Beyond this, there would be limited potential for
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A N S T O / A R I to become a major global radiopharmaceutical company, or even a
major operator in the Asia Pacific, with or without a n e w reactor. Another
limitation with the A m e r s h a m model is that A m e r s h a m is completely privatised.
This m a y be of little consequence in some respects, such as supply of commercial
radioisotopes. In other respects, such as procurement of low-demand research
radioisotopes, privatisation of A R I will do nothing to address these issues.
Another model which ANSTO might pursue is the Japanese Radioisotope
Association QRIA). The JRIA is essentially a peak body, representing 6700 people
involved in clinical nuclear medicine, research, radioisotope production and so
on. Such organisations are commonplace but the JRIA is larger, better funded, and
plays a more proactive and extensive role; it is as m u c h a science agency as a peak
body. It assists in the procurement and supply of radioisotopes and radiopharmaceuticals upon request from users. It operates hot cells and laboratories for
radioisotope processing and research. A n d along with m a n y other functions, it
operates a cyclotron centre with P E T facilities. (Japan Radioisotope Association,
1997, pers. comm.) A n organisation similar to the JRIA would be appropriate for
Australia. It could involve A N S T O / A R I and various medical institutions.

8.3. FUTURE RESEARCH INTO NUCLEAR
MEDICINE AND THE RADIOISOTOPE
INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION
IATROGENESIS
OVERUSE
ALTERNATIVE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES
INTRODUCTION
There are a number of issues that have been overlooked or only briefly touched
upon in the preceding chapters on nuclear medicine and the radioisotope
industry, and some of these have received little if any attention in other literature
on these topics. Nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry can be considered
as interorganisational structures operating in space cleared for and by the actors
within the structures of political and economic systems. Within this framework,
nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry can usefully be considered at the
intersection of two complex and multifaceted domains of social activity - nuclear
programs and health-care systems. In this thesis I have emphasised the links with
nuclear programs, because of the salience of the nuclear connections to the H I F A R
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controversy. The place of nuclear medicine within health-care systems has
received less attention.
Any number of issues might be explored concerning the place of nuclear medicine
within health-care systems. O n e such issue is the class structuring of nuclear
medicine. Mention w a s m a d e in chapter five of the broad symbiosis between
nuclear medicine and dominant class interests. At a practical level this has
involved the sponsoring and support of nuclear medicine by a coalition of state,
corporate, nuclear, media, and professional interests. At an ideological level
nuclear medicine exemplifies the framing of health and medical issues under
capitalism as individual problems amenable to technical fixes, thereby obscuring
the social/political determinants of health and providing another market for
commercial exploitation in the process. A class analysis might also take up the
division of labour in nuclear medicine, drawing from analyses of the class
dynamics of the division of medical labour (e.g. Willis, 1989), analyses which
relate class, gender, and race/ethnicity to the practice of hospital medicine (e.g.
Taussig, 1980), and class analyses of radiology (e.g. Brown, 1973; Larkin, 1983.)
Some useful research could be pursued in relation to the nuclear and military
connections of nuclear medicine. A s mentioned in chapter five a number of
diagnostic imaging technologies, including nuclear medicine, developed as spinoffs from World W a r II military R & D . There were practical links, such as the
refashioning of military technologies (e.g. radar) as medical technologies (e.g.
ultrasound). In the case of nuclear medicine there w a s the practical link of patients
being used as guinea-pigs for military-medical experiments in the U S . There are
also ideological connections, such as swords-to-ploughshares rhetoric. A more
nebulous ideological link is the co-development in medicine and the military of
the idea of propagating a signal to reveal characteristics of the system being
analysed (Yoxen, 1987). M o r e generally there is the issue of the use of military
metaphors in medicine (Short, 1985; Sontag, 1977). All this might be related back
to the class foundations of reductionist, mechanistic ideologies in medicine.
A number of the issues just mentioned could be developed in different directions.
For example the work of Yoxen (1987) dove-tails with Foucault's analyses of the
historical development of forms of control, surveillance, classification,
normalisation, differentiation, exclusion and so on. In the medical domain,
h u m a n subjectivity w a s subjugated as hospital medicine took shape, giving w a y to
the "clinical gaze".73 Nuclear medicine is arguably at the cutting edge of this
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See for example Foucault, 1973,1980. See also Jewson (1976) on the commodification of medicine
and the objectification of the patient.
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historical m o v e m e n t towards the objectification of the patient and the opening up
of the h u m a n body to detailed scrutiny - it is for example the only imaging
modality in which the radiation source is placed inside the body, and it is at the
cutting edge of functional, molecular imaging.
The "clinical gaze" is but one aspect of a broader pattern of surveillance and
control. In Foucault's (1980) terminology, "disciplines of the body" developed in
tandem with "regulations of the population". Indeed medical diagnostic
technologies have themselves become embroiled in broader patterns of control
and regulation, increasingly being used by insurance companies, employers,
courts, the military, and so on. The specific uses of diagnostic technologies in these
settings vary, but often the aim is classification and, for some, exclusion. (Nelkin
and Tancredi, 1989.) Nuclear medicine has largely remained confined within
medical institutions, but there is a trend towards the greater use of nuclear
medicine in other settings. The development of in vitro radioisotope tests is of
particular importance in this regard - an example is the use of radioimmunoassay
tests in drug use/abuse screening programs. (Nelkin and Tancredi, 1989.)
A good deal of useful research could be framed around a lower-level critical
analysis of nuclear medicine, taking u p issues such as iatrogenesis, overuse, and
alternative medical technologies. Summaries of these issues follow.
IATROGENESIS

As with other issues relating to nuclear medicine, the question of iatrogenesis ha
been given little attention by nuclear critics or sociologists of medicine. There is
however a considerable body of literature, and an ongoing public controversy, on
the health effects of low-dose exposure (LDE) to ionising radiation. This relates to
weapons tests, routine and accidental emissions from the nuclear fuel cycle, and
sundry other sources of ionising radiation including medical radiation. In the
critical literature on ionising medical radiation, the emphasis is on x-radiology
(including C T ) , with little discussion on nuclear medicine. Nevertheless nuclear
medicine iatrogenesis can easily be treated as a case study within the broader
debates over ionising medical radiation and other sources of L D E .
Any effort to seriously analyse nuclear medicine iatrogenesis will immediately be
confronted with a host of highly complex and contested technical debates.74 Given
the complexity of the debates, it would be tempting to bracket the technical debates
and use constructivist/symmetrical techniques focused on the politicking. Either
2s For overviews of the technical issues, see Puskin and Nelson, 1995; Gofman, 1990.
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way, a serious attempt to tackle the most important questions, concerning the
nature and extent of nuclear medicine iatrogenesis, would necessitate a thorough
engagement with the technical debates.
The crucial technical debate concerns thresholds for iatrogenic radiation effects.
The argument c o m m o n l y put by nuclear agencies, governments, radiation
protection bodies, radiologists and others, is that below a certain level, and/or
below a certain dose rate, L D E has zero health effects. A N S T O (n.d.), for example,
claims that the radiation dose received during diagnostic nuclear medicine
procedures is "medically insignificant". A milder argument is that low-level,
slow-dose radiation has negligible health effects which are far outweighed by the
positive benefits associated with nuclear power, the medical uses of radiation, etc.
(e.g. Perkins, 1995, p.82).
On the other side of this highly polarised debate are several dozen dissident
scientists. S o m e of these dissident scientists were once employed by nuclear
agencies, and s o m e of them were ostracised, intimidated, sacked, and/or suffered
funding and staff cuts. A m o n g the dissident scientists are some, such as Alice
Stewart and John G o f m a n , whose w o r k has dealt partly or wholly with medical
radiation. The w o r k of the dissident scientists is routinely picked up and used by
nuclear critics and opponents of modern, high-tech medicine. (Wasserman et al.,
1982; Gofman, 1990; Ratcliffe, 1996; Freeman, 1981, ch.4; Gould et al., 1991.)
Among the people and institutions whose work is focused on radiation research
and regulation, the most c o m m o n view is that L D E can have negative health
effects; in other words there is no threshold below which tissue repair completely
ameliorates radiation damage. H o w e v e r in broader public debates, this view tends
to be given short thrift. For example A N S T O (1987) says that:
Radiation effects may appear following exposure to large amounts of
radiation
it would take a very large dose to kill sufficient numbers of
your cells to cause your death

typically several thousand times as large as

the radiation dose you receive normally each year from the environment.
Note also that to cause your death, you would need to be exposed more or
less in one hit, not spread out over a year. (Compare with sunlight: spread
out over a year it gives you a suntan, but in one day of sunbaking it could
cause your death by sunstroke.)
Those comments do not explicitly state that death cannot be caused by LDE, but
that is the implication.
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The figure given by organisations such as the International Commission on
Radiological Protection is that the risk of fatal cancer is 0.05 per Sievert
(joules/kilogram) of radiation exposure (Gonzalez, 1994). Roebuck (1996), a
radiologist writing in the Medical Journal of Australia, uses this 0.05 figure in
compiling the following estimates of cancer deaths likely to result from some
c o m m o n imaging procedures in Australia75:
Procedure Estimated fatal canrprs
in Australia per year
Nuclear bone scan 17
Nuclear thallium scan
Chest x-ray
A b d o m e n x-ray
Intravenous pyelogram
Lumbar spine x-ray
Barium enema
C T abdomen
C T pelvis
C T lumbar spine

26
6
16
27
62
38
36
29
15

Total: 272
To put this in perspective, this is an estimated 272 deaths from 2.748 million
procedures, a rate of about one death per 10 000 procedures (Roebuck, 1996).
A 1991 study on the use of diagnostic radiopharmaceuticals, carried out by
researchers from the Australian Radiation Laboratory, arrived at a figure for
annual collective dose of about 1110 person-Sieverts (Colmanet and Samuels,
1993). Using the figure of 0.05 cancer deaths per Sievert, Colmanet and Samuels
arrive at the figure of 56 potential fatal cancers arising from diagnostic nuclear
medicine in Australia in 1991.76 That w a s from a total of about 170 000 nuclear
imaging procedures, giving a ratio of one cancer death per 3035 procedures. In 1995
the total w a s about 260 000 procedures ( A N S T O , 1995H). Assuming the same
average dose per procedure, and still using the figure of 0.05 cancer deaths per
Sievert, this gives a total of 86 potential fatal cancers arising from diagnostic
nuclear medicine in Australia in 1995.
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For follow-up Letters to the Editor critical of Roebuck's work, see Daunt (1996) and Surveyor
(1996); see also the rejoinder by Roebuck (1996B). There is s o m e consensus that the figure of 0.05 cancer
deaths per Sievert is conservative: s o m e (e.g. radiologists) think it is far too high; others (e.g.
Gofman, 1990) think it grossly underestimates the risks of L D E .
"* Therapeutic nuclear medicine involves far higher radiation doses, with a total of 21 274 personSieverts from the estimated 2340 therapeutic procedures in Australia in 1991.
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Colmanet and Samuels (1993) say that 56 cancer deaths represents about 0.1% of
the estimated 60 000 cancer deaths in Australia each year, and conclude that
diagnostic nuclear medicine contributes very little to the radiation burden of the
Australian population. H o w e v e r as Roebuck (1996) argues, m a n y patients are
investigated without any evidence that the benefits outweigh the risks; some
imaging tests carry a small risk and the potential benefits are great, but it is likely
that m a n y tests do not fall into that category and thus there are unnecessary cancer
deaths (and other iatrogenic effects) from the practice of nuclear medicine. These
debates tie in with the question of overuse of nuclear medicine, taken up below.
Variations in exposure to medical radiation arise from faulty or obsolete
equipment, or inexperienced or incompetent operators. A s a result of these
problems with equipment and personnel, the radiation dose imparted by similar
diagnostic procedures can vary by orders of magnitude (Dalton, 1991, pp.9-10;
Cuaron, 1994; Roebuck, 1996). In some cases the radiation dose is higher than
necessary for simple economic reasons: increasing the administered dose of
radioisotopes in nuclear medicine procedures can decrease examination time,
thus increasing through-put of patients and increasing profits (International
Commission on Radiological Protection, 1987, p.5).
Efforts to reduce exposure to medical radiation because of the iatrogenic effects
have generally been sporadic and half-hearted. The Royal Australasian College of
Radiologists ( R A C R ) , along with similar overseas organisations, has published
some guidelines with discussion on the weaknesses of radiological tests, advice on
when not to investigate at all, and some discussion of risks. However Roebuck
(1996) says that such guidelines are probably widely ignored and that the current
R A C R guidelines for referring doctors do not adequately explain the magnitude of
the risks of individual tests.
If the iatrogenic effects of ionising radiation become an important variable
affecting the future of imaging modalities, this could act as a break on the growth
of nuclear medicine, x-radiology, and C T , and possibly result in greater use of
imaging modalities which do not use ionising radiation such as M R I and
ultrasound.
OVERUSE
In many countries there are obvious economic incentives for overuse of nuclear
medicine and other technologies. Generally the financial arrangements between
third-party payers (insurance companies, government), hospitals (or private
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clinics) and practitioners are important determinants of the frequency of use of
medical technologies. These various groups m a y have conflicting interests - for
example cutting d o w n on tests m a y save m o n e y for third-party payers, but a
hospital or private clinic with a fully equipped and staffed nuclear medicine unit
profits from the performance of nuclear medicine procedures. Clearly there is an
incentive for overservicing in these situations - as Patton (1993) notes in the
journal Seminars in Nuclear Medicine, "The nuclear physician m a y be under
tremendous pressure from his hospital or his partnership to do more procedures
to m a k e his service m o r e cost-effective." Profit motivation for overuse of
technologies is most striking in private practice where medical professionals or
entrepreneurs purchase major pieces of equipment and have a financial stake in
the use of that technology (Blume, 1992, p.8).
Alongside the economic incentives to overservice are various social or cultural
incentives - the pressure on doctors to intervene in patient management
regardless of the situation, a need to control the situation, a desire to discourage
patients from seeking help elsewhere, scientific curiosity and research interests,
and a desire a m o n g referring doctors and specialists to strengthen professional
ties. (Patton, 1993.)
Over-estimation of the value of diagnostic technologies can also lead to overuse.
According to Roebuck (1996), m a n y alleged abnormalities reported by radiologists
are of no clinical significance. These tests can be iatrogenic themselves, they m a y
lead to further unnecessary investigation and treatment, and the high incidence of
false positive reports gives referring doctors a false impression of the value of
these tests and encourages m o r e referrals.
Another factor at work is the rapid incremental innovation in medical imaging.
As the state-of-the-art technology quickly changes, there is an incentive to overuse
existing equipment before it becomes obsolete, thus recovering capital and operating costs which are generally very large for imaging modalities. (Wasserman et al.,
1982, ch.6.)
Also leading to overuse or dubious use of diagnostic technologies are health
insurance programs which sometimes require diagnostic imaging procedures to be
carried out before reimbursing a patient for treatment. The threat of litigation also
encourages the use of diagnostic technologies in excess of medical need.
(Wasserman et al., 1982, ch.6.)
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While m a n y financial arrangements encourage overuse, this is not ubiquitous. In
the U K for example, there is tighter regulation of medical technologies and a high
proportion of salaried doctors and this minimises the economic incentives to
overuse medical technologies. Efforts to cut health spending usually involve
changes to the financial and organisational arrangements between patients,
providers, and third-party payers, hence the development of diagnostic related
groups (DRGs), health maintenance organisations ( H M O s ) and various other
mechanisms. These systems have considerable potential to reduce overservicing;
indeed some encourage underservicing.

ALTERNATIVE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES
Until the 1950s, x-radiology was the only medical imaging technology available.
Then a number of other imaging technologies were developed from the 1960s ultrasound, M R I , C T , and various others.77 The integration (or exclusion) of all
these imaging modalities w a s tied in with a great deal of collusion and
confrontation between radiologists, other branches of the medical profession, and
other health occupations.
The various imaging modalities were not always in competition. In many cases
new medical niches were carved which did not involve competition between
alternative modalities. Another c o m m o n occurrence has been the use of two or
more procedures on the same patient. Ideally this can be a rational and efficient
process - cheaper and safer modalities being used to screen patients, with some
then undergoing further tests - though the ideal can be distorted by factors such as
profiteering and inadequate technology evaluation. In short there was room
enough in the house of medicine for a number of imaging technologies, and turf
battles focused mostly on w h o would control the n e w modalities rather than
whether they would be introduced at all. This situation has changed markedly
over the past 10-20 years. Thus one commentator in The European Journal of
Nuclear Medicine notes that "The future holds the potential for m a n y unpleasant
battles between competing imaging specialists as the need to obtain the m a x i m u m
information in the m i n i m u m time and at the lowest cost intensifies." (Jacobson,
1994.) The main reason for the increasing competitiveness between the various
modalities has been the attempts by governments and other third-party payers
such as insurance companies to cut health spending.
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E.g. electron paramagnetic resonance, magnetic source imaging, infrared noninvasive scanning,
electrical impedance tomography, microwave scanning, acoustothermometry, and magnetic resonai
spectroscopy a m o n g others. Most of these have not been incorporated into routine medical practice.
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A number of nuclear medicine procedures have been superseded by competing
modalities over the years. The introduction of C T scanning in the 1980s adversely
affected s o m e areas of nuclear medicine such as brain and liver imaging, which
comprised a significant proportion of all nuclear medicine studies. A number of
less frequently used nuclear medicine procedures have also given w a y to
alternative modalities, including studies of the haematologic, gastrointestinal,
lymphatic, adrenal, and central nervous systems. Nuclear medicine has survived
by finding different areas such as tests of the skeletal, urinary, and cardiovascular
systems. (Carretta, 1993; Russell, 1979, p.83; A N S T O , 1993, p.4.14.)
Whether nuclear medicine holds its own in an increasingly competitive
environment is very m u c h an open question. Certainly there are imaging
modalities with the potential to replace a number of nuclear medicine procedures.
These include modalities with numerous clinical applications - ultrasound, CT,
MRI, and x-radiology - and other modalities with more specific applications.
Moreover the competition is not only between imaging modalities; for example
there are m a n y chemical and biological alternatives to radioisotopes for in vitro
studies (Party and Gershey, 1995).

To secure a niche within medical practice, practitioners and proponents of nuclea
medicine frequently claim that nuclear medicine is pre-eminent as a modality for
functional imaging in the realms of physiology, biochemistry, and molecular
biology. (ASTEC, 1985, p.l; Khafagi, 1993, pp.449-450; Cuaron, 1994.) The main
reason for this pre-eminence is said to be that nuclear medicine, alone a m o n g
imaging modalities, involves radiation sources (radioisotopes) within the body.
By contrast, alternative imaging modalities are said to be of little or no use for
studies of this nature. These arguments were accepted by the Research Reactor
Review (1993, p.89):
The evidence put to the Review on the future of diagnostic nuclear medicine
was that it would not be supplanted by any other technology in the
foreseeable future because of its unique ability to perform functional
diagnosis.
There is some substance to the claims about nuclear medicine's superiority in
functional imaging, but the claims are overstated. Nuclear medicine is not unique
in terms of its ability to perform functional studies, nor is it i m m u n e to challenges
in this field.
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Function and anatomy cannot neatly be separated; that m u c h is acknowledged in
the medical literature (e.g. K a u f m a n et al., 1982). The distinction is particularly
blurred at the micro level. Alternative modalities - including C T , ultrasound and
M R I - provide superior fine anatomical detail in comparison with nuclear
medicine images. (Perkins, 1995, p.78.) A 1993 report in The Journal of Nuclear
Medicine said that nuclear imaging equipment companies were succeeding in
portraying the advantages of functional nuclear imaging as a complement rather
than an alternative to precise anatomical imaging (Anon., 1993F). Whether they
continue to succeed in that endeavour is an open question.
It is conceivable that having been squeezed out of anatomical studies by
alternative modalities, nuclear medicine m a y increasingly find its more recent
niche as a functional imaging modality under threat as it already does to some
extent.

The trajectory of MRI has been similar to that of PET, although it was introduced
into clinical practice at a greater rate than P E T through the 1970s and 1980s. In both
cases, growth has been greatly limited by high costs, limited funds available for
R & D , and the increasingly competitive environment surrounding imaging
modalities. A s with PET, a number of innovations have reduced costs and M R I
m a y undergo a resurgence on the strength of these innovations. (Ogle, 1996.)
During the developmental phase of M R I , there was considerable expectation that
it would become the predominant functional imaging technology. That did not
occur, largely because of technical limitations and limited funding, and M R I
found a niche as an anatomical imaging modality. Nevertheless M R I has some
applications in functional studies, such as in blood flow and metabolism studies
and musculoskeletal pathology (Holman, 1994; A I H & W , 1993; Blume, 1992, p.219;
Jacobson, 1994). In part the threat that M R I poses to nuclear medicine is because
M R I generates "exquisitely detailed structural pictures" as Mallinckrodt (1996) puts
it, and the structure/function dichotomy breaks d o w n at that level.
Radiology is another modality encroaching into nuclear medicine's turf.
According to a nuclear medicine professional, the axiom that radiology equals
anatomy and nuclear medicine equals function is obsolete: radiology has
historically been descriptive, non-quantitative, and structural, but that is changing
"very fast" with functional radiology (Holman, 1994).
A host of other diagnostic technologies are or can be used for functional
diagnostics. Ell (1992, p.68), a nuclear medicine professional, nominates the
following technologies capable of providing localised biochemical information:
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nuclear medicine (PET and SPECT), microwave technology, infrared imaging,
electronic spin resonance imaging, and M R I spectroscopy.78 Other modalities
provide functional information for specific organs or physiological systems, such
as echocardiology and computerised electroencephalography (Nelkin and
Tancredi, 1989, pp.31-32). Ultrasound poses no great threat to nuclear medicine but
there are some areas of overlap where nuclear medicine is vulnerable (Jacobson,
1994).

Another important point in relation to functional diagnostics is that PET is the
most advanced modality in this domain, and most P E T radioisotopes are cyclotron
produced (see ch.7.9).

^ See also Godik and Gulyaev (1991) for discussion on a number of these techniques.
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CHAPTER NINE:
CONCLUSION
9.1. THE HIFAR CONTROVERSY AND BEYOND
9.2. RESEARCH REACTORS A N D N U C L E A R MEDICINE: THE O T H E R SIDE OF
THE COIN?
9.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE A N D T E C H N O L O G Y STUDIES

This concluding chapter begins with some comments on the HIFAR repl
controversy and the place of this thesis in the context of that controversy and
similar disputes overseas. In section 9.2 I pull together a number of threads
emerging from the thesis concerning the problems with research reactor programs
and nuclear medicine, and I develop those arguments a little further. I finish, in
section 9.3, with some comments on the implications of the thesis for STS
scholarship.

9.1. THE HIFAR CONTROVERSY
AND BEYOND

As discussed in chapter four, all indications are that the HIFAR re

controversy will flare up in 1997, or 1998 at the latest. Furthermore it is likely that
the government will make a decision one way or the other on the issue; the only
alternative to a clear decision to proceed or not to proceed with a replacement
reactor would be to approve an upgrading of HIFAR andtodefer a decision on a
new reactor. However that option has very little support from A N S T O or from
anti-reactor campaigners, and it would still require a very large financial
investment from the government.

At one level the HIFAR replacement controversy comprises a series of
interwoven sub-debates - scientific and medical uses, financial costs and benefits,
the "national interest", health effects of routine emissions, potential for serious
accidents, siting, financial costs, and the list goes on. In light of this, a firm
decision one way or the other by the federal government on the replacement of
HIFAR would best be characterised as a nodal point in a controversy which
promises to extend well beyond any such decision. A new reactor, if it is built, is
likely to be the subject of public opposition for many or all of the same reasons
that the continued operation of HIFAR attracts opposition. Conversely, a decision
not to replace HIFAR would be unlikely to put an end to the efforts of ANSTO
and others to secure government approval and funding for a new reactor.
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Engelhardt and Caplan (1987, pp.11-12) offer a list of conditions which hinder
closure of scientific controversies. The level of consensus or conflicting opinions
among scientists is one variable. In the case of the replacement of H I F A R , a
number of sub-debates have been contested by different scientists including
cyclotron production of Mo-99/Tc-99m, the scientific performance of A N S T O , the
safety of H I F A R , and so on. A second variable is the involvement of competing
groups with different political philosophies and interests. Certainly the H I F A R
replacement controversy has involved a plethora of groups with widely disparate
interests and ideologies. A third variable is the level of public involvement,
which can retard closure by increasing the range of competing interests and
ideologies. Once again the H I F A R replacement controversy appears resistant to
closure because of public concern and public involvement in the campaign against
a n e w reactor. Another variable is that multifaceted controversies - such as the
H I F A R replacement controversy - are resistant to closure.

It is worth briefly canvassing the five forms of controversy closure identified b
Engelhardt and Caplan (1987, pp.8-16): sound argument closure; loss of interest;
force/coercion; consensus; or negotiation.
The HIFAR replacement controversy appears to be resistant to most of these forms
of closure. Sound argument closure is highly unlikely given the number and
complexity of sub-debates and the range and polarity of competing interests and
ideologies. (Notions of sound argument closure are problematic because they rest
on positivist appeals to scientific method, but no more needs to be said on that
point.) The contentiousness of the H I F A R replacement controversy precludes the
possibility of closure through lack of interest. A s for force/coercion, it is certainly
possible and even likely that the federal government will m a k e a decision on the
issue, despite the opposition and antagonism that a decision either w a y is certain
to bring with it; but as discussed such a decision would be more accurately
described as a nodal point in an ongoing controversy rather than closure. A s for
closure by consensus, this is meant to describe shifts in controversies relating
"nonepistemic influences that lead to a community of belief" such as religious
conversion (Engelhardt and Caplan, 1987, p.14). M o r e generally it can be
considered as closure consequent upon the refraining of a debate or controversy by
changes in external circumstances; thus it is different from sound argument
closure or negotiated closure. It is difficult to imagine any such closure of the
H I F A R replacement controversy. Developments beyond the immediate context of
the H I F A R replacement controversy can easily reframe the debates. For example
the pursuit of nuclear weapons programs in regional countries could strengthen
the constituency for a n e w research reactor for purposes of national defence/
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security, but even in that (unlikely) scenario the national defence/security subdebate would remain contentious as would the H I F A R replacement controversy
more generally. Another example is the emergence of several large radioisotope
export ventures around the world in recent years: this significantly improves the
prospects for radioisotope importation, but it falls a long w a y short of settling the
sub-debate over future radioisotope production and supply let alone the H I F A R
replacement controversy. The last form of closure is negotiation, or procedural
closure, in which decision-making procedures are agreed upon and carried out to
close a controversy even if opinions remain polarised. In some respects the federal
government is bound by the 1974 Environmental Protection Act to put in place a
decision-making process which at least has a facade of fairness, inclusiveness, and
accountability. Whether the procedures are seen to be fair by all sides is another
matter, and the outcome of such procedures m a y still only close the controversy
partially and temporarily if at all.
Some comments should be made about the potential for my research to influence
the outcome of the H I F A R replacement controversy. These comments are
necessarily tentative and speculative since the controversy has been all but
dormant throughout the period of research.

To the extent that my research into the radioisotope industry could influence th
HIFAR replacement controversy, its dissemination is important in order to build
a constituency for the sort of radioisotope supply scenario proposed. The research
can be expected to be welcomed by anti-reactor campaigners (and assorted antinuclear groups) since it supports the case against a n e w reactor.
As for future public reviews into the HIFAR replacement controversy, the
potential for intervention in that context will depend on the nature of such a
review. O n top of any contribution that I might m a k e in that context, there is
some scope to canvass for submissions in m u c h the same w a y as A N S T O solicited
a large number of submissions during the Research Reactor Review. Indeed I
have pre-empted this by suggesting to a number of people and organisations that a
government review is imminent and that a submission from their organisation
might be useful and could possibly work to their advantage. Specifically, several
overseas nuclear agencies involved in commercial radioisotope export could be
solicited to provide submissions, thus strengthening the case for greater reliance
on imports. Submissions could also be sought from the organisations involved in
innovative research projects such as the Belgian Adonis project, liquid fuel
reactors, and spallation sources. Submissions might also be sought to balance the
overstated claims m a d e about the value and uniqueness of nuclear medicine:
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from proponents of alternative imaging modalities; from medical regulatory
institutions concerned with overuse of medical technologies and imaging
technologies in particular; and from people or institutions with a more critical
perspective on the issue of the iatrogenic effects of medical radiation than can be
expected from nuclear and medical institutions.
There is clearly some potential to mobilise networks to influence the resolution
a future public review. H o w e v e r it needs to be acknowledged that public reviews
tend not to be even playing fields. They are biased in ways such as the terms of
reference, the personnel appointed to conduct reviews, and so on. A N S T O and
others supporting a n e w reactor have m a n y advantages in terms of resources,
established bodies of knowledge (e.g. the propaganda A N S T O circulates
concerning the allegedly unique and highly important place of nuclear medicine),
established constituencies (e.g. nuclear medicine professionals, neutron beam
scientists), and so on.

As Blume (1992, p.256) notes, while there are typically conflicting interests wit
the interorganisational structure of medical imaging, these are secondary to the
c o m m o n aims, and strong defensive responses are typical w h e n the c o m m o n
interests of the medical imaging community (or a sub-set of it) are challenged. A
critique of the case for a n e w reactor for radioisotope production can be expected to
meet with a more or less unified response from A N S T O and other key
proponents of a n e w reactor including the nuclear medicine community. The
splits within the nuclear medicine community might be played upon to some
extent - for example by attempting to enrol the support of proponents of P E T
(which primarily uses cyclotron radioisotopes), and the same applies for broader
splits between proponents of different imaging modalities. Nevertheless the
response is likely to be overwhelmingly defensive of nuclear medicine.
These comments are speculative and perhaps a little hopeful: it may be that the
advocacy of myself and others for radioisotope supply scenarios other than
domestic reactor production is so overwhelmed by support for domestic reactor
radioisotope production that alternative supply scenarios are largely ignored.
Alternatively the H I F A R replacement controversy m a y be decided primarily on
issues other than radioisotope production - A N S T O still promotes radioisotope
production as one of the key benefits of reactor operation but there are other
important sub-debates. Another possibility is that there is very little scope for
public input into future decision-making processes. It is worth noting that the
H I F A R replacement controversy is as m u c h as battle of power as a battle of ideas:
the 1992-93 campaign against a n e w reactor w a s as good a demonstration as any of
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the need to m e s h intellectual critique with a political campaign which aims to
mobilise the broadest possible alliances and to put as m u c h political pressure on
decision-makers (e.g. review panels, governments) as possible.
The immediate aim of the thesis has been to produce work which will influence
the H I F A R replacement controversy. In addition, I have been in contact with
groups opposing a similar project in Germany - the HEU-fuelled FRM-II research
reactor. Medical radioisotope production is one sub-debate within that
controversy, though not as important as it is to the H I F A R controversy. O n e
correspondent says that a similar debate is likely to develop over the replacement
of the 10 M W Austrian research reactor at Siebersdorf in the near future. There
will be other proposals to build n e w research reactors around the world in coming
years. Indeed there m a y be a considerable number of such proposals as the
numerous reactors built in the 1950s and 1960s reach the end of their working
lives in the coming decades. Possibly m y research m a y be of some small
consequence in those debates overseas, though that is speculation; all I have been
able to do is to establish some contacts overseas, to mutual advantage, and to send
copies of m y research w h e n requested. It should be noted that a fair proportion of
m y research into the radioisotope industry will date quickly, for example the
empirical information on reactor radioisotope production around the world and
the information on innovative radioisotope production techniques.

Other aspects of the thesis will not date nearly so quickly, and have potential u
beyond controversies over research reactor operations. These include the
unfolding history of nuclear development in Australia, and the interconnections
between civil and military nuclear programs.
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9.2 RESEARCH REACTORS & NUCLEAR
MEDICINE: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN?
Although radionuclides were used in medicine before World War II, a
variety of them only became widely available for medical purposes later,
when newly built reactors started producing radionuclides in adequate

quantities. In a way, it can be said that the medical profession was introduce
to the monstrosity of atomic energy first and then only gradually realized the
mitigating medical benefits of the monster. The primal driving force in

nuclear medicine development was not its impact on health care, but a desire
to look for more and more that could be done with atomic energy - for as

many tales of good deeds as possible, as if looking for that elusive other sid
of the coin.
Ganatra and Nofal (1986)
International Atomic Energy Agency
In this section I will tie together a set of arguments concerning the problematic
aspects of research reactor programs and nuclear medicine, with emphasis on the
interconnections between civil and military nuclear development. I begin by
discussing the problematic aspects of research reactor programs and nuclear
medicine. Then it is argued that public opinions towards aspects of research
reactor programs, most notably radioisotope production and "research" (however
conceived), are generally positive, and that nuclear critics and critics of modern
medicine have also tended to spare these aspects of research reactor programs
from critical analysis. I suggest s o m e reasons for the generous estimations of
research reactor programs. Lastly, I consider the implications that might follow
from a more critical perspective.
To begin I will summarise a number of arguments in relation to research reactors
and nuclear medicine.
The operation of research reactors entails the same range of problems as power
reactors, though generally o n a smaller scale. O n e such problem is the potential
for serious accidents - and the reality of serious reactor accidents in roughly a
dozen cases over the years.
Next are the unresolved debates over the health effects and environmental
impact of routine radioactive emissions from research reactors. Whatever might
be said about the technical debates, the m a n a g e m e n t of these issues by nuclear and
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political institutions has all too often amounted to an unsatisfactory politics of
denial and public pacification. In its crudest form this amounts to a narrowing and
reframing of the issue as one concerning the psychology of those concerned about
radioactive reactor emissions (Wasserman et al., 1982, ch.14).

Next are the possibilities for sabotage or terrorist attacks, such as the various
incidents involving the A A E C / A N S T O - the discovery of gelignite and
detonators inside the boundary fence, the threat to fly an aircraft packed with
explosives into H I F A R , and so on. A more serious example is the bombing of Iraqi
research reactors by Iran, Israel, and the US.
Next are the manifold interconnections between research reactor programs and
nuclear power and nuclear weapons. Research reactors are widely and openly used
in support of nuclear power. While a very large majority of research reactors have
not been used directly or indirectly in support of weapons programs, some have
and all research reactors lower the technical barriers, to a greater or lesser extent, to
weapons development. N o r can technical fixes (e.g. the R E R T R program) or
regulatory tightening (e.g. of the I A E A / N P T regime) guarantee that there will not
be further instances of research reactors being used in support of weapons
development.
The links between research reactors and power and weapons programs can be
broadened to consider the place of research reactors within the scope of nuclear
fuel cycle activities, including front-end technologies (esp. uranium mining and
enrichment) and back-end technologies (reprocessing, waste storage and disposal).
These technologies are contentious for a number of reasons, not least weapons
proliferation, and research reactors provide some justification for developments
across the nuclear fuel cycle. In particular the radioactive waste problems
associated with research reactors raise a host of issues concerning public and
occupational health and safety, environmental impact, weapons proliferation, and
the vexed question of long-term waste disposal.
Underlying many of the specific problems with research reactor programs are
questions about public accountability, the adequacy of regulatory regimes, the
bureaucratisation and militarisation of science, the legitimacy of state authority,
and so on.
Now to summarise the contentious aspects of nuclear medicine, with emphasis
on the symbiosis between nuclear medicine, the radioisotope industry, and
nuclear development more generally. Nuclear medicine and reactor radioisotope
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production are held in high public regard (as discussed below). Thus nuclear
medicine and radioisotope production play an important role as ideological props
for research reactor programs. In that general sense nuclear medicine and the
radioisotope industry are linked to the manifold problems associated with
research reactors discussed above: medical radioisotope production is both an
important component of and ideological justification for research reactor
programs and, to a lesser extent, nuclear development more generally.
In addition, radioisotope production and processing generate significant
radioactive emissions and wastes.
In addition, there are some more-or-less direct links between radioisotope
production and weapons proliferation. The production of high specific activity
radioisotopes is one reason for the (continued) use of H E U fuel, and H E U targets,
with weapons proliferation implications. There are also some examples of
radioisotope processing facilities - hot cells - being used for plutonium
separation in support of weapons development. A n d there is overlap in the
enrichment of uranium and the enrichment of isotopes used as feedstock for
radioisotope production.
Apart from the link provided by the radioisotope industry, nuclear medicine is
symbiotic with nuclear development in other ways. Thus nuclear agencies
promote the idea that medical radiation is benign or at least trivial in comparison
with the medical benefits. Medical personnel and institutions, for their part, share
that opinion and often go further, supporting numerous other aspects of nuclear
development. For obvious reasons nuclear medicine practitioners and
institutions are habitual and strong supporters of research reactor projects
involving radioisotope production. Often the support of nuclear development
goes further - at the far end of the spectrum are medical personnel stridently
attacking nuclear critics and voicing their support for everything from nuclear
power to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Also at the far end of the
spectrum, but indicative of a broader symbiosis, w a s the series of radioisotope
experiments carried out in the U S involving such things as injections of
plutonium into patients on behalf of nuclear and military institutions. This was
"Not Nuclear Medicine", as Miller (1994B) put it in The Journal of Nuclear
Medicine, but nuclear medicine provided a fig-leaf of pseudo-medical justification
for those experiments along with practical assistance.
In addition, nuclear medicine raises questions which have little or nothing to do
with its connections to nuclear development, but reflect the contradictory
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elements of medicine under capitalism. A s with most other aspects of
contemporary m o d e r n medicine, nuclear medicine sets health problems in an
individualist framework amenable to technical fixes which both obscure the
social/political determinants of health and provide another market for
commercial exploitation in the process. Overuse and iatrogenesis are related
debates.
Enough has been said on the objectionable or questionable aspects of research
reactor programs and nuclear medicine. Here I take this issue further, first by
considering the level of public opposition to, or concern about, research reactors
programs (esp. radioisotope production and research) and nuclear medicine.

As discussed in chapter 7.7, opposition to research reactors appears to have beco
increasingly c o m m o n over the years. The issues taken up include cost, weapons
proliferation concerns, public and environmental safety, and the adequacy of
regulatory regimes. H o w e v e r it is difficult to m a k e any generalisations about the
overall level of opposition to research reactors. Certainly nuclear weapons and
power programs generate far more opposition.

As for public attitudes towards nuclear medicine, it is clear enough that nuclear
medicine has a very positive public image, with only modest levels of concern
which generally stem from broader debates about the iatrogenic effects of ionising
radiation. Indicative of the level of public support w a s the study commissioned by
the Research Reactor Review which found that medical radioisotope applications
generated the most positive reactions from respondents w h e n compared to other
aspects of A N S T O ' s activities (Roy Morgan Research, 1993).
Nuclear critics rarely incorporate a critique of nuclear medicine into their
propagandising and campaigning around nuclear issues. For example A d a m s o n
(1981, p.90), in the context of a critique of nuclear power, asserts, without
substantiation, that the production of radioactive isotopes for medical purposes
serves a "proven need". Another example is provided by Suter (1985), an advocate
of nuclear free zones. Suter notes that m a n y nuclear free zones have specific
exclusions for medical radioisotopes, (non-military) research and the industrial
usage of radioisotopes, and that hospitals and research institutions practising
nuclear medicine are completely unaffected by the establishment of nuclear free
zones. Another example comes from the Independent Committee of Inquiry into
the Nuclear W e a p o n s and Other Consequences of Australian Uranium (1984,
pp.xii-xiii), which argued that the I A E A should be split in two; one arm would
deal with safeguards, the other with promotion of the "truly beneficial uses of

354

nuclear energy in medicine and research". (As Froggatt (1991) notes, splitting
nuclear agencies into separate promotional and regulatory agencies has had little
positive effect in the countries where it has occurred, but that is beside the point
here.) M a n y more examples could be provided to demonstrate that nuclear
medicine is generally spared from critique by nuclear critics.
While it is common for nuclear critics to spare nuclear medicine from critique,
there are exceptions. For example several submissions to the Research Reactor
Review m a d e s o m e critical comments about nuclear medicine, though generally
in the nature of assertion rather than sustained argument. These comments
referred to iatrogenesis, overuse of nuclear medicine, arguments that more effort
should be directed to illness prevention and health promotion, and making the
link between medical radioisotope production and radioactive waste problems
(e.g. Matson, 1993). Wallace (1993), w h o worked for the Sutherland Shire Council
in the campaign against a n e w reactor, said that "Opponents of a reactor do not
dispute the current importance of radioisotopes as a diagnostic tool in medicine,
but they have questioned the extravagant claims and simplistic statements
A N S T O have m a d e on this issue." The Lucas Heights Study Group (1993) noted
the propaganda value of A N S T O ' s involvement in medical radioisotope
production:
AAEC and ANSTO have always battled to maintain a reason for existence.
They seized on medical isotopes production because of public acceptance and

an improved image and their usefulness. Still today they promote it as their
main activity.
Many nuclear critics advocate cyclotron radioisotope production as an alternative
to reactors, though again this generally assumes the value of nuclear medicine.
The Australian Conservation Foundation (1993) went a little further in its
submission to the Research Reactor Review, calling for alternatives to be
developed to radioactive medical products, but had nothing more to say on the
topic.
It is also notable that academics and activists opposed to aspects of modern
medicine seem to have largely spared nuclear medicine from critical analysis. A s
noted in chapter five, there is hardly any sociological literature on nuclear
medicine and the radioisotope industry, and the literature that exists is generally
bland. Of particular interest is the issue of the health effects of radiation. That
radiation associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power has generated more
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public controversy than medical radiation is generally true. Thus Wright (1988,
p.18), a doctor writing in the (liberal) medical journal New Doctor, says that:
(Ionizing radiation) causes horror when it comes from atom-bomb testing
and nuclear power stations and irrational indifference when it comes from

diagnostic radiology, particularly because the vast bulk of ionizing radiatio
received by patients and populations comes from this source.

However there has in fact been considerable public debate about the health effects
of medical radiation. The w o r k of a number of dissident scientists is important in
this regard (see chapter 8.3). Moreover there has been organised public opposition.
In the U K for example, there is a campaigning group called R A G E , 800 strong,
comprised primarily of people w h o have suffered ill-health as a result of medical
radiation iatrogenesis.79 This group campaigns around a range of issues associated
with what it calls the "radiation road-show". Its emphasis is on the effects of x-rays
whether in the form of radiotherapy, diagnostic x-radiology, or C T scans.
Now to consider why it is that nuclear medicine - and to some extent other
aspects of research reactor programs - are held in high public regard and have not
been subjected to sustained critique even by nuclear or medical critics.
As a starting point, the high public opinion of nuclear medicine could be treated
from a positivist perspective. Proponents of nuclear medicine would see positive
public opinions as an unproblematic reflection of the value of nuclear medicine "saves lives, saves money". Remaining in this positivist framework, a factual
challenge to this perspective could be advanced, confronting the positive opinions
of nuclear medicine with the more critical evidence presented in this thesis.
Either way, the positive opinions associated with nuclear medicine require further
consideration.
Leaving the technical issues to one side, the propagandising by nuclear and
medical institutions is an important variable. Propagandising about the benefits of
nuclear development became increasingly important as concerns and anti-nuclear
campaigns grew from the 1960s and coalesced into mass movements in the
following decades. This propagandising has been more or less successful
depending on the issue. In relation to nuclear medicine it appears to have been
particularly successful. In the process, public opinions towards nuclear
development m o r e generally are shored up, as is the ideological divide between
military and peaceful nuclear programs.
Z^ABC Television, "Four Corners", 20 May 1996.
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Clearly propagandising about nuclear medicine provides s o m e ideological
legitimacy for nuclear development. So too there is a dialectic between
propagandising about the value of nuclear medicine, and the broader rhetorics of
medical benevolence and medical-scientific progress.
Positive public opinions about nuclear medicine can be largely explained by the
factors just mentioned, but the uncritical perspective of nuclear critics is more
puzzling. The propagandising of nuclear and medical personnel and institutions,
and the rhetorics of medical benevolence and medical-scientific progress, offer a
partial explanation. In addition, anti-nuclear groups typically focus on the bigticket items of nuclear development, in particular power and weapons; there is
less critical analysis of nuclear medicine or of research reactor programs more
generally. The emphasis on big-ticket nuclear items is understandable and
justifiable given the relative scale of the problems. The lack of critical analysis of
nuclear medicine, and research reactor programs more generally, can also be seen
as a reflection of relative lack of resources of nuclear critics in comparison with
nuclear proponents. Thus it is c o m m o n enough for nuclear critics to raise doubts
about nuclear medicine - such as those voiced during the Research Reactor
Review - but sustained critiques are rare.
Nuclear medicine is bound up in debates over the iatrogenic effects of ionising
radiation. H o w e v e r nuclear medicine seems to be in the background of such
debates, with most concern focused on the medical uses of x-rays. S o m e m u n d a n e
explanations might be given. Therapeutic uses of radiation have the potential to
cause considerably greater, and more visible and immediate, iatrogenesis than the
smaller radiation doses associated with diagnostic technologies including nuclear
medicine. Thus the U K group R A G E is more concerned about radiotherapy than
diagnostic uses of radiation. Diagnostic procedures generally involve far smaller
radiation doses, and the iatrogenic effects, if any, can be delayed by years or decades
thus making the question of causal attribution far more complicated and
contestable. Yet nuclear medicine also seems to be in the background of debates
over the iatrogenic effects of diagnostic imaging, with more attention given to
modalities such as x-rays, C T , and (foetal) ultrasound. O n e reason for the focus on
other modalities is that nuclear medicine accounts for only a small fraction - 51 0 % - of diagnostic imaging procedures. By contrast x-ray procedures account for
about 80-90% of all medical radiation procedures and thus it is no surprise that xray therapy and diagnosis predominates in debates over radiation iatrogenesis.
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The reasons suggested above go some w a y to explaining positive opinions about
nuclear medicine and other aspects of research reactor programs. Nevertheless
these opinions remain somewhat contradictory given the growing ambivalence or
opposition towards nuclear development and modern medicine over the past
generation, particularly w h e n considering active opponents. To the extent that
there is organised opposition to nuclear development and modern medicine, and
broader public ambivalence to both, it is likely that there is some fertile, receptive
ground for critiques of nuclear medicine and research reactor programs.

Now to briefly consider nuclear research. It is not just medicine that is shroud
and mystified by ideologies of scientific/medical expertise and progress and seen to
be largely i m m u n e from critique. "Research", however conceived, is also held to
be largely beyond challenge. Indeed it is c o m m o n enough for nuclear critics to
consider research and nuclear medicine to be the two - and the only two beneficial aspects of research reactor programs, hence the Independent
Committee's (1984, pp.xii-xiii) support of the "truly beneficial uses of nuclear
energy in medicine and research".
Now to open, though only very briefly, this black box of nuclear research. Some
aspects of nuclear research - in particular research in direct support of nuclear
weapons - are highly contentious. At the other end of the spectrum is research
which is so benign, and potentially socially useful, that it can be supported with
few if any qualifications - for example some nuclear medicine research. M u c h
nuclear research falls in between these two extremes. For example a great deal of
the research carried out at the A A E C / A N S T O has been in support of the uranium
mining industry. Even research carried out to minimise the environmental or
social impact of uranium mining is tainted by the fact that it is in support of an
industry which brings with it major social problems - such as the overwhelmingly negative impact of the industry on Aborigines, and the proliferation
implications - which could never be resolved with technical fixes. Another
example is the research which has been carried out by the A A E C / A N S T O to
improve the technologies associated with safeguards against weapons
proliferation. Such technical fixes m a y m a k e some improvements to the
safeguards regime, but once again the research is in search of technical fixes to
proliferation concerns which are as m u c h political as technical. Another issue is
environmental research. M u c h has been m a d e by nuclear proponents of the
potential for nuclear research to address environmental problems. For example in
their submission to the Research Reactor Review, Blank and Kearley (1993) argued
that:
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several environmental ideals, such as the development of biodegradable
and recyclable plastics, depend critically on ... knowledge that comes from
neutron-scattering experiments. Similarly, the development of metal
hydride high power batteries, and hydrogen storage materials, for powering
pollution-free vehicles requires an understanding of hydrogen atom location
and motion which it is difficult to obtain without neutron scattering.
Research into the development of such things as pollution-free vehicles is
certainly to be supported but once again it raises issues about the search for
technical fixes to problems which are as m u c h political as technological.
To sum up the arguments so far. There are numerous examples of public
campaigns against research reactors, more so than in the first decades of nuclear
development, but it is difficult to say anything more than this about the amount
of opposition. The situation is a little clearer in relation to nuclear medicine: it has
a positive public image, indeed an unduly positive image given the manifold
problems associated with the practice of nuclear medicine and its connections to
more contentious aspects of nuclear development. Moreover nuclear critics, and
academics and activists opposed to aspects of modern medicine, have largely
spared nuclear medicine from critique. Similarly, the black box of nuclear research
tends not to be opened to critical analysis, and seems to be held in positive regard
despite the problems and ambiguities noted above.
Do the manifold links between research reactor programs and nuclear power and
weapons, along with the various other problems associated with research reactor
programs, warrant their cessation? I have several comments to m a k e in response
to this question, none of which provides an unequivocal answer.
Advocacy of a reduction or cessation of research reactor programs needs to take
into account the realpolitik of public support for such programs and the capacity of
nuclear, medical, and research institutions to cultivate such support and to mount
a strong and united defence against critics. To give the most obvious example,
anti-nuclear protest actions which interfered with any aspect of medical
radioisotope production and the practice of nuclear medicine could be highly
counter-productive in terms of building and broadening public support.

An overall assessment of research reactor programs, and particular aspects thereof
must be m a d e : cataloguing the problems, as I have done in this section, will not
suffice. In broad terms, it is clear enough that the outcomes of such assessments
would be ambiguous: research reactor programs involve a mixture of socially-
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useful projects along with more contentious projects and social and environmental problems. At another level there are winners and losers, notwithstanding
efforts to obscure this with universalistic appeals such as those m a d e to the
"national interest".

To argue on the basis of such assessments that all nuclear technologies should be
abandoned would amount to nuclear Luddism. Such arguments were not
advanced by nuclear critics during the Research Reactor Review. A number of
critical submissions to the Review, such as those from the Sutherland Shire
Council (1993) and Friends of the Earth (1993B), argued that a large majority of
ANSTO's research, medical, and commercial projects would not be greatly effected
by the absence of a research reactor, and could and should continue.
I would argue the same position but with some qualifications. There needs to be
m u c h closer scrutiny of the various research and commercial activities including
medical radioisotope production. Nuclear programs have been mystified by their
association with medicine and "research" (in particular environmental and
medical research) and nuclear critics need to adopt a more critical approach, to
open these black boxes to critical scrutiny. This is easier said than done. There has
been little critical scrutiny of these issues and m u c h remains to be done. Moreover
the issues are generally complex, and as always nuclear proponents have the
advantage in terms of expertise, resources and other forms of state support, and
the ability to manipulate and restrict the flow of information. I go some w a y to
subjecting medical radioisotope production and nuclear medicine to critical
scrutiny in this thesis, but m u c h work remains to be done on those topics and I
have had little to say on other aspects of research reactor programs.
A crucial component of assessments of research reactor programs is assessment of
alternative technologies. Thus in this thesis I have considered various means of
producing radioisotopes (cyclotrons, spallation sources, liquid fuel reactors), all of
which offer at least some advantages over research reactors. I have considered the
potential for cyclotron radioisotopes (e.g. iodine-123, F D G ) to replace reactor
radioisotopes (esp. Mo-99/Tc-99m). I have discussed alternative imaging
modalities - in particular C T , M R I , x-radiology, and ultrasound. I mentioned in
passing the efforts of some researchers, motivated by radioactive waste problems,
to find chemical and biological alternatives to research radioisotopes and to
replace longer-lived radioisotopes with shorter-lived radioisotopes. Overall I
proposed a scenario for future radioisotope supply for Australia which involves
importation of reactor radioisotopes for the next generation at least, but which
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also involves research projects which could potentially break the nexus between
research reactors and nuclear medicine in the longer term.
Similar assessments could be made of other aspects of research reactor programs.
For example there is scope for useful research into the relative merits of research
reactors, spallation sources, and particle accelerators for various purposes such as
research and commercial activities.
Of course it is one thing for nuclear critics to assess alternatives to research
programs, and to advocate such alternatives where appropriate, but to realise such
alternatives is m o r e difficult. The forces and interests shaping nuclear
development embrace numerous branches of the state, corporate interests,
medical and scientific professional interests, and so on. Despite the scale and
militancy sometimes apparent in anti-nuclear movements, they have on the
whole only modestly retarded or redirected nuclear development and have had
even less success in reshaping the social structures which give rise to nuclear
development. Suffice it here to note that critical analysis of research reactor
programs vis a vis alternative technologies is a useful exercise but by no means a
panacea; ultimately the future direction of nuclear development is as m u c h a
power struggle as a battle of ideas.
Another complex issue is that advocacy of alternative technologies where
appropriate, combined with support for the continuation of research reactor
projects where they are socially useful and relatively environmentally benign, and
alternatives are under-developed or non-existent, inevitably faces the problem
that nuclear programs, from weapons to medical radioisotopes to termite
eradication, are bound u p with each other in so m a n y ways. A s Phillip Baxter
(1968) noted:
Almost every action, every piece of research, technological development or

industrial activity carried out in peaceful uses of atomic energy could also b
looked upon as a step in the 'manufacture' of nuclear weapons. There is such
a large overlap in the military and peaceful uses in these areas that they are
virtually one.
The overlap between uranium enrichment and isotope enrichment provides a
good example. Should the A A E C have been allowed to pursue w o r k into isotope
enrichment, in particular m o l y b d e n u m isotope separation, once the centrifuge
uranium enrichment program w a s terminated in the m i d 1980s? At best, that
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research could have improved m o l y b d e n u m isotope separation and molybdenum
target technology, enabling far more widespread reactor production of Mo-99/
Tc-99m without the need for high-flux reactors (which often use H E U fuels) or
H E U targets. Better still, that research could have improved the prospects for
commercial-scale cyclotron production of Mo-99/Tc-99 using enriched
molybdenum targets. O n the other hand, pursuit of non-uranium enrichment
R & D would have entailed the maintenance and further development of
enrichment facilities and expertise, which might very easily have been used to
restart uranium enrichment R & D at a later date - indeed one reason
molybdenum separation research w a s carried out at the A A E C in the 1970s w a s
the expectation that it would throw further light on the uranium enrichment
research (Hardy, 1996, p.84).
To advocate continuation of some but not all aspects of nuclear development is
clearly problematic, as is the Luddite position of discontinuation of all nuclear
development. There is no simple answer to this dilemma, but the issue can be
advanced a little further by retraining it as a political issue rather than a narrowly
technical issue concerning the merits of specific aspects of research reactor
programs: clearly the interconnections between research reactor programs and
other aspects of nuclear development are as m u c h political and institutional as
technical.
A useful parallel can be drawn with an analysis of the US bases in Australia.
Noting that the arguments as to whether the bases encourage or discourage
nuclear war and weapons proliferation are very complex at a technical level,
Hayes et al. (1986, pp.409-421) reframe the question in political terms. O n e option the "willing accomplice" - is to maintain the bases and the U S alliance in general
in the hope of being able to influence the U S and thus reduce the possibility of
nuclear war. H o w e v e r there is little evidence to suggest that minor allies such as
Australia can influence the U S in such a way. A second approach - the "honest
broker" - is to use the bases as bargaining chips. For example an ultimatum could
be given: the bases will be closed unless a commitment to complete nuclear
disarmament is m a d e and seriously pursued. A third approach - "going it alone"
- would be to close the bases and terminate (at least some) other aspects of the
alliance such as visits by U S nuclear warships. In fact as Hayes et al. argue, this
approach need not be isolationist - it could be linked to efforts to demilitarise
relations with Pacific states, adjusting military posture to a strictly territorial
defensive posture, and so on. Thus Australia's anti-nuclear and anti-war
credibility would rise, presenting a more potent political challenge to the nuclear
arms race.
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M u c h of Australia's involvement in nuclear programs involves other countries,
and as with the U S bases the general philosophy is the "willing accomplice"
approach - involvement in nuclear projects and industries is justified on the
grounds that international nuclear development can be m a d e safer and less likely
to follow a military rather than a civil path through Australia's involvement,
Australia's national interests can be advanced through the acquisition of
information and intelligence, commercial gains can be m a d e , and so on. Such
arguments are deployed in support of a host of nuclear projects including
uranium mining and export, the numerous bilateral and regional technical
assistance projects in which the A A E C / A N S T O has been (and still is) involved,
Australia's role in forums such as the IAEA, and hosting the U S bases and visits
by U S warships. A s discussed in chapter four, m a n y of these arguments are
overinflated, and sometimes circular and contradictory.
A case can be made for reframing Australia's general approach to nuclear
development. The "honest broker" approach is not greatly relevant - perhaps
only the U S bases are bargaining chips of importance. Following Hayes et al.
(1986), a stronger approach would be to scale back nuclear activities and redirect
international relations along a non-nuclear path. Support of U S nuclear
militarism could be stopped. Uranium mining and export could be stopped.
Technical assistance projects could be redirected - greater support for basic health
care as opposed to nuclear medicine, greater support for renewable energy sources
instead of nuclear power programs, greater support for cyclotrons and less for
research reactor programs, and so on.

Reframing the issues in political rather than technical terms does not resolve t
dilemma as to whether nuclear programs should be completely abandoned or
whether the most socially beneficial and environmentally benign projects should
continue even if they have something of a Trojan horse character about them.
Nevertheless the reframing of the issue in political rather than technical terms
lends support to the view that nuclear development should at least be scaled back.
Moreover the case for operating a research reactor in support of Australia's
manifold nuclear activities abroad - already a shaky argument - would be weakei
still.
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9.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY STUDIES
This final section reflects on some theoretical and methodological issues which
were introduced in chapter one and have framed the thesis - integrated models
for STS analysis, fourth-generation STS/SSK, and social problem centred research.
In chapter one mention was made of a number of integrated models proposed
and/or deployed by STS academics in recent years. The main advantage of
integrated models is that they can encompass structural analysis of science and
technology without losing what is of value in lower-level constructivist
approaches such as actor network analysis. Thus Giere (1993) proposes analysis of
technological artifacts in their scientific-technological context; an understanding of
relevant psychological or cognitive features of various actors; an understanding of
relevant microsocial interactions; and fourthly, an understanding of various
macrosocial interactions, including cultural and economic interactions. Mercer's
(1993) "eclectic" approach to controversy analysis draws from controversy-aspolitics, technocratic politics, fact-value approaches, historico-narrative
approaches, controversy closure studies, and SSK. A n d Martin and Richards (1995)
bring together structural, group politics, SSK/constructivist, and technical
analysis.

No effort was made to map out the different levels to be used in this thesis; to d
so would have risked schematically prefiguring the analysis, and in any case the
scope of the thesis w a s too broad to be neatly m a p p e d out. Instead, it w a s proposed
that the analyses of the various topics taken u p throughout the thesis would take
account of i) the specific features of the system/technology/debate under discussion, ii) the aims of the discussion and its place within the thesis as a whole, iii) the
variety of approaches and levels of analysis that could be deployed, and iv) the
approaches to generic STS/SSK issues (reflexivity, symmetry, partisanship/
impartiality, and epistemology) most suitable for a fourth generation of
(politically-relevant) STS/SSK.
Now to briefly reflect on the different levels of analysis used throughout the
thesis. At the broadest level the analysis of nuclear power, weapons, and research
programs in chapters 2-4 operated primarily at a structural level of analysis,
whereas the analysis of the radioisotope industry and nuclear medicine in
chapters 5-8 w a s more eclectic and more concerned with technical detail.
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The analysis of global nuclear development in chapter two operated primarily at a
structural level of analysis. The development of nuclear power in the capitalist
countries w a s seen to be broadly commensurate with post World W a r II capitalist
development, reflecting trends such as those towards centralised production and
the fusion of state and private capital; nuclear power w a s expected to be an
important industry in itself and it w a s expected to facilitate industrial development (and capital accumulation) through the generation of cheap electricity. The
combined impact of factors such as economic stagnation, technical problems and
inflexibility, and public opposition w a s seen to have precipitated the problems
facing the nuclear power industry in the past 20 years or so.
Similarly the analysis of nuclear weapons emphasised broad social structural
forces. It w a s beyond the scope of the thesis to systematically analyse the
interconnections between nuclear weapons and post World W a r II international
politicking, but s o m e attention w a s paid to the formation and reformation of
regional and global alliances and antagonisms, the connections between civil and
military nuclear development, the implications for weapons proliferation of
economic stagnation and competition for commercial export markets, and so on.
The case of nuclear weapons can be used to briefly canvass some lower-level STS
approaches that might have been adopted. A constructivist, group politics analysis
of nuclear weapons, focused for example on the influence of the armaments
industry, could not adequately explain current trends in nuclear armament/
disarmament or the potential for further nuclear weapons proliferation; it would
suffer the familiar limitations of liberal pluralism, empiricism, and functionalism.80 MacKenzie's (1990) analysis of the development of nuclear missile
guidance systems, and the impact of this on the Cold W a r nuclear arms race, is a
well-known illustration of the value of SSK/constructivist approaches as applied
to nuclear weapons. Yet MacKenzie's analysis works at m a n y levels - it has
elements of actor network and group politics approaches (addressing for example
the role of weapons developers and the importance of inter-service rivalries), it is
influenced by the themes of the strong program (e.g. social interests, social
shaping), it draws from other STS/SSK perspectives such as the sociotechnical
systems work of Hughes (e.g. Hughes, 1987), and it is alert to the broad historical
structuring of the Cold W a r nuclear arms race. MacKenzie's analysis is more an
indication of the value of integrated, multi-level analyses than an advertisement
for SSK/constructivism.

22

See for example the analysis by E.P. T h o m p s o n (1982), in which the "inertial thrust" of the
military-industrial complex is considered crucial, and the critique of this approach by the Midnight
Notes Collective (1984).
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The analysis of nuclear development in Australia in chapters 3-4 also paid some
attention to the broad features of political development in Australia - the pursuit
of nuclear power in the hope of stimulating industrial development, the
industrial and technological weakness of Australia vis a vis the U K and the U S ,
the recurring theme of defence/security concerns (especially relating to Australia's
location in the Asian region), and so on. The analysis of Australia's nuclear
history can be seen to have operated at a number of levels, combining structural
analysis with A N A approaches (e.g. Phillip Baxter as a heterogenous engineer),
S C O T (numerous conflicts over nuclear projects), the strong program (social
shaping, social interests), and so on. The history of the A A E C / A N S T O w a s
considered in some detail, and that history along with other threads of Australia's
nuclear history were seen to come together in the Research Reactor Review. It w a s
argued that technical/positivist or SSK/constructivist analyses of the Research
Reactor Review potentially had m u c h to offer, but that further insights could be
derived from the more structural, historical approach adopted in this thesis.

Whereas the analysis of nuclear programs in chapters 2-4 operated primarily at th
structural level, the analysis of nuclear medicine and the radioisotopes industry in
chapters 5-8 w a s more eclectic. There w a s however some order in the eclecticism:
the issue of future radioisotope production and supply in Australia underpinned
the entire analysis.
As for the social structuring of nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry,
they were considered to lie at the intersection of the two broad sociotechnical
systems of nuclear programs and health-care systems. In some respects this
approach w a s similar to the structural functionalism of Blume (1992), and as in
Blume's analysis considerable attention w a s paid to the economics of the
radioisotope industry. H o w e v e r whereas Blume focuses on the economics of
innovation in imaging equipment markets, and on the symbiosis of industrial
and professional interests, the radioisotope industry w a s seen to be distinctive
because of its connections to the nuclear industry. The analysis also went beyond
Blume's functionalism in that some consideration w a s given to the symbiosis of
nuclear medicine and the radioisotope industry and dominant class interests.
Also in relation to the broad social structuring of nuclear medicine and the
radioisotope industry, a recurring topic in chapters 5-8 w a s the economic
stagnation of the past generation. This w a s s h o w n to have m a n y implications,
such as the growing reluctance of government to fund or subsidise radioisotope
production (and research reactor programs more generally), commercialisation
(and sometimes corporatisation or privatisation) of radioisotope production, the
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increasingly competitive environment between alternative imaging modalities,
and stricter regulation of medical technologies.

The analysis in chapters 5-8 was alert to the broad social shaping of debates o
radioisotope production and supply in relation to the H I F A R replacement
controversy. Public debates, as during the Research Reactor Review, generally
assume the value of nuclear medicine and revolve around questions concerning
alternative methods of production and supply. While m u c h of m y analysis
followed that approach, I also reframed the issue by questioning the value and
uniqueness of nuclear medicine; hence the discussions on iatrogenesis, overuse of
nuclear medicine, and competition with alternative imaging modalities.
Other than the broad framing of the radioisotope debate, some recurring themes
in SSK/constructivist technology studies, such as interpretative and technological
flexibility, or contingency in technological development, were c o m m o n enough
in chapters 5-8, although development of those themes was not given emphasis.
Arguments such as that nuclear medicine is unique as a functional imaging
modality, or that cyclotrons and reactors are complementary rather than
competing radioisotope-production instruments, were opened up for scrutiny.
Teasing out the politics of those arguments, and their implications for the H I F A R
replacement controversy, w a s typical of the SSK/constructivist tradition and was
also relevant to the substantive issue of future radioisotope production and
supply for Australia. In some cases - such as the discussions on iatrogenesis and
cyclotron production of Mo-99/Tc-99m - judgement was suspended on technical
issues. H o w e v e r that w a s done not through any commitment to relativist
epistemologies, but because it w a s beyond the scope of the thesis to analyse these
complex debates in detail.
Analysis of the radioisotope industry also required an extensive, positivist
treatment of technical issues, such as the empirical survey of radioisotope
production in chapter six. In this respect the analysis w a s not dissimilar to the
detailed treatment of microlevel issues c o m m o n in STS/SSK - except that m y
analysis w a s driven by the practical issue of whether or not a n e w reactor is
justified for radioisotope production in Australia, rather than being driven by an
exploration of internal debates within STS/SSK.
I will finish with some comments on how integrated models of science and
technology analysis could be further developed. Integrated models enable critical
engagement with scientific and technological debates and artifacts as well as
engagement with the politics of competing interest groups and social structures. It
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is, however, easy enough to imagine integrated models for STS analysis becoming
as esoteric and disconnected from political concerns as m u c h other contemporary
STS/SSK. O n e can also imagine schematic models for STS analysis substituting for
rigorous sociological analysis. Intellectually, the primary task is to recast the
abstractions of schematic models of science and technology analysis - e.g. A N A ,
S C O T , integrated models - within broader sociological theory. There has been a
thread of class analysis running through this thesis, but the dialectics between
science, technology and capitalism have not been systematically explored, with
more emphasis being paid to topics inviting lower-level treatment. There remains
m u c h scope for linking integrated models m o r e closely to general sociological
theories such as the three traditions pioneered by Marx, W e b e r and Durkheim both applying sociological theory and testing it in the process.
An important task is to marry theories of science-in-society with social problem
centred methodologies. This is no simple task as Martin (1993) argues:
(It) would be desirable to develop a critique that is both epistemologically
sophisticated and socially relevant, and also self-critical about its own
method and social location. I look forward to analyses that fill all these
specifications. But for those of us who are not superhuman, I suspect it is
more appropriate to set less exalted goals.
Problem-centred research may not be as intellectually dense or tight as more
academically-orientated studies. The empirical scope m a y be too broad and
disparate too allow for a neat application of theory or testing of theories. So be it:
problem-centred research can help re-establish the critical milieu of activists and
academics that w a s evident in the early days of STS, and more generally to reestablish STS as a socially-relevant discipline. These are the central problems
facing STS.
Some suggestions have been advanced in this thesis as to how theory can be
integrated with a social problem centred methodology. At a general level the
emphasis needs to shift from trivial topics to important science-in-society issues
and there needs to be a willingness to engage in the politicking of science-insociety issues (as opposed to the internal politicking between competing camps in
STS/SSK).
The four SSK shibboleths - reflexivity, impartiality, epistemology, and symmetry
- can usefully be reframed as practical problems confronting the socially-engaged
scholar/citizen rather than as narrowly intellectual issues. That pursuit could

368

form the basis for a fourth generation of STS/SSK as discussed in chapter one.
This would not only be an improvement on earlier generations of STS/SSK, but
could also be seen as a useful extension of the "politics of symmetry" debate in
which a n u m b e r of the S S K shibboleths have been reconsidered but the issues of
reflexivity and impartiality/partisanship, and the general question of political
engagement, remain largely unexplored.

As for integrated models and social relevance, in this thesis topics and sub-to
were chosen or overlooked with reference to the public policy issues rather than
with reference to the elaboration and development of an integrated model.
Various levels of analysis were taken up - or left alone - inasmuch as they were
considered helpful in the analysis of the substantive science-in-society issues and
questions. Thus integrated models are useful because of their flexibility, and can be
contrasted with approaches in which theoretical or methodological schemas
prefigure the analysis and are deployed in a mechanistic, and sometimes a circular
and self-congratulatory, manner. 81

21 See Hirschman (1979) for a neat analysis of the differences between the mechanistic application
of theoretical schemas as opposed to the intelligent application and testing of theory. C. Wright
Mills' (1959, ch.2) polemic against "grand theory" is also useful here.
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CHAPTER 10: POSTSCRIPT:
NEW REACTOR TO BUILD ON AUSTRALIA'S
"LIFE-SAVING" NUCLEAR MEDICINE
CAPABILITIES, SAYS SCIENCE MINISTER
On September 3, 1997, science minister Peter McGauran announced the federal
government's decision to replace H I F A R with a n e w reactor, to be built at
ANSTO's Lucas Heights site.
McGauran said in a media release that the proposal to replace HIFAR will be
subject to a "stringent" environmental assessment process under the
Environmental Protection Act 1974. The decision attracted considerable
opposition from the federal A L P Opposition and the minor parliamentary parties
(Greens and Democrats). O n the initiative of the Opposition and minor parties, a
Senate Committee has been established to investigate the proposal to replace
HIFAR, to evaluate options such as cyclotrons and spallation sources, and to
investigate whether the conditions set out by the Research Reactor Review (1993,
p.xv) have been satisfied.

While the government's decision was announced as a fait accompli, it is in eff
the opening m o v e in the next phase of the controversy rather than the closure of
the controversy. A s mentioned in chapter 9, "a firm decision one w a y or the other
by the federal government on the replacement of H I F A R would best be
characterised as a nodal point in a controversy which promises to extend well
beyond any such decision."

As for the reasons put forward for a new reactor, nothing has been added to th
arguments rehearsed during the RRR. Very little information has been released in
support of the proposed n e w reactor. A N S T O (1997B) has however released a
"background information" document. The document is problematic in m a n y
respects (Green, 1997; 1997B; 1997C). Here I will summarise the medical
misinformation in A N S T O ' s document.
ANSTO (1997B) says "The most frequently used radiopharmaceutical,
technetium-99m, has a half life of six hours. It would not be possible to satisfy
demand based on imports ...." This is misleading. A N S T O is well aware of the
widespread international trade in the parent radioisotope, molybdenum-99.
ANSTO (1997B) says that "It is possible to import many radioisotopes but, on
average, every third shipment is delayed by at least 24 hours. The resultant loss in
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radioactivity renders m a n y shipments unusable and increases substantially the
real prices of others."
No more detail is provided to substantiate this claim. In the Sydney Morning
Herald (4 September), Peter McGauran is quoted as saying that the figure of every
third shipment arriving late, often by 24 hours or more, refers to shipments to
A N S T O during routine shut d o w n s of HIFAR. The preferred supplier of bulk M o 99 - the most important product - during routine H I F A R shut d o w n s is the South
African Atomic Energy Commission (SAAEC). The S A A E C (1997, pers. comm.)
says that only one in two hundred of its overseas shipments arrives late. It is
difficult to see h o w the claims of the S A A E C and A N S T O can be reconciled with
one another. I have written to A N S T O / A R I three times between September and
November 1997, seeking clarification, but no response has been received. Nor w a s
any clarification forthcoming from Peter McGauran's office.
On the potential use of accelerators (including cyclotrons) to produce Tc-99m,
A N S T O (1997B) quotes a paragraph from the internet site of the University of
California Chemistry and Agriculture Program ( U C C A P , n.d.). The quote, which
A N S T O uses twice in the "background information" document, appears to
suggest that accelerator production of technetium-99m is not a viable option. Yet
on the U C C A P internet site, the second of two paragraphs on this topic reads as
follows:
Particle accelerators have broad scientific applications and play an important
role in providing a broad spectrum of isotopes for medicine and research.
Accelerator technology has evolved rapidly over the last decade and
produced a new generation of machines capable of operating with high

reliability, multiple beams allowing for multiple targets, and high intens

This new accelerator capability may allow for new methods to be developed
for the large-scale production of radioisotopes.
Further investigation reveals that both of the above-mentioned paragraphs were
originally published in a 1993 article by Dr. Manuel Lagunas-Solar (1993). That
article concludes with the words that "The feasibility of producing technetium9 9 m in large Curie quantities .... seems firmly established."
ANSTO's selective quoting from the UCCAP internet site does not reflect the
opinions expressed on the internet site, nor the opinions expressed in the
Lagunas-Solar article, nor does it accurately reflect the well-known views of
Lagunas-Solar himself. This incident (among others) prompted to a letter from
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Lagunas-Solar to the Australian Prime Minister, which includes the following
comments:
It is my understanding that my work has been reviewed by ANSTO, without
the benefit of my direct participation, and clearly using outdated and/or
incomplete information. ANSTO

also provided statements to Parliament

based on information (also out of date) available through our internet site.
Based upon a general analysis of ANSTO's

review, I strongly feel that it do

not provide an objective and balanced review of the actual status or the
conclusions of our work. Furthermore, I have invited an on-site review of
our completed work, and one such visit was being considered but is yet to
materialise.
ANSTO (1997B) says that "A spallation source cannot provide for bulk
radioisotope production
The R R R acknowledged in 1993 that, even if
Australia acquired a spallation source, a reactor would still be needed for
radioisotope production. Costs of spallation sources plus required accelerator
range from $ U S 500 million to $1 billion."
As discussed in chapter 7.8, theoretical calculations indicate that one Adonis
spallation system could produce most or all of world d e m a n d for Mo-99, and
capital, decommissioning and waste disposal costs are expected to be considerably
less than a commercial 10 M W reactor. In the event of a spallation source being
built in Australia for radioisotope production (and perhaps other purposes), and
in addition to supply from domestic cyclotrons and overseas reactors, there would
be n o need for a research reactor for radioisotope production.
A federal Parliamentary Research Report, released the week after the decision on
n e w reactor, concludes with these words (Panter, 1997):
It is clear that, in coming to a decision in principle to have a new reactor
constructed in Australia, the Government has not made a thorough,
balanced comparison of the merits of spallation sources versus the reactor
method for technetium production.
Events of recent months have clarified the importance of medical radioisotope
production and supply within the broader H I F A R replacement controversy. The
production of medical radioisotopes has been by far the major public-relations
push from A N S T O and other proponents of a n e w reactor. Peter McGauran's
media release began with the words that "The construction of a replacement
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research reactor at Lucas Heights will build on Australia's life-saving nuclear
medicine capabilities." H o w e v e r it is likely that other concerns, such as the
"national interest" considerations, have had a greater impact on the federal
Cabinet's decision to replace H I F A R (see chapter 4). Certainly the government's
interest in medicine and health care appears to be a new-found interest. Nobel
Prize winner Professor Peter Doherty (quoted in Pockley, 1997) has attacked the
"massive" cuts of 3 0 % over two years for medical research (from $174 million to
$128 million).
The place of medical radioisotope debates within the broader controversy was
s u m m e d u p thus by science journalist Peter Pockley (1997B) in the October 1997
edition of the science journal Search:
As Search went to press, the Democrats and the ALP were trying to establish
a Senate inquiry. But even if an inquiry is approved and hears evidence from
some of the main characters, it and the mandatory Environmental Impact
Statement will probably amount to little more than delaying nuisances for
the government and ANSTO.
After all, the government can always label any
hindrance to their timetable as "jeopardising the saving of lives", and who
will argue with that?
The October 1997 edition of Search also carried an article by Professor Barry Allen
(1997) from the Department of Pharmacy, University of Sydney. Given that Allen
used to be the Chief Research Scientist at A N S T O , his critical comments on the
medical and scientific debates are all the m o r e noteworthy:
the reactor will be a step into the past (it) will comprise mostly
imported technology and it may well be the last of its kind ever built. More
importantly, anticipated developments in functional magnetic resonance
imaging may well reduce the future application of reactor-based nuclear
medicine. Certainly the $300 million reactor will have little impact on cancer
prognosis, the major killer of Australians today. In fact, the cost of replacing
the reactor is comparable to the whole wish list that arguably could be written
for research facilities by the Australian Science, Technology and Engineering
Council (ASTEC)

Apart from the neutron-scattering element of the

reactor, there will be little research and development yet it will make a large
dent in the budget for Australian research, which at this point is so badly
needed in order to take us into the next century

The decision to proceed

with a new reactor is not wrong, but it is a far cry from the optimal
expenditure of funds that Australia badly needs in science and technology.
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O n September 3, 1997, the government announced that the stockpile of spent fuel
rods stored at Lucas Heights will be shipped to the U S A and to Scotland (Green,
1997D). The 600-700 fuel rods shipped to the U S will be stored indefinitely,
without reprocessing. The 1300 or so fuel rods shipped to Scotland will be
reprocessed, with the reprocessing waste returned to Australia in 10-20 years.
Where the waste will be stored when returned to Australia has not been decided.
The current plan is to "co-locate" the waste at a national low-level waste
repository. This raises two problems. Firstly, the low-level waste repository will no
longer be a low-level waste repository if intermediate and/or high-level wastes are
stored there. Secondly, Australia does not have a low-level waste repository at
which to co-locate other wastes; successive governments have been unable to
establish such a repository over the past two decades, primarily because of political
and public opposition.

There are no immediate plans to build a reprocessing plant in Australia, althoug
this has not been ruled out as a future option.
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